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Preface
The inspiration for this project dates to a number of conversations I had
with colleagues in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Germany in the early
and mid 1990s. Typically, after I would discuss some of my own research on
displaced workers, these colleagues would point out how little was known
about displaced workers anywhere except in the United States. One reason
for this, it turned out, was the availability of data: until recently, the kinds of
panel data needed for an analysis of labor market transitions were simply not
available in countries outside the United States. Another reason was an
absence of policy interest: with Japanese and many European unemployment
rates below U.S. levels and with very high levels of job security among older
workers in those countries, not many non-US economists were interested in
the effects of displacement on workers.
By the mid 1990s, however, both these things had changed dramatically.
Panel data sets in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom had reached a level of maturity that made analysis of transitions
feasible; important longitudinal administrative databases were being made
available for research purposes for the first time. In addition, European and
Japanese unemployment rose while that in the United States began dropping
to levels not seen in decades. Thus, a research project was born.
From the beginning this research project had two key questions at its
heart. First, are the experiences of U.S. displaced workers, and the patterns of
experiences among workers, typical of other developed countries too? Second, what can we learn from both the similarities and the differences among
countries? Do commonalities in displaced workers’ experiences among all
countries reveal fundamental features of modern industrialized economies?
Are international differences informative about the efficacy of different public
policy approaches to worker displacement? These are “big” questions, and
while the prospect of shedding even a little light on them was tantalizing, the
prospect of coming away with very little of general value from such an
untouched area of research was distressingly real as well.
From the beginning it was obvious that this project could not be a oneperson task. While the World Wide Web has greatly facilitated access to
microdata and policy information in many countries other than one’s own,
there remains no substitute for a lifetime of expertise in understanding how a
country’s laws and institutions really work and for having a working knowledge of the details and pitfalls of each country’s labor market microdata. Ultimately, therefore, the 10 countries examined in this volume consist of those
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industrialized countries for which I was able to identify a combination of adequate panel data and the human expertise required to analyze it. All authors
involved in the project either live in or have spent much of their lives in the
countries they are writing about, and all are accomplished labor economists
with whom I have been honored to work. While it would be interesting to
consider worker displacement in less-developed countries as well, our attention in this volume is focused on developed countries, whose similarity on at
least this dimension maximizes the amount those countries might be able to
learn from each others’ experiences.
Collaborative work on the project began in October 1997,with a planning
meeting in the autumn woods of Ancaster, Ontario, where authors met to discuss data comparability, definitions of displacement, and research methodologies. Preliminary drafts of research papers were produced and then circulated
among the research group between March 1998 and the following summer.
Semifinal versions of all five comparative chapters were presented at a conference in Burlington, Ontario on September 27–28, 1998. Participating authors
acted as formal discussants for each others’ papers, and all then participated in
a round-table discussion on the overall meaning of the results. Based on the
discussion and comments in that meeting, the authors prepared final drafts by
mid 1999. Finally, I attempted to summarize and synthesize the results of the
various chapters. The hard-won results of this exercise constitute Chapter 1 of
this volume.
The United States and the Netherlands? Canada and Japan? Why these
odd couples? Certainly a much easier volume to write and edit would have
contained ten chapters, each covering a single country, each written by an
expert in that country’s data and institutions. At our planning meeting in
October 1997, however, two decisions were made which, for better or worse,
determined the structure of this book. First, given the long list of sampling
and data decisions involved in doing careful labor market analysis, and given
the different methods of data collection used in different countries, it soon
became clear that a “one-chapter-per-country” volume ran a high risk of generating no internationally comparable results. To guarantee that at least some
comparisons could be made, we decided to pair countries, yielding five chapters on two countries each. Second, while it was appealing to base these pairings on intrinsic research interest, the very limited comparative knowledge
about displaced workers that was available at the outset of this project meant
that it was not at all clear just what these matches should be. Thus, again to
maximize the prospect of producing genuinely comparable results, these
“arranged marriages” were based largely, but not exclusively, on similarity of
the underlying data sources used to identify displaced workers. While this
similarity is far from complete in the pairings ultimately chosen, it dictated
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certain choices: that analyses based on administrative data be placed with like
analyses—for example Belgium and Denmark—and the same for analyses
based on survey data—the United Kingdom and Australia).
In the end, Belgium was paired with Denmark because both use administrative data on employers, the countries are of similar size, and they both trade
mainly with Germany. They provide an informative comparison because of
the differences between their employment-protection laws, as well. France
and Germany also use administrative employer-based data, and they are similar in size. Canada and Japan both collect data on displaced workers using a
flow sample of job separations. The United States is the only country in the
volume that collects data on displaced workers primarily via a retrospective
survey; we decided to pair it with the Netherlands (which exploits three different data sets) because that offered an opportunity to focus on the effects of displacement on early-retirement decisions. This is an issue of considerable
policy interest in the Netherlands and a surprisingly underresearched issue in
the United States. Finally, the United Kingdom and Australia have similar
survey-based data and afford an interesting contrast of systems similar in
many dimensions, but different in the degree to which wages are regulated—
highly regulated in one (Australia) and essentially unregulated in the other.
While pairwise comparisons are interesting, broader ones are, of course,
better. To maximize a reader’s ability to make broader comparisons, the
authors also agreed at the organizational meeting on a common structure and a
common set of topics to cover for each country. Roughly, each chapter begins
with a description of the institutions likely to affect displacement in the countries under study; these institutions include employment protection law,
unemployment insurance and other forms of income support for unemployed
workers, and institutions affecting the country’s overall wage structure. After
describing the data used and the general economic conditions prevailing in the
countries at the time the data were collected, each chapter then analyzes the
frequency of displacement, the effects of displacement on employment and
unemployment, and the effects of displacement on wages.
After some discussion, one thing we quite consciously decided not to
agree on was a common definition of displacement. Primarily, this was ruled
out by differences in the underlying methods of data collection among the
countries. Typically, data based on administrative records provide large sample sizes and match workers to firms, but they supply little or no information
on why any given firm-worker separation occurred. In countries in which the
main data source is administrative, displaced workers are thus defined as all
workers who separate from a dying or shrinking employer in a certain period
around the closure or shrinkage. Household surveys, on the other hand, tend
to have smaller samples but more detail on (reported) separation reasons. The
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small samples typically make it impractical to focus only on workers involved
in plant closures or mass layoffs, but these data do allow the analyst to restrict
attention to separations that the worker saw as involuntary. Thus, two distinct
definitions of displacement pervade the chapters in this volume.
A second issue in the definition of displaced workers was whether to
restrict attention only to workers with relatively high levels of tenure on the
lost job. Workers with very short tenures typically lose very little from displacement, to the point where some studies, such as Jacobson, Lalonde, and
Sullivan (1993), exclude them from their analysis altogether. While some
chapters in this volume restrict most of their attention to workers with more
than three or four years of tenure, most adopt a broader definition that does
not automatically exclude short-tenure workers. Those chapters which use a
broader definition, however, provide separate results for high- and low-tenure
workers wherever possible.
Many people and organizations deserve thanks for their help in making
this project happen. Foremost are the contributing authors themselves, who
put up with several long flights, e-mailed questions, and requests for revisions, some of which involved substantial changes to the analysis. Thank you
all! Malik Ljutic did a splendid job of organizing the initial meeting of
authors and the major conference in September 1998 at which the five comparative chapters were presented. My wife, Barbara, and sons, Michael and
Jonathan, did without their husband and dad for too many evenings. Both the
authors and Randy Eberts of Upjohn have been particularly understanding
about some delays which resulted from my moving, in the middle of the editing process, from Canada to California. Finally, of course, the two funding
organizations—the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) through its generous support of the Canadian International
Labour Network (CILN) and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research—made it all possible.

Santa Barbara, California
July 2000
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1
Summary and Synthesis
Peter J. Kuhn
University of California, Santa Barbara

Almost every day, we are told that innovation and change are the
chief sources of prosperity in advanced industrial economies. Innovation and change, however, often involve abandoning the production of
goods and services which are technologically superseded or relocating
their production to lower-wage countries. All modern economies thus
face the problem of how to move workers out of outmoded activities
and into more productive ones.
What is the best way to achieve this? In some situations, a combination of voluntary practices, including workforce attrition, reductions
in overtime and in regular weekly work hours, cuts in bonuses and
wages, and adoption of new products and lines of business can be used
to adjust to declines in business without permanent layoffs. Sometimes, however, worker displacement, i.e., the involuntary, permanent
termination of long-term employees, is unavoidable. In the United
States, displacement is fairly common, affecting about 5 percent of all
employed workers each year, and 2.5 percent of those with more than
10 years of service.1 Furthermore, at least for workers with high levels
of tenure in the lost job, the lifetime consequences of displacement can
be both severe and permanent (Ruhm 1991).
Do countries other than the United States rely more or less on
worker displacement as a method of industrial adjustment? Are the
consequences of displacement, when it occurs, more or less severe, and
does this differ for employment versus wages? Do international differences in labor market policy, including employment-protection laws,
unemployment insurance systems, and wage-setting regimes play a
role in explaining differences in the incidence and effects of displacement? Are international differences in the experiences of displaced
workers informative about important structural features of labor markets, such as the wage returns to tenure or the amount of firm-specific
training?
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To date, questions like these have been difficult to answer.
Because displacement involves a change in individuals’ labor market
status, its statistical analysis requires panel data (in other words, data
on individuals at more than one point in time). Such data have only
recently become publicly available in many countries other than the
United States, paving the way for a first examination of worker displacement there. The purpose of this volume is to conduct such an
analysis, with an aim to answering as many of the above research questions as we can.
The insights gained from the research in this volume fall into four
main categories. The first concerns the tremendous variation in the
institutions that regulate and affect displacement in different countries.
Institutions that affect displaced workers include employment-protection laws (such as advance notice, consultation requirements, and severance-pay requirements surrounding layoffs and plant closures),
income support and retraining programs aimed at the unemployed
(especially unemployment insurance), and the broader set of institutions involved in the setting of wages (which may have significant
effects on the distribution of wage changes experienced by displaced
workers).
The second set of lessons from this volume concern methodology.
Because this volume has been a first foray into cross-national research
on displacement, one of its most important outcomes is a list of methodological desiderata and pitfalls that future analyses of displaced
workers, and future international labor market comparisons, would do
well to take into account.
Third are substantive results concerning within-country patterns of
displacement and its consequences: is displacement, for example,
always more common among men than women? Are the consequences
of displacement always more severe for older workers? In a search for
“universal” patterns in displacement, we have uncovered a few probable universals, as well as some fascinating exceptions, which are worthy of study precisely because of their exceptionality.
Finally, the most difficult kind of results to generate, but potentially the most rewarding, are those which make cross-national comparisons in the levels of key variables (such as the frequency of
displacement or the duration of postdisplacement unemployment) and
which associate these with international differences in labor market
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structure and policy. In this area, our conclusions are less firmly held
than in other areas, but in equal measure more tantalizing.
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the four main categories
of lessons learned from our analysis in turn.

INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING DISPLACED WORKERS
The main institutional differences among the 10 labor markets
studied in this volume are summarized in Tables 1.1–1.3. These tables
are derived from the much more detailed descriptions in Chapters 2
through 6, and they refer to the situation prevailing at the time for
which the statistical analyses in those chapters was conducted. In four
cases (Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany) this is the mid to late
1980s. In the remaining six cases it is the mid 1990s. I begin this section by briefly summarizing the main features of employment protection laws, income support, and wage-setting policies in all these
countries in turn. I then discuss a number of observations concerning
the variation in institutions among countries and the ways in which this
variation affects our analysis of displaced workers.
Employment Protection Laws
As Table 1.1 shows, there is dramatic variation among our 10
countries in the scope and stringency of their employment protection
laws (EPLs). For example, suppose a firm wanted to lay some workers
off permanently in response to a decline in sales. United States
employers—like those in several other countries—would find the
notion that they would need to explain and justify such layoffs to some
external authority quite alien. Yet this is precisely the law in four of
the countries under study here. In Japan, France, and Germany, economic necessity and/or social acceptability must be demonstrated to a
point where the decision could be defended in a court of law. In Germany, for example, social acceptability is defined by a considerable
body of case law and often involves detailed seniority rules for layoffs,
consideration of economic need—such as family size and the number
of dependents—in choosing whom to lay off, and extensive relocation
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assistance. In the Netherlands, a firm needs to obtain a permit from a
regional employment institution before it can lay off any workers.
Much more common than justification requirements for economic
layoffs are mandatory notice laws covering layoffs of individual workers. Indeed, consistent with the emphasis on employment at will in the
United States, individual notice requirements are present in all of the
countries under study except the United States.2 These requirements
generally index the statutory amount of notice to a worker’s tenure on
the lost job (the Netherlands, in an interesting exception, ties it to the
worker’s age). In addition, several European countries (in particular
Germany, Belgium, and Denmark) draw quite dramatic distinctions
between blue-collar and white-collar workers, with the latter entitled to
more notice. For example, in Belgium, a white-collar worker with 20
years’ service is entitled to a year of notice, while an identical blue-collar worker is entitled to only two months; in Denmark, blue-collar
workers are not entitled to any notice at all. Finally, comparing the
level of individual notice at similar tenure levels reveals very large differences among countries, especially at high tenure levels. Inspection
of the table reveals, for example, legislated notice levels for a whitecollar worker with 20 years of service include zero notice in the United
States, one week in Australia, one month in Japan, two months in Canada and France, three months in the United Kingdom, six months in
Germany and Denmark, and—as already noted—one year in Belgium.
This tendency of Belgium to stand out as an extreme case of EPL is
discussed and analyzed much more thoroughly in Chapter 6 of this volume.
Many U.S. readers will be familiar with the United States’ advance
notice requirement for mass layoffs, passed into law in 1988. The
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN) mandates two months of notice for workers involved in layoffs of a large
fraction of an establishment’s workforce. Are such group notice laws
even more stringent in other countries (as we might expect from the
previous discussion)? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer here is “no.”
While group notice levels can be higher for very large layoffs in the
United Kingdom (up to three months) and Canada (up to four months),
none of the remaining countries have group notice periods distinct
from the individual requirements summarized above. One reason for
this, of course, is the relatively high levels of individual notice already
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required in those cases. Equally important, however, in three cases
(Denmark, France, and Germany), the absence of extra legislated
notice for mass layoffs is explained by the use of a different, consultative process for managing mass layoffs. This process involves mandated, case-by-case negotiations of notice, severance, and other
downsizing procedures with the works council, union, and/or local
government authorities. The resulting “social plan” can involve many
forms of assistance to displaced workers, including job search assistance and direct outplacement with other firms.
Aside from mandated advance notice and in-kind job search/placement assistance, the other main form taken by EPLs involves cash payments to laid-off workers. In our sample of countries, mandated
severance pay is totally absent in the United States, Japan, and Denmark. It is rare in Australia (applying to “model” awards only) and the
Netherlands (applying only when a case goes to court). In some other
countries it is limited in scope; for example, it applies only to a single
(albeit populous) province in Canada, and only to mass layoffs in Belgium and Germany (in Germany’s case it is negotiated in the social
plan). These qualifications aside, however, mandated severance payments can be very substantial in some countries and situations. In the
United Kingdom, France, and in parts of Canada, they can amount to a
half year or more of pay for individual terminations; in Belgium they
can add up to several years’ wages when a plant is closed.
Finally, in a number of countries, the state’s involvement in layoffs
takes forms that are harder to quantify but not without potentially great
effect. Extensive procedural requirements such as those in Japan and
France can lead to long, uncertain, and costly delays in implementing
mass layoffs, but it is hard to specify their cost equivalent in terms of
weeks of legislated notice or dollars of severance pay. Consultative
requirements, including mandated negotiations with a union and/or
works council, determine the main dimensions of assistance provided
to mass-layoff victims in Germany and France. These can be very generous but will vary on a case-by-case basis depending on the outcomes
of negotiations. Analyses that ignore these dimensions of EPL can
seriously mismeasure the strength of EPL in some countries.
In sum, looking across countries, it is clear that restrictions on
firms’ abilities to dismiss workers vary dramatically. Along almost all
dimensions, the United States appears at one end of the spectrum with
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the least-stringent regulations, and Belgium at the other end with the
most stringent. Between these extremes, however, there is no consistent ranking: countries can be high on some dimensions of EPL and
low on others. Canada, for example, has relatively high statutory
notice and severance provisions, but relatively few consultative and
other procedural impediments to layoffs. At the other extreme, Japan
requires no severance pay and only a month of notice, but has extensive and complex procedural requirements for layoffs. Nor is
“Europe” a high-EPL monolith: compare restrictive Belgium with laissez-faire Denmark. One important implication of this kind of heterogeneity is that any overall ranking of EPL among countries (including
the several that are commonly used in cross-country regression studies)
will not be invariant to the weights assigned to different EPL components.3 Another implication is that research opportunities clearly exist
comparing European countries, a prime example of which is Chapter 6
of this volume.
Income Support Programs
As for employment protection laws, the countries in our sample
differ substantially in their approaches to providing income support to
unemployed workers (Table 1.2). For example, while most countries
require some work history in the year preceding a claim, some—notably Australia and Belgium—do not. The most common qualifying
periods amount to about six months of work in the year preceding the
unemployment insurance (UI) claim (the United States, the Netherlands, Japan, and Denmark). Some are more restrictive (two years of
continuous employment in the United Kingdom); others are less (as
few as 10 weeks in high-unemployment regions of Canada). Benefits
are unlimited in duration in Australia, Belgium, and Denmark; they can
last up to five years in the Netherlands and almost three years in France
and Germany. Maximum benefit durations in the United States, Japan,
Canada, and the United Kingdom are all under one year.
Seven of the 10 countries under study set UI benefits as a fraction
of predisplacement earnings; of these, 4 (the United States, Japan, Canada, and Denmark) have either a maximum benefit level or a sliding
benefit scale that reduces the actual replacement rates well below the
“statutory” rate for workers with higher levels of predisplacement
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earnings. Three do not, offering actual replacement rates of 70 percent
(the Netherlands), 57–75 percent (France) and 60–67 percent (Germany), which are much higher than U.S. levels. Three countries (the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Belgium) do not index benefits to previous earnings at all, instead providing a fixed needs-based amount
depending on family size and structure. Finally, the countries with
limited UI duration all have some sort of fallback source of income
support (such as “Unemployment Assistance” (UA) in the United
Kingdom and Arbeitslosenhilfe (AH) in Germany). These programs
can sometimes be quite generous (including a full rent and property-tax
subsidy in the United Kingdom, and income support equal to 57 percent of the previous wage in Germany), but they are extremely limited
in the United States.
Other noteworthy elements of the cross-country variation in
income support systems include the fact that, in several cases (including the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom), disability or early-retirement benefits offer an attractive alternative to
either unemployment insurance or general welfare. Also, with the
exception of France, all countries impose some restrictions on UI payments to persons who voluntarily quit their jobs. Interestingly, however, France disentitles seasonal workers from UI, while in Canada
they are among the system’s most politically influential beneficiaries.
In Denmark, the trade unions rather than the state administer the unemployment insurance system(s). Finally, in addition to UI, some countries have income support and retraining programs targeted specifically
at displaced workers or at workers who are displaced for specific reasons, such as changes in international trade. Best known here is the
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program in the United States.
Similar programs exist on a more ad hoc basis in Canada. The most
formalized system of this kind, however, is Japan’s system of
“employment maintenance and adjustment subsidies.” These programs make payments to laid-off workers in a (periodically updated)
list of industries deemed to be in serious decline. They also subsidize
retraining; and most interestingly, they pay wage subsidies to employers who hire workers displaced from the targeted industries.
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Wage-Setting Institutions
Countries also differ dramatically in their regulation of the wagesetting process (Table 1.3). Union coverage rates vary from 14 percent
in the United States to 90 percent in France, Germany, and Belgium.
In many countries (especially the Netherlands, Australia, France, Germany, and Belgium) coverage is much higher than membership
because of the mandatory extension of union contracts to nonmembers.
Some nations, like Britain and Germany, have no minimum wage regulations at all; some (like the United States and Japan) set minima that
are a very small fraction (30 to 40 percent) of the average manufacturing wage. This contrasts with France’s minimum of over 80 percent of
the mean industrial wage. Wage minima can be set on the national
level (France), national and state levels (United States), province level
only (Canada), industry and industry-by-prefecture level (Japan), and
even nationally by occupation (Australia), with fascinating (but largely
unexplored) implications for wage structure.
Some Observations on Institutions
In this subsection I discuss three main features of displacementrelated institutions that are particularly relevant to the comparative
study of the effects of labor market institutions on labor market outcomes, including the experiences of displaced workers.
First, although the various subdimensions of the institutional environment are correlated among countries, these correlations are highly
imperfect. Still, it is probably a useful descriptive device to group the
10 countries examined here into two groups. In the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and to some extent Denmark, it
strikes one that the primary focus of displacement-related institutions
is a “palliative” one. At least in their public policy, these countries
seem to place most of their emphasis on assisting impacted workers
after the fact of displacement, via unemployment insurance and statefinanced retraining programs. They seem much more reluctant to
intervene in the displacement process itself than those European and
Japanese governments, who—while also adopting some palliative
measures—take what might be called a “preventative” stance. Preventative policies aim to prevent the layoff in the first place or, if that is
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unavoidable, to prevent a spell of unemployment as a consequence of
the layoff. The idea (presumably) is that unemployment can lead to a
negative feedback cycle involving loss of skills, health, and selfesteem, which is best avoided completely.4 The challenge—and the
source of much current debate in Europe and Japan—is how to do this
without reducing firms’ incentives to hire new workers, especially in
times or industries where demand uncertainty is high. One option,
used in Japan, might be the payment of subsidies to firms which hire
workers formerly employed in industries the government believes
should be shut down.
Concerning the imperfection of the above correlations, a number
of examples illustrate the point. First, within the palliative group, during our sample period Australia had a highly centralized wage-setting
system, while Britain had no minimum wages at all. Canada and the
United Kingdom had fairly stringent advance-notice requirements
while the United States and Australia had almost none. Within the preventative group, Japan has very modest notice requirements compared
to some countries (such as Canada) in the palliative group. (Japan’s
preventative institutions take other forms.) While Denmark has generous unemployment insurance and centralized wage-setting, employment-protection laws differ so dramatically between Belgium and
Denmark that Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning conclude in
Chapter 6 that this is the most likely explanation for the large differences in displaced workers’ unemployment durations between these
countries.
It is common in current public discussions to refer to the problem
of high European unemployment or to attribute non-European differences in labor market performance to rigid European laws and institutions. As our discussion here makes clear, however, many differences
exist within these two groups of countries. Furthermore, comparing
broadly similar countries that differ substantially in only one or two
relevant dimensions—such as the comparisons between Belgium and
Denmark and between the United Kingdom and Australia in the current volume, and that between Canada and the United States in Card
and Freeman (1993)—may be the most informative way to explore the
effects of labor market institutions on labor market outcomes.
My second observation about institutions is simply that they are
multidimensional. In particular, even legislation bearing on a very spe-
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cific action (e.g., a firm’s ability to initiate a layoff) can have several
components, some of which are not easily quantified. Thus, as noted,
in addition to severance pay and notice provisions, some countries (for
example, Japan and Germany) prohibit layoffs unless they are “socially
acceptable” or “economically necessary” and require them to be conducted according to appropriate procedures. In Italy, mandated notice
periods are minimal but dismissals must be pre-approved by state officials with highly variable decision lags (Garibaldi and Brixiova 1997).
The main implication of multidimensionality is that simple measures
of a law’s most-easily quantified aspects (such as weeks of notice) can
be very poor proxies for its overall stringency. Japan has very lenient
advance-notice laws, for example, but this does not mean it is easy to
lay off a worker there. Both this and future studies would do well to
pay close attention to procedural and other details when comparing
legislation among countries.
My third observation is that not all institutions constraining individual firms and workers take the form of legislation. At least four
main forms of nonlegislated institutions affect displaced workers, the
most obvious of which are restrictions contained in union contracts. In
many cases, collective bargaining agreements, especially those negotiated on national levels, and sometimes extended to unorganized workers, set binding constraints on minimum wages, dismissal procedures,
and other elements of the employment contract. For example, in
France, statutory advance-notice provisions are usually superseded by
collectively bargained provisions, which cover 90 percent of the workforce.
A second set of nonlegislated institutions that are directly relevant
to displaced workers are the mechanisms of exchange in industrial
labor markets. An important case in point is the construction industry.
In North America this industry has a very high separation and displacement rate because it is organized along craft lines: workers have longrun attachments to their craft, but not to any particular firm, and move
with great frequency from one firm to another as projects are completed. Furthermore, while displacement in this industry is relatively
inconsequential in its effect on wages, it is sufficiently frequent (and
the industry is sufficiently large) to have a significant effect on the
average national displacement rate. In Britain, construction labor
markets are organized differently, and the construction industry has a
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lower displacement rate than manufacturing. Whether or not construction is included in the statistics also affects comparisons of Canada’s
and Japan’s displacement rates (see Chapter 3).
Just as the organization of labor markets can differ across industries, countries have different national mechanisms of worker termination. Among other things this necessitates great care in defining
roughly comparable measures of displacement. In North American
economies, for example, where temporary layoffs are common, the
precise point at which any given worker makes a permanent break with
his or her firm is often quite unclear. Workers on temporary layoff
often look for other jobs and may or may not eventually be recalled to
their former employer. They may even return after starting a job with
another firm. The whole permanent separation process can thus be
very drawn out, and results using ex post versus ex ante definitions of
permanent layoffs can differ substantially. In some other countries
(such as Germany or the Netherlands), displacement constitutes a
sharper, more well-defined event. Still other countries have institutional mechanisms, such as the shukko system in Japan—involving
outplacements with other firms within an association, or keiretsu—
where workers can be involuntarily moved out of the firm without any
spell of unemployment or any uncertainty regarding their new wage
rate. As the next section illustrates, it matters whether we count such
workers as displaced or not.
It is of course possible that these national termination styles are
simply the result of long-standing differences in legislation among
countries (see Burdett and Wright 1989; Van Audenrode 1994). The
hypothesis that they are caused by legislation is, however, not always
consistent with historical evidence, as Huberman (1997) argues. In
several cases, differences in national adjustment practices predate the
legislative differences that are supposed to have caused them. These
long-standing practices may therefore be the more “primitive” of the
institutions affecting displacement. Long traditions, as well as historical accident, thus play a role in any complete analysis of institutions’
effects.
A final kind of nonlegislated institution is the generally accepted
standard of relocation assistance that is “voluntarily” provided by firms
to workers who are permanently laid off. In different countries and
industries, certain amounts of help are simply considered normal and

12

Kuhn

fair treatment; sometimes (as in Canada and Belgium) these accepted
practices are explicitly recognized in the common law regulating terminations. In some countries, like the United States, this may be quite
minimal, but even there, significant amounts of advance notice were
voluntarily provided by firms before any legislated standard existed.5
Another example is outplacement services, provided by many former
employers, that directly secure jobs for workers at other firms. Such
services, especially in some European countries, can make unemployment following plant closures the exception rather than the rule, unlike
the case in North America. Voluntary relocation assistance is often
ignored in existing analyses of displacement, to some extent surely
because the U.S. Displaced Worker Survey contains no information on
these activities. As some recent Canadian research (Riddell 1999)
indicates, however, it can be substantial even when not required by any
legislation.
Summary
In sum, the 10 countries studied in this volume can be roughly categorized into two groups. The first, consisting of the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and (to some extent) Denmark, confine their market interventions largely to palliative measures
aimed at workers after the fact of displacement. The remainder (the
Netherlands, Japan, France, Germany, and Belgium), while adopting
(sometimes very generous) palliative measures, also take a preventative stance, adopting a number of policies designed to prevent layoffs
in the event of plant closures or, if layoffs are inevitable, to prevent
unemployment in the event of layoffs.
Within these very broad patterns, tremendous and often quite
unexpected institutional heterogeneity remains. Policies affecting displacement are multidimensional, and some of the dimensions in which
variation occurs (such as consultation requirements and approval procedures for layoff permits) can be hard to quantify. In some countries,
collectively bargained provisions supersede legislated requirements as
the main binding constraints on employers, not just in wage-setting
decisions but in worker termination and plant shutdown procedures as
well. Voluntarily provided assistance from firms in many cases constitutes the most important part of a worker’s severance package. Some-
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times the institution with the greatest effect on a statistic like the
displacement rate is simply the organization of labor markets on the
industry level: industries which are organized on a craft or hiring-hall
basis, like construction in North America, will have very high displacement rates (and relatively small consequences of displacement)
because of the methods by which labor is exchanged. National mechanisms of displacement differ too, ranging from the temporary-to-permanent transition common in North America, to the much sharper
breaks which are traditional in some other countries. No analysis of
international differences in displacement is complete without reference
to these less formal (but no less fundamental) institutional differences
between countries.

METHODOLOGICAL LESSONS FOR THE STUDY OF
DISPLACED WORKERS AND FOR CROSS-NATIONAL
LABOR MARKET RESEARCH
Because cross-national research on displacement—and on labor
market dynamics more generally—is very new, one of the most useful
things a volume like this can do is to alert future researchers to a number of key methodological issues that naturally arise in this context.
That is the role of this section. Its main intended audience, therefore, is
labor economists, especially those actively engaged in cross-national
research and, most especially, that on labor market dynamics. Readers
interested primarily in substantive results may wish to skip or skim this
section and move right on to the next section of this chapter (p. 22).
One methodological lesson of this volume has already been discussed: the importance of getting the institutions right, i.e., taking care
in measuring all aspects, including the nonlegislated ones, of the institutional environment in all countries. Aside from this, the main methodological lessons I believe we learned, as a group of 22 authors, are
the following.
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Defining Displaced Workers
Definitional issues arise in all comparative studies of labor markets. For example, studies of wage structure need to decide whether to
define the annual bonuses paid to workers in countries like Japan and
Germany as part of wages. These bonuses can be a large (and in
Japan’s case, a highly variable) fraction of compensation, and their
treatment can change one’s most basic conclusions.6 In the current
volume, however, definitions matter in an even more fundamental way,
because they concern membership in the population under study. At
the very outset, we are confronted with the question of who is a displaced worker, in a group of countries with different institutional
mechanisms of labor adjustment, each with its own nomenclature for
worker-firm separations.
As noted already, two working definitions of displaced workers are
used in this volume. One of these, used in administrative databases,
consists of separations surrounding a firm or plant closure (or a large
reduction in firm or plant size). This definition does not make use of
the reported reason for a separation, either by the worker or the firm.
The other definition consists of self-reported layoffs in surveys of individual workers.
Both the administrative-data-based and the survey-based definitions of displaced workers used here have their advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of the administrative definition is that it will
include early leavers in the sample of displaced workers (early leavers
are individuals who start searching for new jobs in response to information about an impending shutdown and who quit to take such jobs
even before the plant closes). Presumably we would wish to include
these very successful adaptees in our count of the displaced. Another
advantage is the notion, common in the displacement literature, that
plant closure constitutes a better “natural experiment” with which to
analyze broader labor market phenomena, because involvement in a
shutdown is more likely to be orthogonal to an individual’s unobserved
ability than involvement in a person-specific layoff. A disadvantage is
that a large majority of involuntary worker terminations occur on an
individual basis; thus a study of plant closure victims alone would be
unrepresentative of the whole population of displaced workers.7
Another disadvantage of the plant-closure-based definition, especially
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if the “window” around the plant shutdown is relatively wide, is that
such definitions can include a considerable amount of normal workforce turnover, i.e., workers who would have voluntarily left the firm
even in the absence of an impending shutdown. A final disadvantage,
the “false firm death” problem, is discussed in more detail below.
Consider now the survey-based definition of displaced workers,
consisting of all separations labeled as involuntary (from the worker’s
point of view). As argued above, this has the advantage of greater representativeness, but has the disadvantage—especially in an international context—of relying on workers’ (and/or firms’) self-reported
reasons for why a separation occurred. Relying on reported separation
reasons can give rise to three kinds of problems, especially in international studies. First, there may be simple, or “classical,” measurement
error. Some evidence for this is available in the chapter on Canada and
Japan, which presents data from a Canadian survey in which both firms
and workers reported a separation reason. Interestingly, while the marginal totals in these cross-tabulations are roughly similar (for example,
workers and firms both labeled about the same fraction of separations
as firm-initiated), there are substantial off-diagonal elements (workers
and firms often disagree on the cause of any given separation). Second, rather than reflecting fundamental differences in the source of the
shock giving rise to the separation (see McLaughlin 1991), the labeling
of separations as worker- versus firm-initiated may be an endogenous
response to a nation’s labor market institutions. For example, the high
share of layoffs relative to quits in the Canadian economy may reflect
employers’ willingness, in the absence of experience rating, to label
workers’ separations as layoffs in order to qualify them for employment insurance benefits (e.g., Kuhn and Sweetman 1988b). On the
other hand, Bender, Dustmann, Margolis, and Meghir claim in Chapter
5 that in some European countries, “true” layoffs are relabeled as quits
(presumably with some means of ensuring the worker’s cooperation) to
avoid the many administrative complications involved in laying workers off. In Japan, a larger share of separations is labeled as voluntary
than in any other OECD country (OECD 1997, Table 5.12). Abe,
Higuchi, Kuhn, Nakamura, and Sweetman suggest in Chapter 3 that
this may, in part, reflect a cultural reluctance to admit to a kind of “failure” on the worker’s part.
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Third, languages, survey instruments, and the actual mix of mechanisms via which labor moves between firms all differ among countries.
At a mundane level, perhaps because layoffs often give rise to discomfort in conversation—at least when they affect us personally—they
encourage both slang and euphemism. The variety of such expressions, even among English-speaking countries, is remarkable: consider
“getting the sack,” “getting canned,” “downsized,” “right-sized,” “outplaced,” “fired,” “dismissed,” “discharged,” “dislocated,” getting the
“pink slip,” “redundancy” (common in the United Kingdom), and
“retrenchment” (common in Australia). Japan has “forced vacations”
and “kata tataki” (literally, “shoulder-tapping,” referring to the common method by which employees are informed of their layoffs). More
to the point, “firing” or “dismissal” in North America typically means a
worker has not performed his or her job duties adequately; thus we
would not typically count workers reporting these separation reasons
as displaced. In Europe it is much more common to use “firing” and
“dismissal” to refer to employment adjustments for purely economic
reasons. For example, a worker with less than enough job tenure to
qualify for statutory redundancy pay in Britain—typically two years—
might very plausibly report that he or she had been dismissed if the
firm reduced employment due to a shortage of demand. Analyses that
do not take account of such semantic differences may not be comparing similar classes of workers. Furthermore, international comparisons
need to decide how to compare certain methods of shedding labor
which only exist in some countries (such as U.S.-style temporary layoffs or Japanese shukko) with other kinds of displacements used in
other countries.
Aside from nomenclature, there are a number of other issues
involved in the definition of displaced workers that, if not carefully
accounted for, can change the main results of a one-country study or
reverse the sign of international comparisons. One, already mentioned, is whether to condition on tenure: are workers who lose very
short jobs really “displaced”? In this volume we usually focus on
high-tenure workers, but for all countries we also provide some
results—especially for displacement rates—that do not condition on
tenure in the job lost.
Related to the issue of very short jobs, how should we treat separations due to the end of a seasonal job or the expiration of a fixed-term
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contract? The treatment of contract expirations is particularly difficult
in the United States, as its Displaced Worker Survey does not include
this as a possible separation reason. Presumably some of these workers
classify themselves as layoffs (i.e., separated due to a “shortage of
work”), and some choose the “other” category. As Farber (1997) has
shown, this can substantially affect estimates of displacement and its
consequences in the United States. In Chapter 4, Borland, Gregg,
Knight, and Wadsworth document very different wage-change patterns
in the United Kingdom for temporary contract expirations versus other
involuntary separations. Because contract expirations constitute a substantial fraction of involuntary separations in Japan, the statistical picture of displacement rates in that country (see Chapter 3) is quite
different depending on whether these workers are classified as “displaced” or not. When contract expirations are not separately identified
in the data, presumably restricting attention to jobs with longer tenures
will eliminate most of them from the sample. To our knowledge, however, no hard evidence on this point exists.
One response to uncertainty regarding the usefulness of survey
reports of separation reasons is to use ex post criteria to identify separations we truly believe are involuntary. One option, used for some
countries in this volume (for example, the United Kingdom), is to ask
how the results change when we restrict attention to individuals who
experienced a positive unemployment spell. While this, to some
extent, conflates initial conditions with outcomes, it can be a useful
descriptive device and sensitivity check. A more extreme version of
this strategy is adopted in the Canada/Japan chapter, which experiments with the idea of defining displacements by their wage consequences. This is of course tautological when measuring the effects of
displacement on wages but can be useful when making international
comparisons of displacement rates. Specifically, by defining displacement as a separation which leads to a large decline in hourly wages,
one can compare displacement rates among countries in a manner
which is unaffected by any labeling conventions—whether these are
induced by survey instruments, “cultural” predispositions against
admitting a separation was involuntary, opportunistic relabelling to
avoid or take advantage of government regulations, or semantic differences. Future comparative studies of employment dynamics might do
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well to document the resulting statistic—the frequency of “substantial
separation-induced wage losses”—in a greater number of countries.
Other definitions
Clearly, how one defines the population of interest is a major consideration in any international study of displaced workers. A number
of other definitions can also have pivotal impacts in such studies, however, and deserve close scrutiny. One of these is the distinction
between establishments and firms: when the definition of displacement
involves closure or substantial shrinkage of one’s workplace, it can
matter a lot if the workplace is defined as an establishment or a firm.
In two of the four longitudinal employer databases used in this volume,
the unit of analysis is the firm; in the other two, it is the establishment.
Because a common practice, especially in European plant closures,
involves the relocation of large numbers of employees to other
branches of the same firm, this can substantially affect estimates of the
consequences of displacement in addition to the overall displacement
rate. Close attention to the firm/establishment distinction is therefore
required in any comparative study of displacement or of labor market
dynamics more generally.
In analyzing the employment and wage consequences of displacement, three more definitions can have major impacts on the results.
One is the distinction between jobless durations and unemployment
durations. Because most data sets do not make careful distinctions
between the unemployed and those who respond to displacement by
leaving the labor force, most existing studies of displacement are careful to label their findings as applying to total jobless durations.
Clearly, however, the mean jobless spell in a sample can substantially
exceed the mean unemployment spell, especially among populations,
such as women and older workers, for whom labor-force withdrawal is
more common. A second key distinction is between the mean unconditional jobless duration and mean duration conditional on experiencing
a positive spell. In the existing literature, both are commonly reported
without further modifiers as “jobless durations.” Especially in some
European countries, where fewer than half of displaced workers experience any unemployment at all, this distinction can be crucial, and all
the chapters in this volume pay it close attention.
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Finally, there is the distinction between wages and earnings. Due
to data limitations, many studies of the financial implications of displacement limit their attention to total earnings in a month, quarter, or
year. (For example, Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan’s influential 1993
study confined its attention to quarterly earnings.) Even though the
earnings declines in these studies consist of a mixture of unemployment, involuntary part-time work, and hourly wage declines, they are
often discussed as if they are directly informative about hourly wage
rates.8 Yet, as Stevens (1997) showed, making this distinction can
change one’s results considerably. The chapters in this volume are particularly careful in this regard, and future comparative work on displaced workers would do well to repeat that care.
Control Groups
A third methodological lesson concerns the use of control groups.
While it is not obvious how relevant control groups would be to the
analysis of displacement incidence or postdisplacement unemployment
durations, they have been advocated and used by a number of authors
for the study of displacement-induced wage and earnings losses. It has
been argued, for example, that simple before-after wage changes experienced by displaced workers will understate the wage losses caused by
displacement because they fail to account for any predisplacement
wage losses,9 or for any foregone postdisplacement wage growth experienced by displaced workers, relative to their nondisplaced peers. The
use of a control group of nondisplaced workers, it is argued, can
address both these problems.
Some of the analyses in this volume have access to a nondisplaced
control group; others do not. What does the experience of the authors
who can use controls indicate for the rest? Our analysis shows that, in
most cases, simple “difference” estimates do indeed underestimate
wage losses, though exceptions exist. In particular, because real wages
of Belgian nondisplaced workers fell during the sample period (Chapter 6), their “difference in difference” wage loss estimates are smaller
than the simple difference estimates. That said, however, in most cases
the use of a control group does not substantially change the results
unless (as is the case for Australia in this volume) the population under
study consists largely of young workers, who tend to be in a high-
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wage-growth life-cycle stage.10 One reason for this is our focus in this
volume on wage changes over a one- or two-year period bracketing the
displacement date. During this relatively short period, wage or earnings growth among continuously employed workers is not sufficient to
make a large difference in most of the estimates. Second, we cannot
detect any predisplacement wage losses in countries outside the United
States. We conjecture that this is largely due to the fact that wage-setting institutions in those countries are more centralized: as both Bertola
and Rogerson (1997) and Teulings and Hartog (1998) have argued,
there is simply less room for downward wage adjustments at the firm
level in many non-U.S. economies.
There are also some drawbacks to using control groups. One is
that, unless the data allow one to separate the two effects, the analysis
may conflate temporary layoffs and/or hours cuts before the layoff
with wage reductions, thus yielding a less accurate estimate of, say, the
amount of firm-specific capital lost due to displacement. Finally,
unless one has a very large sample of displaced workers, regression
specifications—such as Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s—which
estimate completely separate earnings paths for displaced workers and
controls, do not easily allow one to estimate a large number of interaction effects with observable characteristics, like age, tenure, or gender.
False Firm Deaths
False firm deaths is a methodological problem that is specific to
administrative-data-based studies of displaced workers. In such databases, firm (or plant) closures are typically identified by the disappearance of a firm (or plant) identification number from the data. This
could of course involve the shutdown of a plant or firm, but the possibility also exists that such changes result from simple reorganizations,
in which a plant, together with its entire workforce, is simply subsumed into a new firm and continues producing as before.
The administrative-data-based chapters in this volume make
diverse attempts to deal with the false-deaths problem, as discussed in
detail in later chapters. A common approach is to exclude from the
analysis large groups of workers who move together from one dying
firm and into the same new firm.11 This will, of course, eliminate simple takeovers, but it will also eliminate cases in which the displacing

Summary and Synthesis

21

firm has gone through extraordinary efforts to secure reemployment of
its workers at other firms (or, in the case of plant closures, relocated
them to another of its plants). While such efforts may be uncommon in
North America, they are more frequent elsewhere, especially in those
jurisdictions where a “social plan” must be implemented for all mass
layoffs. In the research conducted for this volume, the results for some
countries changed dramatically after corrections for false firm deaths
were introduced. Future research on displacement using administrative
data sources would be well advised to take great care in addressing this
issue.
Alternative Destinations for Displaced Workers
Our collective experience in this volume strongly suggests that
more attention should be given to several possible “destination” states
for displaced workers besides reemployment. The possibility of laborforce withdrawal has already been mentioned, but further disaggregation of this state, as well as of the reemployment state, is needed. For
example, in Chapter 2, Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, van Lomwel,
van Ours, and Ruhm show that both early retirement and official “disability” are important consequences of displacement. Farber (1999)
recently pointed out the importance of nontraditional forms of employment as transitional states in the adjustment to displacement.
In addition to painting a more complete picture of displaced workers’ experiences, consideration of alternative destinations has several
key implications for research on displaced workers. One is a better
understanding of existing empirical regularities; for example, how
much of the observed effects of age and gender on jobless durations
can be explained by induced early retirement or by labor-force withdrawal? Another is a clarification of the welfare impacts of displacement; I argue below that the direction of the effect of displacement on
retirement is informative about the size of its effects on lifetime utility.
Research on these aspects of displacement, whether in the United
States or elsewhere, has only just begun.

22

Kuhn

Comparability and Regression Design in Cross-National Research
Finally, an interesting consensus emerged among the authors
around the broader issue of how to design regression-based studies in
the context of comparative labor market research. A common temptation in the quest for comparability between countries is to choose a set
of covariates that constitutes the lowest common denominator, in other
words, the subset of control variables that is 1) available, and 2) measured in roughly the same way in both countries.12 While most chapters in this volume provide this kind of comparison, they also make a
point of providing less-comparable results based on fuller, more theoretically appropriate specifications of unemployment or earnings-loss
regressions in each country. For example, just because Japan does not
include a tenure variable in the relevant survey does not mean we
should present no Canadian results that control for tenure. Sometimes,
ancillary information from other data sources (such as age-tenure distributions in the Canada/Japan case) can be used to provide supplementary insights into what the results would be if the fuller set of covariates
were indeed available. International studies of labor markets, in general, should not focus only on lowest-common-denominator regression
specifications.

WITHIN-COUNTRY PATTERNS:
EXCEPTIONS AND UNIVERSALS
Some economic phenomena are so deeply rooted in human tastes
or technologies that they are observed in all cultures or countries that
have been examined.13 Are there any such universal patterns in the
incidence and effects of displacement? In this section I examine the
variation in three displacement-related phenomena—the incidence of
displacement, the unemployment effects of displacement, and the wage
effects of displacement—across four basic demographic attributes
(gender, age, predisplacement job tenure, and skill level) in all 10
countries studied in this volume. I identify some “universals,” as well
as some fascinating and significant exceptions, and speculate on the
meaning of both.
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It is worth emphasizing at the outset that my focus in this section is
on the patterns of covariation, within countries, between demographic
attributes and economic outcomes. Unlike the following section,
which tries to describe and explain differences in levels among countries, this exercise is not affected by international noncomparabilities in
data, as long as these noncomparabilities affect only outcome levels.
In that sense, the results—because they implicitly difference out a
fixed effect for each country—are more robust to differences in data
collection techniques among countries than the results in the following
section.
The patterns of displacement-related outcomes across gender, age,
tenure, and skill groups found in this volume are summarized in Tables
1.4–1.15. The tables display both raw correlations and regressionadjusted correlations, together with a list of all the characteristics held
constant in each regression. To facilitate access to other details underlying the results, I also list the source table from which each result is
drawn. The absence of a country from any one of these tables, or
“n.d.” in a cell in any of them, means the corresponding results are not
available for that country. For each table, I pose a question for which
the majority answer—if any—is “yes.” If there is no majority answer,
I choose what seems to me the most likely ex ante hypothesis. In the
summaries of regression results, “insignif.” means the coefficient was
not significant at the 5 percent level; “no” means the coefficient was
significant but opposite in sign to the question posed.
Who Is Displaced?
Patterns in the incidence of displacement are summarized in Tables
1.4 through 1.7. Looking first at Tables 1.4 and 1.5, it is immediately
clear that displacement disproportionately affects men, and unskilled
workers, in essentially all countries.14 To some extent this is surely a
consequence of the greater cyclicality of industries, such as construction and manufacturing, where unskilled men are overrepresented. As
noted, the craft-based organization of the construction labor market
also plays a role in some countries. Also related to industry effects,
men are disproportionately employed in “old economy” sectors which
are in long-term secular decline in all advanced economies. Not all of
the disproportionate incidence of displacement among men is attribut-

24

Kuhn

able to industry mix, however: this result persists in the two countries
(the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) for which the authors can
add industry controls to displacement-rate regressions. The higher
level of unskilled male displacement, to some extent, may thus also
reflect the continuing erosion of men’s traditional advantages in the
labor market and the increase in demand for skill that appears to pervade all industrialized labor markets.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 shed additional light on the incidence of displacement by focusing on age and tenure effects. With one important
exception—Japan—the message of these tables is essentially the same
for all countries. First, simply comparing means for different age categories, young workers are more likely to be displaced than older workers.15 As the rest of Table 1.6, and all of Table 1.7 make clear, however,
this is not a genuine age effect: when tenure is held constant, displacement rates are no longer correlated with age. Tenure, however, continues to affect displacement when age is held constant. Thus, for all
countries except Japan, the probability of being displaced from a job
declines with the amount of time one has spent in it. Precise causes of
this phenomenon are unclear—it could reflect institutions such as
inverse-seniority (last-in, first-out, or LIFO) layoff rules, or simply the
likelihood that high-tenure workers are, on average, better matched to
their current jobs—but the phenomenon itself appears to be universal
outside Japan.
And what of the Japanese exception? This phenomenon is analyzed in considerable detail in Chapter 3. All the evidence suggests
that 1) it is largely confined to men, and 2) it reflects a practice, dominant among large Japanese employers, of offering essentially total job
security to newly hired young men. Japanese workforce adjustment,
when required, then takes a number of forms, all of which disproportionately affect senior workers: a variable age of mandatory retirement,
an essentially mandatory form of outplacement called shukko, and
(especially in the last few years) simple layoffs.
Thus, with one exception—Japan—displacement is most common
among young, unskilled men. Furthermore, the greater prevalence of
displacement among the young outside Japan is wholly explained by
their lower tenure levels.
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Joblessness Following Displacement
According to Table 1.8, women experience more joblessness than
men after displacement. This phenomenon is essentially universal
among developed countries, and—as is the case for the skill, age, and
tenure patterns discussed below as well—holds irrespective of whether
we measure joblessness as the occurrence of a positive spell, as duration conditional on a positive spell, as unconditional duration, or as
non-employment at a particular (postdisplacement) survey date. Whatever causes women’s postdisplacement joblessness to be higher in all
countries is very likely related to the factors that cause women’s overall labor force participation rate to be lower than men’s in all countries.
Among these are greater participation in child-rearing (thus a higher
opportunity cost of working) and—of particular relevance to displaced
women—greater geographic constraints on married women’s job
search.
According to Table 1.9, unskilled workers experience more joblessness than skilled workers, with one statistically significant exception (Germany). The most likely cause of this almost-universal
phenomenon is unemployment insurance, which in most cases provides much higher benefit replacement rates to low-wage workers.
(Absent something like unemployment insurance, one might expect
skilled workers to have higher durations as they tend to operate in more
specialized labor markets.) In this regard, it is intriguing to note that
Germany is one of only three countries in our sample where UI benefits are a fixed fraction of the predisplacement wage with no maximum,
and is the only country where the “second-tier” benefit system that
takes over when UI expires (in Germany’s case, Arbeitslosenhilfe; see
Table 1.2) has the same feature.
Although (as we have seen) older workers are less likely to be displaced, Table 1.10 shows clearly that they suffer longer jobless spells
when displacement does occur. Further, Tables 1.10 and 1.11 together
show that, unlike our incidence results, this is not simply a tenure
effect. For one thing, tenure does not have a uniform effect on durations when age is held constant; the effect is significant in five of the
seven countries where we can run these regressions, but the coefficient
is negative in two of these five cases. Second, age remains significant
when tenure is held constant. Thus there does appear to be a “pure”
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age effect on postdisplacement unemployment that is essentially universal among countries with very different labor market institutions
and conditions.
What explains the universal effect of age on postdisplacement joblessness? On one hand, this could reflect something as basic as the
biology of aging, making older workers, on average, less adaptable to
change than younger workers. On the other hand, it could reflect the
fact that a greater fraction of older workers’ skills are specific to an
occupation and industry,16 thus exposing them to a much “thinner”
labor market. An older worker’s optimal response to what are presumably lower offer-arrival rates in such markets might well be to spend
longer searching for a job.17 Alternatively, since these results are for
jobless durations (rather than unemployment durations), they could
simply reflect greater labor-force withdrawal for older workers.
Indeed, Abbring et al. demonstrate in Chapter 2 that displacement hastens retirement in the United States. At the same time, however, a
number of analyses find higher jobless durations among older workers
even when workers who leave the labor market are dropped from the
sample. Thus, labor-force withdrawal cannot be the only explanation
for this phenomenon.18 Finally, longer unemployment durations could
be caused by the greater average wealth (and therefore higher reservation wages) of older workers, though if this were the case one might
expect older displaced workers to experience smaller wage losses (see
below).
What explains the very different correlations between predisplacement job tenure and postdisplacement unemployment among countries
as noted above? This correlation can be calculated for 7 of the 10
countries under study and is positive or insignificant in the United
States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Denmark—all countries with
relatively weak employment-protection laws (EPL), by international
standards. In contrast, the correlation is negative and significant in
Germany, Belgium, and France19—all countries with strong employment-protection systems. Notably, this correlation is positive even
when age is not held constant: even though older on average, high-tenure displaced workers in these high-EPL countries experience less
unemployment than low-tenure displaced workers.
It is tempting to see the effects of employment-protection systems
in these statistics: by requiring lengthy notice periods and detailed

Summary and Synthesis

27

adjustment plans, German-style employment-protection systems
appear to continue to shield high-tenure “insiders” from market forces
even if their firm or plant closes down. (Low-tenure workers in general qualify for less job protection than high-tenure workers.) This
interpretation is supported by a comparison of the overall incidence of
unemployment of displaced workers among countries: in high-EPL
countries, displaced workers are much more likely to avoid a spell of
unemployment altogether than, for example, in the United States or
Canada. We discuss the effects of EPL on unemployment further in
the section on “Patterns among Countries” (p. 34).
In sum, looking at postdisplacement jobless durations, a number of
very consistent patterns emerge among all the countries in our sample.
In particular, the demographic groups which are most likely to be displaced are not always those who suffer the least, or the most, from displacement. In particular, young, low-tenure men are more likely to be
displaced, but they experience less joblessness if they are displaced.
The one group that suffers disproportionately on both dimensions is the
unskilled: unskilled workers are more likely to be displaced and take
longer to become reemployed after displacement than other workers.
Unlike with older workers, who also have longer durations, this seems
unlikely to be caused by a disproportionate level of industry- and occupation-specific skill. More likely, this is caused—at least in part—by
the greater relative attractiveness of income-support programs available to unemployed low-wage workers: as noted earlier, in most countries, the UI benefit replacement ratio declines precipitously with
predisplacement earnings.20 Another contributing factor may be the
ongoing decline in demand for unskilled workers throughout the industrialized world, though it is unclear why—in the absence of a social
safety net income “floor”—this would be reflected in unemployment
durations, rather than simply in lower wages.
Displacement-Induced Wage Losses
In the United States, much discussion has centered around the
widely observed positive correlation between tenure and displaced
workers’ wage losses (see, for example, Kletzer 1989; Ruhm 1991; and
Topel 1990). It is now broadly recognized that this phenomenon could
reflect either a causal effect of tenure (such as specific human-capital
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accumulation or seniority-related implicit contracts) or simply differences in average match quality between low- and high-tenure workers.21 Less well known, however, is the fact that in the simplest of
dynamic matching models where workers move to better matches as
they age, the expected correlation between average match quality and
tenure (holding age constant) is negative.22 Thus, under very reasonable assumptions, a positive partial correlation between tenure and
wages implies a positive causal effect of tenure on wages. As Topel
(1991) argued, we can thus be fairly sure that firm-specific skills (or
some similar causal mechanism such as seniority-based implicit contracts or industry-specific skills)23 is an important feature of the U.S.
labor market.
Is this also true in other countries? According to Table 1.12, the
answer is a qualified “yes.” Reasonably strong and statistically significant tenure effects are found in the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, but tenure effects are generally insignificant in the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark—the only other countries where
results are available.24 In the Netherlands and Denmark, this can quite
plausibly be attributed to the very small samples of displaced workers
for whom reemployment wages are observed. In Belgium, however,
sample size is not a plausible explanation: estimates of tenure effects
on wage losses are tightly bounded near zero. As noted in Chapter 6,
this may reflect two features of Belgian wage-setting institutions. One
feature is the relatively high level of union coverage and the centralized nature of wage bargaining: most workers are covered by industrylevel wage contracts that affect all Belgian firms in their industry. The
second feature is the portability of seniority across firms in the same
union bargaining unit, i.e., covered workers changing jobs within an
industry retain their seniority in the new firm. Both of these factors
make it harder for individual Belgian workers to accept a wage cut in
order to become reemployed and may contribute to their very low
reemployment rates.
In sum, the positive correlation between tenure and wage losses
observed in the United States is also seen in two other countries (Canada and the United Kingdom) with similar wage-setting institutions. It
is not seen in a country (Belgium) with very different, much more centralized wage-setting institutions, which also happens to be the only
other country with enough data to estimate a tenure effect with reason-
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able precision in this volume. This does not, of course, negate the possibility of firm-specific capital accumulation in countries like Belgium,
but it does imply that the effects of firm-specific capital on wages are,
in general, mediated by a country’s system of wage-setting institutions.
It also reinforces the notion, pursued further below, that a substantial
fraction of the large wage losses observed among high-tenure displaced workers in the United States. may be directly associated with
two features of its decentralized wage-setting institutions: 1) partial
union coverage and 2) a high level of overall wage inequality in the
labor market as a whole.25 Both these features are less characteristic of
most European countries.
The effect of age on displaced workers’ wage losses is summarized
in Table 1.13. Compared with the tenure effects just discussed, these
are much more robust and uniform across countries: in all countries for
which we have data, older workers experience greater wage losses.
Furthermore, with one exception (Denmark), this effect persists when
we hold tenure constant. Like the results for unemployment, these
results suggest a pure effect of age, perhaps working through changes
in workers’ adaptability.26 Given the strength and robustness of these
results, it is in a way surprising that pure age effects on displaced workers’ wage losses have not received more attention in the economic literature. If adaptability is a function of age, there may be important, but
as yet largely unexplored, effects of an economy’s (or firm’s) age
structure on its ability to adapt to change. An exceptionally old workforce might, for example, help explain Japan’s current difficulties in
restructuring its economy. Counterbalancing this, however, Japan’s
FIFO layoff system may promote the survival and recovery of ailing
firms by keeping them relatively young during sustained periods of
downsizing.
Do men or women experience larger wage losses when they are
displaced? Outside Japan, Table 1.14 shows either no gender difference in wage losses, or a larger (percentage) fall for women. The latter
result echoes a finding in Crossley, Jones, and Kuhn (1994), who found
larger losses for displaced women (at all tenure levels) in Canada and
who argued that this might be caused by tighter geographic constraints
on women’s job-search activities. This geographical mobility hypothesis is supported by Gladden’s (1999) research, which quantified the
effect of differential geographic mobility on the gender wage gap in the
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United States. The exceptional Japanese result may reflect its peculiar
institution of FIFO layoffs, which—being largely confined to men—
may make the pool of displaced men and women very different. One
simple way in which this might be true involves age: laid-off Japanese
men might be, on average, considerably older than laid-off Japanese
women, who do not appear to participate in the FIFO layoff system.
Since we have no regression results that control for age and gender
simultaneously in Japan, we cannot rule this out as an explanation of
this particular Japanese exception.
Table 1.15 examines the association between education and wage
losses among countries. Unlike the case of jobless durations, there is
no consistent or significant association. The presence of an education/
joblessness link, but the absence of an education/wage loss link, is consistent with the notion that income-support programs play an important
role in the jobless durations of less-skilled workers: while lengthening
jobless spells, these programs should not depress reemployment wages
and may, in fact, raise them if more job offers are sampled during the
jobless spell.
Summing up, our analysis of tenure patterns in displacementinduced wage losses cannot rule out the notion that substantial losses
of firm- or industry-specific human capital occur among high-tenure
displaced workers in all countries. However, the analysis strongly suggests that other factors, in particular labor market institutions, also play
a role in determining the wage losses experienced by displaced workers. In particular, it appears that predisplacement tenure affects displaced workers’ wage losses only in countries with decentralized wage
bargaining and high overall wage inequality. In different institutional
environments (such as Belgium’s), the wage-loss pattern seen in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is not present. Our
analysis also suggests that gender differences in job search play a role
in the gender differential in wage losses due to displacement, though
this effect can also be overridden by institutional factors, as in Japan.
Finally, we document a universal positive correlation between wage
losses and age in all countries examined. Given its ubiquity, it is surprising that this relationship has not received more attention in the literature. Further attention to the potential causes of this pure “aging”
effect would seem to be warranted in future analyses.
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Summing Up: Who Loses Most?
Pulling together the three outcome measures (frequency of displacement, unemployment effects of displacement, and wage effects of
displacement) and the four dimensions of demographic variation (gender, age, tenure, and skill level), is there any one demographic group
that is hurt most on all dimensions in all countries examined? Our
answer to this question is summarized in Table 1.16, which distills the
results of Tables 1.4–1.15 into one 4 x 3 table. In almost all cases, the
patterns reported in Table 1.16 apply both to zero-order correlations
(not holding any other characteristics constant) and to correlations that
hold the other characteristics constant in a regression framework.
Cases where a distinction needs to be drawn are highlighted below.
Overall, none of the demographic groups examined in Table 1.16
fares unambiguously worse on all dimensions in all countries examined, though unskilled workers come close: they experience more frequent displacement, more postdisplacement joblessness, and about the
same (percentage) wage loss from displacement as do skilled workers.
Thus, as Farber (1997) has pointed out, while displacement among
skilled workers is increasing and is attracting more public attention in
the United States, displacement both in the United States and in all
other developed countries where evidence exists remains a phenomenon that disproportionately hurts the unskilled.
Older workers fare worse than younger workers after displacement
in all countries, but they are less likely to be displaced in the first place
in all countries except Japan. Thus, Japan—perhaps paradoxically a
culture reputed to place exceptional value on respect for one’s elders—
is the only country in which older workers fare worse on all three displacement-related outcomes examined here.
Tenure effects are more complex than age effects. First, as for age,
in all countries but Japan, high-tenure workers are less likely to be displaced than low-tenure workers. The effect of tenure on postdisplacement joblessness, however, appears to vary with the strength of the
employment-protection legislation in a country: high-tenure displaced
workers seem to have shorter durations in high-EPL countries and
longer durations elsewhere. As expected, in the United States and
other countries with broadly similar institutions, senior workers are
less likely to be displaced but experience larger wage losses if they are.
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In this volume, however, we have not been able to document seniorityrelated wage losses in countries with more centralized wage-setting
institutions, and in one country (Belgium) we can rule out this phenomenon quite convincingly.
In all countries, men are more likely to be displaced than women,
but (with the exception of Japan) women lose equal amounts or more
when displaced. Overall, the most consistent patterns that emerge
from Table 1.16 are that older workers, and unskilled workers, bear the
main costs of displacement.
Other Within-Country Patterns
A careful reading of the chapters in this volume reveals four other
cross-sectional patterns that, while not fitting neatly into the above
framework of incidence, unemployment, and wages, nonetheless
appear to be universal among countries.27 One of these is negative
duration dependence in the reemployment hazard. For all countries in
which this statistic is available (the United States, the Netherlands,
Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France), workers
who have been unemployed a longer time have a smaller chance of
becoming reemployed than workers closer to the start of their unemployment spell. As is well known, this could be either a direct causal
effect of unemployment (for example, skills may atrophy with time out
of work, or workers may become depressed, discouraged, or ill) or a
pure composition effect: workers who are most attractive to employers
(on dimensions not measured by the econometrician) tend to be hired
out of the pool of unemployed workers sooner than others. What the
data firmly reject, however, is a model in which the predominant factor
affecting durations is liquidity constraints: in such a model, unemployed workers become increasingly likely to accept jobs as their
assets or UI benefit entitlements are used up during an unemployment
spell. Increasing hazard rates are not seen in any country in any econometric specification in this volume.
Related to the declining-hazard phenomenon, the authors for four
of the countries under study in this book (the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) examined the correlation between
(completed) unemployment durations and wages upon reemployment. In all four cases, this correlation is negative, even when we use
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the predisplacement wage to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
workers’ abilities. While consistent with a story in which longer
unemployment durations cause workers’ skills to atrophy, this pattern
could, of course, also be explained by selection effects. Indeed, as
noted below, the low reemployment wages of German, French, Belgian, and Danish displaced workers who have been unemployed for
more than a year appear to constitute the only observable gap in the
safety net protecting displaced workers from adverse outcomes in
those countries. The authors for the same four countries also compared
the unemployment durations of displaced workers to those of workers
experiencing other kinds of separations, such as voluntary quits. In a
finding reminiscent of Gibbons and Katz’s (1991) “layoffs and lemons” result (workers displaced en masse fare better than those displaced individually), it appears that—at least in the Netherlands,
France and Germany—displaced workers fare better than other separators. This finding is particularly striking in the Netherlands, where displaced workers receive higher unemployment benefits than other
separators and thus have a lower incentive to become reemployed. In
the case of the Netherlands, the authors speculate that, once again,
employment-protection laws may play a role; nondisplaced workers do
not benefit from nearly as much relocation assistance as displaced
workers. Further exploration of this distinction in countries such as the
Netherlands with very generous EPL certainly seems warranted.
Finally, in only two countries did the authors pose the question,
“Does displacement hasten retirement?” Before considering their
answers, it is worth noting that, theoretically, the answer to this question is not obvious. While the wage loss associated with displacement
among older workers creates a substitution effect away from continued
work, an income effect could encourage later retirement: at a lower
wage, people need to work longer to finance the same level of retirement income. Despite the possibility of these income effects, however,
in both the Netherlands and the United States, displacement appears to
hasten, not to delay, retirement. Either the income effects of displacement are unimportant for workers who are displaced late in life, or a
combination of generous severance payments and social programs
makes these income effects unimportant. The retirement-inducing
effect of displacement thus offers some insight into the long-term
effects of displacement-related wage losses on workers’ well being. If

34

Kuhn

such effects were very severe, we would expect older displaced workers to delay, rather than to hasten, their retirement plans.28

PATTERNS AMONG COUNTRIES
In this section I discuss what can be learned from patterns in the
levels of various displacement-related phenomena among countries.
As noted, these conclusions are more sensitive to differences in data
collection methods among countries than those discussed in the previous section. Nonetheless, as I hope the discussion will show, attention
to detail does allow some broad conclusions to be drawn.
Displacement Rates
Estimates of annual displacement rates taken from Chapters 2
through 6 are presented in Table 1.17. Because two alternative definitions of displacement are used in those chapters, these rates should be
considered in two groups. In the first six countries (the United States,
the Netherlands, Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia)
the statistics refer to total displacement rates—displacements of individual workers as well as mass layoffs and plant closures. In the
remaining four countries (France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark)
they refer to persons displaced due to the closure of a firm or establishment, only.
Examination of the first six countries in Table 1.17 yields a result
that some readers might find surprising: overall, total displacement
rates are very similar among countries with very different labor market
institutions. In fact, the annual rates for the United States, the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom., and Australia are all between 4
and 5 percent per annum.29 In Japan, if we restrict attention to “Western-style” layoffs only, its estimated displacement rate is much lower
than all the other countries, at 1.2 percent. However, if we include in
the count of Japanese displaced workers one source of job loss that is
much more common in Japan than elsewhere (temporary contract expirations) plus another that is largely unique to Japan (mandatory retirements for which the timing is totally at the firm’s discretion), the
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estimated displacement rate rises to 3.5 percent. This is not that different from the other five countries for which total displacement rates are
available.
The remainder of Table 1.17 presents estimates of mass displacement rates for France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark. Restricting
attention to firm closures and to employees with more than three or
four years of tenure yields annual displacement rates of 2.8 and 1.6
percent in France and Belgium, respectively.30 Comparable estimates
for plant closures are 1.0 and 0.6 percent for Germany and Denmark,
respectively. In the United States, a little over a third of all displacements are due to plant closures.31 Given that high-tenure workers tend
to have lower displacement rates (see Table 1.6), these figures seem
roughly consistent with a 4- to 5-percent overall displacement rate as
well (with the exception of France). While we remain unsure of the
precise explanation for this French exception, we note that France is
probably the country in which the false-firm-deaths problem is most
severe. Individuals moving “together” into the same new firm can only
be identified from sample information (rather than a census of the
firm’s employees). Thus it is possible that the value of 2.8 percent per
annum substantially overestimates France’s mass layoff rate.
How do we reconcile the rough similarity in displacement rates
among countries with the popular notion that jobs are, on average,
much less secure in the United States than in countries with strong
employment-protection laws, like the Netherlands, or with a tradition
of lifetime employment, like Japan? One point has already been made:
at least in Japan, displacement is much more common than traditional
statistics suggest if we account for the peculiar institutional features of
involuntary workforce adjustment in that country. Two other considerations are also relevant to the Japanese case: first, displacement in
Japan is concentrated among older workers, and women generally do
not participate in the lifetime employment system. The former phenomenon makes the jobs of younger Japanese men much more secure
than in the United States, and contributes to Japanese men’s very high
age-specific mean tenure levels (see Chapter 3, Table 3.17), without
necessarily reducing the total displacement rate. The latter raises
Japan’s displacement rate substantially when women are included in
the statistics.
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Another point concerns the relationship between the displacement
rates computed here and widely cited comparative estimates of unemployment inflows, such as those in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991,
Chap. 5, Table 1) or OECD (1995, Table 1.9). These unemployment
inflow rates are much higher in the United States than in most other
OECD countries, but they differ from displacement rates for two very
important reasons. First, unemployment inflow statistics generally
include workers starting a temporary layoff spell. Temporary layoffs
are much more common in the United States than most other countries
and do not constitute displacements since the worker returns to his or
her previous job. Second, as is shown below, when displacement
occurs in the United States, it almost always results in an unemployment spell. The same is not true in a number of European countries,
where a substantial majority of displaced workers never enter unemployment. As a result, similar European and U.S. displacement rates
are quite consistent with a much lower unemployment inflow rate in
Europe.32
A final point regarding the perceived relative insecurity of U.S.
jobs is that popular perceptions are influenced by the severity of displacement’s effects, as well as by its frequency. As I shall argue
below, the consequences of displacement do differ substantially among
countries, and—at least for the case of wage losses— these are considerably more severe in the United States than most other countries.
What, if anything, does the international similarity in displacement
rates imply about the relation between labor market institutions and
outcomes? Perhaps, as noted, institutions can affect the precise form
that displacement takes (for example, the distinction between “pure”
layoffs and mandatory outplacements such as shukko). Perhaps, as I
shall argue below, they can also have important effects on the consequences of displacement by providing generous outplacement assistance. But it may be that overall displacement rates are relatively
immune to policy interventions. There could simply be a relatively
fixed amount of labor reallocation that must occur in any dynamic capitalist economy.33 At a minimum, we have yet to see convincing evidence of a modern capitalist economy with a total displacement rate
very different from 4 to 5 percent per annum.
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Incidence of Joblessness
International differences in the amount of joblessness experienced
by displaced workers are summarized in Table 1.18. In sharp contrast
to the evidence for displacement rates, there is wide variation among
countries in the probability that a displaced worker experiences any
joblessness. While U.S. analysts tend to assume (correctly, for their
country) that involuntary termination almost always results in a jobless
spell, this is not the case in some other countries. For example,
Abbring et al. draw attention to the large difference in incidence of joblessness between U.S. and Dutch displaced workers. Using very similar samples and definitions, they calculate that only 30 percent of
displaced workers in the Netherlands actually experience any joblessness, compared with 85 percent in the United States. A very low incidence of joblessness among displaced workers is also observed among
workers involved in plant closures in Germany (39 percent) and in
plant closures or shrinkages in Denmark (31 percent).34
As is argued in several chapters of this volume, the most likely
explanation for the low incidence of joblessness among displaced
workers in some European countries is employment-protection legislation. This should not be surprising, since in many cases the intent of
European EPL is to prevent displacement-induced joblessness. As
Table 1.18 suggests, these apparent effects of EPL are most visible in
the case of plant, rather than firm, closures (the French and Belgian statistics refer to firm closures and are not so low). It is in the case of
plant closures that EPL is both strongest—involving all the provisions
associated with mass layoffs such as a “social plan”—and most
enforceable (enforcement problems naturally arise when the legal
entity responsible for complying with the law ceases to exist). While
further research is certainly warranted, the chapters in this volume
strongly suggest that joblessness is not an inevitable consequence of
displacement, and that—for better or worse—it is possible to design a
system of employment-protection laws that makes joblessness the
exception rather than the rule among workers displaced from dying
plants.
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Conditional Jobless Durations
Now suppose a displaced Dutch, German, or Japanese worker is
unlucky enough to start a jobless spell. Is he or she likely to be jobless
much longer than a U.S. worker in the same situation? Perhaps surprisingly, given the prevailing view of these labor markets as low-turnover and “sclerotic,” Table 1.18 provides only mixed support for this
hypothesis. The conditional probability of long-term joblessness is
substantially higher in Germany and France than in the United States.
Given the much higher unemployment rates in these countries during
the sample period, this is not surprising. More surprisingly, in the
Netherlands, 28 percent of jobless spells experienced by displaced
workers last more than a year, a fraction which is identical to that in the
United States. Even more surprisingly, conditional durations in the
United Kingdom are below those in the United States.
Why are U.S. displaced workers’ unemployment durations so unexpectedly high when viewed in an international context? To understand this phenomenon, at least three definitional and statistical points
are relevant. First, recall again that the statistics in Table 1.18 exclude
temporary layoff spells—which tend to be short—from the sample of
jobless durations in all countries where they are a significant phenomenon (especially the United States and Canada, but also France). These
short spells are included in most published estimates of comparative
unemployment durations, which tend to show much shorter average
spells in the United States. Second, note that Table 1.18 reports actual
survivor rates (the fraction of displaced persons actually reemployed
within 6 and 12 months of displacement) rather than, for example, estimated mean durations extrapolated from a sample of incomplete spells
(as in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991, Chapter 5, Table 1). As jobless durations tend to be very skewed, means tend to be much higher
than the median; i.e., than the duration experienced by a typical individual, especially in European countries where the distribution has a
long right tail. Even more importantly (in contrast to extrapolated
means), our survivor function estimates do not depend on assumptions
about the distribution of spells beyond the censoring point or on the
assumption of a steady state.
Third, note that our numbers also differ from relatively well known
statistics on the fraction of the stock of unemployed workers who have
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been employed for over a year (e.g., OECD 1995, Table 1.8). These
“stock” statistics vary much more among countries than ours do, but
are unrepresentative of the experiences of a typical displaced worker in
each country for a different reason. Stock statistics refer to the population of workers who are unemployed at a point in time. In contrast, our
“flow” statistics refer to a random sample of new unemployment
spells. Because long spells will (by definition) be overrepresented in a
stock sample, such samples overstate the duration of unemployment a
newly unemployed worker is likely to experience.
Aside from the above statistical issues, there may be a potentially
important substantive reason why U.S. unemployment durations are so
high. Consider a North American worker who is (ex post) permanently
displaced. Compared to, say, a laid-off worker in Japan who has no
prospect of returning to his or her original job, the North American
worker may not search as intensively for a new job near the start of his
or her spell because recall remains a possibility. Clearly, the effects of
the North American temporary layoff system on the jobless durations
of workers who are, ultimately, permanently displaced warrant further
research.
Unconditional Jobless Durations
Combining incidence and duration, in which countries do displaced workers experience the most joblessness? This statistic is
examined in the final three columns of Table 1.18 for the seven countries for which it is available. Three features stand out. First are the
very low total jobless durations in Japan and the United Kingdom.
Contrary to many popular discussions about the “thinness” of nonentry-level labor markets in Japan, by international standards displaced
Japanese workers do not have long jobless durations, even when we
exclude from the calculations those displacements taking place via
mandatory outplacements (shukko) and even in 1995, when Japan was
in a deep and prolonged recession. Furthermore, when we exclude
temporary layoffs from the U.S. statistics, U.S. displaced workers in
fact experience more joblessness than do the British. The second feature is the fact that total jobless durations in Canada, France, and Germany do exceed those in the United States. Among other factors, this
could reflect a much more generous unemployment insurance system.
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The third feature is the large gap between Belgian and Danish jobless durations, which is thoroughly documented and analyzed in Chapter 6 by Albæk et al. According to these authors, the only factor that
can plausibly explain this differential between otherwise very similar
countries is a negative effect of Belgium’s very stringent employmentprotection laws on the rate of new job creation. Certainly, Belgium has
the most stringent advance-notice laws of the countries considered in
this volume; it also has the highest total jobless durations among its
displaced workers. Thus, despite their direct effect in reducing the
incidence of jobless spells, it appears that very high EPLs can be counterproductive in combatting unemployment among displaced workers:
their negative equilibrium effects on new job offer arrival rates can
outweigh these direct effects.
In sum, rather than being at the low end of the scale, the United
States is in the middle of the pack when it comes to the total amount of
joblessness experienced by displaced workers. One reason for this is
definitional: previous estimates of comparative unemployment durations underestimate the amount of unemployment experienced by U.S.
displaced workers because they include the short durations of the many
U.S. workers who are not displaced but are just on temporary layoff.
Another may be a detrimental causal effect of the North American temporary layoff system on the jobless durations of workers who ultimately are permanently displaced: an expectation of recall might
reduce search intensity. A third factor explaining the unexpectedly
good unemployment “performance” of displaced workers in some
European countries is related to the relatively large fractions of displaced workers who avoid unemployment altogether: strict EPLs prevent the inception of unemployment spells, raising the number of spells
with an unconditional duration of zero. At the same time, however,
EPLs—especially when they are very strict and legalistic, as in Belgium—may also play a detrimental role in the high conditional jobless
durations experienced by displaced workers by reducing the equilibrium offer arrival rate.35
Wage Changes
Table 1.19 presents estimates of mean percentage wage changes
experienced by displaced workers, drawn from Chapters 2 through 6 of
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this volume. In all cases these estimates are formulated to correspond
as closely as possible to changes in the wage earned per hour of work
(rather than total earnings during periods that could contain jobless
spells) before and after displacement. Because—at least in some countries—displaced workers’ wage losses vary substantially with predisplacement tenure, the table presents disaggregated results by individual
years of tenure. (Where the only available results combine multiple
years of tenure, I simply repeat the estimates in adjacent cells of the
table.) Most estimates in the table consist of simple before/after mean
wage changes for workers reemployed within a year or two of displacement. Where available, however, estimates of wage losses relative to a control group of continuously employed workers are also
shown.
Even though Chapter 2 reports some estimates of wage losses for
the Netherlands (see the discussion of Table 2.22), these are not
included in Table 1.19. As the authors of that chapter indicate, their
wage-change results are based on a very small sample, resulting in
standard errors so high that no remotely plausible sizes of wage
changes can be ruled out. Estimates from Australia (Table 4.17) are
also excluded because they apply to a sample of very young workers
and are thus not comparable with any of the other countries in Table
1.19. Because wage changes can differ between individual and mass
layoffs, throughout the table I note whether the statistics refer to mass
layoffs only or to the population of all displaced workers. To ensure
that any conclusions involving wage changes in the United States are
robust as to whether a sample of mass layoffs from administrative data
or survey-based samples of individual layoffs are used, Table 1.19 also
reports estimates from the well-known administrative-data-based study
of U.S. displaced workers by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
Among the broad patterns that emerge from an examination of
Table 1.19, one has already been noted (see Table 1.14): real-wage
changes associated with displacement become more negative (or less
positive) with tenure on the lost job. Two other observations are primarily of methodological interest. First, in all countries but Belgium
(and at all tenure levels within those countries), wage-change estimates
that utilize a control group of continuously employed workers are more
negative (or less positive) than estimates that do not use a control
group. Evidently, in all those countries (even the United States, where
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aggregate real wages had stagnated for decades) the typical nondisplaced worker experienced real wage growth during the sample
period.36 Displaced workers’ own wage declines thus understate their
losses relative to comparable workers who are not displaced. The
exception is Belgium, where during our sample period continuously
employed workers experienced real wage declines; here simple “difference” estimates overstate the wage losses “caused” by displacement.
Second, in most cases—and especially in Germany, France, and Belgium—the disparity between the simple “difference” estimates and the
“difference in differences” estimator is not large. Disparities of more
than 5 percentage points are confined to the U.S. results of Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993)—where they are small relative to the
size of the losses incurred—and the United Kingdom. Among the
countries examined, the United Kingdom appears to be the only country where 1) continuously employed workers experience high rates of
real wage growth during the sample period (of over 7 percent per year
for continuously employed low-tenure workers and 3.5 percent for
high-tenure workers), and 2) displaced workers experience measurable
real wage declines. In general, however, because of real wage growth
among continuously employed workers, simple “difference” estimates
usually understate the amount workers lose as a result of displacement.
However, because real wage growth in most economies during our
sample period is not very large, they usually don’t understate it by very
much.
Turning to more substantive conclusions, consider first the wage
changes experienced either by displaced workers with low levels of
predisplacement tenure (say, under two years) or those experienced by
displaced workers of all tenure levels combined. With one exception—again, the United Kingdom—the wage changes experienced by
both these groups are either positive (as for short-tenure workers in the
United States and Canada) or close to zero (as for the United States,
Japan, and Canada overall). The small loss (or the gain) among shorttenure workers requires no explanation: most reasons displaced workers might experience substantial wage losses do not apply to very
short-tenure workers. The small overal1 loss stems from a simple
composition effect: because displacement rates decline sharply with
job tenure (see Table 1.6), low-tenure workers will dominate in any
representative sample of involuntary separations.
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What of the British exception to this pattern? A closer examination of Table 1.19 shows that the British exception stems entirely from
relatively large wage losses experienced by workers with under a year
of tenure. Workers with between one and two years of tenure do fit the
pattern noted above; furthermore, the inverted U-shaped relation
between wage changes and predisplacement tenure observed for Britain is not found in any other country. Given this, I suspect that the real
wage changes in the lowest tenure category in Britain may be related to
the difficulties in measuring tenure in the British Household Panel Survey and to the resulting large number of missing observations on tenure there. I shall treat them as anomalous here and in what follows. If
further research shows, instead, that they are genuine, it will be fascinating to try to understand what explains these high losses among a
group for whom they are very rarely seen.
Next, it is hard not to notice the large number of positive entries in
Table 1.19: U.S. displaced workers with tenure of under four years,
Canadian displaced workers with tenure under one year, and apparently all German and French displaced workers experience a mean
wage change that is positive. Apparently the large losses documented
by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for Pennsylvania workers
are not universal; their focus on high-tenure workers (and, as I shall
argue below, on workers in highly unionized industries in a relatively
nonunionized, high-wage-inequality country, plus focus on quarterly
earnings rather than on wage rates) explains much of their results.
Finally, consider high-tenure displaced workers. In contrast to the
wage increases observed for many low-tenure workers, Table 1.19
indicates (as expected) that large mean wage losses are seen in some
countries, in particular the United States, Canada, and—to a lesser
extent—the United Kingdom. They are not observed in other countries, however.37 What, then, is distinctive about the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Canada? Recalling the discussion of labor market institutions earlier in this chapter, these are clearly the three countries with the most decentralized wage-setting institutions.38 The likely
effects of wage structure on displaced workers’ wage losses are
addressed most directly in Chapter 3 by Abe et al. Using very similar
surveys and definitions, they document a much higher variance of displacement-induced wage changes in Canada than in Japan. This higher
variance has dramatic implications for the amount of lifetime wage
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security experienced by workers in both countries. For example, Table
3.21 indicates that an average 20- to 24-year-old employed Canadian
man has a 4.7 percent chance of experiencing a separation that will cut
his hourly wage rate by 30 percent or more. The comparable statistic
in Japan is 0.8 percent. For men aged 35–39, the Canadian and Japanese probabilities are 1.7 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. The
much higher level of Japanese wage security cannot be primarily
attributed to a lower permanent separation rate (Table 3.5). A substantial fraction of Japanese men’s wage security thus derives from the
much more compressed structure of wage changes they experience
when they are displaced.
It is also well known that Germany, France, Belgium, and Denmark have much more compressed wage structures than the United
States and Canada. This is in part due to higher collective bargaining
coverage; in France’s case the very high national minimum wage also
plays a role. And according to Table 1.19, high-tenure displaced workers in these countries do not experience significant wage losses, either
unconditionally or relative to continuously employed workers. Further, the fact that Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) found large
wage losses in the United States using administrative data on workers
involved in mass layoffs implies that the low losses found in the above
European countries are not just an artifact of a different data-collection
scheme and displacement definition.39
Blau and Kahn (1996b) convincingly demonstrated that international differences in overall wage inequality play a major role in explaining international differences in the gender pay gap. Overall, our
findings in this section suggest that a similar mechanism may be at
work for displaced workers: in countries with high wage inequality,
senior displaced workers appear to experience larger wage losses.
Relatedly—since partial union coverage in a nation contributes to high
levels of wage inequality—both Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993, p. 703) and Kuhn and Sweetman (1988a) observed that a substantial portion of U.S. displaced workers’ wage losses may in fact be
attributable to the loss of union coverage upon displacement. Naturally, this is much less of a factor in countries where union coverage is
almost universal.
Before leaving the subject of wage changes it is worth drawing
attention to two exceptions to the phenomenon of small wage losses in
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countries with compressed wage structures. In some sense, these are
exceptions which, because of the special circumstances in which they
occur, “prove” the rule. First, as Bender et al. point out, larger wage
losses are observed in France and Germany when attention is restricted
to the small minority of displaced workers who become unemployed
and remain so for over a year. These workers appear to fall out of the
protective net provided both by EPL and the compressed national wage
structure. Second are Japanese men over the age of 50 or 55. These
men essentially leave the “primary” labor market where jobs and
wages are protected and take new “post-retirement” jobs in a very different sector of the labor market. They experience large wage losses
because they switch from a primary to a secondary segment of the
labor market, much like displaced Pennsylvania steelworkers who
become reemployed in a nonunion, service-sector job.
Summary
In comparing the levels of displacement rates, postdisplacement
unemployment, and displacement-induced wage losses among the
countries under study in this volume, the following main conclusions
emerge:
1) Although some difficulties remain in reconciling displacement
counts from firm-based versus worker-based data, comparable
worker-based data yields estimated displacement rates, which are
surprisingly similar in all countries where they are available, of
between 4 and 5 percent of the employed population each year.
This occurs despite substantial differences in labor market institutions among countries. This phenomenon is not inconsistent
with previous statistics showing very large differences in unemployment inflows among countries, and it is consistent with statistics showing similar rates of sectoral labor reallocation
(Bertola and Rogerson 1997). Perhaps a certain rate of displacement is simply a necessary feature of a dynamic capitalist economy.
2) Given that a worker is displaced, the probability that he or she
will experience any joblessness at all varies a great deal among
countries. While over 80 percent of U.S. displaced workers
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experience some joblessness immediately following displacement, experiencing a spell of joblessness is the exception rather
than the rule in such countries as the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Germany. The most likely explanations of this low incidence of
unemployment are employment-protection laws and union negotiations of the terms surrounding layoffs, both of which employ a
variety of means to forestall the inception of an unemployment
spell.
Supporting evidence for the EPL explanation of low unemployment incidence among some European displaced workers
comes from two sources. One is the effect of predisplacement
tenure on postdisplacement unemployment, examined in Table
1.11: as noted, in France, Germany, and Belgium (no Dutch data
on this question are available), high-tenure displaced workers
actually experience less unemployment than low-tenure workers.
In France and Germany this is true even if age is not held constant, even though older workers tend to have both higher tenures
and longer unemployment spells otherwise. This is strongly suggestive of greater advance notice and reemployment assistance
provided to high-tenure “insiders” in these economies. A second
source of corroborating evidence is the observation that, in the
Netherlands, displaced workers actually get reemployed faster
than workers who voluntarily quit their jobs, even though quitters face unemployment insurance penalties. As Abbring et al.
suggest, this may be attributable to extensive reemployment
assistance required for displaced workers but not in the case of
quits.
3) Given that a spell of joblessness has begun, its expected length
also varies substantially across countries. Perhaps unexpectedly,
these conditional durations are not lowest in the United States:
the United States is in the middle of the pack. One reason for the
unexpectedly high unemployment durations of U.S. workers is
that previous comparisons may have been contaminated by the
inclusion of temporary layoffs, which tend to have short durations, in the U.S. statistics. Also, the fact that many (ex post)
displaced workers in the United States have a prospect of being
recalled to their former firm may reduce their search intensity
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relative to workers in countries where displacement is a more
discrete phenomenon.
4) In all countries, the mean wage change experienced by a low-tenure displaced worker is close to zero or positive. Small losses
are also observed when we consider all displaced workers as a
group, not conditioning on tenure. In essence, this reflects the
fact that all the countries under study have a casual labor market,
in which displacement is frequent but relatively inconsequential
for current wages. Displacements from such jobs tend to dominate flow samples of involuntary separations everywhere.
5) Large percentage wage losses are observed only for workers with
high tenure levels, and only in countries (the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.) with relatively high levels of
wage inequality and low rates of union coverage. Just as a compressed wage structure may reduce the size of gender-wage differentials (Blau and Kahn 1996b), it may also reduce the
magnitude of the wage changes experienced by displaced workers. Relatedly, displaced workers in a partially unionized economy such as these may be more likely to experience wage losses
due to the loss of union coverage upon displacement.
Overall, the cross-national experience suggests that—with the possible exception of Belgium and its especially inflexible employmentprotection system—it is hard to pinpoint any large negative effects of
the highly regulated labor markets of Europe and Japan on displaced
workers. Instead, employment-protection laws appear to dramatically
reduce the incidence of an unemployment spell among workers who
lose their jobs involuntarily. Compressed national wage structures also
appear to reduce the frequency of large, displacement-induced wage
losses experienced by a country’s labor force. And while jobless durations, conditional on starting a spell, do tend to be higher outside the
United States, they are not dramatically so, especially when temporary
layoffs are removed from the statistics.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that strong EPLs, for
example, are good for any country. It does mean, however—and again
with the probable exception of Belgium—that researchers looking for
evidence of major EPL-induced costs need to look somewhere other
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than at displaced workers, perhaps at the labor market for new entrants,
including immigrants, women, and students.40 There is a sense in
which, in some European labor markets, once one becomes an insider,
one is always an insider. Even permanent job loss and the closure of
one’s workplace do not undermine the strong employment rights given
to incumbents in these labor markets. This may harm new entrants, but
that is one subject that is beyond the scope of this volume.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Clearly, much has been learned from the research in this volume,
both about displaced workers and about comparative labor markets.
Just as clearly, however, much more remains to be learned. Indeed, as
was noted, and as is to be expected in a first attempt at international
research on displacement, some of the key lessons from our work are
methodological ones, which we hope will speed up and improve the
work of others on these topics. Just what should future researchers in
this area focus on, and how should they approach this subject matter? I
consider these two questions in turn below.
One very worthwhile goal for future research would be to understand the “universals” uncovered in this volume. For example, pure
age effects on wage losses and on unemployment following displacement are observed in every country under study. What is it about older
workers that causes these larger losses? Can one disentangle “thinner”
labor markets from shorter time horizons, higher wealth, or declining
adaptability to change? Why are women’s jobless durations almost
always longer? Is it simply greater labor-force withdrawal connected
with family responsibilities or are other factors (like geographical
search constraints) at work? Careful studies, which pay close attention
to empirical implications that distinguish these simple hypotheses from
each other, can add a lot to our understanding of labor markets worldwide.
Another universal that could benefit from greater scrutiny is the
finding of very small, or zero wage losses for the entire population of
displaced workers in all countries. The contrast between this result and
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s could not be more stark, emphasiz-
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ing the point that their workers may be a very special case: they are
high-tenure workers, in distressed, high-rent, highly unionized industries in a relatively nonunionized country, displaced during a major
recession. Further research needs to carefully distinguish these special
cases from the experiences of typical job losers, whose situations are
not nearly as severe. Just when and where do large wage losses occur,
and when do they not?
Second are the exceptions, especially Japan. In particular, what
drives the apparent Japanese exception to the age profile of displacement? Can a FIFO layoff system be directly observed in Japanese
firms? In what industries is it the strongest? How does it affect declining firms (does it keep them younger, thus helping to forestall their
decline)? As the relative displacement rates of older workers in North
America are beginning to increase, an examination of this Japanese
practice might yield insights of relevance to North America as well.
Third is a deeper understanding of displaced workers’ flows into
labor market states other than reemployment: what is the role of early
retirement, discouragement, disability, retraining, and other forms of
nonparticipation? Not only are these flows interesting in their own
right, they also yield insights into the welfare effects of displacement.
Retirement behavior, for example, like consumption behavior, provides clues to the severity of displacement’s effects on workers’ permanent incomes.
Fourth is the need to draw closer links between labor market institutions and outcomes, links which, while highly suggestive, are of
necessity drawn on a relatively preliminary and impressionistic basis in
this volume. One key institution that deserves more comparative attention is the system of temporary layoffs in the United States and Canada. Does the prospect of recall reduce search? During a layoff spell
with some (ex ante) probability of recall, how do workers update their
priors about recall probabilities and adjust their search strategies?
How does this system compare with one in which the break with the
predisplacement employer is a sharper, more well-defined event?
Other key institutions appear to be the level of union coverage and the
degree of centralization in wage bargaining. This volume provides
highly suggestive, though not yet conclusive, evidence that loss of
union coverage and a decentralized wage-setting system explain much
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of the large wage losses experienced by senior workers in the United
States.
Fifth, more needs to be known about voluntary reemployment
assistance provided by firms even in the absence of, or in excess of legislated benefits. Such help can take the form of arranging employee
transfers, setting up interviews, providing outplacement consultants,
and so forth. Is this more, or less common in jurisdictions with strong
EPLs? If less common, then EPLs could simply be displacing voluntary assistance with little net effect. If more common, EPLs effects
may be magnified by changes in assistance voluntarily provided by
firms.
Most important, however, is the effect of employment-protection
laws and compressed national wage structures on workers who are not
displaced—who, after all, at least in any particular year constitute the
vast majority of a nation’s labor force. Of particular interest here are
new entrants to the labor force, including young school-leavers,
women reentering after childbirth or child-rearing, and immigrants.
We have already shown, I believe quite convincingly, that for the most
part, displaced workers benefit from strong EPLs and compressed
wage structures. Demonstrating whether or not new labor market
entrants are harmed by these practices—which may also make it more
difficult to break into the labor market and become a protected
“insider”—is a much harder question to answer. This is because the
effects are indirect, working through changes in market prices and
search frictions rather than directly on the groups specifically targeted
by these laws. It is, however, the most important question left unanswered by this volume.
How should future studies conduct the above analyses? As our
collective experience makes clear, such studies will need to pay close
attention to institutional details, and not just those embodied in legislation and regulations. These nonlegislated institutions include labor
unions, the organization of industrial labor markets, and accepted
mechanisms of worker termination that differ among countries for
apparently historical reasons. Future studies also need to pay excruciatingly close attention to definitional and, perhaps less expected, to linguistic issues. This is hard work, but, as this volume shows, it can be
done. The results not only test existing hypotheses and preconceptions
about how labor markets work, but they also yield new hypotheses to
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be assessed in future work. It is my sincere hope that this volume will
encourage others to embark on the difficult but rewarding path of comparative labor market research.

Notes
1. In this volume, Chapter 2, Table 2.3.
2. The United States imposes notice requirements only for mass layoffs, as defined
in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN).
3. For a recent example of such a study and a summary of various recent attempts to
derive one-dimensional measures of the overall “strictness” of EPL across countries, see Heckman and Pages (2000).
4. For a recent example of the effects of displacement on health, see Gallo et al.
(2000).
5. See, for example, Addison and Blackburn (1994).
6. See, for example, Tachibanaki (1996).
7. One might think a plant-closure-based sample would overestimate the severity of
the consequences of displacement, as congestion effects in local labor markets
might make it harder for each individual worker to become reemployed. As is
now well known, however, Gibbons and Katz (1991) found the opposite: persons
displaced individually fare worse. They attribute this to a “lemons” phenomenon
in which individual layoffs serve as adverse signals about an employee’s productivity.
8. Any discussion of losses in firm- or industry-specific skills as a possible cause of
displacement-induced wage losses implicitly makes this assumption.
9. See de la Rica (1995).
10. See also Kletzer and Fairlie’s 1999 study of displacement among young U.S.
workers.
11. This is typically only possible in data sets where one has access to the full population of workers at each plant before it disappears. Identifying the size of a group
of workers who move together when one only has a sample of workers raises
some difficult sampling issues. This is the case with the data from France and is
discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
12. A similar comment applies to the way in which variables are measured themselves; e.g., the number of occupational categories used or the time units in which
wages are measured.
13. One example appears to be the effect of children on women’s labor-force participation rates. See, for example, Duleep and Sanders (1994).
14. The only exception to the gender pattern in incidence is in the simple means for
Belgium; this applies to mass displacements only, and reverses sign when standard covariates are added to the regression. Some minor exceptions affect the
education patterns (a U-shaped effect in France and a positive effect of job com-
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plexity in the Netherlands, when both education and the predisplacement wage
are held constant).
There is a tendency for displacement rates to rise a small amount after age 50 or
55 in some countries, but no other country exhibits anything like the monotonic
increase in age, starting at age 20, that is observed very clearly in Japan.
Skills that are specific to a firm should be captured by the tenure coefficient.
See van den Berg (1994).
For example, these results hold for Dutch reemployment hazards in Chapter 2,
where the sample consists only of workers engaged in active search; they also
hold in Crossley, Jones, and Kuhn (1994), who remove workers who leave the
labor market from their sample.
In France, this is only the case for the probability of experiencing a positive spell
of unemployment.
Evidence in favor of this interpretation comes from a number of less-developed
countries without a meaningful social safety net. Unlike the United States and
Western Europe, unemployment rates are higher in these countries among skilled
workers, perhaps because only they can afford to spend time in this activity. For
further discussion, see Dickens and Lang (1995).
Any differences in general ability that might exist between high- and low-tenure
workers in a cross-section sample are “differenced out” when looking at wage
changes experienced by displaced workers.
See Topel (1991, p. 152). The intuition is that, while good matches last, it is also
the case that (especially among more experienced workers) new matches will not
be consummated unless they are especially good. Whenever the true causal effect
of tenure is positive, the latter effect outweighs the former.
Neal (1995) has noted that the tenure effect also captures industry-specific skills
when (as is usually the case) tenure in the industry is not in the list of regressors.
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) presented estimates of stronger tenure effects on
wages in Japan than in the United States. Teulings and Hartog (1998, chap. 1)
presented estimates for 11 countries that are consistent with the patterns noted
below (higher tenure effects in “noncorporatist” countries). Unlike the displacement-based estimates in this volume, however, all these estimates are based on
cross-section data only, and thus do not correct for unobserved ability differences
between workers of different tenure levels.
See Teulings and Hartog (1998), Table 1 of the synopsis, and Chapter 5.
If anything, human-capital theory predicts the opposite: older workers should
invest less in new skills; to the extent they pay their own training costs, this
should raise their starting wages on their postdisplacement jobs. As discussed for
unemployment durations, however, older workers may have more specialized
industry- or occupation-specific skills that are not completely captured by the tenure variables used here. Another explanation might be a composition effect
related to induced retirement. For this to explain the age effect, however, it would
have to be the case that among older workers, those with low reemployment wage
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prospects (relative to their previous job) are more likely to return to work. This
seems unlikely.
At least this is true in the sense that, for every country in which the given correlation is reported in this volume, it has the same sign.
This question has recently been addressed using consumption data by Stephens
(1999) and by Browning and Crossley (2000).
This assumes the Australian average for men (3.9) and women (5.2) together is
between 4 and 5 percent.
I focus on closures rather than substantial shrinkage of a firm’s or plant’s workforce for two reasons. One is comparability among all four countries: in France
and Germany, the statistics on closures are the only ones reported. The more
important reason is conceptual: estimated displacement rates due to firm or plant
shrinkage in Belgium and Denmark may be substantially inflated by voluntary
turnover during the window period, especially in small firms and plants.
See, for example, Kuhn and Sweetman (1999, Table 1).
Consistent with our interpretation, Bertola and Rogerson (1997) also noted a
broad uniformity among countries in job turnover rates, despite large differences
in unemployment inflows. They also made reference to employment-protection
laws as an explanation for this pattern because they allow worker reallocation to
occur without an intervening unemployment spell.
One could counter, of course, that even if the total amount of labor reallocation is
fixed, the share of such reallocation that is involuntary (from the worker’s point of
view) may not be. Bertola and Rogerson (1997), however, reported similar rates
of labor reallocation (as measured by job turnover) among countries, and present
theoretical arguments—related to wage compression—for why most reallocation
is involuntary from the worker’s point of view.
It may be worth recalling (see Note 30) that the Danish data could be contaminated by normal turnover during the “window” period, especially in small plants.
This is of much less concern in the German data, which restrict attention to plant
closures only.
Other European countries tend to have more flexible EPL provisions, which may
be more sensitive to the circumstances surrounding each mass layoff or plant closure, because they involve case-by-case negotiations in the construction of a
“social plan.”
Recall that the control group wage-growth rates that are relevant here occur
within cohorts, while most aggregate wage-growth statistics make comparisons
among cohorts.
The six percent loss (relative to controls) among Danish workers with three or
more years of tenure is the most negative point estimate, but—due in part to the
small sample size—the 95 percent confidence interval stretches from about –2 to
–10 percent (see Chapter 6, Table 6.10B).
These countries also tend to have the highest measured earnings inequality, especially at the low end of the earnings distribution—which is most relevant to the
losses experienced by displaced workers. See, for example, the statistics on the

54

Kuhn

ratio between the 50th and 10th percentiles of the earnings distribution in OECD
1993, Table 5.2.
39. Another possible manifestation of the relation between wage-setting institutions
and displaced workers’ wage losses is alluded to in Chapter 4 by Borland et al. In
many respects, the United Kingdom and Australia have similar labor markets,
with low levels of employment protection and moderate levels of union membership. One big difference, however, is the very centralized system of wage-setting
institutions embodied in Australia’s awards system. Noting that they found substantial wage losses in Britain but not Australia, these authors speculated that
wage-setting institutions may play a role. As they pointed out, however, the fact
that their Australian sample was much younger could also have accounted for
some, or all, of this difference.
40. These issues have recently been addressed for a sample of Latin American countries by Heckman and Pages (2000).
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Table 1.1 Institutions Affecting Displacement: Employment-Protection Laws

Country

Justification for
“economic”
layoffs needed?

Mandatory advance notice:
individual terminations

Mandatory
advance notice:
Mandatory
mass terminations severance pay

Consultation and other
requirements

U.S.A.

No

None

2 Months

None

Inform local government
of mass layoffs

Netherlands

Yesa—layoffs
are by permit
only

Workers under age 45:
0.25 month per year service

No special
provision

Only in court
cases

No special provisions

Over age 45:
0.5 months per year service, up
to 6 months
Notice begins after permit issued

Japan

Yes—firms must One month
demonstrate
economic
necessity and
correct procedure

No special
provision

None

Extensive procedural
requirements, including
use of all reasonable
alternatives (early
retirements, cutting
temporary and part-time
employment) before
layoffs of “regular”
employees

Canadab

No

Up to 4 months
for layoffs
of over 500
workers

0.25 Months
per year of
service, up to
6 monthsc

Notify local authorities of
mass layoffs

0.25 Month per year service,
up to 2 months

U.K.

No

0.25 Month per year service,
up to 3 months.

1 Month for
0.25 Month per No special provisions
year of service
layoffs of
20–100 workers between ages
22–40
3 Months for
layoffs of
0.375 Months per
over 100
year of service
workers
between ages
41–60d

Australia

No

0.25 Month in “typical”
pre-1984 award

No special
provision

0.5 Months per
year service, up
to 2 mo.
(in TCR-test case
awards only)

Restrictions on
terminations specified in
award settlements, which
vary by occupation,
industry, and state.

Same as for
individual
terminations

>2 Years
service: 0.1
month salary
per year of
service

Employer must offer a
retraining option

“As soon as practicable” in
TCR test-case awarde
France

Yes—must
demonstrate
economic
necessity to
works council

0.5–2 Years service: 1 month
>2 Years service: 2 months
However, legal procedures before
notice can be issued take from
1 to 2.5 months.

>10 Years
service:
0.17 month salary
per year of
service

Workers have priority in
future hiring for one year
Must share accounting
information with works
council
In larger layoffs, a “social
plan” must be devised

(continued)
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Table 1.1 (continued)

Country
Germany

Belgium

Justification for
“economic”
layoffs needed?

Mandatory advance notice:
individual terminations

Yes—layoffs of
workers with > 6
months tenure
prohibited unless
shown to be
“socially
acceptable”f

Blue-collar workers:
1 month after 5 years
3 months after 10 years

No

Blue-collar workers:
<20 years service: 1 month
>20 years service: 2 months

White collar workers:
3 months after 5 years
6 months after 10 years

White-collar workers:
<5 years service: 3 months
5-9 years: 6 months
10-15 years: 9 months, etc.
(courts often award even
longer notice periods for whitecollar workers)

Mandatory
advance notice:
Mandatory
mass terminations severance pay
Generally
No special
legislation; may negotiated in
be negotiated in social plan
social plan

Consultation and other
requirements
Works council must be
consulted for all layoffs
For large layoffs, council
can demand a “social
plan”
For large layoffs, must
inform local employment
office

None

One month’s
pay per year
service in plant
closures (less in
mass layoffs)

In addition to statutory
minima, notice periods for
white-collar workers are
affected by an extensive
body of case law. Typical
periods depend on age,
specialization, tenure and
wage, ranging up to 36
months

Denmark

No

White-collar workers only:
increases with tenure to a
maximum of 6 months

None

None

For mass layoffs: required
to notify regional labor
market board and
negotiate with union

NOTE: For comparability, any notice or severance requirements legislated in weeks have been converted to monthly amounts, at 0.25
months per week (exception: 26 weeks is converted as 6 months).
a
Employees on fixed-term contracts are exempt from these requirements.
b
Canadian legislation varies by province. Figures are for Ontario, which is the largest province and fairly typical (except for severance
pay).
c
Only applies to Ontario (Canada’s most populous province). Ontario has about 40% of the national population.
d
The maximum period of service for which severance is paid is 20 years. Statutory redundancy payments are free of income tax.
e
The TCR (Termination, Change, and Redundancy) test case award incorporated stronger restrictions on dismissals for the first time; its
provisions have been adopted by only a minority of awards since 1984.
f
Since the 1985 Employment Promotion Act, nonrenewable limited-duration contracts of up to 18 months have been exempt from these
requirements.
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Table 1.2 Institutions Affecting Displacement: Unemployment Insurance Systems
Country
U.S.A.

a

Qualifying period
26 Weeks of work
in past year

Duration of benefits
26 Weeks (plus 13
weeks extended
benefits in years or
states with high
unemployment)

Replacement rate
50–70% to a
maximum
Actual average
replacement rate
30–40%

“Fallback” program
Means-tested
welfare benefits
available to single
parents only
Lifetime limit of 5
years

Comments
Very low takeup rate
Quitters disqualified
Benefits taxed as
income

Netherlands

26 Weeks of work in 6 Months to 5 years, 70%
past year
depending on
employment history

Universal social
Quitters disqualified
assistance; unlimited
High takeup
duration
Long-term
Disability insurance
unemployed must
an attractive
accept jobs below
alternative to UI
their previous “skill”
level

Japan

26 Weeks of work
in past year

90–300 Days;
increases with age,
years worked, and
full time status

50–80%, depending
on age and rate of
pay, to a maximum

Universal welfare,
unlimited duration

Some restrictions on
quitters

Canada

10–20 Weeks of
work in past year
(decreases with
local unemployment rate)

55%, to a maximum
14–50 Weeks,
increases with
weeks worked and
local unemployment
rate

Universal welfare,
unlimited duration

Quitters disqualified
Easy to requalify in
successive years based
on seasonal work.
Higher takeup than
U.S.A.

U.K.

2 Years continuous
employmentb

6 Months

Flat rate cash benefit UA (means-tested
unemployment
assistance), based on
household income;
unlimited duration

(£48.25 in 1996)

Long-term sickness
benefit an
attractive alternative
to both UA and UI

UA is often more
generous than UI,
especially if no other
earners in the
household. UA can
include full rent and
property tax subsidy.

Australia

None

Unlimited

Flat amounts based
on family income,
family size, and
home ownership

Benefits low relative
Unemployment
benefit itself acts as to average earnings
“the” welfare system.

France

5 Alternative ways
to qualify for
different benefit
durations, depending
on work history in
last 3 years

4 Months to 33
months, depending
on employment
history and age

57–75% of previous
earnings (no
maximum); benefit
rate falls after an
initial jobless period

RMI (Minimum
Insertion
Allowance): meanstested program

Seasonal workers
disqualified

(continued)
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Table 1.2 (continued)
Country
Germany

Qualifying period
12 months in last 3
years (for AG or
Arbeitslosengeld)

Duration of benefits
156–832 Days,
depending on age
and employment
history

Replacement rate
67% of previous net
wage (60% for
workers without
children)

“Fallback” program
AH
(Arbeitslosenhilfe)

Comments
12-Week waiting
period for quitters

57% of previous net
wage (50%
without children)
Means-tested;
unlimited duration.

Belgium

None

Unlimited, though
benefits reduced
after one year of
unemployment

Effectively, benefits
are flat amounts
based on family
status and current
incomec

UI functions as the
main social safety
net

Denmark

6 Months work in
previous yeard

Essentially
unlimitede

Up to 90%

Means-tested “social UI funds administered
assistance” program by trade union; very
wide coverage
(bistandsydelse)
provides unlimitedduration benefits

Declines with
previous wage;
Average replacement rate is 65%

Search requirement
rarely enforced

a

Provisions vary by state. Typical parameters are presented.
Before 1988, insurance contributions could be credited during unemployment spells to maintain eligibility.
c
Official replacement rates are 60% in the first year of unemployment and 40% after that. In most cases these are made irrelevant by a
higher flat benefit amount based on the family’s “needs.”
d
Some new entrants can qualify for UI based on apprenticeship training periods.
e
Throughout the sample period in this volume (until the early 1990s) unemployed workers could requalify for UI by participating in a
public employment scheme.
b
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Table 1.3 Institutions Affecting Displacement: Unions and Minimum Wages
Country

Union density
and coverage

Bargaining level(s),
contract extension

Minimum wages:
jurisdict. and coverage

Minimum wages:
levels

U.S.A.

Density 14.5% (1996)
(10% in private sector)
Coverage rates similar to
membership

Firm-level bargaining
No extension

State and federal; federal
supersedes state if higher

$5.15/hr (1997) (40% of
average production worker
wage)

Netherlands

Membership 26% (1990)a
Coverage 75% (1998)

Industry-level bargaining,
extensions common

National

14.01 Guilders (US$7)/hr

Japan

Membership 24% (1998)
Coverage similar

Firm-level bargaining, no
extension

Prefectural minima, plus
some industry minima
within prefectures

4868 Yen/day (weighted
regional minimum, 1995);
36% of mean contract wage

Canada

Membership 31% Coverage Firm-level bargaining, no
34% (1997)
extension

Provincial (with a small
federal sector)

38% of mean manufacturing
wage, 1994

U.K.

Membership about 30%
Coverage 37% (1996)

Firm-level bargaining, no
extension

None: wages councils
were abolished in 1993

None

Australia

Membership 31% (1996)
Coverage 80% ((1990)a

Industrial tribunals, with
union and firm
representation; set wage
“awards” by occup. and
industry

Awards pervasive;
no other wage minima

Set by awards

France

Membership 10% (1996)
Coverage 90% (1985)a

Industry-level bargaining,
extension pervasive

National minimum wage

84% of mean industrial wage
(1995)

Germany

Membership 32%
Coverage 90% (1992)a

Industry- and regional-level No minimum wage apart
from (extended) union
bargaining, extension is
contracts
pervasive

Belgium

Membership 51%
Coverage 90% (1990)a

National-, industry-,
and firm-level bargaining
(pyramidal)

Denmark

Membership 80–90%
Coverage 75%

National bargaining,
No minimum wage apart
supplemented by firm-level from (extended) union
agreements
contracts

a

National minimum wage

None

Low national minimum,
generally superseded by
extended union contracts
None

Figures from OECD 1994, chart 5.1.

65

66

Table 1.4 Displacement and Gender: Are Men More Likely to Be Displaced?
Comparing means

Using regressions

Result

Source
(table no.)

Result

U.S.A.

Yes

2.2

n.d.a

—

—

Netherlands

Yes

2.7

Yes

2.9

Age, tenure, educ.,
part-time, industry,
firm size, wage,
occup., job complexity

Japan

Yes, but small
difference

3.8

n.d.

—

—

Canada

Yes, very much

3.8

n.d.

—

—

yes

4.2

b

4.3

Australia

Yes

4.11

n.d.

—

Belgium

No, women
more likely

6.4

Yes

6.5

Age, tenure, bluecollar, wage

Denmark

No difference

6.4

Yes

6.2

Age, tenure, bluecollar, wage

Country

U.K.

Yes

Source
(table no.)

NOTE: The chapter on France and Germany presents results for men only and thus is excluded from this table.
n.d. = no data available.
b
But significant only for temporary contract expirations.
a

Variables held
constant

Age, tenure, educ.,
part-time, industry,
firm size, marital
status, children
—

Table 1.5 Displacement and Skills: Are Unskilled Workers More Likely to Be Displaced?
Comparing means
Country
Netherlands

U.K.

Skill measure

Result

Source
(table no.)

Job complexity

Yes

2.7

Wage

n.d.b

Education

Education

Using regressions
Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

No,a lower rates
in less
complex jobs

2.8, 2.9

Gender, age,
tenure, educ., parttime, industry, firm
size, wage, occup.

—

Yes

2.8, 2.9

Gender, age,
tenure, educ., parttime, industry, firm
size, occup., job
complexity

Yes
(weak effect)

2.7

Insignif.c

2.8, 2.9

Gender, age,
tenure, part-time,
industry, firm size,
wage, occup., job
complexity

Nonmonotonic:
lowest disp. in
middle groups

4.2

Yes

4.3

Gender, age,
tenure, part-time,
industry, firm size,
marital status,
children

Result
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Table 1.5 (continued)
Comparing means

Using regressions

Skill measure

Result

Source
(table no.)

France

Education

n.d.

—

Lowest disp. in
middle groups

5.3

Gender,d age,
tenure

Belgium

B/W collar

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age,
tenure, wage

Wage

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age,
tenure, blue-collar

B/W collar

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age,
tenure, wage

Wage

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age,
tenure, blue-collar

Country

Denmark

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass displacements. No results on skills and displacement rates are available in this volume for the U.S.A., Australia, Japan, Canada, or Germany. For the United States, Farber (1997) showed that educated workers are much less likely to be displaced than other workers,
though the relative displacement rates of these groups increased in the 1990s. For Canada, Picot, Lin, and Pyper (1997) showed that
Canadians earning high wages are much less likely to be displaced than other Canadians.
a
No = coefficient significant at 5% level but opposite in size to question posed.
b
n.d. = no data available.
c
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d
Regressions run for men only.

Table 1.6 Displacement and Age: Are Younger Workers More Likely to Be Displaced?
Comparing means

Using regressions

Result

Source
(table no.)

Result

U.S.A.

Yes

2.4

n.d.a

—

—

Netherlands

Yes

2.7

Small, nonmonotonic
effect

2.9

Gender, tenure, educ.,
part-time, industry,
firm size, wage,
occup., job complexity

No, less likely

3.8

n.d.

—

—

Canada

Yes, but disp. rates
rise after 55

3.8

n.d.

—

—

U.K.

Yes, but disp. rates
rise after 55

4.2

Yesb

4.3

Gender, tenure, educ.,
part-time, industry,
firm size, marital
status, children

Country

Japan

Australia

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

No effect

4.13

n.d.

—

—

France

Yes, but disp. rates
rise after 50

5.2

No

5.3

Gender,c tenure, educ.

Germany

Yes, but disp. rates
rise after 50

5.4

No

5.5

Gender,c tenure, educ.,
industry
(continued)
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Table 1.6 (continued)
Comparing means
Country

Result

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

Belgium

Yes, but
not strongly

6.4

Yes, within
displacing firms,
otherwise nod

6.5

Gender, tenure, bluecollar, wage (but the
tenure variable groups
together all those with
6 or more years)

Denmark

No effect

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, tenure, bluecollar, wage (but the
tenure variable groups
together all those with
6 or more years)

NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass displacements.
a
n.d. = no data available.
b
But significant only for temporary contract expirations.
c
Regressions run for men only.
d
In a sample of all employed workers, displacement is correlated to age between ages 20 and 59. Teens have lower displacement rates
and workers over 60 have higher rates than those 20–59.

Table 1.7 Displacement and Tenure: Are Low-Tenure Workers More Likely to Be Displaced?
Comparing means
Country

Result

Source
(table no.)

Using regressions
Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

a

—

—

2.9

Gender, age, educ., part-time, industry,
firm size, wage, occ., job complexity

Result

U.S.A.

Yes,
strongly

2.3

n.d.

Netherlands

Yes,
strongly

2.6

Yes

Canada
U.K.
Australia
France

Yesb

—

n.d.

—

—

Yes,
strongly

4.2

Yes

4.3

Gender, age, educ., part-time, industry,
firm size, marital status, children

Yes

4.12, 4.13

n.d.

—

—
c

Yes,
not strongly

5.2

Yes

5.3

Gender, age, educ.

Germany

Yes

5.4

Yes

5.5

Gender, age, educ., industry

Belgium

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age, blue-collar, wage

Denmark

Yes

6.4

Yes

6.5

Gender, age, blue-collar, wage

NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass
displacements.
a
n.d. = no data available.
b
No results are reported in this volume for Japan or Canada. However, when jobs lasting under a year were excluded from the Canadian
displacement counts, displacement rates fell dramatically.
c
Regressions run for men only.
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Table 1.8 Joblessness and Gender: Do Displaced Women Experience More Joblessness?
Comparing means
Country
U.S.A.

Jobless measure

Result

Prob. (positive
spell)

n.d.

Duration of
positive spells

a

Source
(table no.)

Using regressions
Source
(table no.)

Result
b

Variables held constant

—

Insignif.

2.12

Age, tenure, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Yes

2.10

Yes

2.12

Age, tenure, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Unconditional
duration

Yes

2.10

Yes

2.12

Age, tenure, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Duration of
positive spells
(insured
unemployment)

Yes

2.16

Yes

2.17

Age, wage, married, urban, parttime, UI sanction

Japanc

Unconditional
duration

Yes

3.11

n.d.

—

—

Canada

Unconditional
duration

Yes

3.11

n.d.

—

—

U.K.

Duration of
positive spells

n.d.

—

Insignif.

4.6

Age, tenure, qualif., married,
children, part-time, occup.,
industry, industry declining, firm
size

Netherlands

Unconditional
duration

n.d.

—

Insignif.

4.6

Age, tenure, qualif., married,
children, part-time, occup.,
industry, industry declining, firm
size

Australia

Survey date
reemployment

Yes

4.12, 4.13

Yes

4.16

Age, educ., math and reading
aptitude, unempl. rate in last
occup.

Belgium

Duration of
positive spells
(insured
unemployment)

n.d.

—

Yes

6.8

Age, tenure, last wage, whitecollar

Denmark

Duration of
positive spells
(insured
unemployment)

n.d.

—

Insignif.

6.8

Age, tenure, last wage, whitecollar (very small sample)

NOTE: The chapter on France and Germany presents results for men only. Except where noted, durations refer to total joblessness following displacement, whether due to unemployment or labor-force withdrawal.
a
n.d. = no data available.
b
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c
For Japan and Canada, separate duration regressions were run for women and men, but no predictions at common values of the regressors were performed.
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Comparing means
Country
(skill measure)

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Prob. (positive
spell)

n.d.

a

—

Yes

2.12

Gender, age, tenure, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Duration of
positive spells

n.d.

—

Yes

2.12

Gender, age, tenure, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Unconditional
duration

n.d.

—

Yes

2.12

Gender, age, tenure, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Netherlands
Duration of
(predisp. wage) positive (insured
UI) spells

n.d.

—

Yes

2.17

Gender, age, married, urban, parttime, UI sanction

Japan
(education)

Unconditional
duration

n.d.

—

Insignif.

3.12

Gender,c age, firm size, part-time,
industry, age-sex specific U/V ratio.

Canada
(education,
predisp. wage)

Unconditional
duration

n.d.

—

Yes

3.13

Gender,c age, tenure, firm size, parttime, industry, region (only the
predisp. wage is signif. for men; only
education is signif. for women)

U.K.
(qualifications)

Duration of
positive spells

n.d.

—

Insignif.

4.6

Gender, age, tenure, occup., married,
children, part-time, industry, industry
declining, firm size

Unconditional
duration

n.d.

—

Insignif.

4.6

Gender, age, tenure, occupation,
married, children, part-time, industry,
industry declining, firm size

U.S.A.
(education)

Jobless measure

Result

Variables held constant
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Table 1.9 Joblessness and Skills: Do Skilled Displaced Workers Experience Less Joblessness?

Australia
(education)

Survey date
reemployment

Yes

4.13

Yes

4.16

Gender, age, math and reading
aptitude, unempl. rate in last occup.
(aptitude scores are not significant)

France
(education)

Duration of
positive spells

n.d.

—

Yes

5.7

Gender,d age, tenure, year

Germany
(education)

Duration of
positive spells

n.d.

—

Noe—
educated
workers have
longer
durations

5.9

Gender,d age, tenure, year

Belgium
Duration of
(predisp. wage) positive (insured
UI) spells

n.d.

—

Yes

6.8

Gender, age, tenure, white-collar

Denmark
Duration of
(predisp. wage) positive (insured
UI) spells

n.d.

—

Insignif.

6.8

Gender, age, tenure, white-collar (very
small sample; positive point estimate)

NOTE: Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass
displacements.
a
n.d. = no data available.
b
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d
Regressions were run for men only.
e
No = coefficient significant at 5% level but opposite in sign to question posed.
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Comparing means
Country

Jobless measurea

Result
b

Source
(table no.)

Using regressions
Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

Prob. (positive spell)

n.d.

—

Yes
(borderline
significant)

2.12

Gender, tenure, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Duration of positive
spells

Yes

2.10

Yes

2.12

Gender, tenure, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Unconditional duration

Yes

2.10

Yes

2.12

Gender, tenure, educ, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Netherlands

Duration of positive
spells (insured
unemployment)

Yes

2.16

Yes

2.17

Gender, wage, married, urban,
part-time, UI sanction

Japan

Unconditional duration

n.d.

—

Insignif.

3.12

Gender,c educ., firm size, parttime, industry, age-sex specific
U/V ratio.

Canada

Unconditional duration

n.d.

—

U-shaped
effect

3.13

Gender,c educ., firm size, parttime, industry, region (result also
holds when tenure, union and
wage are included)

U.K.

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

Yes

4.6

Gender, tenure, qualif., occup.,
married, children, part-time,
industry, industry declining, firm
size

U.S.A.
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Table 1.10 Joblessness and Age: Do Older Displaced Workers Experience More Joblessness?

Unconditional duration

n.d.

—

Yes

4.6

Gender, tenure, qualif., occup.,
married, children, part-time,
industry, industry declining, firm
size

Yes (mostly
age 55–64)

4.13

Yes

4.16

Gender, educ., math and reading
aptitude, unempl. rate in last
occupation [becomes insignif.
when year dummies included]

Australia

Survey date
reemployment

France

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

Insignif.

5.7

Gender,d tenure, educ., year

Germany

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

Yes

5.9

Gender,d tenure, educ., year

Belgium

Duration of positive
spells (insured
unemployment)

n.d.

—

Yes

6.8

Gender, tenure, last wage, whitecollar

Denmark

Duration of positive
spells (insured
unemployment)

n.d.

—

Insignif.

6.8

Gender, tenure, last wage, whitecollar (very small sample; point
estimates suggest older workers
do have longer durations)

a

Except where noted, durations refer to total joblessness following displacement, whether due to unemployment or labor-force withdrawal.
n.d. = no data available.
c
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d
Regressions were run for men only.
b
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Comparing means
Country
U.S.A.

Jobless measure

Result
a

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

Prob. (positive spell)

n.d.

—

Insignif.

2.12

Gender, age, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Duration of positive
spells

Yes

12.0

Insignif.

2.12

Gender, age, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Unconditional duration

Yes

2.10

Insignif.

2.12

Gender, age, educ, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure, notice

Canada

Unconditional duration

n.d.

—

Yes

3.13

Gender,c age, educ., firm size,
part-time, industry, region (result
also holds when union and wage
are included)

U.K.

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

Yes

4.6

Gender, age, qualif., occup.,
married, children, part-time,
industry, industry declining, firm
size (but age controls are coarse
and the only signif. effect is for
tenure < 1 year)

Unconditional duration

n.d.

—

Yes

4.6

Gender, age, qualif., occup.,
married, children, part-time,
industry, industry declining, firm
size (see comment above)
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Table 1.11 Joblessness and Tenure: Do High-Tenure Displaced Workers Experience More Joblessness?

Australia

Survey date
reemployment

France

Germany

Belgium

Yes, but
largely for
tenure >10
years

4.12, 4.13

n.d.

—

—

Prob. (positive spell)

Nod—
unemployment
spells less
likely

5.6

n.d.

—

—

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

Yes

5.7

Prob. (positive spell)

Nod—
unemployment
spells less
likely

5.8

n.d.

—

Duration of positive
spells

n.d.

—

No—senior
workers have
shorter
durations

5.9

Gender,b age, educ., year

Duration of positive
spells (insured
unemployment)

n.d.

—

No—senior
workers have
shorter
durations

6.8

Gender, age, last wage, whitecollar

Gender,e age, educ., year
—
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Table 1.11 (continued)
Comparing means
Country
Denmark

Jobless measure
Duration of positive
spells (insured
unemployment)

Using regressions

Result

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

n.d.

—

Insignif.

6.8

Variables held constant
Gender, age, last wage, whitecollar (very small sample; point
estimates suggest senior workers
have shorter durations)

NOTE: No information on tenure is available in the Netherlands or Japan. Recall that France, Germany, Belgium, and Denmark focus on
mass displacements only; others combine individual and mass displacements.
a
n.d. = no data available.
b
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
c
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d
In a sample of all employed workers, displacement is correlated to age between ages 20 and 59. Teens have lower displacement rates
and workers over 60 have higher rates than those 20–59.

Table 1.12 Wage Loss and Tenure: Do High-Tenure Displaced Workers Experience Larger Wage Losses?
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Using regressions

Result

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

Weekly earnings

Yes

2.19

Yes

2.21

Gender, age, educ., married,
nonwhite, immig., closure,
notice, union

Netherlands

Monthly earnings,
within an
employment spell

n.d.b

—

Yes, though
significant only for
tenure under vs.
over 1 year

2.22

Gender, age, educ., married,
immig., spell length, type of
displacement

Canada

Hourly wage rate

Yes

3.16

Yes

3.20

Gender,c age, educ., firm size
(pre and post), industry
change, visible minority,
union (pre and post),
province

U.K.

Weekly earnings

Yes, except
lowest tenure
category

4.8a

Yes, but signif. only
in Table 4.10
(which includes all
separation reasons)

4.9, 4.10

Gender, age, educ., change in
firm size, industry decline,
unempl. duration, part-time
predispl., part-time
postdispl.

Yes

4.8b

Yes, but signif. only
in Table 4.10
(which includes all
separation reasons)

4.9, 4.10

Gender, age, educ., change in
firm size, industry decline,
unempl. duration

Weekly earnings,
full-time–full-time
only

(continued)
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Table 1.12 (continued)
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Result

Source
(table no.)

Using regressions
Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

Belgium

Daily wage rate

n.d.

—

Insignif., point
estimates
consistently show
higher losses
though

16.11

Gender, age, blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, closure,
region, occup.d

Denmark

Hourly wage rate

n.d.

—

Insignif.; point
estimates
consistently show
higher losses
though

6.11

Gender, age, blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, closure,
region, occup.d

NOTE: Data on predisplacement tenure are unavailable for Australia or Japan. Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact
wage losses with demographic characteristics.
In all cases the dependent variable is a wage measure (pay per unit of time worked), not an earnings measure. Details are as follows:
U.S.: Change in log wages, up to three years after displacement
Netherlands: Change in log wages, up to four months after displacement
Japan: Worker’s self-reported percentage change in wages, within a year of displacement
Canada: (calculated) percentage change in wages, from actual pre- and postdisplacement wages up to 16 months apart
U.K. Change in log wages, one year after displacement

a

Australia: Change in log wages, one to two years after displacement
Belgium: Log hourly wage rate two years after displacement
Denmark: Log hourly wage rate two years after displacement
b
n.d. = no data available.
c
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
d
Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
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Table 1.13 Wage Loss and Age: Do Older Displaced Workers Experience Larger Wage Losses?
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

Yes (except for
oldest group)

2.19

Yes

2.21

Gender, tenure,
educ., married,
nonwhite, immig.,
closure, notice,
union
Gender, tenure,
educ., married,
immig., spell
length, type of
displacement

Result

U.S.A.

Weekly wages

Netherlands

Monthly earnings,
within an
employment spell

n.d.b

—

Insignif.c

2.22

Japan

Wage rate per
month, excluding
bonuses

Yes, though
primarily among
men

3.14

Yes

3.18, 3.19

Gender,d educ.,
firm size (pre and
post), type of
displacement
(shukko vs. layoff),
industry change,
year

Yes (both men
and women)

3.15

Yes

3.20

Gender,d educ.,
firm size (pre and
post), industry
change, visible
minority (result is
robust to additional
controls for tenure
and union)

Weekly wages

Yes

4.8a

Insignif.

4.9

Gender, tenure,
educ., change in
firm size, industry
decline, unempl.
duration, part-time

Weekly wages,
full-time–full-time
only

Yes

4.8b

Yes

4.9

Gender, tenure,
educ., change in
firm size, industry
decline, unempl.
duration

Average weekly
earnings

n.d.

—

Yes

4.19

Sex, educ.,
immigrant, fulltime–part-time
changes, unempl.
rate in predisp.
occup.e

Canada

Hourly wage
rate

U.K.

Australia
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Table 1.13 (continued)
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Result

Source
(table no.)

Using regressions
Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

Belgium

Daily wage rate

n.d.

—

Yes, but only
over age 60

6.11

Gender, tenure,
blue-collar,
predispl. firm size,
closure, region,
occup.f

Denmark

Hourly wage rate

n.d.

—

Yes, but only
over age 60

6.11

Gender, tenure,
blue-collar,
predispl. firm size,
closure, region,
occup.f

NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics.
See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b
n.d. = no data available.
c
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
e
Sample includes quitters, with a dummy for displaced.
f
Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
a

Table 1.14 Wage Loss and Gender: Do Displaced Women Experience Larger Wage Losses?
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Result
b

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

U.S.A.

Weekly wages

Yes

2.19

Insignif.

Netherlands

Monthly earnings,
within an
employment spell

n.d.

—

Insignif.

2.22

Age, tenure, educ, married,
immig., type of
displacement

Japan

Wage rate per
month, excluding
bonuses

Noc—
men have
bigger losses

3.14

n.d.

—

—

Canada

Hourly wage
rate

Yes, but
difference is
small

3.15

n.d.

—

—

U.K.

Weekly wages

Yes

4.8a

Insignif.

4.9

Age, tenure, educ., change
in firm size, industry
decline, unemp. duration,
part-time predisp., part-time
postdisp.

Weekly wages,
full-time–full-time
only

Yes

4.8b

Insignif.

4.9

Age, tenure, educ., change
in firm size, industry
decline, unempl. duration

2.21 (col. 3) Age, tenure, educ, married,
nonwhite, immig., closure,
notice, union
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Table 1.14 (continued)
Comparing means
Country

Wage loss
measurea

Result

Using regressions

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held constant

Australia

Average weekly
earnings

No
difference

4.18

Insignif.

4.19

Age, educ., immigrant, fulltime-part-time changes,
unempl. rate in predispl.
occup. (sample includes
quitters)

Belgium

Daily wage rate

n.d.

—

Yes

6.11

Age, tenure, blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, closure,
region, occup.d

Denmark

Hourly wage rate

n.d.

—

Yes

6.11

Age, tenure, blue-collar,
predispl. firm size, closure,
region, occup.d

NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics. For Japan and Canada,
separate duration regressions were run for women and men, but no predictions at common values of the regressors were performed.
a
See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b
Men experience a small wage gain; women, a small loss.
c
n.d. = no data available.
d
Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.

Table 1.15 Wage Loss and Skills: Do Skilled Displaced Workers Experience Smaller Wage Losses?
Comparing means
Country and skill
measure

Wage loss
measurea

Using regressions

Result

Source
(table no.)

Result

Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

U.S.A.
(education)

Weekly wages

n.d.b

—

Insignif.c

2.21

Gender, tenure, age,
married, nonwhite,
immig., closure,
notice, union

Netherlands
(education)

Monthly earnings,
within an
employment spell

n.d.

—

Insignif.

2.22

Gender, tenure, age,
married, immig.,
spell length, type of
displacement

Japan
(education)

Wage rate per
month, excluding
bonuses

n.d.

—

No—educated
workers have
larger losses

3.18, 3.19

Gender,d age, firm
size (pre and post),
type of
displacement
(shukko vs. layoff),
industry change,
year
(continued)
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Table 1.15 (continued)
Comparing means
Country and skill
measure

Wage loss
measurea

Canada
(education)

Hourly wage rate

U.K.
(education)

Weekly wages

Result

Source
(table no.)

n.d.

—

Yes, though
small effect

Weekly wages,
Yes, large effect
full-time–full-time
only

Using regressions
Source
(table no.)

Variables held
constant

No real pattern,
mostly insignif.

3.20

Gender,d age, firm
size (pre and post),
industry change,
visible minority
(result is robust to
additional controls
for tenure and
union)

4.8a

Insignif.

4.9

Gender, tenure,
educ., change in
firm size, industry
decline, unempl.
duration, part-time
predispl., part-time
postdispl.

4.8b

Insignif.

4.9

Gender, tenure, age,
change in firm size,
industry decline,
unempl. duration

Result

Australia
(education)

Average weekly
earnings

n.d.

—

Insignif.

4.19

Gender, age,
immigrant, fulltime–part-time
changes,
unemployment rate
in predispl. occup.e

Belgium
(white-collar)

Daily wage rate

n.d.

—

Yes

6.11

Gender, age, tenure,
predispl. firm size,
closure, region,
occup.f

Denmark
(white-collar)

Hourly wage rate

n.d.

—

Insignif.

6.11

Gender, age, tenure,
predispl. firm size,
closure, region,
occup.f

NOTE: Wage regressions for France and Germany do not interact wage losses with demographic characteristics.
a
See notes to Table 1.12 for more detail on the dependent variables.
b
n.d. = no data available.
c
Insignif. = not significant at the 5% level.
d
Separate regressions were run for women and men.
e
Sample includes quitters, with a dummy for displaced.
f
Regression is for postdisplacement wage, controlling for predisplacement wage.
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Table 1.16 Who Loses Most from Displacement across Countries?
The Effects of Gender, Age, Tenure, and Skill Level
Outcome
measure
Attribute
Gender

Age
Tenure
Skill level
a

Frequency of
displacement

Postdisplacement
joblessness

Displacementinduced wage losses

Men

Women

Either no difference,
or women lose more
(except Japan)

Young (except
Japana)

Old

Juniora

Varies

Unskilled

Unskilled

Old
Senior (in U.S.A.,
U.K., and Canada)
No consistent
difference

In Japan, no tenure information is available. Thus, we cannot say whether the
observed age effect is purely due to lower tenure among the young, or what the “true”
tenure effect is.

Table 1.17 Annual Displacement Rates: International Comparisons
Data source

Displacement definition

Period

Population

Rate
(annual)

Source
(table no.)

Retrospective
survey of
persons

Self reports of
permanent job loss due
to plant closing, slack
work, position or shift
abolished
(includes individual and
mass layoffs)

1993–95

Tenure greater
than 1 year, age
20–64

4.9 (M)
4.3 (F)
4.6 (A)

2.3

All tenure levels,
age 20–64

5.3 (M)
4.5 (F)
4.9 (A)

Netherlands

Panel survey of Firms’ reported layoffs,
firms
plus: workers moving
into new jobs, early
retirement, or disability
insurance from firms
shrinking 30% or more

1993–95

All tenure levels,
age 60 and under

4.2 (M)
4.0 (F)
4.1 (A)

2.6

Layoffs during
probationary
periods excluded

Japan

Panel survey of Firms’ reports of
firms
separations due to
“management
convenience” only

1995

Establishments
with more than 5
employees,
tenure one
month or more,
age 15 and over

1.3 (M)
1.1 (F)
1.2 (A)

3.8

—

U.S.A.

Comments

2.3
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Table 1.17 (continued)
Data source

Rate
(annual)

Source
(table no.)

Establishments
with more than
5 employees,
tenure one
month or more,
age 15 and over

3.7 (M)
3.2 (F)
3.5 (A)

3.8

Establishments
with more than
5 employees,
tenure one
month or more,
age 15 and over

6.1 (M)
3.4 (F)
4.9 (A)

3.8

1990–96

Age 18 to
pensionable
age

6.4 (M)
2.9 (F)
4.7 (A)

4.1, 4.2

1995

Employed
workers

5.2 (M)
3.9 (F)

4.12

Displacement definition

Period

Population

“Management
convenience,” plus
“contract finished,” plus
mandatory retirement

1995

Administrative
data on
separations
(from
Employment
Insurance
system)

Firms’ reports of layoffs
(separations due to
“short work,” excluding
workers who return to
the original firm within a
year)

1995

U.K.

Household
panel survey

Workers’ reported job
loss due to redundancy
or dismissal

Australia

Labor mobility Workers ceasing a job
survey, 1995
due to retrenchment, ill
health, seasonal or
temporary job ended.

Canada

Comments

Same list of
industries as
Japan
May include a
small number of
fixed-term
contract
expirations
Includes a small
number of
dismissals for
cause

France

Panel of
administrative
social security
records

Workers separating from
dying firms, in the
calendar year of “death”
and the preceding
calendar year

1984

Age 25–50,
tenure at least
4 years

2.8 (M)

5.2

1984–90

Age 25–50,
tenure at least
4 years

1.0 (M)

5.4

Value is
calculated by
dividing the
7-year
displacement
rate in Table 5.4
(for 1984–1990)
by 7

1983

Tenure at least
3 years

1.6 (A)

6.3

All tenures

2.1(A)

Adjustments
made for “false
firm deaths,”
excludes public
sector

Adjustments made for
“false firm deaths”
Excludes workers who
return to original firm
within a year
Germany

Panel of
administrative
social security
records

Workers separating from
dying plants, in the
calendar year of “death”
and the preceding
calendar year
Adjustments made for
“false firm deaths”

Belgium

Panel of
administrative
social security
records

Workers separating from
dying firms in the
calendar year of death
(firms with at least 5
employees)
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Table 1.17 (continued)

Denmark

Rate
(annual)

Source
(table no.)

Tenure at least
3 years

0.6 (A)

6.3

All tenures

1.6 (A)

Data source

Displacement definition

Period

Population

Panel of
administrative
records

Workers separating from
dying plants with at least
5 employees in the
calendar year of death

1988

NOTE: (M) denotes “men”; (F), “women”; and (A), “all workers.”

Comments
Adjustments
made for “false
firm deaths,”
excludes public
sector

Table 1.18 Postdisplacement Unemployment: International Comparisons
Probability of a positive Jobless durations conditional
jobless spell
on a positive spell
Country
(displacement type)

Unconditional jobless
durations

Prob.a jobless Prob. jobless
Prob. jobless
after 6
after 12
Prob. jobless
after 12
Source for
months
months
after 6 months
months
durations

Result

Source
(table no.)

All tenure
levels

0.84

2.3

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

—

Tenure greater
than 1 year

.0.85

2.3

0.39

0.28

0.33

0.24

Tab. 2.10

Tenure 3 years
or moreb

n.d.

—

0.41

0.30

0.34

0.25

Tab. 2.10

All tenure
levels

0.30

2.13

0.45

0.27

n.d.

n.d.

Tab. 2.18

Tenure greater
than 1 year

0.30

2.13

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

—

Japan (all “layoffs”c)

All tenure
levels

n.d.

—

n.d.

n.d.

0.23 (M)d
0.25 (F)

0.14 (M)
0.11 (F)

Tab. 3.11

Canada (all layoffs)

All tenure
levels

n.d.

—

n.d.

n.d.

0.47 (M)
0.68 (F)

0.0 (M)
0.41 (F)

Tab. 3.11e

U.K. (all layoffs)

All tenure
levels

0.63

4.5

0.32

0.19f

0.20

0.12f

Tab. 4.5

U.S.A. (all layoffs)

Netherlands
(all layoffs)

Population
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Table 1.18 (continued)
Probability of a positive Jobless durations conditional
jobless spell
on a positive spell
Country
(displacement type)

Population

Result

Source
(table no.)

Unconditional jobless
durations

Prob.a jobless Prob. jobless
Prob. jobless
after 12
after 12
Prob. jobless
Source for
after 6
months
months
after 6 months
months
durations

Australia (all layoffs)

All tenure
levels, young
workers only

n.d.

—

0.27

0.15

n.d.

n.d.

Tab. 4.14

France (firm closures
only)

Tenure at
least 4 years

0.78 (M)

5:6

0.62 (M)

0.45 (M)

n.d.

n.d.

Fig. 5.1g

Germany (plant
closures only)

Tenure at
least 4 years

0.39 (M)

5:8

0.52 (M)

0.40 (M)

n.d.

n.d.

Fig. 5.2g

Belgium (firm shrinkage Tenure at
and closures only)
least 3 years

0.65h

6:6

n.d.

0.63 (M)

0.72 (M)

Denmark (plant
Tenure at
shrinkage and closures least 3 years
only)

0.31h

6:6

n.d.

0.28 (M)

0.37 (M)

a

Tab. 6.7
n.d.

n.d. = no data available.
Simple average of the proportions for 3–4, 5–9, and more than 10 years, respectively (these do not differ markedly).
c
Includes mandatory retirement and contract expirations; does not include shukko.
d
M = men; F = women.
e
Simple average of the “Canada A” and “Canada B” figures (these do not differ markedly).
f
After 10 months.
g
Numerical estimates based on figure.
h
Percent experiencing any unemployment in the three years after displacement.
b

Tab. 6.7

Table 1.19 Displacement-Induced Percentage Wage Changes: International Comparisons
Tenure on the predisplacement job (years)b

Country
(displacement type)

Relative
to
controls?a

U.S.A. (all
displacements)

No

U.S.A.
(mass, from
Jacobson,
LaLonde, and
Sullivan
1993)c

No
Yes

Japan (all)d

No

Canada (all)

No

3(M)
1(F)

0(M)
1(F)

U.K. (all)f

No

–6

1

Germany
(mass)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10+

All

Source

+11

+11

5

5

0

0

0

0

0

–19

0

Tab. 2.19

–23
–30

–23
–30

–23
–30

–23
–30

–23
–30

–5(M)
–8(F)

–5(M) –5(M) –5(M) –5(M) –5(M) –11(M)
–4(F) –4(F) –4(F) –4(F) –4(F) –7(F)

–5

–6
–5

–5

–11

–11

No

Fig. 1c

–4(M)e
0(F)

Tab. 3.14

–1(M)
–2(F)

Tab. 3.16

–4

Tab. 4.7,
4.8b

–6

–6

–6

–6

–6

–10

–10

–10

–10

–10

–10

–10

17

17

12

12

14

14

10

10

Yes

12

2

8

8

10

10

7

7

No
Yes

2
–1

2
–1

6
2

6
2

6
–3

–3

2
–1

2
–1

Yes
France (mass)

<1

–13

–7

–11

Tab. 5.10
Tab. 5.11
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Table 1.19 (continued)
Country
(displacement type)

Relative
to
controls?a

Tenure on the predisplacement job (years)b
<1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10+

All

Source

Belgium

No
Yes

–6
–3

–6
–3

–5
–2

–6
–3

–6
–3

–6
–3

–6
–3

–6
–3

–6
–3

Tab. 6.10b,
6. 11g

Denmark
(mass)

No
Yes

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

–1
–6

Tab. 6.10,
6.11g

NOTE: In all cases, percentage change estimates condition on reemployment and measure rates of pay per unit of time worked.
a
In all cases where a control group is used, it is continuously employed workers (not necessarily in the same plants as the displaced
workers).
b
<1 = less than 1 yr.; 1 = at least a year but less than two years; 2 = at least 2 yrs. but less than 3 yrs; and so forth.
c
Estimates are from Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) for 3 years after displacement, for workers with positive earnings in each
year after displacement. Percentage changes are based on the following estimates taken from their Figure 1: mean (quarterly) predisplacement earnings of $6,000 for both displaced workers and controls; mean quarterly earnings six years after displacement of $4,600
for displaced workers and $6,600 for controls.
d
Excluding shukko.
e
M and F indicate statistics for men and women respectively. Wage-change statistics for Australia (Chapter 4, Table 4.17) are not
included because they apply to a sample of very young workers only and are not directly comparable. Wage-change statistics for the
Netherlands (provided in the discussion of Table 2.22, Chapter 2) are not included because they are based on a very small sample.
While some of their estimates are large in magnitude, none are significantly different from zero.
f
Full time in both the predisplacement and postdisplacement job.
g
Figures calculated from sample means in Table 6.10b (for wages two years after displacement) in combination with regression coefficients in Table 6.11. The estimates with controls simply subtract off the two-year earnings growth of continuously employed workers
reported in Table 6.10b. Due to the very small sample size and the resulting high standard errors on Table 6.11 tenure coefficients, I
report here only the totals for all workers in their sample for Denmark.
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In this chapter, we analyze worker displacement (permanent job
separations initiated by employers because of adverse economic conditions) in the United States and the Netherlands. Labor displacement
has been widely studied in the U.S. context, where adequate data have
been available for a considerably longer period than in most other
countries. No similar literature exists for the Netherlands, even though
displacement is an increasingly important phenomenon there.1 We discuss the relevant institutions and provide an empirical analysis of the
incidence of displacement and the labor market transitions and earnings changes induced by displacement in both countries.
Our analysis of worker displacement generally identifies displacement as permanent (rather than temporary) layoffs, controlling to varying extents for the cause of job termination. In much of the analysis,
we focus on workers with substantial tenure or compare their experiences to those of dislocated persons with less tenure. Restricting our
analysis to permanent layoffs is almost irrelevant in the Netherlands
because temporary layoffs with recall are rarely observed there. In
fact, Dutch institutions work against them. Arrangements for providing unemployment insurance (UI) to workers who are laid off temporarily, for instance, are restricted to very specific activities.2
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This chapter also provides new information on the relationship
between displacement and retirement. In the 1970s and the 1980s, disability insurance (DI) was allegedly used as a convenient alternative to
unemployment insurance for the separation of workers in the Netherlands. Early retirement arrangements may also have facilitated the displacement of older workers. Although the data for the Netherlands
provide some information on transitions from employment into these
alternative destinations, this information is not as rich as for other
issues addressed below. Therefore, we mainly discuss the relevant
institutional arrangements and findings from existing empirical work
in order to clarify the role of DI and early retirement in the Netherlands. Surprisingly, despite richer data, there has been little previous
analysis of the relationship between displacement and retirement in the
United States. A preliminary investigation of that relationship is also
provided in this chapter.
Our discussion of displacement in the United States frequently
refers to the results of an extensive North American literature on displacement. These data are well known and were designed specifically
for the study of displaced workers. As a result, this chapter provides
only a modest updating of prior U.S. analyses. In contrast, our Dutch
analyses require data from various sources, none explicitly addressing
displacement, and represent the first substantive study of these issues.
Our discussions of the Dutch data and results, therefore, usually need
to be more extensive than those for the United States.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. First we discuss institutions
that are relevant to displacement (such as wage formation, employment
protection, and social security) and the data sets used in the analyses.
We continue by discussing time-series and cross-sectional properties
of displacement rates. Then we analyze labor market transitions following displacement and wage or earnings changes induced by displacement. We finish by discussing the role of early retirement and DI.
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INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
United States
Minimum wages
Compared with most other industrialized nations, U.S. labor markets are highly flexible.3 Few workers are unionized and minimum
wages are low as a fraction of average earnings. In 1996, for example,
union members accounted for only 14.5 percent of total wage and salary employment and 10.0 percent of private wage and salary workers
(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1997, Table 688). Effective September 1,
1997, the minimum wage was raised to $5.15 per hour. Even after this
increase, however, it was only about 40 percent of the average hourly
earnings of production workers.4
Employment protection
Employees in most European nations have considerable protection
against “unjust” dismissals. In contrast, the U.S. “employment-atwill” doctrine provides U.S. employers with wide latitude to terminate
workers for almost any reason. There are important exceptions, however, for unionized workers and for individuals with contracts containing provisions governing discharges. Some state courts have also
recognized exceptions that limit dismissals when employees perform
acts serving the interests of public policy (such as jury duty) or when
an implied contract exists due to written or oral statements made by
employers. Some courts have upheld “good faith” provisions requiring
employers to treat workers in a “fair and reasonable” manner in all
employment relationships, including terminations.5 Since the Worker
Retraining and Notification Act (WARN) took effect in 1989, employers with more than 100 full-time workers have been required to provide
60 days’ written advance notice of plant closings or mass layoffs.
However, the law contains numerous exemptions, and a preliminary
analysis by Addison and Blackburn (1994) suggested that the legislation has had little effect on the provision of notice.
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Programs to assist displaced workers
The United States provides limited support to workers who lose
jobs. By far the most important assistance comes from unemployment
insurance. The UI program is overseen by the U.S. Department of
Labor but administered by the individual states, resulting in variation
in program eligibility and benefits among geographic locations. Workers with qualified employment histories are eligible for benefits if they
are available for work and have become unemployed due to involuntary separation from their jobs (without good cause) or voluntary separation with good cause.6 Benefit duration is generally restricted to 26
weeks, although up to 13 additional weeks can be obtained under the
Extended Benefits Program, if the state unemployment rate is sufficiently high.7 Almost all wage and salary workers are covered by the
UI system, but only a fraction of the unemployed actually receive benefits (36 percent in 1995).8 Wage replacement rates are also relatively
low, generally ranging from 50 to 70 percent of the individual’s average weekly pretax wage up to a state-determined maximum, and these
funds are taxable as normal income. Due to the ceiling, benefits are
somewhat progressive and typically average between 30 and 40 percent of previous earnings.
Other programs assist job losers more directly. Trade Assistance
Adjustment (TAA), originally enacted in 1962, targets persons displaced from industries adversely affected by import competition.
Qualifying workers can receive up to 52 weeks of combined UI and
Trade Readjustment Allowance (TRA) benefits, 76 weeks if enrolled
in an approved training program, with TRA generally paid at the same
rate as UI. TRA is a limited program, however; only 31,000 workers
were supported in 1994, at a cost of $120 million.9 Some assistance is
also provided to dislocated workers under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Worker Security Act and the Employment
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance Program. In addition,
a variety of demonstration programs have been implemented to test the
efficacy of particular assistance strategies for displaced workers.10 The
relatively small size of these efforts implies that most displaced workers receive relatively limited support from the government beyond that
available to persons who are jobless for other reasons.11
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The Netherlands
Wage formation
Minimum wages in the Netherlands are higher than those in the
United States. As of July 1998, the minimum wage has been set at
14.01 Dutch guilders (f.; U.S.$7) per hour before taxes and social security premium payments.12 In contrast to the United States, 75 percent
of all employees are covered by collective agreements, which are negotiated by central bargaining between large firms or employer organizations and unions. The resulting agreements, called Collectieve Arbeids
Overeenkomsten (CAOs), are usually, but not always, put in terms of
lower bounds on the terms of employment, notably the wage. Since
1927 central agreements reached by worker unions have, by law, also
been applicable to nonunion employees. Another law, passed in 1937,
enabled the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment to declare collective agreements binding for entire sectors. Such extensions of the
scope of CAOs, called Algemeen Verbindend Verklaring (AVVs) are
indeed common practice.13
Employment protection
Although there is currently a tendency toward more flexible
employment relations, employment protection is stronger in the Netherlands than in the United States. Employment relationships are
arranged by either fixed-term or permanent contracts.14 Fixed-term
contracts allow employers to lay workers off at the end of the contracted period without either prior notice or a permit, therefore offering
no employment protection to the employee. If the employee is allowed
to continue to work after the contracted period, however, or if a new
fixed-term contract is written within 31 days of the end date of the first
contract, the employee is considered to be working on a “continued
contract,” and is basically provided the protection of a permanent contract.15
As long as workers and firms are bound by a contract, they can
separate only after a permit has been granted by a regional employment
institution, although this rule is generally applied only to firm-initiated
separations. Employers always need a permit for dismissal or layoff of
workers unless there is mutual agreement between the employer and
the employee, severe misconduct by the employee (like stealing),
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bankruptcy of the employer, or unless the employment contract is dissolved by a court. Permits are usually granted for dismissal based on
low employee performance and for layoffs necessitated by economic
circumstances (displacement). Dismissal because of illness, marriage,
pregnancy, or military service is prohibited. Court cases and permits
are frequently used to dissolve labor contracts.
Both employers and employees who want to end their employment
relationship are bound by mandatory advance-notice requirements.
Advance-notice periods are always shorter than six months. Exact
durations depend on age, tenure, and the type of contract involved.16
Severance pay is generally provided only in cases where the contract is
dissolved by a court and the employee is not declared responsible. In
these cases, severance pay is typically between one and two months’
salary per year of tenure.
Public pensions and other programs assisting
displaced workers
Assistance to unemployed displaced workers is far more generous
in the Netherlands than in the United States. The most important
source of income for workers displaced from private sector jobs is
unemployment insurance, which is set according to the Unemployment
Law.17 A worker in the Netherlands is entitled to UI benefits if he or
she has been employed for at least 26 of the prior 52 weeks, faces a sufficiently large, unpaid, reduction in working hours, and is willing to
accept a new job.18 Benefits equal 70 percent of the gross wage in the
last job before unemployment to a maximum (as of January 1999) of
217 f. (U.S.$105) per day and are subject to income tax. The maximum duration of these benefits ranges from six months to five years,
depending on the employment history of the unemployed workers.19
Some unemployed workers are entitled to an extension of these benefits at a level related to the mandatory minimum wage.20 If, after the
expiration of UI benefits, the unemployed individual has not found a
job, he may receive subsistence benefits (social assistance), which are
means-tested (by household income) and related to what is considered
to be the social minimum income.21 The Unemployment Law provides
some arrangements for “short-time unemployment” due to weather
conditions, but none for temporary layoffs. This may be the reason
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that temporary layoffs are not an important phenomenon in the Netherlands (see Emerson 1988).
According to the Unemployment Law, a worker has to prevent
unnecessary job loss in order to be entitled to UI. The administrators
of the unemployment benefits system, mainly organized at the level of
the industry, are authorized to impose sanctions on unemployed workers who have violated this rule.22 Thus, to the extent that they do not
immediately move into new jobs, most displaced workers in the private
sector can be identified as workers flowing into UI and not receiving
sanctions for unnecessary job loss. Because of the institutional
arrangements, this definition restricts attention both to longer service
workers, although not necessarily workers with long tenure in their last
jobs, and to layoffs due to economic conditions. In this context, it is
relevant that UI premiums are not experience rated at the level of the
individual firm.23
Other social security schemes have also served as destinations for
displaced workers during some periods in recent history, disability
insurance being a well-known alleged escape route for displacement.24
In the 1970s and 1980s, DI was more attractive than UI for both
employers and employees in terms of replacement rates and, perhaps,
less negative stigma effects. In 1990, there were in fact 139 DI claimants for every 1,000 workers in the Netherlands, while there were only
78 in Sweden and 43 in Germany (Aarts, Dercksen, and de Jong 1993).
Since Dutch workers are not likely to run much higher health risks than
workers in Sweden and Germany, this suggests that Dutch DI serves
more goals than just disability insurance.25 Policy changes in the late
1980s and the 1990s have been directed at preventing abuse of DI.
First, DI replacement rates were reduced in 1985 and 1987. Stricter
rules concerning disability, and more extensive monitoring, were introduced in the 1993 law. As a consequence, the DI rate has now reduced,
after increasing continuously until 1985 (CTSV 1997).
Another possible escape route for displaced workers is early retirement. Since the late 1970s there have been arrangements for retirement before the standard retirement age (65 years), which were
formally established by law in 1981. There is some circumstantial evidence that early retirement may be relevant to worker displacement:
labor-force participation rates of Dutch men over age 50 decrease relatively quickly with age compared to other OECD countries (Thio
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1997). The use of early retirement to avoid layoff costs in case of displacement is clearly restricted, however, by specific age requirements.
Also, early retirement schemes have recently been incorporated in private so-called flexible pension plans, which may reduce the scope for
abuse of this scheme. Additional information on the role of DI and
early retirement is provided at the end of this chapter.

DATA
United States
Significant improvements in data availability have led to an explosion of analysis on U.S. displaced workers during the last decade. The
majority of this research has used information available from the Displaced Worker Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey
(CPS). The first DWS was conducted in January 1984, with new supplements released at two-year intervals since that time. Until recently,
the surveys collected information for workers losing jobs in the five
calendar years prior to the interview date. Beginning in 1994, the surveys were switched from January to February and the period over
which job loss was measured was cut from five to three years. Information is collected on pre- and postdisplacement job characteristics
and on the intervening period of joblessness.26 Sample sizes are reasonably large, the DWS data can be supplemented with the information
contained in the normal monthly CPS, and the information is fairly
easy to analyze.27 The new analysis of displacement contained in this
chapter uses data from the February 1996 DWS and CPS and focuses
on 20- to 64-year-old workers (at the survey date) losing jobs due to a
plant closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishment. In order to
make the investigation more comparable with that conducted for the
Netherlands, many of the results focus on persons losing jobs that have
lasted at least one year. Special attention is also paid to those who are
out of work for some time following the termination.
For all its strengths, the DWS has a variety of disadvantages. First,
the data are retrospective and subject to recall bias. Second, information is available for only one lost job, and data on company characteris-
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tics or the situation prior to displacement are limited. Most
importantly, it is difficult to construct a comparison group of nondisplaced workers.28 This has led some researchers to use longitudinal
data sets (such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics) or administrative data (such as payroll or unemployment insurance records) to analyze the incidence or consequences of displacement.29 These alternate
sources have advantages, particularly the availability of a comparison
group, but they also have problems. For instance, sample sizes of displaced workers are typically quite small in panel data, and the reason
for job change often cannot be identified from administrative sources.
The Netherlands
There is no equivalent to the DWS for the Netherlands. We have
access, however, to three microdata sets that contain information on
various aspects of displacement: the Firm Employment (FE) data set,
an administrative longitudinal UI data set of the Dutch Social Security
Council (Sociale Verzekeringsraad or SVr), and the Labor Force Survey (LFS) of the Netherlands Organization for Strategic Labor Market
Research (OSA). Unlike the DWS these data allow, to some extent, for
the construction of comparison groups of nondisplaced workers. For
some of the analyses, however, sample sizes are small compared to the
DWS.
The FE data set is constructed by sampling individuals from
administrative records of firms covering the period 1992–1996. It provides information on tenure and separation, reasons for separation, and
a variety of individual and job characteristics. The data provide very
useful information on the incidence of displacement and shed some
light on labor market transitions immediately following displacement.
However, the FE data are silent about subsequent labor market transitions and earnings losses.
The UI data set provides information on unemployment spells of
all workers entering UI in 1992. Because all unemployed workers in
the market sector with sufficiently long employment records end up in
UI, and the data reveal worker-initiated separations, these data can be
used to study reemployment durations after displacement, conditional
on a positive non-employment spell. Since these data show the entire
inflow into UI by sector, municipality, and month, we can also con-
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struct indicators of excessive inflow into UI in local labor markets,
which can be used as indicators of excessive, or even mass, layoffs.
Earnings losses, however, are not observed in this data set either: for
this we require the LFS data, a labor-force panel survey covering the
period 1985–1990. The LFS data set provides extensive information
on labor market transitions and earnings, but suffers from small numbers of displaced workers.
Table 2.1 summarizes the main features of the data. Because the
Dutch data sets have not been used to study displacement before, we
will discuss these in more detail. The appendix provides additional
information.
The Firm Employment Data
The Firm Employment data (or Arbeidsvoorwaardenonderzoek in
Dutch) are firm-worker data collected by civil servants (of the Labor
Inspection Service, or Arbeidinspectie) of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment (Ministerie van Sociale Zaker en Werkgelenheid). These data provide information on the incidence of displacement over the period 1992–1996. The data are collected yearly (in
October 1993–1996) as repeated cross sections from administrative
wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified two-step
sampling procedure.30
In the first step a sample of firms is drawn (about 2,000 in each
year) from the Ministry’s own database (which is roughly similar to the
database of firms of Statistics Netherlands, CBS). In the second step, a
sample of workers (about 26,000 per year) is drawn from the records of
the firms selected in the first step. The workers are sampled from
administrative records of two moments in time, one year before the
sampling date and at the sampling date. A distinction is made among
employees who are present in both years (“stayers”), workers who are
present only in the first year (“leavers”), and workers who are present
only in the second year (“entrants”). More than 75 percent of the
workers are stayers. Information obtained on the way leavers separate
from firms is later used to distinguish between displacement and other
separations.
The data set includes additional information on wages, hours
worked, days worked, and a number of other variables, including age,
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gender, education, job complexity, occupation, SIC industry code, firm
size, and type of wage contract.
The UI Data Set
The UI data, which are provided by the SVr, are administrative
data from the sectoral organizations that implement the unemployment
insurance system. The data cover all individuals who started collecting
UI benefits in 1992. Individuals are followed up to September 1993, if
necessary. Note that for a given individual the date of inflow into UI as
a rule coincides with the date of inflow into unemployment. For each
individual we know the duration of UI benefit receipt, except when it is
right-censored by the end of the observation period (late 1993); that
occurs in 17 percent of all cases. If the UI duration is completed we
know the exit state, which is usually either employment (67 percent of
the completed spells) or continued unemployment after completion of
UI entitlement (14 percent). Only 8 percent of the spells end because
of transitions into DI, and hardly any UI spells in our sample end in
retirement.31 Apart from this, we do not have information on events
occurring after individuals leave UI.
We observe whether individuals have had a sanction imposed right
at the start of the UI spell. These sanctions are punitive benefit reductions that are applied if the UI applicant is considered to bear at least
some responsibility for his job loss. Thus, this variable can be used to
control for worker-initiated separations, as far as these are not excluded
by restricting attention to UI inflow. Otherwise, the number of explanatory variables is limited by the character of the data set. The data do
not contain the exact magnitude of the individual UI benefit level. The
magnitude is a direct function of the wage earned before entering
unemployment, however, affected by personal and household characteristics. Both the wage and these characteristics can be observed, but
the data provide only limited information on individual maximum UI
entitlement, except of course when the individual is seen to complete
entitlement.
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The Labor Force Survey of the OSA
The OSA Labor Supply Panel Survey, or just LFS, is a panel which
started in 1985. Presently four waves are available (April–May 1985,
August–October 1986, August–October 1988, and August–November
1990). In the LFS a random sample of households in the Netherlands
is followed over time. Because the study concentrates on individuals
between 15 and 61 years of age who are not full-time students, only
households with at least one person in this category are included. For
households chosen, all individuals in this category (and in all cases the
head of the household) are interviewed. The first wave consists of
4,020 individuals (in 2,132 households). The four waves together contain information on 8,121 individuals.
In every interview, retrospective questions are asked to elicit information on possible labor market transitions made by the respondent
during the period between the prior and current interviews.32 This process allows us to reconstruct the sequence of labor market states experienced by 8,075 respondents, with the sojourn times and income levels
in all these states.33 The LFS data identify employment, self-employment, unemployment, not-in-labor-force, military service, and fulltime education as labor market states.34 The respondent is asked to
provide a motive or cause for each transition between any two of these
labor market states and to indicate whether the transition was made
voluntarily.35 This information enables us to distinguish displacement
from other separations. We will come back to this issue when we discuss the analysis of labor market transitions following displacement.

DISPLACEMENT RATES
Incidence of Displacement
United States
Farber (1997) estimated displacement probabilities, over threeyear periods, using information from all the available Displaced
Worker Supplements. A crude estimate of annual job loss due to plant
closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishment is obtained by
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dividing his estimated values by three.36 These results, displayed in
Table 2.2, reveal displacement rates of between 2 and 4 percent per
year, with higher probabilities for men than women. Displacements
are somewhat countercyclical—e.g., notice the high rates during the
recessionary period in the early 1980s and the low rates during the economic expansion at the end of the decade—but there is little indication
of a time trend.37
There are at least two reasons why these estimates understate displacement probabilities. First, the DWS records a maximum of one job
loss during the three-year period, thus missing multiple separations.38
Second, the surveys suffer from recall bias, whereby terminations
occurring further in the past are more likely to be forgotten (Topel
1990; Evans and Leighton 1995). Table 2.3 provides estimates of
annual displacement rates for the 1993–1995 period, with an attempt
made to correct for both sources of bias. The top section shows estimates for all types of displacements, whereas the second is limited to
job loss resulting in an initial period of joblessness. This is done to
make the results more comparable to those of the Netherlands and
some of the countries analyzed in other chapters of this volume, where
data limitations restrict the analysis to displacements that lead to unemployment.
The first row of each section shows estimated displacement rates
both for all workers and separately by gender. The “correction”
involves two parts. First, it is assumed that an equal number of persons
are displaced in all three years. Second, it is assumed that in each of
the next two years 10 percent of the workers displaced in any given
year experience a second job loss.39 Using these assumptions, persons
losing jobs in 1995 should account for 29.9 percent of the displacements observed in the 1996 DWS.40 Instead, 47.5 percent of displaced
workers in the 1996 DWS report losing their jobs in 1995, suggesting
that the number of displacements is understated by around 59 percent
(0.475/0.299 = 1.589) and that the corrected annual displacement probability is 4.9 percent (0.031 H 1.589 = 0.049). A similar procedure
yields a 5.3 percent estimated rate of annual job loss for men and 4.5
percent probability for women.41 The corresponding entry in the bottom section deflates the displacement probability by the percentage of
job losers who obtain new employment without an intervening spell of
non-employment. For instance, 14.4 percent of displaced individuals
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do not experience any initial joblessness, implying that 3.8 percent
(0.049 H 0.856 = 0.042) are expected to lose positions and become jobless.
The remainder of the table provides estimates of annual displacement rates as a function of tenure in the predisplacement job. Since
Farber (1997) did not break down his statistics by tenure, additional
steps are required to obtain these estimates. First, the predisplacement
tenure distribution of workers losing jobs between 1993 and 1995 is
calculated from the 1996 DWS. Second, the job tenure of all 20- to 64year-old workers in February 1996 is estimated using data from the
monthly CPS. Third, a relative risk of displacement is calculated by
dividing the share of displaced workers in a tenure group by the corresponding share for all workers. Finally, this relative risk is multiplied
by the aggregate displacement rate to arrive at a probability of job loss
for each tenure category. For example, persons with 1–2 years of preseparation tenure accounted for 26.8 percent of displaced workers but
just 13.2 percent of the nondisplaced, implying a relative risk of 2.03
(0.268/0.132) and an estimated annual displacement rate of 9.9 percent
(2.03 H 0.049). This procedure is performed separately for men and
women, as well as for both together.
Table 2.3 shows an almost monotonic negative relationship
between job tenure and the probability of job loss. Persons holding
jobs for ten or more years are only about one-fourth as likely to be displaced as those in positions that have lasted for just a year or two. The
one exception to this pattern is that persons in the first year of the job
appear to have somewhat lower displacement rates than those with one
to two years of tenure. This result is probably erroneous, for two reasons. First, recall bias is probably most severe for very short-tenure
workers, since these persons may incur few adjustment problems when
their positions end.42 Second, information on predisplacement tenure is
missing for 11 percent of the displaced workers; these individuals are
excluded from the calculations in the table. If, as is likely, data are
missing relatively frequently for very brief employment spells, the
share of displacements and the corresponding risk of job loss will be
understated for this group. Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that
displacement rates fall with job tenure.43
The age pattern of displacement rates over the 1993–1995 period is
shown in Table 2.4. These estimates adjust the overall displacement
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probabilities in Table 2.3 by the age-specific relative probabilities of
job loss calculated by Farber (1997). For example, the probability of
displacement is 11.6 percent higher for 20- to 24-year-olds than for all
workers, implying an estimated displacement rate of 5.5 percent (0.049
H 1.116 = 0.055). The table shows clear evidence that probabilities of
job loss decline with age, but the profile is not nearly as steep as for job
tenure. For instance, 55- to 64-year-olds are roughly three-quarters as
likely to be permanently laid off as 20- to 24-year-olds.
The lack of a comparison group in the DWS makes it difficult to
perform a regression analysis of the determinants of displacement.
However, Farber (1997) estimated a series of probit models where the
dependent variable indicated whether or not a job loss had occurred
over a three-year period and the regressors were limited to characteristics observed at the survey date. His analysis confirmed that displacement probabilities decline with age and indicated lower rates of job
loss for educated workers, women, and whites.
The Netherlands
Reasonably long displacement-rate time series can be constructed
from aggregate UI data, giving the yearly numbers of new UI cases and
data on the number of employed individuals at risk. The merits of the
first series as a measure of displacement have been discussed in the
institutions and data sections. Although it provides only an imperfect
measure of displacement, it is the only measure for which we can construct time series over several business cycles.44 Ideally, one would
like to measure the number of individuals at risk as the number of
employed individuals who would be eligible for UI benefits in case of
displacement. Unfortunately, we have to approximate this series by
the number of employed individuals paying UI premiums. Because
this number includes individuals with employment histories insufficient for UI eligibility, it provides an upper bound to the number of
individuals at risk. As a consequence, the rate computed is a lower
bound on the true rate of displacement leading to positive unemployment spells.
Figure 2.1 graphs the annual displacement-rate time series constructed in this manner, together with real Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) growth in the Netherlands (percentage change from previous
year) for the period 1970–1993. The rate of displacement is clearly an
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Figure 2.1 Netherlands: The Annual Rate of Displacement

upward trend over the data period, rising from around 4 percent in
1970 to 11 percent in 1993.45 As is to be expected, we also observe
strong fluctuations over the business cycle, with steep increases in
1970–1972, 1973–1975, 1979–1982, 1986–1987, and 1990–1993.
Comparing this to the superimposed macro indicator, real GDP
growth, we see that displacement rates are countercyclical. Notable
exceptions are 1976–1977, 1984–1985, and 1989–1990, which are all
years with decreasing growth and displacement rates. A simple explanation could be that the downturns of the business cycle led to worker
displacement, although this seems not to be true for the early 1970s.
However, the correlation between the two series is –0.58. A regression
of displacement on GDP growth and time shows that displacement
changes –0.33 (s.e. 0.12) percentage points for each percentage-point
increase in real GDP growth, and 0.15 (s.e. 0.03) percentage points per
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year (R2 = 0.69). We do not find significant coefficients for one- and
two-year lagged GDP growth.
The FE data can be used to study the variation of displacement
over groups of workers.46 For each separation, information is available
that is helpful in identifying displacement. Among other things, the
data distinguish layoffs, separations because of the expiration of fixedterm contracts, and transitions into other jobs, DI, and early and normal
retirement.47 It should be understood that this information comes from
administrative records of the firm and is therefore limited by the observational scope of the firm’s administration. For instance, a worker
who is given notice of layoff in the near future may quit immediately to
go to another job (before the date of layoff) in order to avoid unemployment. In such a case, the worker would most likely be recorded as
a job-to-job mover, without any reference to the layoff. A worker who
stays with the firm until the date of layoff, however, is most likely to be
recorded as a laid-off worker. For the latter worker the data do not provide information on the labor market state occupied just after displacement. Similar arguments can be made for workers moving into DI or
early retirement. For a worker observed to move into early retirement,
for instance, we do not have independent information on the circumstances leading to early retirement. Thus, the causes of separations and
destinations of labor market transitions following separations are intertwined in the data, and we have to decide on an appropriate way to
identify displacement.
We have opted for the following method. For all firms, workers
under age 60 with tenure of at least one year who are recorded to be
laid off are considered to be displaced. As argued above, some displaced workers who immediately find a new job, or move into DI or
early retirement, will be excluded by this definition of displacement.
To include at least some of these cases, we will label leavers moving
into new jobs, DI, or early retirement from “strongly shrinking” firms
to be displaced as well. Since there is no a priori reason to pick any
particular threshold employment-loss level, we have experimented
with a number of different criteria. The results can be found in Table
2.5, which gives the contributions to the annual displacement rate over
the period 1993–1996 of separations from strongly shrinking firms by
type of separation for six different criteria. The first question is
whether we should focus on net or gross employment (outflow)
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changes. Using the latter, we will overestimate displacement rates in
high turnover sectors, where high simultaneous employment inflow
and outflow rates are no exception, whereas using the former we will
underestimate displacement at restructuring firms.48 The weakest criterion in Table 2.5 results in an aggregate annual displacement rate of 7.2
percent, while the strongest criterion results in an aggregate displacement rate of 3.5 percent, over the 1993–1996 period. With all criteria,
we find that most workers displaced from strongly shrinking firms are
labeled as moving directly into new jobs, with almost as many labeled
as being laid off. Early retirement and, in particular, DI seem of minor
importance. Note again, however, that some of the workers labeled as
being laid off could have moved into new jobs, early retirement, or DI.
We will return to this issue later. In what follows we use the net
employment criterion, with a –30 percent threshold, mainly because
other authors in this volume (Denmark, Belgium) do so.
First, we will give a short description of the variation in displacement rates over time and among different categories of workers. Table
2.6 shows that displacement rates are somewhat higher for men than
for women and that displacement rates are much lower for workers
with high tenure. Note that, despite the institutional differences, the
results are very similar to those for the United States shown in Table
2.3.49 In both countries, low-tenure men have higher displacement
rates than low-tenure women, whereas at the highest tenure levels
women have higher displacement rates than men. Table 2.7 shows that
displacement rates are highest in 1993 and lowest in 1996. Since 1993
was the year in which the Netherlands had its lowest net employment
growth (it was even negative) and the Dutch economy has strongly
recovered since 1995, this result is consistent with countercyclical displacement rates. The table also shows that workers covered by a collective agreement (CAO) have lower displacement rates than both
workers whose wage contract is required to follow CAO contracts of
other firms in the same sector (AVV) and workers with only individual
contracts.50 The finding that displacement rates are highest for AVV
workers could reflect the fact that firms are bound to pay such workers
wages that are agreed upon by other firms. These wages may not
reflect the business conditions of AVV firms. It is also interesting to
see that displacement rates for workers at simple jobs, for workers with
little formal training, and for young workers are relatively high. This is
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in line with standard labor hoarding and human-capital theories.
Finally, we see that displacement rates decline with age.
We continue to investigate the results by estimating a logit model
for the incidence of displacement (Table 2.8). As the net marginal
benefits of displacing a worker will typically be influenced by macroeconomic conditions, we not only include firm and worker characteristics, but sets of calendar-time and sectoral dummies, too. It is
important to point out that some of the variables that are used as
explanatory variables may well be endogenous. Employed workers
who have been relatively successful at avoiding displacement in the
past may have both a high current tenure and a low current probability
of displacement. Employed workers who have been promoted by
accident to a job with fringe benefits that exceed what they can get
from other employers may have both a high current tenure and a high
current probability of displacement. This potential endogeneity hampers straightforward interpretation of the parameter estimates. Table
2.8 gives the corresponding estimates. The displacement probability
decreases with tenure (up to some level), and with gross hourly wages,
and it increases with educational and job-complexity level. It is also
relatively high for workers without collective contracts and workers
employed at large firms.
Using these estimates, we compute displacement probabilities for
different types of workers. We evaluate these probabilities at the estimated parameter values and the mean observed characteristics. Table
2.9 illustrates the partial effects of the different worker and firm characteristics. We see some differences from the exploratory results in
Table 2.7. Controlling for other characteristics, the displacement probability no longer decreases with education and job complexity level.
Furthermore, displacement probabilities differ very little as a result of
the type of contract. It appears that low-wage and low-tenure workers
have a particularly high probability of being displaced. According to
the logit model, a worker with average characteristics who earns 15 f.
an hour faces a 4.3 percent chance of being displaced, whereas this
probability is only 1.1 percent for a worker who earns 50 f. an hour.
This is not a surprising result if wages are determined by a surplus
sharing rule, in which case matches with the highest surplus have the
lowest probability of ending.
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Finally, note that displacement rates calculated with the FE data set
are lower than the UI inflow time-series figures because we observe
very few firm closings in the FE data. Furthermore, we include individuals who lose only part of their job (those whose hours of work are
reduced) in the UI data, and we do not exclude individuals with sanctions.51

TRANSITIONS
Labor Market Transitions after Displacement
United States
Job loss increases the risk that an individual will be out of work for
some period. Swaim and Podgursky (1991) estimated that the median
worker is jobless for 25 to 30 weeks following a permanent layoff, and
Farber (1993) found that 29 to 38 percent of men displaced during the
previous two years were unemployed at the DWS interview date, compared to 4 to 5 percent of the nondisplaced.52 Much of the employment
reduction is temporary, however. Ruhm (1991a) estimated that unemployment increases by around eight weeks in the year of the permanent
layoff, four weeks in the next year, but only around one week four
years after the event.
The patterns of postdisplacement joblessness and labor-force status
for 1996 DWS respondents losing jobs that had lasted at least one year
are shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. Table 2.10 shows the probability
that workers obtain new jobs within either six months or one year after
displacement. By European standards, non-employment spells in the
United States are brief, with around two-thirds reemployed in six
months or less and three-quarters within a year. Over 60 percent of
those with an initial spell of joblessness are working again within six
months and 72 percent in less than a year. Men and short-tenure workers obtain new jobs somewhat faster than women and those with longer
tenure. The age differences in reemployment are fairly small through
the workers’ late forties, but workers beyond that age are much more
likely to have extended spells of joblessness. This may represent
greater adjustment difficulties following displacement, but it could also
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confound the effects of job loss and retirement. We return to this point
below. Groups obtaining new jobs rapidly generally have rather high
rates of survey date employment. The patterns of unemployment and
labor-force participation, however, are more divergent, as is shown in
Table 2.11. In particular, the relatively low employment rates of
mature adults and women are explained by high rates of labor-force
withdrawal, rather than elevated unemployment.
Econometric estimates of the determinants of postdisplacement
joblessness are summarized in Table 2.12. The first column shows
results of a probit equation where the dependent variable equals one for
persons finding new jobs without any intervening joblessness and zero
for those who are out of work for at least one week. The second shows
results of a Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent variable is weeks of joblessness and the sample is restricted to those out of
work for at least one week. The third shows corresponding hazard estimates for the full sample, where the dependent variable is weeks of
joblessness plus one-half. Thus, the second column indicates hazard
rates, conditional on a positive spell, while the third shows results for
the unconditional model (that includes both zero- and positive-week
spells). The excluded reference category is a white, unmarried, female,
high school dropout, born outside the United States, with one to two
years of predisplacement tenure, age 20 to 29, who loses a job due to a
position or shift abolishment, and receives no written advance notice.
A higher hazard rate implies faster exit from joblessness and shorter
spells.
The results are generally consistent with those in earlier research.
Non-employment declines with education, increases with age, and is
higher for nonwhites than whites. Men are just as likely as women to
experience some joblessness but transition into employment more
quickly. Conversely, married and native-born persons are more likely
than their counterparts to move directly into new jobs but once out-ofwork show little evidence of faster reemployment. Long-tenure workers have relatively high probabilities of avoiding joblessness but may
have modestly lower reemployment hazard rates, conditional on a positive spell. Persons involved in plant closings are more likely to move
directly into new positions than those losing jobs due to a position or
shift abolishment and have elevated reemployment hazards relative to
both this group and those displaced by slack work. 53 Individuals
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receiving lengthy written notice are more likely than the non-notified
to avoid joblessness, but the notice does not appear to have any effect
on reemployment hazard rates. Furthermore, the exit probabilities for
those with brief notice are, if anything, actually lower than for those
not receiving any written warnings.54
The Netherlands
Both the LFS and the FE data provide some information on the
labor market states occupied by workers just after displacement. In the
LFS, we are able to distinguish job-to-job transitions (E-E), transitions
from employment to unemployment (E-U), and transitions from
employment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N) in each individual labor
market history. We use the self-reported motive or cause for each transition and the information on whether or not transitions are made voluntarily to distinguish displacement from other types of separations in
each case. Details are provided in the appendix.
Table 2.13 shows the number of displaced workers in our sample
by transition and motivation. In total we observe 327 displacements.
The large majority, 70 percent, involve job-to-job transitions. In contrast, in the United States many more workers experience a positive
non-employment spell. As for motivations, in most cases (68 percent)
displacement is indicated by the most clear-cut motivation, “reorganization or plant closure” (of which 73 percent involve no joblessness).
Only a small share is due to DI (17 percent) or early retirement (1 percent). If we restrict attention to workers with tenure of at least one
year, only 162 displacements are left. However, qualitatively similar
results hold for this subsample.
As we stated before, the FE data also give some information on the
labor market state just after displacement. Although this data set does
not indicate the labor market state for those displaced workers labeled
as being laid off, firms may be involved in arranging DI and, in particular, early retirement if these destinations are really used as convenient
ways to displace workers. In such a case we may expect these transitions actually to be recorded. Similarly, because of employment protection regulation, we may expect firms to be involved in reemploying
displaced workers, and so at least some job-to-job transitions of displaced workers will be recorded. In any case, the share of layoffs in
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overall displacement provides only an upper bound to the share of displaced workers ending up in unemployment right after being displaced.
Table 2.14 compares the FE layoff rates, job-to-job transition rates,
DI inflow rates, and early retirement rates between firms shrinking by
30 percent or more and other firms. We see that not only the layoff
rates but also the other separation probabilities are higher at the 30-percent-shrinking firms. This seems to indicate that at least some displaced workers enter DI or early retirement, or move directly into
another job. The second column for each type of firms shows, however, that a relatively high share of separations from shrinking firms
are labeled as layoffs, and relatively few as job-to-job transitions. So,
most of the displacement seems to be captured by layoffs.
The LFS data also provide information on the labor market states
occupied by displaced workers 12 months after displacement. Table
2.15 gives the number of individuals in the different labor market
states, by type of transition made just after displacement.55 The table
shows that most individuals remain in the same state as they were
when they became displaced. We cannot derive strong results on E-U
and E-N transitions because of the limited number of individuals in
these categories, but it seems that the job-to-job movers do not have
problems finding steady employment after being displaced.
Finally, we can analyze reemployment durations following displacement using the 1992 UI inflow data set. We distinguish individuals who have been sanctioned for responsibility for job loss from
individuals who have not been sanctioned. Only the latter are considered to be displaced. The sanctioned individuals may then serve as a
“control” group, where we should acknowledge that this group contains only individuals who are eligible for UI benefits and no individuals who have, for instance, also quit their jobs or who have been
dismissed for severe misconduct. The groups may also differ for two
reasons other than cause of separation. First, the “nondisplaced” individuals have been sanctioned, which implies that they face reduced
benefits for some period of time. Second, workers are likely to be nonrandomly selected into both states, for which we will not directly control.
Table 2.16 presents summary statistics of reemployment durations
by demographic group. Because 44 percent of the durations are rightcensored, we compute median durations, in particular median residual
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durations at 0 and 26 weeks. From the upper segment we learn that the
median reemployment duration of all spells is 20.8 weeks. For displaced workers, the median duration is 3.5 weeks shorter than for sanctioned workers. The median residual durations at 26 weeks are 4–5
times larger, implying strong negative duration dependence of the corresponding reemployment hazard rates. It is well known that this can
be explained by both “genuine” duration dependence at the individual
level (because of stigma effects or atrophy of skills), and dynamic sorting because of exit-rate heterogeneity.56 The lower panel restricts
attention to displaced workers and gives median durations for various
demographic groups. One feature worth noting is the strong increase
in median durations with age. This may be due to the institutional
structure of UI, which is more generous for older unemployed and
unemployed with longer employment histories. In addition, search
rules are less strict for older individuals.
We also develop a measure of excess layoffs in the local labor market of each individual. From the UI inflow census we can compute the
size of the inflow in UI in each month of 1992 in each Dutch municipality by sector. Thus, we can distinguish local labor markets by
municipality and sector, and define excess UI inflow in a local labor
market to be the inflow into UI in that market net of the overall average
inflow over time, municipality, and sector. More formally, if Cmst is
the inflow in UI in municipality m in sector s in month t, then data on
Cmst for all municipalities, sectors, and months in 1992 are regressed on
municipality, sector, and time dummies, yielding both predicted counts
Cmst and residual counts εˆmst = Cmst – Ĉ mst for each cell or (m,s,t).
Now, each combination (m,s) represents a local labor market, and the
εˆmst is an indicator of excess layoffs in local labor market (m,s) in
month t. We can assign each individual to a local labor market, and
use εˆ as a regressor in an analysis of reemployment durations. Because we will include province indicators instead of municipality indicators in the duration analysis (for computational reasons), it is useful
to also include C as a regressor.
The duration model for reemployment durations is specified as a
single-risk mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model, with the log hazard for reemployment given by ln θ(t|x, v) = λ(t) + xN β = v, where λ is
a piecewise constant log baseline hazard, and β is the regressor parameter vector. The vector x is a regressor vector containing the sanction
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indicator, the cell or local labor market indicators, and other individual
characteristics. The variable v is an unobserved component which is
assumed to be discretely distributed so that, with n points of support,
Pr(v = vi) = pi, for i = 1, . . . n, and pn = 1 –3n–1i = 1 pi. 57 We fix the number of mass points at n = 2 and perform sensitivity analysis by reestimating the model for higher values of n. Finally, we treat destinations
different from reemployment as randomly right-censoring the reemployment durations. We have right-censoring because of the fact that
individuals are followed only until late 1993.
Table 2.17 shows results from maximum likelihood estimation.
The most important finding is that individuals who are displaced
according to the sanction indicator, in other words, those who do not
have sanctions imposed, have approximately 20 percent higher reemployment rates than sanctioned individuals. Considering the fact that
sanctions are likely to increase reemployment rates if they have any
direct effect, this figure provides a lower bound on the difference
between displaced and nondisplaced workers, given a similar benefits
level.58 This result is consistent with the work of Gibbons and Katz
(1991) for the United States, who find that workers displaced because
of plant closings have shorter reemployment durations than workers
laid off because of slack work or elimination of a position or shift. It is
also interesting to note that the predicted size of the local labor market
has a significantly negative effect on reemployment rates, which could
be a symptom of congestion effects in local labor markets. It should be
noted that this variable is identified only from variation between
municipalities, as the model contains full sets of time and sector dummies. The wage has a significantly positive effect on reemployment
rates, and age a significantly negative effect (from age 16 onwards).
Wald-test statistics for the joint significance of the three sets of dummy
variables show that there is significant variation (at the 5 percent level)
among sectors, months of inflow, and provinces. Most of the variation
in reemployment rates between cells or local labor markets is caused
by sectoral heterogeneity. Finally, we find significant unobserved heterogeneity and negative individual duration dependence of reemployment rates.59
Table 2.18 gives reemployment probabilities computed with the
estimated model, by fixing the unobserved heterogeneity component at
its estimated mean and the regressors at the sample mean, and consid-
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ering one-by-one deviations of regressors from this mean. Of the displaced workers, 55 percent are reemployed within 26 weeks, 73
percent within 52 weeks. For sanctioned individuals these probabilities are slightly lower. We still find strong negative effects of age on
reemployment probabilities. Wages have positive effects on reemployment probabilities, ceteris paribus, a finding which overturns the
results from the raw median estimates.
Earnings and Wage Changes
United States
In addition to transitory increases in joblessness, labor displacement in the United States is frequently accompanied by substantial and
lasting wage reductions. Several studies have examined these earnings
losses in detail, using longitudinal or administrative data to allow a
comparison group of nondisplaced workers. Using the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics, Ruhm (1991a) found that job loss reduces weekly
wages by 14 to 18 percent in the following year and 11 to 15 percent
four years later, with little evidence of recovery beyond this point. A
more recent study of the same data source by Stevens (1997) indicated
average decreases of roughly the same magnitude and pattern but further highlighted that large losses are concentrated among persons experiencing repeated turnover. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan’s 1993
analysis of administrative data for Pennsylvania workers with six or
more years of tenure on the predisplacement job uncovered a similar
time profile and even larger losses—quarterly earnings declined by 30
to 40 percent initially, with persistent losses of 20 to 30 percent. The
variance of wage changes is also large, however. Early studies by
Ruhm (1987) or Kletzer (1991), for example, pointed out that many
workers earn more after job loss than before it. Storer and Van Audenrode (1997) suggested that uncertainty over potential wage changes is a
major source of the utility losses resulting from displacement, far outweighing the comparatively modest reduction in average wages.
Table 2.19 displays changes in average real weekly earnings
occurring between the time of a job loss and the survey date for respondents to the 1996 DWS who have been displaced from jobs lasting at
least one year.60 The first column shows results for the subsample who
are working at the survey date; the second presents averages for the full
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sample, using a zero value for weekly wages for those not employed in
February 1996. Average real weekly wages of reemployed sample
members do not change between the displacement and interview dates,
with gains observed for persons avoiding joblessness, men, and those
with little seniority on the lost job.
These relatively favorable results may partially reflect the robust
economic conditions in the United States during the time period analyzed.61 The findings are not inconsistent with the large earnings losses
mentioned above, however, for at least three reasons. First, persons
who are not working at the survey date (and so are excluded from these
calculations) may have relatively low earnings potential. Second, the
“before” versus “after” comparison does not account for changes that
would have occurred in the absence of the job loss (young workers, for
example, have steep age–wage profiles, suggesting that losses could
result from foregone growth in wages). Third, pay frequently begins to
decline prior to the actual displacement (Hamermesh 1991; Ruhm
1991b; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993), implying that the earnings reduction is understated by these estimates. In addition, the
median displaced worker does considerably worse than the mean individual—median weekly wages decline by 6 percent conditional on
reemployment and 30 percent for all job losers—demonstrating the
importance of considering the variance of wage outcomes.
The distribution of earnings changes is displayed in Table 2.20. As
above, the analysis is restricted to those losing jobs that have lasted at
least one year. The conditional estimates restrict the sample to reemployed workers, whereas the unconditional results assume zero wages
for those not working in February of 1996. The last two columns
restrict the sample to 25- to 49-year-old men in order to focus on a
group with particularly strong labor-force attachments. The table highlights the substantial dispersion of postdisplacement outcomes. Over
one-quarter of the reemployed workers earn at least 10 percent more
than before being displaced, and the pay of 18 percent increases by at
least 25 percent. Even when persons not working at the survey date are
included and treated as having a zero wage, 20 percent receive a wage
premium exceeding 10 percent in the new job while 13 percent earn at
least 25 percent more. Conversely, weekly earnings fall 25 percent or
more for 52 percent of all displaced individuals and for 32 percent of
those working at the survey date. Interestingly, the results are quite
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similar for 25- to 49-year-old men, with the main exception being that
their higher rates of reemployment imply somewhat lower unconditional probabilities of large wage losses.
Table 2.21 summarizes the results of a series of earnings regressions for workers displaced from jobs lasting at least one year. The
dependent variable in the first two columns is the natural log of weekly
wages in February 1996. The second column includes predisplacement
wages as a regressor, whereas the first does not. The outcome in column 3 is the change in weekly (ln) earnings. Effectively, this specification constrains the coefficient on previous wages to one, whereas
column 2 allows it to vary freely.62
Wage levels and changes could be affected by different factors.
Postdisplacement earnings will primarily reflect the general human
capital possessed by the individual, whereas reductions in pay can
occur from losses of firm-specific human capital, job or industry rents,
or idiosyncratic residuals (luck). For instance, survey-date earnings
are positively related with predisplacement tenure but wage reductions
also increase with previous seniority, suggesting that the preseparation
tenure differential reflects a combination of specific and general
human capital.63 In contrast, education is positively correlated with
earnings on both jobs, suggesting that it provides general human capital.64 Men and married individuals also earn more on both jobs. Conversely, persons 55 and over experience very large wage reductions.
There is little evidence of race or advance-notice effects, once the other
regressors are controlled for. Interestingly, there is also an indication,
albeit only a modest one, that unionized workers suffer relatively large
losses following displacements. Somewhat surprisingly, those displaced due to slack work gain relative to those losing jobs because of
position or shift abolishment.65 Finally, the coefficient on the predisplacement wage, in column 2, suggests that slightly over half of any
earnings residual received on the old job is transferred to the new position.
The Netherlands
To analyze possible earnings losses between pre- and postdisplacement jobs, we use data on transitions between jobs, either with or without intervening non-employment spells, from the LFS. Thus, we
consider E-N-E, E-U-E, and E-E transitions, of which we have 1,719
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observations in our sample, including both displacement and other
types of separation from the first employment spell. Only one income
level is reported for each labor market spell. However, under the
assumption that earnings do not vary within employment spells, the
change in earnings between pre- and postseparation jobs equals the
change of earnings between the date of separation and the date of
entering the first new job. To correct these earnings differentials for
inflation, we have used the monthly all-item Consumer Price Index
(CPI).66 After this inflation correction, 1,551 observations remain.67 If
we restrict our sample to workers with tenure of at least one year in the
first employment spell, we have 668 observations.68
The average post- to preseparation earnings ratio in this sample is
1.24, with a standard error (of the mean) equal to 0.02. For the subsample of displaced individuals (232 observations) this average equals
1.18, with a standard error equal to 0.04. For our subsample of workers with sufficient tenure we find an average earnings ratio of 1.24
(0.02) for all workers and of 1.14 (0.03) for displaced workers (116
observations). In either case, real earnings rise significantly between
two consecutive employment spells. Because there is no significant
difference between the ratio for all workers and that for displaced
workers (their 95 percent confidence intervals are overlapping), this
indicates that displacement has no significant effect on future earnings.
To investigate this further, we have regressed the log real earnings ratio
on tenure in the first employment spell, the duration of the intervening
non-employment spell (defined to be 0 for E-E cases), a dummy variable indicating whether the separation involves displacement, and
some additional controls. The estimation results are reported in Table
2.22.
The results confirm the preliminary conclusions from the comparison of the averages. Displacement does not have a significant effect on
earnings after a separation. Moreover, the first column shows that the
effect of displacement is very small if we do not include the tenure criterion in the displacement definition. In the second column, we find
some evidence of a negative effect of displacement if we restrict the
displacement indicator to separations of workers with at least one year
of tenure. This is confirmed by estimates for the tenure-restricted sample in the third column. Also, in all cases we find a significantly negative effect of the length of the spell of intervening joblessness. Thus,
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workers who have been without work longer experience smaller earnings gains. This can be explained by either stigma effects or loss of
skills. Log tenure is generally insignificant, but the results in the second column indicate that workers with tenure below one year face significantly smaller earnings gains.
Retirement and Disability
United States
As discussed, compared with younger individuals, older persons
obtain new jobs more slowly following displacements and suffer relatively larger wage reductions when they do. Rather than indicating a
causal effect, however, it is possible that the effects of aging and displacement may be confounded. This possibility is particularly important given that labor-force participation rates fall rapidly once
individuals reach their late fifties; previous research provides little
insight, however, into the relationship between job loss and retirement.69
Table 2.23 supplies information on labor-force participation and
retirement or disability status in February 1996 of displaced workers
with more than one year on the preseparation job. The missing category is “other” reasons for being out of the labor force. Retirement and
disability status are combined because these are likely to be close substitutes for at least some older workers. The table shows that retirement or disability probabilities rise and labor-force participation rates
decline with age. However, as discussed, this may represent the normal process of aging rather than any unique consequence of job loss.
To examine this possibility, we compare the labor-force status of displaced and nondisplaced men (Table 2.24). Displacement again
includes job loss in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to plant closing, slack
work, or position or shift abolishment. We focus on men because
women are much more likely to report being out of the labor force for
ambiguous “other” reasons. Data are from the February 1996 Current
Population Survey and Displaced Worker Supplement.
The table shows that male job losers are more likely than their nondisplaced peers to participate in the labor force but less likely to report
being retired or disabled. Taken at face value, this suggests that permanent layoffs delay rather than promote retirement. This could be the
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result of reduced wages (and a dominant income effect) or of other
financial losses (such as reductions in housing equity) that follow displacement. However, there is an important qualification to this interpretation. The participation and retirement rates of nondisplaced
individuals do not condition on labor-force status in previous years. To
the contrary, one must be working to be at risk of displacement. Therefore, the probabilities for displaced men in Table 2.24 are dependent on
recent labor-force participation, whereas those for nondisplaced men
are not. This distinction becomes increasingly important with age. For
example, 62 percent of 62- to 64-year-old male job losers participated
in the labor force in February 1996, compared to 46 percent of men not
terminated. Many of the latter group were likely to have left the labor
force several years earlier, however, implying that the conditional participation probabilities are much higher.70
The following procedure was used to provide more comparable
estimates of survey-date labor-force status. First, age-specific probabilities of being in each labor-force state were calculated.71 Second,
lagged labor-force participation was estimated as the participation rate
of workers two years younger than the specified age. A two-year lag
was chosen roughly to correspond to the average amount of time since
job loss for displaced workers. Third, conditional labor-force participation rates for nondisplaced men were calculated as the difference
between current and lagged labor-force participation divided by the
lagged rate. Similarly, conditional retirement or disability rates were
estimated as the difference between current and lagged values of retirement or disability probabilities, divided by the lagged participation
rates.72
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 display the age-specific labor-force participation and retirement or disability probabilities for displaced and nondisplaced men. The unconditional estimates for nondisplaced men
correspond to those in Table 2.24; the conditional estimates were
obtained using the procedure described above. As mentioned, nondisplaced men have uniformly lower probabilities of participating in the
labor force and higher rates of retirement or disability. Conditional on
being in the labor force two years earlier, however, men in their middle
fifties and older who have not lost jobs are more likely to participate
and less likely to classify themselves as retired or disabled than those
who have lost jobs. For example, the conditional retirement or disabil-
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Figure 2.2 United States: Labor Force Participation Rates of Displaced
and Nondisplaced Males

Figure 2.3 United States: Retirement/Disability Rates of Displaced and
Nondisplaced Males
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ity probabilities of 55-, 60-, and 64-year-old nondisplaced men are 2, 8,
and 27 percent, compared to 9, 16, and 38 percent for displaced men.73
These results suggest that job loss may hasten retirement. Further analysis is needed before this conclusion can be asserted with confidence,
however.
The Netherlands
The results from the analyses of labor market transitions following
displacement suggest that early retirement and DI have been used to
facilitate displacement in the Netherlands. Recall, for example, that in
the LFS data (Tables 2.13 and 2.15) at least some displaced workers
withdrew from the labor force, either by early retirement or in DI, in
the 1985–1990 period. The tables also indicate that this concerns at
most 10 percent of all displaced workers. More surprisingly, the FE
data (Table 2.14) attribute some role to both early retirement and DI in
the 1993–1996 period, even though DI legislation had already undergone major changes to avoid improper use (see the institutional details
provided earlier).
The improper use of DI and the role of early retirement have
received ample attention in the Dutch policy debate, and numerous
empirical studies on these issues exist. Although these usually do not
focus on displaced workers per se, some of these papers offer insights
that are useful in the context of displacement.
A series of papers has sought to explain the relatively high DI caseload in the Netherlands (see Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder 1997 for an
overview). The data suggest that before the reforms in the late 1980s
up to 50 percent of the DI inflow was related to “redundancy of workers” and not to actual health problems. This conclusion may appear
rather extreme, but it is consistent with the relatively high DI rates in
the Netherlands (see the earlier discussion of Dutch institutions). Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder, using an OSA panel survey of firms, estimated that in the late 1980s (after the 1980s reforms) there was still 10
percent of the DI inflow that was related to redundancy. Although
these authors did not investigate DI in the 1990s, one can expect that
the 1993 reforms have reduced this number even further.
Thio (1997) used data from a 1993 survey among elderly heads of
households and their partners, conducted by the Centre for Economic
Research on Retirement and Ageing, to sample heads of household,
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53- to 63-year-olds, who were not working (were “retired”) at the time
of the interview, had been working at least up to age 40, and had been
working for at least three months with their last employer. The data
distinguish various self-reported reasons for retiring from their last job.
One group of explanation corresponds to layoffs for economic reasons
(displacement). Other categories are quits, health-related separations,
separations related to working conditions, and separations for family
reasons. The data also distinguish various exit routes for retirement,
including early retirement and DI. In the sample of retired heads of
households used, 37 percent were on DI and 43 percent were in early
retirement. The average retirement age was 54 years.
In 96 percent of the DI cases, health was reported as a reason for
retirement, and in 86 percent as the primary reason. In 24 percent of
the DI cases, layoff was reported as a reason, but in only 8 percent as
the primary reason. This seems consistent with the results found by
Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder (1997): the average time between retirement and the survey was five years, implying that the results were
roughly applicable to the late 1980s. Furthermore, since the data
applied to the period before the major DI reform of 1993, the results
were again likely to overestimate the current role of DI in facilitating
adjustment to displacement. Of individuals in early retirement, 37 percent reported layoff as a reason for retirement, and 26 percent reported
layoff as the primary reason. Thus, it seems that a significant share of
the inflow into early retirement was related to displacement. Finally, it
was shown that 60 percent of retirement due to layoffs, including those
retired in UI and other schemes, was concentrated among 54- to 59year-olds, and only 9 percent concerned individuals of age 60 and up.74

CONCLUSION
Discussion
This chapter analyzes the incidence and consequences of displacement in the United States and the Netherlands. For the United States,
we provide an illustrative investigation using data from the February
1996 Current Population Survey and attached Displaced Worker Sup-
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plement. For the Netherlands, no equivalent to the Displaced Worker
Supplements exists, and so displacement is studied using three longitudinal data sets: an administrative firm-worker data set, an administrative UI data set, and a labor-force panel survey.
Although the scope for direct comparisons between the United
States and the Netherlands is limited by differences in the available
data, several interesting comparisons can be drawn. First, the evidence indicates that displacement is a common event and occurs with
roughly the same frequency in both countries: during the 1993–1995
period, between 3 and 4 percent of persons holding jobs lasting more
than one year were estimated to have been permanently laid off and to
have experienced at least some unemployment. Displacement probabilities are also lower for women than men and decline with job tenure
in both nations. Termination rates are estimated to fall with age and
education in each country. These effects may reflect other factors,
however, and do not persist in the regression analysis provided for the
Netherlands. Employment terminations also appear to hasten retirement or transition into disability status in both the United States and
the Netherlands, and there is reason to believe that the consequences
of displacement were less severe in the booming U.S. labor market of
the mid 1990s than in earlier years. In contrast, displacement in the
Netherlands seems to have been more frequent in the 1990s than in the
1970s and 1980s.
Patterns of non-employment following displacement exhibit
intriguing differences and similarities for the two countries. As might
be expected, terminated workers in the Netherlands are out of work for
a much longer period of time, conditional on experiencing some joblessness. A much larger share of displaced workers move into alternative employment directly, however, without experiencing unemployment.75 The lower Dutch reemployment hazard rates are consistent
with the possibility that greater labor market rigidity and support during periods of joblessness reduce both the opportunity and the incentive to obtain new positions. The higher frequency of direct transitions
into new jobs is harder to explain. Possibly the data are inadequate to
make this comparison (the DWS data in the United States, for example,
may miss many displacements that result in direct transitions to new
employment). Alternatively, the employment protection provisions in
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the Netherlands may be more likely to restrict displacements to cases
in which new jobs have already been obtained or are readily available.
Despite the aforementioned differences, there are many common
patterns of post-termination joblessness in the two countries. For
example, reemployment hazard rates decline with age and are lower for
women (compared to men) in both nations. The data also suggest negative duration dependence in the United States and the Netherlands.
Finally, the overall probabilities that displaced workers are reemployed
within six months or one year are surprisingly similar in the two countries. These similarities suggest that there may be adjustment patterns
following job loss that are common among many countries, and perhaps even universal, despite substantial differences in institutional
arrangements.
It is difficult to compare the wage changes that follow job loss in
the two countries. As already mentioned, one problem is that patterns
of reemployment are so different in the United States and the Netherlands.76 In the Netherlands, displaced workers experiencing positive
non-employment spells are likely to be out of work for sufficiently
lengthy periods to have sorting and stigma effects and loss of skills that
significantly affect their labor market position per se (see Andersen
1997). This hampers the interpretation of empirical results on this
wage difference.77 Also, given the difficulties in getting a job once
unemployed, workers in the Netherlands who expect displacement may
have particularly strong incentives to search actively for another job
while still employed. Consequently, some job-to-job transitions may
be the result of anticipated displacement. Indeed, if unemployment
durations are long, employment may be an even more important destination state following displacement.78 Again, this suggests that issues
like sorting are important and that workers moving directly into other
jobs in the Netherlands may be quite different from their U.S. counterparts. Another problem is that only the data analyzed for the Netherlands allow for a comparison of displaced and nondisplaced workers.
On the other hand, since sample sizes are small for the Netherlands, it
is not possible to say much about how the experiences differ among
groups.
This notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that there is no evidence that
mean wages decline following displacement in either country. The
point estimates actually show significantly higher subsequent earnings
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in the Netherlands and no change in the United States. This suggests
that the losses in average earnings of reemployed workers should take
the form of slower wage growth than for workers avoiding displacement, rather than of outright reductions in compensation (as is shown
in the Dutch data). The variance of outcomes is substantial, however.
For example, the U.S. evidence indicates that substantial earnings
losses are experienced by older workers, those displaced from longtenure jobs, and those whose earnings were originally relatively high
compared to others with similar observable characteristics. Finally, the
results suggest two important sources of risk beyond any expected
changes in wages for reemployed workers. The first relates to uncertainty regarding duration of the spell of joblessness and the second to
the substantial variance of subsequent earnings experienced by workers on their new jobs. These risks and the institutional arrangements
for dealing with them are also related to the experiences of displaced
individuals. For instance, Dutch workers who experience unemployment following displacement may have longer spells than their U.S.
counterparts precisely because the Dutch social protections reduce the
size of loss during periods of unemployment. This could result in
reduced dispersion of postdisplacement wage changes, conditional on
reemployment, because workers have less incentive to obtain new jobs
that pay substantially less than their old ones.
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Notes
We thank Peter Kuhn and Christian Dustmann for useful comments on earlier drafts of
this chapter.
1. Displacement rates increased from about 4 percent in 1970 to 11 percent in 1993,
according to a rough estimate based on the unemployment insurance (UI). Displacement rates are lower in 1994–1996, however, than in 1993. See the section
on incidence for details.
2. Temporary layoffs may occur in less organized ways, however. Seasonally
unemployed workers, for instance, can sometimes receive UI. Institutional details
and a discussion of the consequences for our analysis are provided in later sections. Emerson (1988) discussed the role of temporary layoffs in various industrialized countries.
3. See Siebert (1997) and Nickell (1997) for recent, and somewhat conflicting, discussions of the role of labor market rigidities in explaining the disparate employment experiences of the United States and Europe.
4. Production workers averaged $12.39 per hour in September 1997 (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 1998).
5. More detailed discussion of these issues are provided in Krueger (1991) and Dertouzos and Karoly (1993).
6. Generally individuals must have worked at least two quarters and earned a minimum amount (typically between $500 and $3000, depending on the state) during
the year prior to the immediately completed calendar quarter. The claimant must
also be available for, and able to, work if a “suitable” offer is received.
7. Most of the information in this and the next paragraph comes from the Committee
on Ways and Means (1996).
8. For displaced workers, a somewhat larger fraction probably qualify for benefits.
Data from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement indicates, for instance, that 44
percent of the 25- to 64-year olds losing jobs due to plant closings, slack work, or
position or shift abolishment between 1993 and 1995 received UI.
9. Payments under TAA were much larger in earlier years, peaking at 532,000 persons and $1.6 billion in 1980.
10. Leigh (1995) and Kodrzycki (1997) provided useful summaries of these programs
and their effectiveness.
11. The total budget for dislocated worker programs funded through the Employment
and Training Administration of the Department of Labor was $1.1 billion in fiscal
year 1996 (Office of Management and Budget 1998).
12. Minimum wages in the Netherlands are actually set as monthly wages. They can
be transformed to hourly minimum wages by dividing the sector-specific normal
working hours. The reported hourly minimum wage is valid for a 38 hour/week
sector. For young workers up to 23 years of age, minimum wages are lower.
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13. One of the data sets used in our analyses distinguishes between individuals
employed under CAO contracts or AVVs and employees who are not covered by
either of these. See the data section.
14. In recent years, so-called flexible contracts have been used increasingly. Such
contracts do not specify working hours and correspond more closely to U.S.
employment-at-will arrangements. In 1996, however, only 6 percent of all working hours were controlled by such flexible contracts (CBS 1998).
15. Note that employers have to avoid such “continued contracts” in several ways, by
only offering new contracts after slightly more than 31 days. Although such contracts are not formally “continued contracts,” employees have been successful in
fighting such contracting behavior in court. Also note that, currently, laws are
proposed that allow for more flexible fixed-term contracting, offering less protection to the employee.
16. In case of separation, advance-notice periods start after a permit has been granted
and, if not specified otherwise in the contract, generally equal the time between
two subsequent wage payments, as a base. This period is usually one month. In
addition, however, the employer must give one week’s notice for each year of the
employee’s tenure, up to a maximum of 13 weeks, with one additional week per
year of tenure for employees of age 45–65, up to a maximum of 26 weeks.
Advance-notice periods can be contracted, instead. However, such periods can
never be excluded, nor can they exceed six months.
17. Actually, there are two laws, of 1949 and 1987, which were both revised in the
1990s.
18. We use administrative UI data for 1992–1993 in this chapter. To qualify as
unemployed, the individual has to face a reduction of at least five hours of work
per week or half of his original hours if he worked fewer than 10 hours per week.
19. For example, to get an initial benefit-entitlement period of five years, the unemployed worker has to have had jobs for at least 40 months, including at least three
of the five years just prior to the start of the unemployment spell.
20. The extended benefits are equal to 70 percent of the gross minimum wage or 70
percent of the gross wage in the last job before unemployment, whichever is
lower, and are again subject to income tax. Unemployed who have had jobs in the
last three of the last five years are eligible for extended benefits, for a maximum
duration of one year, or sometimes longer for older workers.
21. In general, welfare is applicable to all jobless not covered by UI, DI, or other
schemes, and provides benefits at the subsistence level (currently around $500
after taxes per month for singles without children).
22. A UI recipient should 1) take actions to avoid staying unemployed—to search for
a job and accept appropriate job offers, register as a job searcher at the public
employment office, participate in education and training, etc., and 2) keep the
administration informed about everything that is relevant to the payment of his UI
benefits. For more details and references see Abbring, van den Berg, and van
Ours (1997).
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23. A small part of the cost of UI—roughly 50 percent of the costs induced by UI benefits paid during the first 13 weeks of unemployment—is covered by premiums
related to sectoral unemployment risk.
24. DI is arranged by a variety of laws from 1967 (referring to a law from 1930),
1976, and 1993, and is revised throughout. Also, DI actually consists of two separate arrangements, one for the first 52 weeks of DI, and one for the remaining DI
spell. In this chapter, we simply label both arrangements as DI. See CTSV
(1997) for details.
25. It should be noted that Dutch DI also covers disability that is not work related,
however.
26. Analysis of DWS data typically focuses on joblessness, rather than unemployment, since information on labor-force participation is not available.
27. For additional information on the Displaced Worker Supplements, as well as
excellent reviews of research using these and other data sources, see Fallick 1996
or Kletzer 1998.
28. Researchers have used a variety of strategies in an attempt to surmount this shortcoming. For instance, displacement probabilities are sometimes calculated by
assuming that the number of persons at risk of permanent layoff (the denominator
of the displacement rate) is equal to the number employed at the survey date.
Similarly, the quasi-longitudinal nature of the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group data has been used to construct estimates of the earnings
changes of nondisplaced workers, which can then be compared to those of job losers. Farber (1993) is an example of a study using several of these techniques.
29. Studies using longitudinal data include Topel (1990); Ruhm (1991a); and Stevens
(1997). Administrative data have been utilized by Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996), among others.
30. Note that the structure of the FE data is similar to that of the Japanese data used in
this volume.
31. The remaining spells are completed for quantitatively less important reasons like
death, military service, self-employment, or permanent 100 percent benefit reductions because, for instance, of noncompliance with eligibility rules.
32. Thus, we do not miss transitions made between two consecutive interview dates,
assuming recall errors are absent.
33. We exclude 46 individuals whose interviews are not successive. This reconstruction covers at most the five-year period 1985 until the end of 1990 for respondents
who participated in all waves, and some retrospective information on the state
occupied at the date of the first interview. See van den Berg, Lindeboom, and
Ridder (1994) for an analysis of attrition using these data. They found that the
effects of attrition on estimates of transition models are unimportant.
34. Unemployment and not-in-the-labor-force are differentiated by requiring those
who are unemployed to actively search for a job.
35. Job-to-job changes are recorded. The motive or cause is selected from an extensive list.
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36. Farber (1997) included in this category job loss for “other” reasons in his analysis.
We have deleted persons in this category from our calculations. In a recent analysis of additional data collected on respondents to the 1996 DWS who report being
displaced for “other” reasons, Farber (1998) concluded that fewer than one-quarter of persons giving this response had “involuntary” job losses (and some of
these may have left temporary or seasonal jobs). It is also worth noting that workers whose contracts expire do not fit neatly into any of the DWS categories.
These individuals might classify themselves as displaced for “other” reasons or,
alternatively, say that their position has been abolished or that they have concluded a temporary job.
37. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Hall (1995) estimated the
rate of permanent layoffs to be around 1.8 percent per quarter or roughly 7 percent
per year. Using the same data source, Stevens (1997) estimates, however, that
annual displacement rates are only around half as large. On the other hand,
Hamermesh (1989) indicated that displacement rates were 20 to 40 percent higher
in the 1980s than the 1970s.
38. The issue of multiple turnover was discussed in Ruhm (1987) and played a key
role in the analysis made by Stevens (1997).
39. Farber (1997) estimated that 30 percent of persons losing jobs in a given year are
again displaced at some point during the next three. Stevens (1997) estimated
annual displacement rates of between 10 and 12 percent in the two years following an initial job loss.
40. Assume that 100 individuals are displaced in each year between 1993 and 1995.
Under the second assumption above, 10 persons terminating jobs in 1994 will also
have been displaced in 1993 and so only 90 of the job losses will be recorded in
the 1996 DWS. Similarly, 10 of those terminated in 1995 will have had a 1993
job loss and 9 of them a 1994 displacement. Therefore, workers identified as displaced in 1995 will constitute 81 out of 271 sample members.
41. Men and women losing jobs in 1995 account for 46.2 and 48.5 percent of the 1996
DWS samples, implying inflation factors of 1.545 (0.462/0.299) and 1.622
(0.485/0.299) respectively. In the absence of recall bias, observed displacements
might be concentrated in the later years if the rate of job loss actually increased
over time. Given that the economy was improving, however (unemployment fell
from 6.9 percent in 1993 to 5.6 percent in 1995), this seems unlikely.
42. A common inflation factor is used to account for the effects of recall bias, with no
attempt made to differentiate as a function of job seniority. In fact, 58 percent of
observed displacements involving those with less than one year of tenure occur in
1995, suggesting that recall bias is particularly severe for this group.
43. A multivariate analysis by Farber (1993) indicated a strong monotonic decline in
the risk of job loss with tenure. Fallick (1996) summarized evidence suggesting
that the protective effect of tenure decreases over time.
44. A more complete measure of aggregate displacement can be computed from the
FE data on a much shorter time interval. This measure and its differences from
the UI measure will be discussed later.
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45. Note that we will show later that displacement rates are lower again in 1994–
1996.
46. Analyses based on the FE data draw on results from a project on crowding out of
low-skilled workers, in which three of the authors of this chapter are involved at
the CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in The Hague.
47. Note that we observe that workers are on a fixed-term contract only once they
separate for that reason; so we cannot exclude these workers from the data set.
This is not a serious problem, however, as we condition on tenure, which seems
more relevant as a determinant of the risk set for displacement.
48. If, for example, Philips displaces all workers at its computer division and at the
same time expands its audio and video divisions, we will underestimate the true
displacement rate when we use the net employment criterion.
49. The relatively low displacement rate of the lowest tenure group could be an artifact of the FE sampling procedure, which undersamples workers who separate
within a year (see the data section). Note that the FE data are administrative and
cannot suffer from recall bias as the DWS possibly does. On the other hand, the
nonmonotonicity could be explained by a learning model along the lines of
Jovanovic (1979).
50. See the institutions section for a discussion of collective agreements in the Netherlands.
51. See the discussion of the role of sanctions in the data and transitions sections. We
do not exclude low-tenure individuals. However, the UI eligibility requirements
would prevent most of the low-tenure workers from ending up in UI. Also note
that we will conclude later that a large proportion of displaced workers in the
Netherlands experience no unemployment spells at all, which implies that the UI
data may well underestimate the true displacement rate.
52. Displacements are also associated with lower employment probabilities for
women, although the differences are less dramatic for men.
53. This is consistent with Gibbons and Katz’s evidence (1991) that workers displaced by plant closings are reemployed more quickly than those losing jobs due
to slack work or position or shift abolishment. They attributed this to the possibility that plant closings affect a relatively random group of workers, whereas the
other types of job loss impact those of lower average quality.
54. Finding that advance notice is associated with the lower rates of joblessness but
without reductions in durations, conditional on a positive spell, is common in this
literature (see Addison and Portugal 1987; or Ehrenberg and Jakubson 1988).
Ruhm (1992, 1994) provided evidence that persons with short written notice have
longer spells and concluded that this occurs because firms disproportionately supply voluntary notice to workers with unobserved characteristics correlated with
low reemployment probabilities. Previous research has also shown that union
membership, high predisplacement earnings, and depressed local labor market
conditions are associated with extended joblessness (see Fallick 1996 for examples). Estimation of corresponding Weibull hazard models reveals that baseline
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55.
56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

rates decline over time. This could reflect either observed heterogeneity (where
“better” workers get reemployed first) or duration dependence.
The total number of observations is smaller than in Table 2.13 because information on sojourn times was missing in some cases.
See, for instance, Lancaster (1979). The fact that median residual durations are
now longer for displaced workers can possibly be traced back to heterogeneity in
terms of unobserved and other observed characteristics. Earlier analyses of the
same data by Abbring, van den Berg, and van Ours (1997) indeed did show that
both negative genuine duration dependence and observed and unobserved heterogeneity play a significant role in explaining the observed duration dependency
pattern.
Because of their flexibility and computational convenience, discrete distributions
for unobservables are frequently used in MPH analyses. The flexibility of discrete distributions as heterogeneity or mixture of distributions was illustrated by a
result of Heckman and Singer (1984) who showed that in MPH models the nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator or the heterogeneity distribution is a
discrete distribution. The estimation procedure requires the number of points of
support not to be fixed in advance, however, and the estimation of standard errors
is not straightforward.
Recall, however, that unobserved differences between the two groups of individuals may interfere with this argument. The excess layoffs indicator, the “residual
size of the cell,” has a significantly positive effect on reemployment rates, which
could be explained as a signaling effect. Workers who are involved in excess, or
even mass, layoffs, are more attractive than workers who are singled out for layoff.
The table includes an Information Matrix (IM) test on the unobserved heterogeneity parameters (see White 1982). Chesher (1984) has shown that this test on the
equality of the score and Hessian representations of the IM can be interpreted as a
test of local parameter variation. In this case, the IM test can be expected to detect
additional unobserved heterogeneity, and can be shown to be distributed with two
degrees of freedom. Thus, the IM is rejected at just a 5 percent significance level.
Adding an additional mass point to the heterogeneity distribution does not change
the results, however, two mass points converge to the same value and other
parameter estimates are unaffected.
The DWS does not contain information on hourly earnings. Crude controls for
part-time versus full-time work are available, but these are not used in the analysis
below because these changes are likely to be endogenous (e.g., some displaced
workers may be unable to obtain full-time jobs).
During the 1993–1995 period, the civilian unemployment rate averaged 6.2 percent, 62.4 percent of the civilian population were employed, and real GDP grew
2.6 percent per year. The comparable figures for the 1990–1992 time span were
6.6, 62.0, and 1.0 percent. Herz (1990) and Farber (1997), among others, showed
that workers adjust more easily to displacements occurring during booming periods than when economic conditions are less favorable. In addition, many of the
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earlier analyses have been restricted to groups likely to experience relatively large
wage losses, such as persons with more than three years’ tenure.
No effort is made to control for selection into employment. Therefore these
results should be interpreted as providing information on the determinants of
wages (or earnings changes) conditional on survey-date employment.
Kletzer (1989), Addison and Portugal (1989), and Ruhm (1990), among others,
provided earlier related analyses.
Other research also suggests the usefulness of distinguishing between general and
specific human capital. For example, larger losses have been found for displaced
workers who switch industries than for those who do not; see Kletzer (1998) for a
detailed summary of this literature.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) indicated smaller displacement-induced losses for those
affected by plant closings than for other job losers but, as mentioned, do not distinguish between slack work and position or shift abolishment.
Source: CBS (1998, 1991).
There are several reasons for this loss of observations. First, the starting date of
the initial observed labor market state can be missing. In this case the different
states cannot be linked to a calendar time, a necessity for the inflation correction.
Second, the starting date may be inconsistent with the reported sojourn time,
given the date of the first interview. Finally, one or more sojourn times may be
missing.
Note that most observations are lost because tenure is missing: tenure is observed
for 1,069 of the 1,551 observations. Of these 1,069 cases, 168 cases concern displacement. Of the 668 observations with sufficient tenure, 116 concern displacement, which is 69 percent of 168. This number is referred to in the discussion of
the UI inflow measure later on.
The labor-force participation rates of 45- to 54- and 55- to 64-year-old men
(women) were 89 and 67 (75 and 50) percent, respectively, in 1996 (U.S. Bureau
of the Census 1997). In contrast, 35- to 44-year-olds were only marginally more
likely than those age 45 to 54 to participate (92 percent of the men and 78 percent
of the women). The lack of research on displacement and retirement is probably
due to the difficulty in using the DWS for this type of analysis. The small bit of
earlier literature that is relevant to this issue uncovered little evidence that displacements have strong effects on retirement ages.
Workers with less than a year on the predisplacement job are retained in this portion of the analysis because the end of even a brief job has the potential of creating
considerable adjustment problems for older workers. In addition, information on
prior tenure is unavailable for nondisplaced workers, making it difficult to undertake the comparison procedure discussed next.
To reduce fluctuations due to small sample sizes (particularly for displaced workers) the probabilities are actually calculated as three-year averages centered
around the specific age (for example, the retirement or disability rate for “60year-olds” is actually the average retirement or disability rate of 59- to 61-yearolds).
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72. These conditional probabilities are analogous but not identical to hazard rates.
They differ in part because 1) some men who are initially nonparticipants might
reenter the labor force during the compensation period; 2) “lagged” status is calculated for slightly younger workers in 1996, rather than for the same cohort of
men in an earlier year; 3) there can be some movement over time between “other”
reasons for nonparticipation and retirement or disability.
73. The unconditional retirement or disability probabilities for nondisplaced men are
15, 29, and 58 percent.
74. By construction of the data set, the remainder is in the 40–53 age group.
75. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991, chap. 5, Table 1) provided a steady state
estimate of unemployment durations of around three months for 1988 for both
countries. Furthermore, their Table 2 showed that this is fairly typical of the
period 1962–1989. In the Netherlands, however, mean unemployment durations
are usually longer than one year: Layard, Nickell, and Jackman even gave a
steady state estimate of 25 months for 1988. Also, median reemployment durations of displaced workers in our 1992 UI data set for the Netherlands (20 weeks;
see Table 2.16) are substantially longer than median reemployment durations in
our U.S. data set (7 weeks). This is remarkable, as our data set excludes workers
entering other schemes and hardly ever returning to employment, and includes at
least some short-tenure workers, who can be expected to be more mobile.
76. These problems have recently been encountered by Cohen, Lefranc, and SaintPaul (1997), who compared the U.S. and French labor markets. Using the
Enquete Emploi, collected by the INSEE, for France and the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics for the United States, they found that wage discounts after displacement are roughly the same in both countries. The discussion following the
paper, however, showed that it is not easy to draw and clear conclusions from this.
77. An additional empirical problem is that the postdisplacement wage will frequently
be unobserved for these workers due to right-censored unemployment spells.
78. Of course, workers in the United States also have incentives to avoid unemployment and to find new jobs prior to job loss, but they are generally weaker incentives.
79. See the section on labor market transitions following displacement. We exclude
individuals who are living abroad.
80. This may be due to DI legislation, however. Partly disabled workers have to find
a job for their remaining work capacity because of a rule that came into effect in
1987. We cannot distinguish these cases, but the rule only affects observations in
part of our observation period (see Hassink, van Ours, and Ridder 1997).
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Table 2.1 Netherlands: Overview of the Data Sets
Data set

FE data

LFS

UI data

Unit of observation

Firm/worker

Household (hh.)/individ. (i.)

UI case

Type of data

Administrative

Survey

Sampling scheme

2-yr. rotating panel 4 waves
(1991–92, 1992–93,
1993–94, 1994–95)
Approx. 2,000 firms/26,000
workers per year

Random panel
4 waves (1985, 1986, 1988, 1990)

Administrative
Inflow sample
UI inflow 1992 (spells followed up
to Sept. 1993)

Key feature

Worker transitions into and out
of firms

Full individual labor market
histories

Transitions into and out of UI

Displacement criterion

Separations labeled as layoffs and
those from shrinking firms

Layoffs for economic reasons

UI inflow (minus sanctions
responsibility for job loss)

Tenure restriction

Tenure ≥1 yr.

Tenure ≥1 yr.

Entitlement to UI

Information on
displacement rate

Yes

No

Noa

Transitions following
displacement

Yes

No

No

Prob. positive
spell joblessness

Upper boundb

Yes

No

Reemployment
duration

No

Yesc

Yes

No. of observations

2,132 hh./4,020 i. in the first wave 209,478 cases

Labor market
state after 1 yr.

No

Yes

Nod

Role of early
retirement or DI

Somee

Somee

No

Earnings changes
induced by
displacement

No

Yes

No

a

However, the corresponding aggregate time series on UI inflow over the period 1970–93 are used to construct displacement-rate time
series.
b
Only for displacement identified by separations from shrinking firms, some job-to-job transitions are recorded; thus the probability of a
positive spell of joblessness is overestimated.
c
The LFS data are not used here, however, because of the superiority of the UI data for this purpose.
d
We observe whether an individual leaves UI and why (i.e., to what labor market state), but not the subsequent labor market transitions
made.
e
These data can be used to construct circumstantial evidence, but we employ results from other studies using data that are better suited to
analyze these issues.
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Table 2.2 United States: “Lower-Bound” Estimates of Annual
Displacement Rates (%)
Time period

All workers

Men

Women

1981–83

3.8

4.4

3.0

1983–85

3.0

3.4

2.5

1985–87

2.7

3.1

2.2

1987–89

2.4

2.6

2.1

1989–91

3.4

4.0

2.8

1991–93

3.2

3.6

2.7

1993–95

3.1

3.4

2.8

NOTE: The table refers to job loss among 20- to 64-year-olds (at the survey date) due
to plant closing, slack work, or position or shift abolishments.
SOURCE: Estimates obtained by dividing by three the estimates for three-year displacement rates calculated by Farber (1997).
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Table 2.3 United States: Estimated Annual Displacement Rates during
the 1993–95 Period by Predisplacement Job Tenure (%)
Tenure (yr.)

All workers

Men

Women

All

4.9

5.3

4.5

<1

5.9

6.7

5.1

>1

4.6

4.9

4.3

1–2

9.9

10.9

9.0

3–4

4.7

5.6

4.0

5–9

3.5

4.0

3.0

≥10

2.7

2.5

2.9

All

4.2

4.5

3.9

<1

5.1

5.7

4.4

>1

3.9

4.2

3.7

1–2

8.5

9.3

7.7

3–4

4.0

4.8

3.5

5–9

3.0

3.4

2.6

≥10

2.3

2.1

2.5

a,b

All displacements

Displacements resulting in
joblessnessc

NOTE: Estimates for overall and gender-specific annual displacement rates are
obtained using the lower-bound displacement rates in Table 2.2 and then inflating
them via the procedure discussed in the text.
a
Tenure-specific rates are calculated by multiplying the overall displacement rate by
the ratio of the fraction of displaced workers with the specified amount of tenure
divided by the franction of all workers with that amount of tenure. For example, the
displacement rate for persons with 1–2 years of seniority is calculated as 0.049 x
0.268/0.132 = 0.099.
b
Results for all types of permanent job loss.
c
Restricted to displacements resulting in an initial spell of joblessness.

154

Abbring, van den Berg, Gautier, van Lomwel, van Ours, and Ruhm

Table 2.4 United States: Estimated Annual
Displacement Rates during the 1993–95
Period by Age (%)

All displacements

Displacements
resulting
in joblessness

All

4.9

4.2

20–24

5.5

4.7

25–34

5.3

4.5

35–44

4.7

4.0

45–54

4.4

3.8

55–64

4.1

3.5

Age (yr.)

NOTE: Estimates for overall displacement rates are obtained from
Table 2.3. Age-specific rates are calculated by adjusting the
overall rate by the relative age-specific differences in displacement probabilities calculated by Farber (1997).

Table 2.5 Netherlands: Reported Labor Market States of Workers at Strongly Shrinking Firms, 1993–96 (% of
Employment at all Firms)
Criterion

Firms (%)a

Layoffb

New jobb

Early retirementb

DIb

Displacementc

Employment
(net change)

–20%
–30%
–40%

16.0
9.4
4.7

0.6
0.4
0.2

0.7
0.4
0.3

0.1
0.1
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

4.8
3.8
3.5

Outflow
(gross change)

–20%
–30%
–40%

50.3
32.4
19.5

1.5
1.0
0.7

2.4
1.7
1.2

0.2
0.2
0.1

0.1
0.1
0.0

7.2
5.9
5.1

NOTE: Workers older than 60 years are excluded, as are workers with less than one year’s tenure.
a
Firm shares are computed among firms with workers in the selected category.
b
Separations only from strongly shrinking firms added to annual displacement rates.
c
Total displacement as a percentage of total employment. Displacement includes “layoffs” (excluding layoffs during test periods) at all
firms, plus transitions into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at strongly shrinking firms.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.6 Annual Displacement Rates by Tenure during
the 1993–95 Period (%)
Tenure (yr.)
All

All workers

Men

Women

4.1

4.2

4.0

<1

5.8

6.3

5.2

1–2

8.1

9.2

6.7

3–4

4.7

5.2

4.0

5–9

3.0

3.0

2.9

≥10

1.9

1.9

2.0

NOTE: Workers older than 60 are excluded. Displacement is
identified with “layoffs” (excluding “layoffs during test periods”)
at any firm, plus transitions into “new jobs,” “early retirement,”
and “DI” at firms with net employment changes < –30%.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.7 Netherlands: Displacement and Other Separation Frequencies
1993–96 (%)
Variable

No transition

Displaced

Other outflow

88.3

3.8

7.8

1993

87.2

7.6

5.2

1994

89.8

2.9

7.4

1995

88.3

3.6

8.1

1996

88.1

1.7

10.2

Female

87.0

3.6

9.4

Male

89.1

3.9

7.0

<1

88.0

4.5

7.5

1–2

81.7

6.8

11.5

3–4

87.1

4.0

9.0

5–10

91.3

2.6

6.1

>10

93.9

1.7

4.4

CAOa

88.8

3.6

7.7

AVVb

85.8

5.2

9.0

None

87.3

4.3

8.4

82.6

5.7

11.8

All
Year

Gender

Tenure (yr.)

Coll. agreement

Job complexity level
Low
Intermediate

89.5

3.4

7.1

High

91.3

3.3

5.4

87.4

4.3

8.4

Education (yr.)
≤10
>10 – <15

89.9

3.1

7.1

≥15

89.6

3.3

7.1

72.3

10.7

17.0

Age (yr.)
18–19

(continued)
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Table 2.7 (continued)
No transition

Displaced

Other outflow

20–29

Variable

83.0

5.8

11.2

30–39

89.7

3.4

6.9

40–49

93.0

2.6

4.4

≥50

90.4

2.1

7.5

NOTE: Workers older than 60 are excluded, as are workers with less than one year’s
tenure (except in the row giving results for these workers). Displacement is identified
with “layoff” (excluding “layoffs during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions
into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at firms with net employment changes
< –30%.
a
Covered by a collective agreement.
b
Covered by a mandatory extension of a CAO.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.8 Netherlands: Logit Estimates of
Probability of Displacement
Variablea
Intercept

Estimate (std. error)
–11.21*** (2.58)

log Age

8.15*** (1.62)

(log Age)2

–1.13*** (0.23)

Woman

–0.36*** (0.05)

log Tenure

–0.54*** (0.05)
2

(log Tenure)
log Wage
(log Wage)2
Part-time

Education (yr.)

0.02

(0.02)

–2.52*** (0.31)
0.20*** (0.05)
–0.24*** (0.05)
0.00

(0.01)

Job complexity
Low

–0.72*** (0.10)

Intermediate

–0.68*** (0.08)

Occupation
Simple technical
Administrative
Management

0.09

(0.16)

0.30**

(0.15)

–0.06

(0.17)

Services

0.14

(0.16)

Commercial

0.20

(0.16)

Creative

0.19

(0.21)

CAO

–0.00

(0.05)

AVV

–0.05

(0.08)

Wage agreementb

Sector
Manufacturing
Construction
Trade
Restaurants, etc.

0.20*

(0.11)

0.44*** (0.11)
–0.16

(0.11)

0.39*** (0.14)

Transport,
comm.

–0.03

Financial

0.16

(0.13)
(0.12)
(continued)
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Table 2.8 (continued)
Variablea
Health

Estimate (std. error)
–0.12

(0.11)

Firm sizec
10–19

–0.26*** (0.06)

20–49

–0.42*** (0.06)

50–99

–0.56*** (0.07)

100–199

–0.49*** (0.06)

200–499

–0.24*** (0.06)

≥500

0.48*** (0.05)

Year = 1993

1.46*** (0.06)

Year = 1994

0.38*** (0.06)

Year = 1995
log L
N

1.07*** (0.06)
–32,842.81
100,908

NOTE: Logit estimates with dependent states
“displaced” and “not displaced” (reference
state). Workers older than 60 or with tenure less
than one year are excluded. Displacement is
identified with “layoffs” (excluding “layoffs
during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions
into “new jobs,” “early retirement,” and “DI” at
firms with net employment changes < –30%.
Wages are real gross hourly wages (in Dutch
guilders) including extra time payments, profit
sharing, etc. *** = statistically significant at the
1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; * = statistically significant at the 10%
level.
a
Age and tenure are measured in years. Reference states are “male,” “full-time,” “high job
complexity,” “IT,” “no collective wage agreement,” “agriculture/mining,” “firm with < 10
workers,” and “year = 1996.”
b
“CAO” refers to coverage by a collective agreement, “AVV” to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement.
c
Firm size is measured by the number of employees.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.9 Netherlands: Simulated Annual Displacement
Probabilities (%)
Variable

Not displaced

Displaced

97.8

2.2

1993

95.3

4.7

1994

98.4

1.6

1995

96.8

3.2

1996

98.9

1.1

Female

98.2

1.8

Male

97.4

2.5

1

95.0

5.0

2

96.5

3.5

4

97.5

2.5

10

98.3

1.7

20

98.8

1.2

CAO

97.8

2.2

AVV

97.9

2.1

97.8

2.2

Low

98.0

2.0

Intermediate

98.0

2.0

High

96.0

4.0

20

98.1

1.8

30

97.5

2.5

40

97.4

2.6

50

97.7

2.3

Total population
Year

Gender

Tenure (yr.)

Wage agreement

a

No collective wage
agreement
Job-complexity level

Age (yr.)

(continued)
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Table 2.9 (continued)
Variable

Not displaced

Displaced

15

95.7

4.3

20

97.0

3.0

40

98.7

1.3

50

98.9

1.1

Wage (guilders)

NOTE: Based on logit estimates (see Table 2.8), evaluated at the mean characteristics
of the population over the period 1993–96. Displacement is identified with “layoffs”
(excluding “layoffs during test periods”) at any firm, plus transitions into “new jobs,”
“early retirement,” and “DI” at firms with net employment changes < –30%.
a
“CAO” refers to coverage by a collective agreement, “AVV” to coverage by a mandatory extension of such an agreement.
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Table 2.10 United States: Duration of Postdisplacement Joblessness

Variable
All displaced workers

All displacements

Displacements resulting in
joblessness

% reemployed within

% reemployed within

6 mo.

1 yr.

6 mo.

1 yr.

67.3

76.1

61.0

71.7

Gender
Male

69.7

77.8

63.5

73.2

Female

64.0

74.3

57.7

69.8

20–29

70.9

78.0

66.5

75.7

30–39

72.4

79.6

66.7

75.4

40–49

67.8

79.0

61.5

74.8

50–54

58.8

68.9

50.3

62.5

55–59

52.7

63.0

42.3

54.8

60–64

44.0

53.0

34.5

45.1

1–2

70.0

77.8

65.2

74.2

3–4

66.6

76.5

61.1

72.7

Age (yr.)

Job tenure (yr.)

5–9

67.7

74.4

60.4

68.7

≥10

64.2

76.0

55.8

70.4

NOTE: Data are weighted so as to be nationally representative.The data apply to workers who were 20 to 64 years old at the survey date and were displaced from jobs lasting more than one year in 1993 or 1994.
SOURCE: From the February 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.
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Table 2.11 United States: Labor-Force Status of Displaced Workers (%)
Variable

Employed

Unemployed

Out of labor force

All displaced workers

73.7

14.7

11.6

Male

76.5

16.5

6.9

Female

69.9

12.3

17.8

Gender

Age (yr.)
20–29

77.9

15.2

7.0

30–39

77.3

12.0

10.7

40–49

76.5

14.5

9.0

50–54

66.2

19.5

14.3

55–59

58.8

18.1

23.1

60–64

42.6

19.6

37.8

73.6

16.2

10.2

Job tenure (yr.)
1–2
3–4

74.7

12.8

12.6

5–9

76.6

14.7

8.7

≥10

70.0

15.0

15.2

NOTE: The table shows the labor-force status in February 1996 of 20- to 64-year-old
persons displaced from jobs lasting more than one year during the 1993–95 period.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.12 United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of
Postdisplacement Joblessness

Regressor

Probability of no
joblessnessa

Duration of joblessness
Conditionalb

Unconditionalc

Job tenure (yr.)
3–4

0.047

(0.089)

0.116

(0.073)

0.028

(0.055)

5–9

0.052

(0.090)

–0.017

(0.075)

0.006

(0.090)

≥10

0.095

(0.096)

–0.054*

(0.083)

–0.007

(0.073)

30–39

–0.052

(0.094)

–0.118

(0.078)

–0.107

(0.069)

40–49

–0.134

(0.099)

–0.185** (0.082)

–0.184** (0.072)

50–54

–0.212

(0.133)

–0.479*** (0.113)

–0.442*** (0.100)

55–59

–0.138

(0.146)

–0.704*** (0.137)

–0.583*** (0.117)

60–64

–0.353*

(0.190)

–1.12*** (0.187)

–1.01*** (0.163)

High school
grad.

0.321** (0.134)

0.271*** (0.105)

0.303*** (0.096)

Some college

0.341** (0.135)

0.319*** (0.105)

0.345*** (0.096)

College grad.

0.394*** (0.144)

0.387*** (0.115)

0.416*** (0.104)

Grad. school

0.480*** (0.170)

0.304** (0.140)

0.381*** (0.125)

0.135*

(0.069)

0.027

(0.058)

0.059*** (0.051)

Age (yr.)

Education

Married
Man

–0.007

(0.065)

0.231*** (0.055)

0.182*** (0.049)

Nonwhite

–0.285** (0.113)

–0.188** (0.087)

–0.228*** (0.080)

Native born

0.387*** (0.131)

–0.006

(0.090)

0.093

(0.084)

Source of
job loss
Plant closing

0.066

(0.084)

0.072

(0.058)

0.075

(0.060)

Slack work

0.034

(0.087)

0.010

(0.073)

0.021

(0.065)

–0.018

(0.112)

–0.036

(0.095)

–0.033

(0.084)

Written notice
(months)
<1

(continued)
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Table 2.12 (continued)
Regressor
1–2
>2

Probability of no
joblessnessa
–0.139

Duration of joblessness
Conditionalb

(0.108)

–0.139

(0.086)

0.209 ** (0.089)

–0.048

(0.082)

Unconditionalc
–0.154** (0.078)
0.039

(0.070)

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes persons displaced
from jobs lasting more than one year in 1993, 1994, or 1995 who were between the
ages of 20 and 64 in February 1996. The reference groups for the sets of dummy variables are persons with 1–2 years of tenure on the predisplacement job, 20- to 29-yearolds, high school dropouts, those losing jobs due to a position or shift abolishment,
and those with no written advance notice. *** = Statistically significant at the 1%
level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the
10% level.
a
This column shows the results of a probit model where the dependent variable is equal
to 1 if the respondent obtains a new job within one week of the displacement and zero
otherwise.
b
This column indicates coefficients for a Cox proportional hazard model where the
dependent variable is weeks of joblessness and the sample is restricted to persons out
of work for at least one week following displacement.
c
This column shows results for a Cox proportional hazard model estimated over all displaced workers where the dependent variable is weeks of joblessness plus one-half
week.
SOURCE: From the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.
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Table 2.13 Netherlands: Displacement by Motivation and Transition
Motivationa
Worker category
b

Transition

1

2

3

4

5

All

E-E

30

162

1

37

—

230

E-U

6

47

0

15

—

68

E-N

7

14

3

—

5

29

43

223

4

52

5

327

E-E

19

76

1

17

—

113

E-U

1

21

0

10

—

32

All
Workers with
tenure ≥1 year
Transitionb

E-N
All

2

11

1

—

3

17

22

108

2

27

3

162

NOTE: Rows correspond to self-reported combinations of motivation for and voluntariness of transition.
a
1 = “would have lost job anyway”; 2 = “reorganization or plant closure”; 3 = “involuntary early retirement”; 4 = “DI”; and 5 = “voluntary disability” (E-N only).
b
E-E = job-to-job transitions, E-U = employment-to-unemployment transitions, and
E-N = employment-to-not-in-labor-force transition.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.

Table 2.14 Netherlands: Reported Labor Market States of Separated
Workers by Net Employment Change (%)
Layoff

New job

Early
retirement

DI

All workers

24.9

19.4

2.9

1.9

Outflow

44.3

34.5

5.1

1.8

Group of firms
Net employment
changes < –30%

Other firms
All workers
Outflow

3.3

4.6

0.5

0.4

31.0

43.4

4.9

3.5

NOTE: Workers older than 60 and workers with tenure less than one year have been
excluded.
SOURCE: Based on weighted FE data.
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Table 2.15 Netherlands: Labor Market State One Year after
Displacement by Transition
Labor market statea
Worker category
b

Transition

E

S

U

N

M

F

All

E-E

143

0

3

1

0

0

147

E-U

17

2

27

1

0

1

48

E-N

4

0

0

18

0

0

22

164

2

30

20

0

1

217

E-E

75

0

1

1

0

0

77

E-U

6

1

17

0

0

1

25

All
Workers with
tenure ≥1 year
Transitionb

E-N
All
a

2

0

0

12

0

0

14

83

1

18

13

0

1

116

E = “employed”; S = “self-employed”; U = “unemployed and searching”; N = “notin-labor-force”; M = “military service”; and F = “full-time education.”
b
E-E = job-to-job transitions, E-U = employment-to-unemployment transitions, and
E-N = employment-to-not-in-the-labor-force.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.
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Table 2.16 Netherlands: Median Residual Reemployment Durations
(weeks)
Worker category

At 0 weeks

At 26 weeks

20.8

102.9

Nondisplaced

23.9

86.2

Displaced

20.4

104.6

All workers
Sanction indicator

Displaced workers
Age (yr.)
<30

14.0

77.4

30≤ – <40

23.2

91.3

30≤ – <50

27.2

∞

∞a
∞

22.0

93.2

80≤ – <110

26.6

106.9

110≤ – <150

15.5

97.7

≥150

21.4

≥50
Daily wage (guilders)
<80

∞

Gender
Female

25.8

93.3

Male

17.2

105.4

Urban

25.5

100.0

Not urban

19.7

106.5

Urbanization

Hours
Part-time

29.9

101.5

Full-time

18.0

107.9

Married

32.3

109.2

Not married

15.4

92.0

Marital status

NOTE: Durations are observed in intervals and may be right-censored. Medians are
computed using the actuarial method, i.e., assuming that censoring and reemployment
durations are uniformly distributed within observational intervals.
a
∞ is used to denote medians larger than the longest completed spell observed, i.e.,
that are beyond the scope of the data set.
SOURCE: Based on the UI data.
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Table 2.17 Netherlands: Mixed Proportional Hazard
Estimates of Reemployment Durations
Variablea
Nondisplaced (sanction)
Sanctions/cell member

b

Estimate (std. error)
–0.18*** (0.04)
0.01

(0.07)

Predicted size cell ( ĉ )

–1.42*** (0.15)

Residual size cell (εˆ )

0.35*** (0.05)

log Age

c

0.89*** (0.28)
2

(log Age)

–0.93*** (0.12)

log Waged
(log Wage)

0.18*** (0.03)
2

0.09*** (0.02)

Right-censored wage

e

–0.48*** (0.15)

Female

–0.09*** (0.02)

Urban

–0.01

(0.05)

Part-time

–0.00

(0.03)

Married

–0.15*** (0.03)

v1

–2.80*** (0.19)

v2

–3.74*** (0.15)

p1

0.40**

p2

0.60*** (0.16)

(0.16)

8–16 weeks

–0.13*** (0.04)

16–24 weeks

–0.26*** (0.05)

24–32 weeks

–0.43*** (0.06)

32–45 weeks

–0.80*** (0.07)

45–58 weeks

–1.05*** (0.10)

>58 weeks

–1.05*** (0.12)

log L

–40,739.8

N

21,079
Test
f

IM mixing dist.
Wald sectors

Statistic (d.f.)
6.95 (2)
628.99 (16)
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Test
Wald months
Wald provinces

Statistic (d.f.)
108.54 (11)
20.75 (11)

NOTE: Sector, month of inflow, and province dummy variables are
included. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level.
a
All variables are included in deviation from their sample means.
Reference interval for the piecewise constant baseline hazard is 0–
8 weeks.
b
Cell refers to municipality × month of inflow UI × sector – groups.
The sanction rate in each cell is included as a regressor. Also, the
number of individuals in each cell is regressed on municipality,
month of inflow UI, and sector dummies, which gives predicted
cell counts ĉ and residuals εˆ .
c
“Age” = age/10.
d
Wage is daily wage in referral period in 100 Dutch guilders.
e
Wages are right-censored at 430 guilders.
f
IM = a test statistic for local parameter variation in (v1, v2), or,
equivalently, (v1, v2, p1, p2); Wald-tests for the joint significance of
the three groups of dummy variables. All tests are asymptotically χ 2 distributed with the degrees of freedom given in parentheses.
SOURCE: Based on the UI data.
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Table 2.18 Netherlands: Simulated Reemployment Probabilities
Pr(t ≤ 26 weeks)

Pr(t ≤ 52 weeks)

0.54

0.72

Nondisplaced

0.49

0.66

Displaced

0.55

0.73

20

0.70

0.86

30

0.58

0.76

40

0.44

0.61

50

0.32

0.46

50

0.50

0.68

100

0.53

0.71

150

0.56

0.74

200

0.59

0.77

Female

0.52

0.70

Male

0.56

0.74

Urban

0.54

0.72

Not urban

0.54

0.72

Part-time

0.54

0.72

Full-time

0.54

0.72

Married

0.51

0.69

Not married

0.56

0.74

Variable
Sample mean
Sanction indicator

Age (yr.)

Daily wage (guilders)

Gender

Urbanization

Hours

Marital status

NOTE: Probabilities are computed using the model estimates of Table 2.17. The sample mean is computed at the mean of the regressors in the sample used for estimation
and the estimated mean of the unobserved heterogeneity component. All other rows
correspond to single deviations from this mean.
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Table 2.19 United States: Ratio of Average Survey Date and
Predisplacement Weekly Earnings
Conditional on survey
date employment

Unconditional

1.00

0.70

0

1.19

1.14

>0

0.95

0.62

Female

0.95

0.64

Male

1.03

0.75

20–29

1.20

0.90

30–39

0.98

0.73

40–49

0.90

0.66

50–54

0.92

0.56

55–59

0.90

0.49

60–64

1.18

0.46

1–2

1.11

0.77

3–4

1.05

0.76

5–9

1.00

0.74

≥10

0.81

0.53

1993

0.96

0.75

1994

1.04

0.78

1995

0.99

0.62

Category
All displaced workers
Initial jobless spell (weeks)

Gender

Age (yr.)

Job tenure (yr.)

Year of displacement

NOTE: The table shows average values of the ratio of survey date (February 1996) to
predisplacement weekly wages, both measured in February 1996 dollars, using the
all-items Consumer Price Index to adjust for price changes. The sample includes persons aged 20–64 at the survey date who lost jobs lasting more than one year in 1993,
1994, or 1995 due to slack work, plant closing, or position or shift abolishment.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Workers Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.20 Distribution of the Ratio of Survey Date to Predisplacement
Wages
All displaced workers
Wage ratio

Conditional

a

25- to 49-year-old men

Unconditional

Conditional

Unconditional

<0.75

0.323

0.523

0.276

0.449

0.75–0.89

0.136

0.096

0.134

0.102

0.9–1.09

0.262

0.184

0.286

0.218

1.1–1.25

0.096

0.068

0.105

0.080

>1.25

0.184

0.129

0.199

0.151

NOTE: The table shows the distribution of the ratio of survey date (February 1996) to
predisplacement weekly wages. Predisplacement earnings are in February 1996 dollars, using the all-items Consumer Price Index to adjust for price changes. The sample includes persons aged 20–64 at the survey date who lost jobs lasting more than
one year in 1993, 1994, or 1995 due to slack work, plant closing, or a position or shift
abolishment.
a
The conditional estimates are for reemployed workers only.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Workers Supplement and are weighted so
as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.21 United States: Econometric Estimates of the Determinants of
Postdisplacement Earnings and Earnings Changes
Postdisplacement wages
a

(1)

Regressor

b

Change in wages
c

(3)d

(2)

Job tenure (yr.)
3–4

0.062

(0.047)

0.039

(0.044)

–0.031

(0.047)

5–9

0.091** (0.049)

0.018

(0.046)

–0.024

(0.049)

≥10

0.087

(0.054)

–0.081

(0.051)

–0.187*** (0.054)

30–39

0.127** (0.050)

–0.045

(0.048)

–0.153*** (0.050

40–49

0.142*** (0.053)

–0.041

(0.051)

–0.061*** (0.053)

50–54

0.067

(0.073)

–0.087

(0.069)

–0.181*** (0.073

55–59

0.018

(0.085)

–0.177** (0.080)

–0.283*** (0.085)

60–64

–0.197*

(0.118)

–0.286*** (0.111

–0.345*** (0.119)

Age (yr.)

Education
High school
grad.

0.215*** (0.069)

0.081

(0.064)

–0.002

(0.068)

Some college

0.383*** (0.070)

0.144*

(0.065)

0.007

(0.069)

College grad.

0.546*** (0.075)

0.237*** (0.071)

0.027

(0.074)

Grad. school

0.766*** (0.091)

0.325*** (0.086)

0.029

(0.089)

0.025

0.010

Married

(0.035)

0.000

(0.037)

Male

–0.428*** (0.036)

(0.037)

0.201*** (0.036)

0.041

(0.036)

Nonwhite

–0.050

(0.057)

0.030

(0.055)

0.045

(0.058)

Native born

–0.010

(0.060)

–0.022

(0.057)

Plant closing

–0.050

(0.043)

–0.010

(0.041)

0.039

Slack work

–0.026

(0.047)

0.061

(0.044)

0.120*** (0.047)

<1

–0.045

(0.061)

–0.054

(0.057)

–0.056

(0.061)

1–2

0.025

(0.057)

0.002

(0.054)

–0.007

(0.058)

>2

0.023

(0.051)

–0.012

(0.048)

–0.050

–0.048

(0.061)

Source of
job loss
(0.043)

Written notice
(mo.)

(0.051)
(continued)
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Table 2.21 (continued)
Postdisplacement wages
Regressora

(1)b

Change in wages

(2)c

(3)d

Year of
displacement
1994

–0.041

(0.043)

–0.013

(0.041)

0.016

(0.044)

1995

–0.075*

(0.042)

–0.039

(0.039)

–0.009

(0.042)

0.032

(0.052)

–0.021

(0.049)

–0.061

(0.052)

Union
Predisplacement wage

—

0.599*** (0.029)

—

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes persons between the
ages of 20 and 64 who were displaced from jobs lasting more than one year in 1993,
1994, or 1995 and were reemployed in February 1996. *** = Statistically significant
at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
The reference groups for the sets of dummy variables are persons with 1–2 years’ tenure on the predisplacement job, 20- to 29-year-olds, high school dropouts, those losing
jobs due to position or shift abolishments, and those with no written advance notice.
b
The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages at the survey date. Predisplacement wage is not included as a regressor.
c
The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly wages at the survey date. Predisplacement wage is included as a regressor.
d
The dependent variable is the difference in (the natural logs of) weekly wages at the
survey date and prior to displacement, both in February 1996 dollars.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker Supplement.

Table 2.22 Netherlands: Estimates of Changes in Earnings after Displacement
All workers

Variable
Constant

Tenure 1 yr. min.

Workers with tenure ≥1 yr.b

estimate (std. error)

estimate (std. error)

estimate (std. error)

0.160*** (0.036)
a

log Tenure

(log Tenure)2b
c

log Age
(log

No tenure criterion

Age)2b
d

0.016*

0.197*** (0.038)

0.199*** (0.046)

(0.009)

–0.011

(0.015)

–0.025

(0.018)

–0.004

(0.005)

0.001

(0.005)

0.009

(0.016)

–0.101*

(0.053)

–0.087

(0.053)

0.002

(0.062)

0.272*

(0.153)

(0.153)

0.190

(0.185)

–0.008**

(0.004)

Spell

–0.008*** (0.003)

dIdispl e

–0.003

dIIdispl f

—

Female

–0.025

Intermediate

(0.033)

0.281*

–0.008*** (0.003)
—

—

–0.049

(0.040)

–0.050

(0.038)

(0.024)

–0.024

(0.024)

–0.024

(0.030)

–0.002

(0.027)

–0.004

(0.027)

0.013

(0.032)

Higher

–0.022

(0.035)

–0.022

(0.035)

–0.043

(0.041)

University

–0.030

(0.056)

–0.029

(0.055)

–0.083

(0.068)

–0.049

(0.029)

–0.051*

(0.029)

–0.067*

(0.035)

0.078

(0.074)

0.069

(0.074)

–0.012

(0.086)

Education

Married/cohabitating
Non-Dutch
Tenure <1 yr.

—

–0.104*** (0.040)

—
177
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Table 2.22 (continued)
All workers

Variable

No tenure criterion

Tenure 1 yr. min.

Workers with tenure ≥1 yr.b

estimate (std. error)

estimate (std. error)

estimate (std. error)

R2

0.024

0.031

0.029

N

1,069

1,069

668

168

116

116

No. displaced

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on all transitions between jobs with or without intervening non-employment spells (E-E,
E-U-E, and E-N-E) are included. Dependent variable is the change in log real after-tax monthly earnings between the pre- and postseparation employment spell. Reference states are “nondisplaced,” “male,” “primary/lower education,” “unmarried and not cohabitating,”
“Dutch,” and “tenure ≥ 1 year”; “log tenure,” “log age,” and “spell” are included in deviation from their sample means. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
“Tenure” = tenure on the preseparation job (in months).
b
In “(log tenure)2” and “(log age)2,” both “log tenure” and “log age” are in deviation from their sample means, which correspond to geometric means of tenure and age equal respectively to 18.0 months and 28.9 years in the full sample and 39.8 months and 29.9 years in the
tenure-restricted sample.
c
“Age” = the age at the date of the first interview (in years).
d
“Spell” = the duration of the non-employment spell between the pre- and postseparation jobs (in months); 0 for E-E cases.
e
The variable dIdispl = a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by displacement, using the definition discussed in the text.
f
The variable dIIdispl = a dummy indicating whether the separation was caused by displacement, using the definition discussed in the text.
SOURCE: Based on the LFS.

Table 2.23 United States: Survey Date Labor-Force Status of Displaced Workers (%)
All displaced
Age (yr.)

Males

Females

In labor force

Retired/disabled

In labor force

Retired/disabled

In labor force

Retired/disabled

30–39

81.3

1.5

95.6

2.0

81.6

1.0

40–49

91.0

1.2

93.4

1.9

87.6

0.3

50–54

85.7

6.5

92.5

3.8

76.1

10.3

55–59

76.9

13.5

81.5

13.9

69.9

12.8

60–64

62.1

30.5

68.8

28.4

54.9

32.8

NOTE: The table shows the labor-force status in February 1996 of persons displaced during the 1993–95 period, from jobs lasting more
than one year.
SOURCE: Data are from the 1996 Displaced Worker supplement and are weighted so as to be nationally representative.
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Table 2.24 United States: Survey Date Labor-Force Status of Displaced
and Nondisplaced Males (%)
Men, not displaced

Men, displaced

Age (yr.)

In labor force

Retired/disabled

In labor force

Retired/disabled

44–46

90.4

5.9

93.8

1.6

47–49

90.0

7.1

91.5

3.0

50–52

86.4

11.1

95.0

2.2

53–55

81.5

14.1

90.8

4.7

56–58

75.3

21.5

81.9

16.5

59–61

68.0

29.3

79.7

16.7

62–64

46.0

52.1

61.8

34.9

NOTE: The table analyzes labor-force status in February 1996. “Displaced” individuals are those losing jobs during the 1993–95 period due to plant closing, slack work,
or a position or shift abolishment.
SOURCE: Data are from the February 1996 Current Population Survey and Displaced
Worker Supplement and are weighted so as to be nationally representative.

Appendix
Details of Dutch Data Sources
THE FE DATA
The Firm Employment (FE) data were collected by the Dutch “Labor inspection,” which is part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and
contain administrative data on workers employed in both the private and the
public sector. For our analyses we use only private sector workers below 60
years of age with at least one year of tenure (unless stated otherwise).
The data are collected yearly (in 1993–1996) as repeated cross-sections
from administrative wage records of a sample of firms by means of a stratified
two-step sampling procedure. In October of each year, in the first step a sample
of firms is drawn. In the second step, workers are sampled from administrative
records of these firms corresponding to two moments in time, one year before
the sampling date and at the sampling date. As the two-step sampling procedure is repeated in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, we have information on separation and displacement between October 1992 and October 1993, October
1993 and October 1994, October 1994 and October 1995, and October 1995
and October 1996. For notational convenience, we label these four data periods by 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, respectively. It should be noted that workers who enter and leave a firm between these two sampling moments are never
sampled by this method.
Because both the first-step firm sample and the second-step worker sample
are stratified, we have to reweigh the data before performing any (cross-) tabulation. Firm strata are distinguished by firm size (number of employees) and
sector. The number of workers sampled per firm depends on firm size; whether
the worker is a new entrant, a stayer, or one who left in the previous period; and
whether the employee is covered by a collective agreement. Weights for the
firm strata are computed from the “Business Statistics” of CBS. Employee
weights are calculated from the CBS statistic “Jobs of Employees.”
Table 2.A1 provides some sample characteristics. It is useful to mention
that the data contain very few missing cases. Job-complexity levels, for example, are known for more than 99 percent of the workers. Below we provide information on the construction of some of the key variables.
Displacement
All workers with at least one year of tenure who are laid off, plus all separations because of disability (DI), early retirement, and transitions into other
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jobs directly at firms that face a (net) loss of more than 30 percent of their workforce.
Other Outflow
Workers who separate from a firm that is not shrinking by at least 30 percent because of (early) retirement, disability (DI), end of a test period, transition into another job, or expiration of a contract with a temporary work office.
Job-Complexity Level
We use the following classification of job-complexity levels:
Low
Simple, generally repetitive activities that take place under direct supervision. Little or no formal schooling or experience is required.
Intermediate
Less simple activities that partly take place without direct supervision.
Administrative or technical knowledge is often required.
High
Activities that require a higher level of knowledge and experience and that
take place without direct supervision. Also, management activities that require
an academic degree or comparable level of learning.
Tenure
Measured in years (difference between starting and sampling dates).
Wage
Monthly wages (including extra-time payments, profit shares, and so
forth) and hours worked are measured very accurately. We calculate gross
hourly wages for each worker and deflate the wage by the all-item Consumer
Price Index.
Wage Agreement
We distinguish three types of wage contracts. Most workers have a collective agreement (CAO) which is negotiated at the sectoral level or by leading
firms within a sector. The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the
right to force all other firms within a sector to follow an existing CAO, a practice which is labeled by AVV. The remaining workers have only bilateral employment contracts. These workers are, in general, employed at higher
positions.
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Part-Time–Full-Time
Part-time refers to working less than 100 percent of the regular number of
hours in the worker’s industry. Regular hours are determined by collective
agreements; currently about half of Dutch industries set regular hours at 36 per
week.
Education
Education refers to years of completed education. When it takes four years
to complete higher vocational education, the reported years of schooling will
be four years (plus the number of years it takes to finish high school and elementary school) even if the worker has spent more or fewer years to actually
complete his higher vocational degree.
THE UI DATA
The UI data set is provided by Dutch Social Security Council (SVr) and
contains administrative data from the sectoral organizations that implement the
unemployment insurance system. Table 2.A2 reports results of our analysis of
UI data. All cases of individuals applying for unemployment benefits in 1992
were included in the database, and, if necessary, followed up to September
1993. We create an initial data set by restricting the raw data to cases that can
be linked to a local labor market—individuals who started collecting benefits
in 1992 for whom sector, municipality, and month of inflow are known.79 This
data set contains 219,531 cases and is used for computing characteristics of local labor markets. Excluding all cases for which one or more regressor variables are missing leaves 209,478 cases. This data set is merged with local labor
market characteristics computed from the initial data set and becomes the point
of departure for the reemployment duration analysis. Below we give some details on measurement and construction of some of the variables.
Duration of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Both the duration of the insurance benefits period and the destination state
of individuals whose benefits expire are observed. Durations are observed in
intervals. Thirteen biweekly intervals cover the first half year. Then we have
one six-week interval, for durations between 26 and 32 weeks. On the interval
32 to 318 weeks we are able to distinguish 22 quarterly duration classes. The
remaining durations are observed as being 318 weeks or longer. Since we are
not considering benefit payments that started before 1992, and we are only following benefit recipients up to September 1993, there is no right-censoring because of observations in the residual class 318 weeks and higher. We observe
unemployment spells that are continuing at the end of September 1993, how-
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ever, and transitions out of unemployment insurance to destinations other than
employment. In our analysis, both are considered to be right-censored.
Sanctions
The data set contains a variable indicating whether a sanction has been imposed at the start of the UI spell (because of a worker’s responsibility for becoming unemployed). We do not use information on sanctions that are
imposed during the UI spell, as these are related to behavior during the unemployment spell and not to any behavior that may have led to displacement.
Age
Age is computed as the age in years at the start of the individual’s benefits
spell.
Wage
Wage is the daily wage before taxes earned by the individual before becoming unemployed. It is the wage that is used by the administrative organization to compute the level of benefits. It is observed in 43 intervals—of width
10 f. up to 430 f.—and a residual interval for those earning over 430 f. The
continuous wage variable is defined as the average wage in each wage class, or
435 f. for those in the highest wage class. An additional dummy variable is included for the highest wage class.
Provinces and Urbanization
Municipality codes are observed and recoded to provincial and urbanization dummies. The provinces are Groningen, Friesland, Drenthe, Overijssel,
Flevoland, Gelderland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg, Utrecht, Noord-Holland,
Zuid-Holland, and Zeeland. Urbanized areas are municipalities that are highly
urbanized according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS): Amsterdam, Delft, The
Hague, Groningen, Haarlem, Leiden, Rijswijk, Rotterdam, Schiedam, Utrecht,
Vlaardingen, and Voorburg.
Part-Time–Full-Time
Like the wage information, this variable refers to the employment situation
of the benefits recipient preceding the unemployment spell. Full-time refers to
working 100 percent or more of the regular number of hours. Part-time refers
to working less than 100 percent of the regular number of hours.
THE LFS DATA
The OSA Labor Force Survey follows a random sample of households in
the Netherlands over time. On the basis of these data, sequences of labor mar-
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ket states occupied by the respondents are reconstructed. Table 2.A3 provides
some characteristics of the sample that is used in this chapter. The following
labor market states are distinguished: employed, self-employed, unemployed,
not-in-labor-force, military service, and full-time education. For each transition between two of these labor market states, the respondent is asked to provide a motive or cause selected from an extensive list of possible motives and
causes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Due to Tweeverdienerswet (law on double-income households).
I wanted a more interesting job.
I wanted a more secure job.
I wanted a job with better career opportunities.
I wanted a better paying job.
I would have lost my job anyway.
Unemployment benefits are sufficient.
I wanted a job.
Reorganization or plant closure.
Bankruptcy.
Family business closed or reorganized.
Laid off for other reasons.
Early retirement.
Retired, living off my investments.
Disability.
Marriage.
Birth of a child.
Move of household or partner.
My family situation did not allow it anymore.
I wanted to earn my own wage or an extra wage again.
My family situation allowed it again.
I wanted to be more among people.
I wanted to attend classes again.
I just finished my education.
I had to fulfill military service.
I just fulfilled military service.

Most respondents, 78 percent, do not experience a labor market transition.
Almost all respondents make fewer than four transitions (99 percent). The low
number of transitions can be explained by the relatively short observation period (at most five years) and the fact that most respondents are breadwinners,
who can be expected to have low job mobility. At the date of the first interview, 62 percent of the respondents are employed, whereas 27 percent are nonparticipants, and 7 percent are unemployed.
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In the LFS, three types of transitions can be the result of displacement:
job-to-job transitions (E-E), transitions from employment to unemployment
(E-U), and transitions from employment to not-in-the-labor-force (E-N). As
noted earlier, the LFS provides a self-reported motive or cause for each transition in the data set, and it provides information on whether the transition was
made voluntarily. This information can be used to identify displacement. For
instance, if “reorganization or plant closure” is reported as a cause for leaving
a job, the worker is clearly displaced. There are several other motives which
could indicate displacement. It could have occurred through DI, in which case
disability may be reported as a cause for leaving employment. In deciding
which motivation-voluntariness combinations identify displacement, we had to
recognize that the reported motivations and voluntariness are heavily liable to
subjective perceptions (like the distinction between a quit and a layoff). Having this in mind, we decided to consider transitions with the following motivation-voluntariness pairs as displacement.
The motivation “I would have lost my job anyway” will most likely be applicable to situations in which people anticipate displacement. In this case we
take both voluntary and involuntary as involuntary transitions, because there
seems to be no reason to believe that one or the other excludes displacement.
The same holds for the cause “reorganization or plant closure.” For the motivation “early retirement” involuntary transitions seem most likely to denote
displacement. Voluntary early retirements, on the other hand, will probably
cover individuals who prefer to stop working irrespective of economic conditions in the firm; these individuals would have reported “would have lost job
anyway” in case of displacement. Finally, we have the transitions into DI. For
this motivation we distinguish between E-E and E-U transitions, on the one
hand, and E-N, on the other. We think that in case of an E-E or E-U transition,
both voluntary and involuntary transitions denote displacement, because these
people keep working or are searching for a job after the transition; they are not
really incapacitated for work.80 For E-N transitions, we assume that displacement is indicated by voluntary transitions, while involuntary transitions cover
transitions for pure medical reasons.
More details on the LFS data can be found in van den Berg and Ridder
(1998) and van den Berg (1992).
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Table 2.A1 Netherlands: Weighted Means in FE Data for the
1993–96 Period
Variable

Mean

a

Year

1993

0.23

1994

0.24

1995

0.25

1996

0.28

Gender
Female

0.37

Male

0.63

Coll. agreement
CAOb

0.72

c

0.05

None

0.23

AVV

Job-complexity level
Low

0.19

Intermediate

0.70

High

0.11

Education (yr.)

11.3

Age (yr.)

34.1

Tenure (yr.)

4.1

Real gross hourly wage (guilders)

27.1

Total no. of workers

102,141

NOTE: Workers older than 60 and workers with less than one year’s tenure are
excluded.
a
“Year” = the sampling year. Note that data on two consecutive years for each worker
are collected at a single sampling date, October of the sample year, by reviewing the
administrative records of both the sampling date and one year before the sampling
date.
b
“CAO” = coverage by a collective agreement.
c
“AVV” = coverage by a mandatory extension of such a CAO.
SOURCE: FE data.
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Table 2.A2 Netherlands: Some Characteristics of UI Data
Characteristic
No. of spells

209,478

Terminated by
Reemployment

0.56

Maximum entitlement

0.12

Transition into DI

0.07

End of observation period

0.17

Other

a

0.08
Mean

Std. dev.

Nondisplaced (sanction)

0.13

Age (yr.)

32.0

10.9

Daily wage (guilders)

122.5

65.9

Female

0.43

Urban

0.17

Part-time

0.29

Married

0.40

NOTE: Wages are observed in 10-guilder intervals and are right-censored at 430 guilders. Sample mean and standard error of wages are computed by recoding wages to
mean interval wages, or to 435 guilders if right-censored.
a
“Other” includes reaching age 65, death, military service, and self-employment,
among other things, all of which occur in less than 0.5 percent of the cases.
SOURCE: UI data.
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Table 2.A3 Netherlands: Characteristics of LFS Earnings Sample
All workers
Variable

Workers with tenure ≥1 yr

Mean

Std. dev.

Mean

Std. dev.

Ratio post- to preseparation
earningsa

1.22

0.62

1.24

0.55

Tenure (months)b

44.4

71.0

67.5

81.5

30.0

8.1

31.0

8.3

c

Age (yr.)

d

Spell (months)

0.7

3.5

0.6

3.3

Spell (nonzero spells only, in
months)

8.8

9.5

10.4

10.1

Education
Primary/lower sec.

0.36

0.34

Intermediate

0.41

0.43

Higher

0.18

0.19

University

0.05

0.05

dIdisple
dIIdisplf

0.16

—

0.11

0.17

Female

0.40

0.36

Married/cohabitating

0.69

0.75

Non-Dutch

0.03

0.03

Total no. of individuals

1,069

668

81

37

No. of nonzero intervening spells
a

“Ratio post- to preseparation earnings” = real after-tax monthly earnings in the preseparation and the first postseparation jobs.
b
“Tenure” = tenure on the preseparation job; it is used to select the cases in the right
panel.
c
“Age” = age at the date of the first interview.
d
“Spell” = the duration of non-employment spell between the pre- and postseparation
jobs (0 for E-E cases).
e I
d displ is a dummy variable indicating whether the separation was caused by displacement (1) or not (0), using the definition discussed in the main text.
f II
d displ = dIdispl with the additional requirement that the tenure of the displaced individual equals at least one year.
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The profound institutional and structural differences between Japanese and North American labor markets are well known. Despite these
differences, the two types of economies face a common problem: finding the best way to reallocate labor when technological, trade, and
other shocks raise the demand for workers in some activities but reduce
the demand in others. When these shocks occur, can permanent displacement, especially of vulnerable senior workers, be avoided? If not,
what are the consequences of such displacements?
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of
the incidence and consequences of worker displacement in a North
American economy—Canada—and in Japan. We begin with a brief
description of the main modes of labor adjustment in the two countries,
situating worker displacement in the broader context of how firms
adjust to declines in product demand. Next we describe the legal and
social institutions most likely to affect the displacement process and
the general labor market conditions prevailing in each country at the
time of our analysis. We then analyze, in turn, the frequency of displacement in each country and its consequences.
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Our main findings are as follows. First, the primary mechanisms
by which Japanese and Canadian firms shed workers differ. In Japan
involuntary terminations can take three main forms: layoffs, mandatory
retirement, and a kind of outplacement called shukko. In addition to
simply laying workers off, Japanese firms often terminate workers as
young as their mid 40s by forcing them to take a retirement package.
Shukko involves placing workers at affiliated or related firms. Sometimes used as a means of transferring skills across company lines, it is
also used, especially for older workers, simply as a means of reducing
the workforce. While some younger shukko workers may be recalled
to their original employer, this is seldom the case for older workers.
In Canada neither shukko nor mandatory retirement (at least for
prime-age workers) is a common method of adjusting to demand
shocks. Layoffs, which are common, take a different form there
because their permanence is often unclear. Over half of all laid-off
workers in Canada expect at the time of layoff to return to their original
employer, and over 40 percent actually do so. Furthermore, neither
workers nor firms are good predictors of actual recall probabilities.
Thus the process of displacement in Canada, rather than being a sharp
and permanent break, more typically begins with a layoff of no clear
permanence and proceeds through an updating of probabilities of recall
to the original workplace.
Second, perhaps surprisingly, institutional factors affecting displaced workers in Japan and Canada have as many similarities as differences. Both Japanese and Canadian firms, for example, are required
to provide advance notice to workers being laid off, with statutory
notice requirements actually somewhat higher in Canada. At the same
time, however, Canadian firms can lay workers off for “economic” reasons without having to justify their actions legally; in Japan such layoffs must be justified, and certain procedural requirements satisfied,
before they occur. Employment insurance benefits in both countries
have similar replacement rates and are limited to less than a year in
duration. Japan has a much more explicit and comprehensive program
of adjustment subsidies for declining industries than Canada, but a
number of such programs exist on an ad hoc basis in Canada as well.
Wage-setting institutions, such as unions and minimum wages, can
be relevant to displaced workers by affecting the distribution of preand postdisplacement wages. In both countries only a minority of
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workers are unionized. In both countries, wage bargaining is at the
enterprise level, although Japan has an element of coordination
(shunto) not present in Canada. In both countries, statutory minimum
wages are set at subnational (province or prefecture) levels and are
only a small fraction of average wages, compared to many European
countries. Unlike Canada, however, Japan has a system of industryspecific minimum wages which may provide a channel whereby collectively bargained wages can have some impact on the wages of unorganized workers.
Third, separations are much more frequent in the Canadian than
the Japanese labor market, especially for men: in firms with at least
five workers, and in jobs that have lasted at least a month, there are
0.36 separations per employed male in Canada per year; in Japan there
are one-third as many, 0.12. A very large share of this difference,
however, is due to the large number of temporary layoffs in Canada;
when we look only at (ex post) permanent separations, overall separation rates are similar in the two countries. They are in fact higher
among Japanese women than among Canadian women.
Fourth, a much larger share of separations is labeled as involuntary
(in other words, firm-initiated) in Canada than in Japan. In Canada,
about two-thirds of separating workers say they were “laid off”; this
agrees roughly with the fraction of separations that firms label as due
to “shortage of work.” In Japan, under 10 percent of separations are
labeled (by firms) as due to “management convenience” (which
includes shukko workers). In fact, the total of all “involuntary” separations in Japan (which also includes mandatory retirements and the
expiration of fixed-term contracts) is under one-third of all separations.
Fifth, the combination of similar permanent separation rates plus a
larger involuntary share in Canada means that worker displacement—
permanent, involuntary separation—is more common in Canada than
Japan. The difference is very large if we focus only on men and on a
narrow definition of displacement (“management convenience” only)
in Japan: a displacement rate of 6.1 percent per year in Canada versus
1.3 percent in Japan. Smaller, but still substantial, differences exist for
women and for broader definitions of displacement in Japan.
Sixth, we find a fascinating pattern (at least to a non-Japanese
audience) in the age pattern of permanent layoffs in Japan and Canada.
In Canada, as one might expect, layoff rates decline with age, as work-
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ers settle into jobs and accumulate seniority (which in North America
tends to protect workers from a layoff). In Japan, young workers have
very low layoff rates, but these layoff rates increase with age. This
system of seniority-based (rather than inverse-seniority-based) layoffs
in Japan appears to place a larger share of the employment adjustment
burden on older, rather than younger, workers.
Seventh, despite frequent comments about the inability of Japanese
labor markets to accommodate displaced mid-career workers, we find
that unemployment durations of displaced Japanese workers are much
shorter than those of displaced Canadian workers. Focusing on Japanese workers who separated due to a layoff, bankruptcy, declining
business, expiration of a casual or fixed-term contract, or mandatory
retirement, we find that median non-employment durations in the mid
1990s were under two months in Japan compared to just under six
months for Canadian men and over eight months for Canadian women.
The Japanese numbers would be even lower if we included the direct
job-to-job transitions among shukko workers in our calculations. To
some extent, these low relative durations reflect the lower overall Japanese unemployment rate even during the recessionary period of our
data. However, they could also reflect low search intensities among
Canadian workers hoping to be recalled to their former employer.
Eighth, for all workers under the age of about 50 in both countries,
the mean wage consequence of displacement is essentially zero.
Despite this, Canadian displaced workers are much more likely to
experience large wage declines than Japanese displaced workers: all
told, 14.5 percent of displaced Canadian men (16.4 percent of women)
experience wage declines of more than 30 percent, compared with 8.7
and 4.3 percent respectively in Japan (the Japanese numbers are even
smaller if we include shukko workers in the sample). These two facts
are reconciled by the greater likelihood of large displacement-related
wage increases in Canada: fully 17 percent of displaced Canadian men
experience a wage gain of over 30 percent, compared with under 2 percent of displaced Japanese men; comparable numbers for women are
18 and 3 percent. These wage consequences of displacement may
reflect a more compressed wage structure in Japan than Canada. Japanese displaced workers thus appear to face much less wage uncertainty
than Canadian displaced workers.
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Ninth, the mean wage loss associated with displacement increases
with age in both countries, especially in Japan. In a sample of Japanese
men over age 55 whose separation is due to management convenience,
mandatory retirement, or contract expiration, mean wage losses are
substantial (10 to 15 percent). It is unclear how much of this reflects
mandatory “retirement” followed by lower-wage work, or simple layoffs (or, for that matter, whether this distinction is very meaningful).
This age pattern in wage losses reinforces the notion that older workers
bear a larger share of the adjustment burden in Japan than in Canada,
which emerges from our examination of layoff rates.
Finally, we compute a simple summary measure of the combined
employment and wage security experienced by Japanese and Canadian
workers. Aside from combining the above information on the incidence and consequences of displacement, this measure has the advantage of not being affected by possible differences in the labeling of
separations between countries. In particular, the measure we compute
is the fraction of employed persons who, in a given year, are likely to
experience a wage loss of 30 percent or more as a result of an employer
change. This fraction is 1.9 percent for Canadian men versus 0.8 percent for Japanese men. This gap becomes much larger if we exclude
older Japanese men: for example, for men aged 35–39, the rates are 1.7
percent in Canada versus only 0.2 percent in Japan. “Prime-age” Japanese men thus experience a level of wage and job security that may be
unrivalled anywhere. This international gap in total earnings security
is smaller for women and is dramatically reversed for older men: conditional on continuing to work, 6.8 percent of employed Japanese men
over the age of 60 experience a separation resulting in a wage drop of
more than 30 percent each year, compared to only 1.0 percent of Canadian men.
All told, despite a worsening Japanese recession and historically
very high unemployment rates, our findings clearly show that—with
one exception—Japanese workers are less likely to be displaced, experience less unemployment when displaced, and are less likely to suffer
a large wage reduction as a consequence of displacement. That one
exception is for men over the age of about 55 and reflects, at least in
part, the common Japanese practice of mandatory retirement followed
by work at lower wages in a more casual labor market. With that one
potential exception, we do not find evidence that—at least compared to
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Canada—Japanese labor markets are poorly adapted to the task of
reemploying displaced mid-career workers.

EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT MECHANISMS
Firms can adjust to declines in the demand for their products in a
number of ways, many of which do not involve involuntary reductions
in employment. These mechanisms include the development of new
products, reductions in employee compensation, reductions in hours
per worker, reductions in hiring, and voluntary workforce attrition.
The mix of these mechanisms chosen by firms is known to vary substantially among countries. Nakamura and Nakamura (1991) showed,
for example, that Japanese firms tend to adjust hours of work and
wages, while U.S. firms tend to adjust employment. Despite this and
other alternative forms of flexibility, involuntary employment reductions must sometimes occur in Japan, especially in the recent recession.
The incidence and consequences of these reductions have, to date, been
very little studied and are our main interests in this chapter. The
remainder of this section describes the primary mechanisms by which
involuntary workforce reductions occur in the two countries. As most
readers will be less familiar with the Japanese case, our focus will be
mainly on that country.
Japan
Mandatory retirement
As is well known, mandatory retirement at a prearranged age is a
common feature of the Japanese labor market. Also, much more frequently than in Canada or the United States, it is followed by employment at a different firm, often on a part-time basis and usually at a
lower wage.1 The mandatory retirement age recommended by the government is 60 years; until very recently, however, many firms used 55
as the retirement age for many of their workers.2 Mandatory retirement
at age 55 is sufficiently common in Japan to be reflected in aggregate
wage statistics. For example, Figure 3.1 shows cross-section age-wage
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Figure 3.1 Wage Profiles by Age and Education, Japan

SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor.

profiles for regular Japanese workers in 1993. These profiles grow
monotonically to age 54 but drop suddenly at age 55.
A less well-known feature of the Japanese labor market is the common use of mandatory retirement well in advance of the pre-arranged
age as a means of labor adjustment. This can occur as early as a
worker’s early 40s. It is also known that so-called voluntary earlyretirement programs are not always voluntary and that some targeted
workers feel pressure to accept such packages. Early-retirement
schemes are very common in large Japanese firms: almost half of firms
with more than 5,000 employees had such programs in 1990, compared
with under 2 percent of firms with 30–99 employees (Japan Ministry of
Labor 1992).
Many Japanese firms provide workers with a lump-sum payment
on retirement. The amount of such retirement pay depends on the
number of years of service and the rank the worker has attained in the
firm at the time of retirement; it can range from one year’s to several
years’ salary. These retirement payments are separate from annual
pensions and receive distinct, favorable tax treatment. Seike (1993)
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showed that the marginal gain workers get from their retirement lumpsum payments by staying with their present employer for another year
is positive for younger age groups but negative for those above age 40.
He concluded that for older age groups the presence of lump-sum
retirement pay encourages workers’ separations from their employers.
A sweetened lump-sum retirement pay is often used as a bargaining
tool for soliciting early retirements from middle-aged workers. One
difference between severance pay in Canada and the lump-sum retirement pay in Japan is that the latter is paid even if workers quit prior to
their normal mandatory retirement ages.
Shukko
A second form of involuntary separation in Japan occurs when
firms simply assign their workers to an affiliate or otherwise-related
firm; this arrangement is known as shukko. Most shukko assignments
occur within vertically or horizontally related groups of firms
(keiretsu) in Japan.3 These new jobs are often with smaller firms and
pay less than the workers’ current jobs. There are two types of shukko,
the first of which (tenseki) represents a one-way ticket to another firm
with virtually no possibility of coming back to the original employer.
The second type, ichiji (temporary) shukko, involves a substantial
probability of returning to the original employer after a few years. It is
more prevalent for younger workers. For example, younger workers
may be assigned to some jobs at other firms as part of their job rotation
for learning certain skills required by the original employer. Moreexperienced workers of a parent firm may also go on temporary shukko
to its affiliated firms in order to teach some skill the parent firm wants
the affiliated firms to possess. Many firms have agreements with their
labor unions regarding the practice of calling back workers on temporary shukko within three or four years after their shukko assignments
start.
For both temporary and permanent shukko, the original employer
often pays most (or all) of the wages of the workers who are sent out, at
least for the first year or two. After that, the new employer may start
paying shukko workers’ salaries, depending on the arrangement made
between the two employers. At that point in time these workers may
become regular employees of the new company and sever their ties to
the old.
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An example of the use of shukko in a Japanese firm is given in Figure 3.2, which shows the age distribution of employees at a large Japanese steel producer in 1997. About 4.5 percent of the firm’s employees
are 49 (34 + 15) years of age. Of those, fewer than two-thirds (under 3
percent) are actually working at the company, while the remainder are
away on shukko assignments (on loan) to other employers. Those on
shukko assignments may or may not be on the firm’s payroll. The proportion of employees on shukko starts to increase rapidly beginning at
about age 44 (15 + 29) and exceeds 50 percent of the total workforce
by age 51. Most of the shukko employees older than their mid 40s will
not come back to their original employer, while those in their 20s and
30s are quite likely to do so.
Because shukko workers, especially of the “permanent” type, experience involuntary employer changes, they can be thought of as a kind
of displaced worker. In contrast to North American displaced workers,
however, they do not experience any unemployment. As we shall see,

Figure 3.2 Shukko and Age Distribution of Workers at a Large Japanese
Steel Company, 1977
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they also experience only very small wage changes, at least within one
year of moving to the new firm.
Layoffs and the process of employment reduction
In Japan, there are also workers who lose jobs because employers
cannot afford to keep them on, or because their employers have gone
out of business. Generally, layoffs are used as a last resort after other
mechanisms, like mandatory retirement and shukko, have been
exhausted. As an illustration of this, Figure 3.3 shows how these processes were sequenced as Japanese manufacturers were forced to
reduce employment from 1987 through early 1994. Clearly, the postbubble recession had a major impact on employment adjustment, startFigure 3.3 Methods of Employment Adjustment at Manufacturing
Establishments between 1987 (Q1) and 1994 (Q2)
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ing almost immediately after the bubble burst in 1990. As the change
in the production index for manufacturing and mining registered a
sharp decline in late 1991, reductions in overtime immediately followed.
These were joined by job rotations and shukko as well as reductions in, or complete termination of, new employment for mid-career
workers. These methods, in turn, were followed by nonrenewal or cancellation of contracts with part-time employees. Next, temporary
forced vacations of regular employees were implemented. Finally,
after part-time workers were terminated, about 2 percent of Japanese
manufacturers also implemented voluntary early-retirement programs
and layoffs between 1992 and 1994 (see Higuchi 1996, for example).
Thus, layoffs are clearly a last resort; but they do occur. They have
been studied very little in Japan, and we hope to make an early attempt
in this chapter at understanding their frequency and consequences.
Canada
Neither mandatory retirement for prime-age workers nor shukko is
an important feature of firms’ labor adjustment policies in Canada.
The dominant form of involuntary downward employment adjustment
used by Canadian firms is clearly layoff into unemployment. At the
same time, however, it is important to realize that not all layoffs constitute what we normally think of as displacements. The main reason for
this is that a large fraction of layoffs in North America are temporary,
and the workers involved expect to return to the original employer after
a short time. That a worker has been displaced, or permanently laid
off, from her or his employer, may thus not be immediately obvious (to
either the worker or the firm) at the time of separation. The sets of displaced and temporarily laid-off workers can be very fluid on the margin, and studies using ex post definitions will have quite different
samples than those using ex ante ones.
The distinction between permanent and temporary layoffs figures
prominently in the definition of displaced workers in Canada and has
potentially important consequences for search intensities and unemployment durations. We explore this distinction in depth later in this
chapter.
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LEGISLATION AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECTING
DISPLACED WORKERS
In this section we describe the main laws and institutions that are
likely to affect the frequency and consequences of worker displacement in Japan and Canada. We begin with a discussion of employment-protection legislation, namely policies which limit firms’
freedom to reduce employment, including mandatory advance-notice
periods, mandated severance pay, unjust dismissal laws, and requirements to consult with local governments before engaging in mass layoffs. 4 We then discuss the “passive” income support (primarily
employment insurance) available to unemployed workers in both countries. Next we focus on a set of policies that are particularly prevalent
in Japan but probably less common, and certainly more ad hoc, in Canada: subsidies to employers and workers in “threatened” industries,
designed both to maintain employment in the old firms and to encourage mobility into new product lines and industries. Finally, we briefly
describe the main institutions, apart from firms, that shape the wagesetting process in both countries: collective bargaining and minimum
wages. Because these institutions shape the distribution of wages
among individuals, jobs, firms, and industries, they can have a significant effect on the wage changes experienced by displaced workers.
Our description of laws and other institutions in the two countries
below is quite detailed and is meant to function both as background to
the empirical work in this chapter and as reference material to
researchers interested in displacement and related policy. Readers
already familiar with Japanese and Canadian labor market institutions,
or who are mostly interested in just what happens to displaced workers
in the two countries, might happily skip ahead to our section on General Economic Conditions (p. 220).
Employment Protection Legislation
Japan
Japanese employment law, like that of many European countries,
distinguishes between workers on “regular” employment contracts
(usually long-term and full-time) and those working under other

Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada

207

arrangements, including temporary and part-time workers. For workers on regular contracts, substantial legal precedent requires firms to
demonstrate “just cause” to terminate their employment. Workers
without regular contracts do not necessarily enjoy this just-cause protection, but they can qualify if they have worked for the same employer
for a long time.5 “Just cause” in Japan can include declines in business,
but if firms want to invoke this reason to lay workers off, they must be
able to demonstrate the following: 1) the necessity of the layoff, 2) that
they have made efforts to avoid layoffs, 3) appropriate procedure, and
4) rational and fair choice of those to be laid off. Vol-untary early
retirement programs are a typical part of the “efforts to avoid layoffs.”
To first lay off nonregular workers, such as temporary and part-time
workers, is accepted as an “appropriate procedure.” While negotiating
with the labor union is considered to be an integral part of the procedure, employers can lay workers off even if no agreement with the
labor union is reached after the employer has made a sincere effort.
The Japanese Labor Code requires that 30 days’ advance notice be
given to workers prior to a layoff; as in Canada firms have the option
of paying the equivalent amount of severance in lieu of giving notice.
Despite this low amount of statutory notice, it seems likely that, given
the substantial procedural requirements that must be fulfilled to demonstrate the justification of layoffs in Japan, “effective” notice—the
amount of time before the layoff when workers actually know it is
coming—may in fact be substantially greater in duration.
Canada
In Canada, two main bodies of legislation restrict firms’ abilities to
terminate workers’ employment.6 The first and older of these is the
common law, which governs the interpretation and enforcement of private employment contracts. According to Canadian common law,
labor contracts without an explicit fixed duration can be terminated by
the firm in two main ways: termination for cause or by giving notice.
Permissible “causes” are defined by centuries of British and Canadian
case law and include items such as repeated insolence, drunkenness, or
morally improper behavior (Arthurs et al., 1993, pp. 153–155).
In contrast to dismissal for cause, termination of employment for
“economic” reasons, such as a shortage of work, generally requires
giving the employee a “reasonable” amount of notice under Canadian
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common law. In the event of a dispute, what is reasonable is determined by a judge, who is expected to consider the custom in the industry and geographical area, the periodicity of payment (hourly, weekly,
or monthly, and so forth), and the difficulty the employee will have in
finding a new job (Arthurs et al., 1993, pp. 146–149). As enforcing
these common law provisions for reasonable notice generally requires
workers to bring a civil suit against their employer, this option is typically exercised only by highly paid workers. It is worth noting, however, that in such situations the courts have determined advance-notice
requirements of as much as 21 months to be “reasonable.”7
The second main body of law regulating layoffs in Canada is contained in the Employment Standards Acts of its 13 labor jurisdictions.8
These acts set minimum conditions that must be satisfied by all
employment relationships, including minimum wages, paid vacations,
and limits on overtime work. Of these, three main provisions would
likely be considered “employment-protection laws”: advance notice of
layoff, severance pay, and consultation requirements.
Minimum mandatory notice statutes for permanent layoffs in each
of the Canadian labor jurisdictions are summarized in Table 3.1, which
shows the state of legislation as of September 1, 1997.9 In most cases,
mandated notice depends on the duration of employment, ranging from
1 week for relatively new workers to 8 weeks for workers with 10 or
more years of experience. Generally, as in Japan, an employee can be
given pay in lieu of notice.10 Separate regulations exist for mass termination in 11 of the 13 jurisdictions. The number of workers necessary
to constitute a mass termination is usually 50 or more in a period of
four weeks. The amount of notice that must be given ranges from 4
weeks to 18 weeks, depending on the number of workers let go.
Employment-protection legislation in two Canadian jurisdictions
also includes severance pay. In the federal jurisdiction, the amount of
compensation is not large, consisting of two days’ wages to be paid per
year of service. In Ontario, severance packages apply only to employees with five or more years of service; the amount of compensation
given is quite high, however, at one week of severance pay for each
year of service, to a maximum of 26 weeks. Finally, most Canadian
jurisdictions with mass-termination laws compel employers, in the
event of a mass layoff, to establish and finance a “manpower adjustment committee” with worker representation to develop an adjustment
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program for workers and to help workers in finding new employment
opportunities. Furthermore, the firms must advise and cooperate with
local governments regarding the closure procedure.
Unlike the common law, employee remedies for employer noncompliance with minimum notice statutes are relatively fast and costless. In Ontario, for example, an employee has only to notify the local
Employment Standards office and this can be done by telephone. The
claim is then investigated and if the employer is found liable, he or she
may be ordered by a judge to reimburse wages for the required notice
period.
Given their universal application and ease of enforcement, one
would expect the statutory notice provisions outlined above to be relevant to a much larger number of workers than those in the common
law. While this is certainly true, Table 3.2 shows that even these minimum standards do not result in notice actually being received by the
majority of workers experiencing a permanent layoff in Canada: only
35 percent of men and about 44 percent of women in such situations
report receiving any formal notice at all. Of those who receive formal
notice, about 30 percent obtain less than one week; only 6–10 percent
(or 2–7 percent of all layoffs) receive more than one month (four
weeks) of notice. The fraction expecting the permanent layoff is somewhat higher, at 63 and 60 percent for men and women, respectively,
but even among these the vast majority learned of the impending job
loss less than two weeks in advance. The principal reason for this lack
of widespread notice is simply the preponderance of very short jobs in
any sample of Canadian job losers. Thus, notice requirements are not
binding on employers for the majority of job losers in Canada. It
would be very useful to know how much “effective” notice of this kind
is actually available to displaced workers in Japan, but we are not
aware of any source of such information.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the current mix of employment-protection laws in Canada has resulted from a series of provinceby-province increases in legislated notice starting in the 1960s.
Indeed, despite the recent move to the political right in a number of
jurisdictions, and despite significant retrenchment in a number of
social programs and in labor relations legislation, as of January 1999
there has not been a single instance of a reduction in employment-protection law in Canada. In contrast to Europe, where employment-pro-
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tection laws have been blamed for high unemployment rates and in
many cases have been scaled back as a result, current levels of Canadian employment-protection legislation have not been perceived as a
major obstacle to business. Instead, it appears that they are sufficiently
valued by middle-class voters in a time of greater perceived job insecurity to make any attack on them politically unprofitable.
Comparing Canadian and Japanese employment-protection laws, it
seems that, if anything, minimum statutory provisions for notice and
severance are stronger in Canada. At the same time, however, it is not
clear that these statutory provisions apply to most laid-off workers in
Canada, and it may be the case that the stricter procedural requirements
for layoffs in Japan give rise to greater “effective” notice than the statutory minimum in most cases. Ranking the two countries in terms of
legal impediments to layoffs is therefore not clear; to this end, statistics
on how far in advance Japanese workers actually knew of their layoff
would be very useful in future research.
Passive Income Support
Japan
Japan’s employment insurance (EI) system covers all employed
workers except those aged 60 or older, government employees, and
ship workers. Eligibility conditions include employment in EI-covered
jobs for at least six months in the year prior to job separation and application to a government placement office for job-seeking status. Some
restrictions apply for voluntary quits.
Statutory benefit levels under Japan’s employment insurance system are presented in Table 3.3. EI payments range between 60 and 80
percent (50 and 80 percent for those 60 to 64) of the regular wage on
the last job held, up to a maximum. The replacement rate declines with
the rate of pay on the last job, while the maximum daily payment
increases with age up to 59. Benefit duration varies from 90 to 300
days and is an increasing function of age, number of years insured, and
full-time status. As the table indicates, somewhat longer benefits are
available for disabled and other “hard to employ” workers.11
In addition to basic income support, Japanese EI provides numerous other allowances for items like learning a skill, lodging cost for job
training, disability during unemployment, job search, preparation for a
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new job, and moving costs. There are also a number of programs for
unemployed workers who are not eligible under the EI law, such as a
training subsidy for changing jobs (Shokugyo tenkan kyuuhukin).
Finally, in addition to EI, Japan also has a welfare system for its longterm unemployed. Households certified for welfare receive cash and
in-kind payments in various forms.
Canada
In contrast to Japan’s EI system, which in most cases requires at
least half a year of work to qualify, Canada’s EI system allows workers
with quite short employment spells to qualify for benefits, especially in
high-unemployment regions.
Canada’s system of passive income support for the unemployed
has two components: EI (called unemployment insurance [UI] before
1996), and Social Assistance, more commonly referred to as “welfare.”
EI, or UI, is federally operated, compulsory, and covers well over 90
percent of employed Canadians. During the 1990s, the program went
through a series of substantial changes, primarily designed to reduce
costs. In what follows we describe the main features of Canada’s UI
system in the period in which most of our data were collected—the mid
1990s. Information about subsequent reforms to the system, in particular in 1996, is available in Canada Employment Insurance Commission
(1997).12
Despite the changes between 1990 and 1996, the main features of
UI were reasonably constant over this period since most of the amendments were to parameters of the system rather than to the structure of
the program itself. Insurable employment was deemed to be any paid
employment over 15 hours per week, but earnings over a specified ceiling were not insurable. Premiums were (nominally) paid by both
workers and employers, but collected and remitted by employers. In
addition to sufficient earnings, qualifying for benefits required a minimum number of weeks of work during a 52-week qualifying period.
The number of work weeks required varied across regions, from 20 in
regions with a 6 percent or lower unemployment rate to 12 (10 in the
early part of the period) where the unemployment rate was above 13
percent.13
All claimants received the same statutory replacement rate for
earnings up to a weekly maximum. In 1995 this was 55 percent (60
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percent for low-income individuals with a dependent) of the average
weekly insurable earnings for the 20 weeks prior to the claim. The
number of benefit weeks to which one was entitled varied from 14 to
50 as a function of the local unemployment rate and the number of
qualifying weeks worked. In January 1995, after several cuts to the
program’s generosity, in a high unemployment-rate region 12 weeks of
work entitled a worker to 32 weeks of benefits, while in a low unemployment-rate region 12 weeks was too few to obtain benefits, and the
minimum number of weeks of work required for entitlement, 20, entitled a worker to 14 weeks of benefits. Workers with a full year of
employment still qualified for a full year of benefits.
The broad magnitudes of Canadian UI entitlements are thus
roughly comparable to those in Japan, summarized earlier. There seem
to be two main differences, one of which is the greater generosity of
the Canadian system to part-year, or seasonal, workers, who at the very
most would be entitled to a lump sum of 50 days’ worth of benefits in
Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese system offers higher replacement rates, of up to 80 percent for low-wage workers, to displaced
workers with steady work histories.14
In addition to employment insurance, all Canadians, including single men, are eligible for welfare (or in the case of those over age 65,
other social benefits). Welfare is a provincial responsibility, and in
some provinces it is administered at a municipal level; thus there is
substantial inter- (and intra-) provincial heterogeneity. Welfare can be
obtained after UI benefits are exhausted, and there is some evidence
that the two programs substitute for one another. Like Japanese welfare, (but unlike the current U.S. welfare system), Canadian welfare
has no benefit expiration.
Employment Maintenance and Adjustment Subsidies
Japan
Compared to the United States or Canada, Japan has a large number of programs specifically targeted at maintaining employment in
designated declining industries. The Japanese programs are administered under two distinct bodies of legislation: EI laws and employment
maintenance (EM) laws (koyo taisakuho). Programs under both systems consist largely of employment, outplacement, and training subsi-
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dies; in this section we describe the programs administered under the
EI law only.15
Eligibility for most types of employment maintenance and adjustment subsidies requires the firm or worker to be in one of two lists of
narrowly defined industries specified by the Ministry of Labor. Industries in both these lists are typically in need of significant downward
employment adjustment. Industries in the first list, “special employment adjustment industries” (tokutei koyo chosei gyoshu), are considered to face little prospect for future recovery; this is not necessarily
true of the second group, “employment adjustment subsidy industries”
(koyo chosei joseikin shitei gyoshu). As of early 1998, there were 72
special employment adjustment industries comprising 86,954 establishments and 723,022 workers. As of mid 1998, there were 51
employment adjustment subsidy industries, comprising 511,921 establishments and 846,957 workers. Lists of both types of industries are
provided in the appendix. Note that the average establishment covered
by both laws is very small, with only 8.3 and 1.6 employees, respectively.
Employment maintenance and adjustment subsidies paid under
Japan’s EI program fall into four main categories, discussed in turn
below. The first of these is available to workers and firms in both
groups of industries described above. The other three are available
only in special employment adjustment industries, those with little
prospect for recovery.
Employment adjustment subsidy (koyo chosei joseikin). This
law allows the Japanese government to subsidize the wages of workers
who are laid off, are on educational or training assignments because of
the lack of work, or are reassigned to another firm (shukko). Current
subsidy rates are one-half of the wages of workers who are laid off or
on shukko, with a higher rate of two-thirds in small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs).16 The maximum subsidy duration is 200 days for
laid-off workers and two years for shukko assignments. This program
also pays half the cost of worker retraining or education (two-thirds in
SMEs) for up to two years.
Labor movement employment-stability subsidy (rodo ido koyo
antei joseikin). This subsidy is given to those firms in special employ-
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ment-adjustment industries which invested in new lines of business in
order to employ workers who have become redundant in the old operations. Interestingly, these subsidies are also payable to firms in any
industry who hire workers displaced from special employment-adjustment industries. The subsidies are used for paying portions of workers’ wages and/or relocation costs. Current subsidy rates are onefourth of wages (one-third for SMEs) for up to one year. Other benefits are moving costs (actual cost up to a prespecified limit), housing
costs (one-half of the cost paid by the employer for realtor fees and one
year’s rent), and special subsidies paid to firms for their new investment in plant and equipment and employment maintenance.
Labor movement ability-development subsidy (rodo ido noryoku kaihatsu joseikin). This subsidy is given to employers in special
employment-adjustment industries who provide workers with education or training for the purpose of shukko, arranging for new jobs and
reassignment of workers to new lines of business. The length of the
subsidy is for one year prior to the relocation of workers. The subsidy
takes the following forms: i) two-thirds of the wages (three-fourths for
SMEs) with a maximum of 10,510 yen per day; ii) two-thirds of the
training cost (three-fourths for SMEs) with a maximum of 100,000
yen; and iii) a subsidy to relocation costs for workers who receive
retraining for new occupations. Components (i) and (ii) are also available to employers in any industry who employ and train workers who
were laid off by firms belonging to special employment-adjustment
industries.
Lifetime ability-development subsidy (shogai noryoku kaihatsu
kyuhukin). Three distinct activities are subsidized under this program.
“Ability-development subsidies” cover portions of employers’ cost of
training workers in their own company occupational skill-development
programs. “Self-development subsidies” (jiko keihatsu josei kyuuhukin) reimburse a portion of employers’ subsidy to their workers’ cost
of receiving outside education and training. Finally, a subsidy is also
available for the development and testing of officially recognized tests
of worker skill, the “skill evaluation promotion subsidy” (gino hyoka
sokushin kyuuhukin).
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Canada
Canada does not have a formal approach to government intervention in declining industries like Japan’s. However, there is a mosaic of
ad hoc initiatives and semi-permanent programs that perform a similar
function, although not on as large a scale. The steel industry, for example, experienced a large downturn in the last few decades and the federal government funded a multiyear Canadian Steel Trades Employment Congress to aid workers in retraining and job search. Similar
programs received funding to aid workers displaced as a result of international trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement. In general, large failing firms and organized industries
have frequently looked to the government for loan guarantees, tax concessions, or other forms of support. Although these “bailouts” are not
as common as they once were, they occur regularly and, typically, each
is a highly politicized event that is handled on an ad hoc basis by the
government in power.
As in Japan, Canada’s UI-EI system does play some role in
retraining and in the explicit subsidization of labor mobility. UI-EI
offers retraining assistance, for example, and in 1994, 6.2 percent of
all UI weeks paid were in this category (combined with geographic
mobility assistance). Furthermore, all formal tuition fees and moving
costs can be deducted from taxable income; so the government implicitly subsidizes all such activity. Finally, there are smaller specialized
UI-EI programs to promote temporary work sharing, job creation, and
self-employment assistance, all of which have some parallels in the
Japanese EI system. However, in 1994 these three specialized programs together accounted for only 1.5 percent of all UI benefit weeks
paid.
Unions
A country’s system of unionization is directly relevant to the experiences of its displaced workers in at least two ways. One of these is
the effect of unions on the entire distribution of pre- and postdisplacement wages. For example, one might expect displaced workers in an
economy with highly decentralized wage-setting institutions to face
more wage uncertainty than workers in a more centralized economy.
Second, unions sometimes intervene directly in the management of the
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displacement process. We provide a brief discussion of the possible
effects of unions on displaced workers in Japan and Canada in this section.
Japan
In Japan, like Canada and the United States, only a minority of
workers are unionized. The Japanese unionization rate (union members divided by the number of employed) peaked around 35.5 percent
in the 1970s and gradually declined to the current level of 24 percent.
As in Canada and the United States, unionization is highest in the government and public utilities sectors (about 67 percent), compared to 29
percent in manufacturing industries and 15 percent in the service sector. Also like Canada and the United States, Japanese unions are
highly decentralized: the predominant form of private sector union in
Japan is organized at the enterprise level. While legal provisions do
exist for the extension of collective bargaining agreements to nonunion
workers, these only set relatively low minimum wages within prefectures (see the following section on minimum wages).
Despite its low level of unionization and its enterprise-based structure, Japan’s collective bargaining does contain one element of centralized coordination not present in the United States and Canada. This is
the annual unified negotiation process, which takes place every spring
between the Japanese Employers’ Federation and various associations
of labor unions (shunto). Wage settlements in shunto are determined at
the firm level and vary across industries and firms, reflecting their
industry- and firm-specific performance.17 This process typically
determines the formulas for general and individual annual increases in
the level of regular pay. The formulas for bonuses, which are paid
twice a year (usually in June and December), are also determined for
unionized workers during the period between early spring and June.
Bonuses generally constitute more than 25 percent of workers’ annual
pay and fluctuate more over time than regular (contract) pay.18
While nonunionized workers and government employees are not
covered by shunto, it is widely argued that shunto wage settlements
have a significant impact on the wages of these workers as well.
Although the process by which this occurs is hard to document, Teulings and Hartog (1998), among others, have argued that this informal,
economy-wide wage coordination has important effects on the national
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wage structure. If so, it is likely to have observable effects on the wage
changes experienced by displaced workers as well—a question we
address in detail later in this chapter.
Japanese unions also generally play at least some explicit role in
the management of the displacement process at the firm level. According to the 1991 Survey of Labor-Management Agreements (Japan Ministry of Labor 1992), approximately 70 percent of unionized firms have
some formal rules for employer-union consultation regarding job rotation, shukko, and rehiring of retired workers. Ninety percent of these
firms have some formal rules for consultation regarding layoffs. On
the other hand, a much smaller proportion of firms (30 percent) have
formal rules for consultation regarding employment matters resulting
from the introduction of new technology. It is unknown how common
these arrangements are in nonunionized firms.
Canada
In 1997, Canada had a union membership rate of 31 percent of
employed persons, with about 34 percent of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Akyeampong 1997). While this is more
than double the U.S. rate at that time, many aspects of Canada’s industrial relations system are similar to that in the United States, from
which Canada adapted much of its collective bargaining legislation.19
Wage bargaining is done at the plant level, but not coordinated annually as in Japan. Most agreements are two or three years in duration,
but this is an outcome of the bargaining process and single-year contracts are not unheard of. State-sanctioned extension of collectively
bargained wages to nonunionized workers is essentially non-existent.
As is well known, the average union/nonunion wage gap for observationally identical workers in North America is about 15 percent. Furthermore, relative to nonunion firms, North American unions compress
wages across skill levels (see Lemieux 1993). Kuhn and Sweetman
(1998) showed that the loss of union status plays a very significant role
in the wage losses of Canadian displaced workers.
In sum, only a minority of workers are union members in both
Canada and Japan. While there is some coordination of wage settlements in Japan, and some extension of union wage settlements to nonunion workers, both countries have quite decentralized wage-setting
mechanisms in which conditions at the level of the individual firm play
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large roles in the setting of wages. Based on an examination of the collective bargaining system, one would therefore expect considerable
dispersion in the wage outcomes of displaced workers in both countries, as compared, for example, with such highly centralized countries
as Denmark or Austria.
Minimum Wages
Minimum wages, like unions, affect the entire distribution of preand postdisplacement wages. They could thus affect the distribution of
wage changes experienced by displaced workers in each country.
Japan
Unlike U.S. or Canadian minimum wages, which are hourly rates,
Japanese minimum wages are generally specified on a daily basis.
Like Canada (and to a much lesser extent the United States) Japanese
minimum wages vary among political subdivisions of the country,
which in Japan are called prefectures. Unlike either the United States
or Canada, Japanese minimum wages also vary across industries. Minimum wages are determined by Prefectural Minimum Wage Councils
and are set in two main ways.20
District minimum wages. Each of the 47 prefectures has an overall minimum wage. These minimum wages are applicable to all workers including part-time workers, nonregular workers, and workers
under other types of employment contracts. At the time of writing,
most of the prefectural minimum wages were set on October 1, 1997;
they range from 4,625 yen for Okinawa (lowest in the nation) to 5,368
yen for Tokyo and Kanagawa (highest).
Industry minimum wages. Within each prefecture, management
and unions can agree on higher minimum wages for certain industries.
There are currently 253 industry-level minimum wages of this type.
Examples include the pulp and paper industry in Toyama Prefecture
(5,637 yen, set on November 25, 1995); the pulp and paper industry in
Shizuoka Prefecture (5,848 yen, set on December 31, 1997); the steel
industry (5,487 yen in Oita; 5,970 in Tokyo; and 6,184 in Osaka); and
the retail automobile industry (4,630 in Okinawa; and 6,049 in
Saitama). These industry-specific minimum wages, which do not have
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a counterpart in Canada, may provide a channel whereby collectively
bargained wages affect the wages of unorganized workers, and—
because they exceed the overall district minimum—may work to compress wages in Japan more than minimum wages in Canada do.
Canada
As noted, minimum wages in Canada are a provincial responsibility, except for a small number of industries that are under federal jurisdiction, and are increased periodically on an ad hoc basis. With the
exception of a small number of federally regulated industries, the minimum wage does not vary across industries. Benjamin, Gunderson, and
Riddell (1998) described the trend of a population-weighted average of
Canadian minimum wages. In the mid 1970s it was about 50 percent
of the average manufacturing wage. It fell over the subsequent decade
to about 35 percent and increased recently to about 38 percent.
In sum, both Canada and Japan have minimum wages that are set
at subnational levels (provinces in Canada, prefectures and industryprefecture cells in Japan). Clearly, these levels reflect local economic
conditions, as they tend to be higher in higher-wage jurisdictions.
Unlike Canada, Japan has a system of industry-specific minimum
wages that exceed general local mimina and provide a channel
whereby collectively bargained wages can affect nonunion wages.
Finally, minimum wages are not very high relative to mean wages in
either country. This is shown in Table 3.4: Japan, Canada, and the
United States all have minimum wages between 36 and 38 percent of
mean wages (though the definitions of mean wages vary somewhat),
levels which are very low compared with France and Germany. We
thus expect considerable heterogeneity in the wage outcomes experienced by displaced workers in both countries, with perhaps somewhat
more legislation-induced wage compression in Japan than in Canada,
given Japan’s system of industry wage minima.
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GENERAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
In this section, we briefly describe the overall macroeconomic and
labor market conditions around the period (the mid 1990s) to which
most of our analysis applies.
Japan
As is well known, the mid 1990s was a period of deepening recession for the Japanese economy. Unemployment rose from 2.1 percent
in 1990 to 4.1 percent in 1998, and the number of vacancies per job
seeker was cut by more than half, from 1.4 to 0.5. This recession has
often been linked to the burst of the stock- and property-market bubble
in 1990. The Nikkei stock price index climbed to its historical high of
38,916 yen on December 29, 1989. The bubble burst in 1990, and the
Nikkei index fell to 20,222 yen on October 1, 1990 and then to 14,309
yen on August 18, 1992. Another factor contributing to the recession
may have been Japan’s recent deindustrialization, driven in part by the
appreciation of the Japanese currency in the late 1980s. It is estimated
that the fraction of overseas production in Japanese manufacturers’
overall sales revenue, which had been about 3 percent in 1985, had
risen to more than 8 percent by 1994 and was expected to approach 11
percent by 2000. At the same time the share of manufactured goods in
total Japanese imports grew from 31 percent in 1985 to more than 55
percent in 1994. These trends were reflected in the much steeper
declines in manufacturing employment than in overall employment
during the 1980s and 1990s, and could be expected to put unprecedented pressure on Japanese firms, especially in manufacturing, to
shed labor.
Canada
Canada’s unemployment rate has been higher than Japan’s
throughout most of the postwar period and has exceeded that of the
United States since the early 1980s. It peaked most recently in the
1992 recession at 11.3 percent, and declined only very slowly after that
to 9.2 percent in 1997. The national number masks enormous regional
differences, however, that have persisted for decades. Some areas have

Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada

221

unemployment rates that are approximately 20 percentage points
higher than others. The rate of employment growth also slowed markedly in the first half of the 1990s and the employment rate dropped
from a peak in the low 60 percent range in the late 1980s to just under
60 percent.
Thus, during the mid 1990s, economic conditions were moving in
opposite directions in Japan and Canada: deteriorating in Japan and
improving in Canada. Despite this, it is important to note that there
was a huge gap in unemployment rates in favor of Japan: in 1995, the
Canadian unemployment rate of 9.5 percent was almost triple the Japanese rate of 3.2. This difference colors all discussion of comparative
displacement and reemployment rates in the two countries. As we
shall see, it shows up in large differences in both displacement rates
and jobless durations among displaced workers in the two countries.

RATES OF SEPARATION AND DISPLACEMENT
Data
The goal of this section is to ascertain whether, and to what extent,
job displacement is more or less common in Japan than in Canada. As
displacements are a subset of all job separations, we present results on
overall separation rates as well. In addition, we wish to see whether
broad patterns of the incidence of separation and displacement among
demographic groups (essentially age and gender groups) are similar in
the two countries.
To accomplish this goal, we use one Japanese and two Canadian
data sets. For Japan, we rely on the employment mobility survey
(EMS), with its relatively large sample of persons leaving and entering
firms. For Canada, we use a very large sample of separations drawn
from administrative data collected by Human Resources Development
Canada (HRDC). We supplement this with a much smaller, but richer,
survey of separators called the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP).
Japan’s employment mobility survey (“Survey of Employment
Trends”) is an establishment survey that is conducted twice a year by
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the Ministry of Labor. The two surveys for each year (typically conducted during the periods July 1 to July 31 and January 16 to February
15) cover the employment changes which have taken place at surveyed
establishments during the periods January 1 to June 30 and July 1 to
December 31, respectively. This survey began in essentially the
present form in 1964. Privately and publicly owned establishments
with at least five employees in the following nine industries are covered: mining, construction, manufacturing, public utilities, transportation and communications, retail/wholesale and restaurants, finance/
insurance, real estate, and service. In 1995, 14,000 establishments
were surveyed. In addition to establishments’ characteristics, the survey collects information on three subsets of their workers: 1) those
who were hired during the six-month reference period, 2) those who
left the firm during that period, and 3) those who experienced transfers
from one establishment to another within the same firm (intrafirm
transfers). For 1995, the workers surveyed comprise about 130,000
new hires, 120,000 departures, and 50,000 within-firm transfers. In
this section we use the “departures” sample to compute separation and
displacement rates; later we use the “hires” sample to examine the consequences of displacement.21 We do not use the third, “transfers,” sample.
The Canadian administrative data we use is collected as a by-product of administering the employment insurance system. Whenever a
separation occurs, a Canadian employer is expected to submit to
HRDC a form called a “Record of Employment” (ROE).22 ROE forms
contain information on the date and (firm-reported) reason for the separation, an indication of whether the separation is expected to be permanent or temporary, plus some limited demographic and firm
information (including age, gender, job tenure, and firm size). Both
the worker and firm are identified, so it is possible to see whether the
person returned to the original firm after the separation.
Time series of separation rates based on the above data have
recently been published in a series of Statistics Canada working papers
(Picot and Lin 1996; Picot, Lin and Pyper 1997; Lin and Pyper 1997);
these rates are not comparable to Japanese data derived from the
employment mobility survey, however, for a number of reasons. In
particular, the Japanese survey on which our results are based is
restricted to establishments with five or more employees, to jobs last-
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ing at least a month, and to a large but not exhaustive set of industries
(for example, most of the public sector is excluded). To adjust for
these differences (some of which make a considerable difference to the
numbers), Garnett Picot and Leonard Landry of Statistics Canada have
generously provided us with revised figures that impose the same
restrictions as the Japanese numbers.
As mentioned, supplementary information on separating workers
in Canada is available in a series of surveys called the COEPs. These
use ROE forms as the sampling frame for a telephone survey which
asks detailed questions about old and new jobs, unemployment durations, and search activities, among other items. In our work here, we
use two merged COEP surveys: those which surveyed workers displaced between January and June of 1993 and of 1995. In 1995 this
survey was conducted in two panels (or waves) approximately 8–9 and
13–14 months after the event; the 1993 survey had a third panel
between these dates. Although much smaller in size than the Japanese
employment mobility survey, the COEP gives us a comparable and
representative sample of separations, combined with detailed information on their subsequent labor-force status and wages.
Separation and Displacement Rates
Total annual separation rates, calculated from the 1995 Japanese
employment mobility survey and comparably defined Canadian
administrative data, are presented in the first and third columns of
Table 3.5. These rates give the annual number of separations from jobs
which have lasted one month or more, from firms with five or more
workers, expressed as a fraction of the employed population in June of
1995.23
Overall, the differences are striking: employed Canadian men are
much more likely to experience a separation than Japanese men, with a
separation rate of 35.9 percent, essentially triple the Japanese rate of
11.9 percent. The difference is considerably less dramatic for women,
whose separation rates are essentially identical to men’s in Canada, but
much higher than men’s in Japan. Thus Canadian women’s separation
rate (34.1 percent) is not even double that of Japanese women (18.3
percent). Ignoring teenagers, separation rates in both Canada and
Japan seem to be U-shaped in age, especially in Japan, and especially
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for men.24 Thus jobs are most stable for prime-age workers in both
countries, as one might expect from a number of models, including
job-shopping models and models where retirement is followed by one
or more casual jobs.
To what extent are these apparently massive differences in turnover between Canada and Japan “real,” in the sense that they actually
result in a worker moving from one firm to another? With the exception of some shukko assignments, which are relatively infrequent, Japanese separations, especially as reported in Table 3.5, are essentially all
permanent.25 As in the United States, however, temporary layoffs constitute a large fraction of separations in Canada. To correct for this, the
second column excludes from the count of separations all those workers who were observed working for their preseparation employer in the
year following the separation. This dramatically reduces the Canadian
separation rate, to the point where comparably defined permanent separation rates are very similar in Canada (16.8 percent) and Japan (14.3
percent). Previous analyses have often missed this because they
included the huge volume of temporary separations in North American
economies.
This overall similarity in permanent separation rates, however,
obscures offsetting patterns by gender: in line with expectations, Japanese men do turn over substantially less than Canadian men (11.9 versus 16.8 percent per year), but this is offset by higher employment
instability among Japanese women (18.3 versus 15.7 percent turnover).
Overall rates also obscure a different age pattern in the two economies:
while turnover is U-shaped with age in both, the ranking of the two
countries is different at the top and bottom of the age distribution.26
Consistent with a “job shopping” model, young Canadian workers,
especially those in their 20s, turn over much more than workers in all
other age categories. There is also some evidence of job shopping in
Japan, but in stark contrast to Canada, the highest turnover rates in
Japan are actually found among the oldest workers, aged 60 and over.
These workers actually turn over much more rapidly in Japan than in
Canada, suggesting the importance of both mandatory retirement and a
casual labor market among “retirees.”
Thus we find that overall permanent separation rates are not that
different in Japan and Canada, but what about worker displacements,
or the subset of separations that are involuntary from the worker’s
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point of view? If a larger fraction of permanent turnover in Japan is
voluntary, it may still be the case that displacement is less common
there. We confront this issue in Table 3.6, which presents the distribution of firm-reported reasons for separation in Japan (from published
EMS data), and Table 3.7, which examines both firm- and workerreported reasons for separation in the Canadian COEP data.
In Table 3.6, the separation reason that corresponds most closely to
what North Americans mean by layoffs is the “management convenience” category. In Japan in 1995, this category of separations constituted 8.7 percent of total separations, with a higher share for men (11.3
percent) than women (6.0 percent). Notably, this low “layoff” share
includes shukko assignments, which do not result in unemployment;
thus a count of layoffs that might conceivably cause unemployment
would be even lower. At the same time, however, this rate does not
include contract expirations or mandatory retirements, which might be
considered a form of displacement. All told, total involuntary separations—which consist primarily of those based on the three reasons just
mentioned—account for about one-third of all separations in Japan,
with a higher involuntary share for men than women. The involuntary
share increases strongly with age, echoing our earlier notion that job
security falls with age in Japan. Importantly, this increase is not just
due to mandatory retirement, which is important only for workers over
55 in these data. The great bulk of the increase in involuntary separations with age is in the “management convenience” category, which
includes shukko. In stark contrast (as we shall see) to Canada, the vast
majority of separations for all workers under 54 are voluntary; for both
women and men, most of these voluntary separations are not related to
marriage, childbirth, or nursing care.
For Canada, unlike Japan, the COEP survey allows a detailed
examination of reported reasons for separation, including information
on both the firm’s and worker’s perceptions. The employer’s perceived separation reasons are those reported on the ROE form, which
asks employers to choose one of 13 permitted answers: shortage of
work (layoff), labor dispute, return to school, injury or illness, voluntary departure (quit), pregnancy, retirement, participation in a worksharing program, apprenticeship, age 65, dismissal (for cause), leave of
absence, and “other.”27 In addition to this information, however, the
first panel of the COEP household survey asks each worker the pri-
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mary reason for which the job ended. Only those whose self-reported
reason for separation was either quit, dismissed or fired, laid off, injury
or illness, or “other” were allowed to complete this survey (the survey
was quickly terminated for separations due to retirement, maternity,
labor dispute, and so forth, and these separations are not included in
our data).28
Table 3.7 presents a cross-tabulation of firm- and self-reported reasons for separation for participants in the COEP survey. Interestingly,
there is a divergence of opinion as to the nature of the separation in a
substantial number of cases. For men (women) about 13 percent (7
percent) of those who label their separation as a quit have the separation labeled as a layoff by the firm. Almost 14 percent of women (11
percent of men) who said they quit were actually dismissed (i.e., terminated for cause) according to their employers. Further, only 60 percent
of men (68 percent of women) whose separations are labeled as voluntary departures by firms label themselves as quits. While 89 percent of
men (87 percent of women) reported by the firm as being laid off (a
separation attributed to a shortage of work, that is, economic reasons)
report themselves as having been laid off, only 76 percent of men (64
percent of women) who report that they were laid off are declared as
such by the firm. A large part of this discrepancy results from the
“other” category, which firms are much more likely to use than workers, but the number of separations labeled as quits by firms that are
declared to be layoffs by workers is quite large, about 24 percent for
men and 14 percent for women.
Overall, however, while Table 3.7 shows some discrepancy
between worker and firm perceptions, it suggests that the large international differences we observe in the labeling of separations are common to workers and firms. In particular, no matter whether the
worker’s or the firm’s label is used, a much higher share of separations
in Canada (relative to Japan) are employer-initiated. Depending on
whose label is used, layoffs constitute 62–72 percent of separations for
men, and 48–65 percent for women. One reason for this might be Canada’s UI-EI system, which disqualifies all workers labeled as quitters
from benefits. This feature, combined with a lack of employer experience rating, might lead a much larger fraction of separations to be
labeled as layoffs, even by the employer. Another reason might simply
be cultural differences in labeling. It is sometimes claimed, for exam-
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ple, that a considerable number of forced resignations are reported
under the category of voluntary separations in Japan, to preserve public
appearances. If this is the case, our statistics in this section may underestimate the real rate of layoffs in Japan. We return to this issue in the
section called “Combining Incidence and Consequences” (p. 243),
which proposes and analyzes a definition of displacement that is not
dependent on reported reasons for separation to make international
comparisons. To anticipate, we find that the larger voluntary share in
Japan is not illusory.
Given the rough similarity in overall permanent separation rates,
plus the larger share of separations labeled as involuntary in Canada,
one would expect the overall rate of displacement—of permanent,
involuntary separation—to be higher in Canada than in Japan. This
expectation is confirmed overall by Table 3.8, which presents our best
estimates of displacement rates in the two countries. The Canadian
numbers come from administrative data from Picot, Lin, and Pyper
(1997) and simply restrict attention to separations labeled as due to
“shortage of work” by the employer on the ROE form.29 For Japan, the
last three columns combine the published information in Tables 3.5
and 3.6 (multiplying separation rates by the fraction of separations in
each category) to generate three alternative definitions of displacement
rates.
According to Table 3.8, overall displacement rates are lower in
Japan, no matter what definition of displacement is used. The overall
annual displacement rate in Canada was 4.9 percent in 1995: conditional on being employed at least a month and on working for a firm
with at least 5 employees, about 1 in 20 workers is permanently laid off
each year in Canada. According to the narrowest definition of displacement in Japan (separations due to management convenience
only), this fraction is only 1.2 percent, or 1 in 83 workers. This number
would be even lower if we excluded shukko workers from the count of
Japanese workers; these workers do not experience any unemployment
and (as we shall see) face much more muted wage changes than those
in other separations. The Japanese displacement rate rises substantially, to 2.7 percent, if we count workers whose temporary contracts
end as being displaced.30 Because they involve permanent, and (presumably) involuntary employment terminations, contract expirations
may be considered a kind of displacement; as they typically involve
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short jobs and are not unanticipated, however, they may not be fully
equivalent to layoffs. Finally, if mandatory retirements are included in
the count of Japanese displacements, the overall displacement rate rises
to 3.5 percent, still below the Canadian rate of 4.9 percent but much
less dramatically so.31
Is the international difference in displacement rates shown in Table
3.8 an artifact of special features of work organization in one or two
industries? One might imagine, for example, that the construction
industry in Canada accounts for a very large share of annual separations nationwide. In that industry, many workers have a permanent
affiliation to a craft rather than an employer and cycle through a large
number of jobs with different employers in a given year. This is a fundamentally different form of labor market organization than almost all
other industries. To check for this, we were able to generate separation
and displacement rates for two roughly comparable industry groups—
construction and manufacturing—for 1995 in both countries, according
to the definitions used in Tables 3.5 and 3.8. The figures are for men
and women combined. For construction, we find separation rates of 54
percent in Canada, but the permanent separation rate is only 22 percent. This compares to a permanent separation rate of 15 percent in
Japan. The permanent layoff rate is 17.7 percent in Canada, compared
to 1.1 percent in Japan, according to the “management convenience”
definition in Table 3.8. Thus there is indeed a huge difference in displacement rates between the two countries in the construction industry.
For manufacturing, the separation rate is 49 percent in Canada, but permanent separations are only 17.3 percent, compared to 12.1 percent in
Japan. Manufacturing displacement rates, as defined above, are 6.1
percent in Canada and 1.1 percent in Japan. Thus, looking just at manufacturing, the international difference in displacement rates is smaller
than in construction, but still very large. Indeed the rates for manufacturing are quite similar to those for the economy as a whole. We conclude that the differences seen in Table 3.8 are not an artifact of how
the construction industry, or any other single industry, is organized.
Two other noteworthy features of Table 3.8 are the following.
First, perhaps surprisingly, displacement rates are quite similar for Japanese men and women, but are considerably higher for Canadian men
than Canadian women. In part due to differences in industry mix (men
are overrepresented in construction, primary, and manufacturing indus-
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tries) and to interindustry differences in adjustment patterns (the above
industries have more volatile product demand and rely more on layoffs
as an adjustment mechanism), displacement is thus disproportionately
a “male” phenomenon in Canada. Second, and even more striking, are
the opposite age patterns in Canada and Japan, which are particularly
stark for men: displacement rates fall with age in Canada but increase
with age in Japan. While mandatory retirement clearly plays some
role here, Table 3.8 indicates that much more than this is going on:
both layoffs due to “management convenience” and finishing a temporary contract also increase substantially with age in Japan. This trend
highlights a key difference between the job markets of the two countries, which we explore further below: although Canadian workers
operate in a less-secure job market overall, their job security tends to
increase as they age, in part due to rising seniority levels and the widespread practice of ordering layoffs by inverse seniority. In Japan, the
opposite occurs: while young workers experience very high job security, this security erodes with age, as more and more workers are forced
out among the older age groups. Even excluding mandatory retirements, the displacement rate for Japanese workers over the age of 55
actually exceeds the Canadian displacement rate for workers of the
same age.
In sum, our analysis of separation and displacement rates in Canada and Japan shows the following. There are large differences in total
separation rates between Japan and Canada, with Canadian separations
being much more frequent. Because a large fraction of Canadian separations are temporary (involving a return to the original employer), differences in permanent separations between the two countries are
however much more modest. In fact this difference is reversed for
women, who have a higher permanent separation rate in Japan than
Canada. Finally, if we restrict attention to those separations that are
labeled as firm-initiated (or as “layoffs”), the difference between Canadian and Japanese separation rates (which we can now consider as
“displacement rates”) again becomes much wider. The reason is that in
Japan, a much larger share of separations tends to be labeled as “voluntary” from the worker’s point of view. An implication, of course, is
that the total rate of voluntary separation must actually be greater in
Japan than in Canada; understanding this phenomenon would seem to
be an important goal for further research.
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The Permanence of Layoffs
A final, but key, element in our description of displacement rates in
the two countries is a closer understanding of the North American phenomenon of temporary layoffs; as noted above, a very large fraction of
separations in Canada involves a temporary sojourn on employment
insurance, followed by recall to the preseparation employer. When
workers are laid off in Canada, how certain are they about their recall
prospects? Do their expectations coincide with the firm’s, and how
well do both parties’ expectations predict what actually happens?
These questions have important implications for workers’ search strategies and provide a useful contrast to the Japanese case, where separations (except for certain types of shukko) almost always involve a
permanent severing of ties with the employer. We use the COEP to
answer these questions in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.
Table 3.9 contrasts worker and firm recall expectations among the
subset of workers from Table 3.7 who are labeled as a layoff by either
party. The firm data are from the ROE form which is filled out near the
time of separation. The worker expectations are retrospective: workers
were asked at the time of the first survey what their expectation was
when the job ended. By this time, workers had had an opportunity to
see the ROE form. On average, the fraction of laid-off women expecting recall (46.5 percent) is quite similar to the fraction of women
employers expected to recall (49.2 percent). For men there is a somewhat larger gap, with 47.4 percent of workers expecting recall compared to 55.7 percent of firms. At the individual level, however, there
are much larger differences in expectations; 34 percent of men (36 percent of women) who indicated that they expected to be recalled, for
example, were not listed by the firm as workers they planned to recall.
Recall realizations are contrasted with expectations in Table 3.10
for the subset of workers from Table 3.9 who were reemployed by their
last survey date (these are the only workers for whom we can identify
the postseparation firm).32 Clearly, neither firms nor workers are very
reliable predictors of recall. For men, about 62 percent of workers who
expected to be recalled and 51 percent of the workers firms expected to
recall were actually back with their former employer. The corresponding numbers for women are about 70 percent and 63 percent. (This
could reflect workers’ exercising their option to search while unem-
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ployed, locating new jobs, and then declining the recall when it
arrives.)33 Perhaps more surprisingly, about 14 percent of the men and
15 percent of the women who expected not to be recalled were in fact
reemployed by their former employer, and 33 percent of men and 35
percent of women with no indication of recall on their ROE were actually recalled. This suggests a reluctance by some firms to indicate an
even weak commitment to recall workers in the face of uncertainty.
In sum, both the divergence in individual workers’ and firms’
expectations of recall and the inaccuracy of both firms’ and workers’
predictions of whether recall will occur mean that, in many cases, displacement in Canada does not constitute a sharp and well-defined
event. Workers on EI may search at a low intensity for several months
waiting to see whether they will be recalled or not. In contrast to
Japan, where displacement constitutes a short, sharp, and permanent
break with the firm, this more drawn-out process may contribute to the
longer unemployment durations among displaced workers in Canada.
We turn to this issue in the next section.

LABOR-FORCE TRANSITIONS AFTER DISPLACEMENT
In the previous section we established that, with the possible
exception of older men, worker displacement is less common in Japan
than in Canada. In this section we begin our analysis of the consequences of displacement in the two countries, focusing on the amount
of time it takes displaced workers to find new jobs. In particular, we
are interested in whether Japanese workers “pay” for their greater job
security with worse unemployment consequences in the event of involuntary job loss. Because so few workers are displaced, are the few
workers who are displaced seen by the labor market as “lemons,” thus
experiencing very long unemployment durations? Relatedly, does the
widely cited “thinness” of Japanese labor markets for mid-career workers manifest itself in much longer unemployment durations of laid-off
workers? Finally, we are also interested in the empirical correlates of
long-term unemployment: are the same kinds of workers likely to
experience long durations in both countries, or do patterns differ?
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Table 3.11 contains our main results on the relative unemployment
durations of displaced workers in Canada and Japan. The Japanese figures in that table are calculated from a special survey of workers entering unemployment, conducted in conjunction with the Japanese labor
force survey in 1996 and 1997 (Japan Ministry of Labor 1996, 1997).
This survey specifically interviewed workers who were employed one
year before the survey date and experienced a separation within the
prior 12 months. Individuals who had dropped out of the labor force
(were neither working nor looking for work at the survey date) were
not interviewed. With a sample size of about 5,200 persons, this special survey is small compared to the Employment Mobility Survey, but
unlike that survey (and like the COEP) it contains relatively detailed
information on jobless durations for an inflow-based sample. Our sample of displaced workers from this survey consists of all separations
due to layoffs, bankruptcy, a decline in business, and other “management convenience” reasons.34 This sample does not include workers
on shukko, as such workers generally experience no unemployment.
Both Japanese and Canadian samples, however, do include individuals
who, despite being involuntarily and permanently terminated, moved
directly into another job with no intervening joblessness.35
Canadian figures in Table 3.11 are based on the COEP survey.
Canadian displaced workers are defined as those experiencing a separation due to a self-reported “layoff” who do not return to their preseparation employer within the (approximately) one-year panel of the
COEP survey. For comparability with the Japanese statistics (which
drop individuals who are not in the labor force on the single survey
date on which they were interviewed), we impose two alternative
restrictions on the Canadian sample: “Canada A” drops individuals
who were out of the labor force at every date on which they were interviewed after the separation; Canada B drops individuals who were out
of the labor force at any of the (postseparation) interview dates. 36
Together, results from these two samples should bracket what would
be obtained from a sampling strategy identical to the Japanese one.
The numbers presented in Table 3.11 are cumulative reemployment rates derived from a Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function. The Kaplan-Meier technique provides a simple way to adjust for
the effect of censoring in the data, which is empirically fairly important: in Japan, 31 percent of men’s and 30 percent of women’s dura-
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tions were censored; in Canada this fraction was higher, at 32 and 42
percent, respectively. Cumulative reemployment rates give the fraction of workers whose completed jobless durations are estimated to
have ended by a specific amount of time after the layoff, and, by definition, cannot decrease with elapsed time.
Overall, the message of Table 3.11 is clear: even though displacement is much less common in Japan, Japanese displaced workers do
not take longer to become reemployed than Canadian displaced workers. In contrast, their durations are much shorter, with a median of just
under two months for both men and women, compared with between
five and six months for Canadian men and between seven and nine
months for Canadian women. Two months after displacement, over
half of Japanese workers are reemployed, compared with under 30 percent of Canadian workers (according to either Canadian sample). Six
months later, about three-quarters are reemployed in Japan compared
with about 52 and 42 percent of Canadian men and women, respectively. It is worth reemphasizing that these results apply to involuntarily terminated workers only, and that they hold in spite of the fact
that a much smaller fraction of separations are involuntary in Japan,
and of the fact that we have excluded shukko workers (who experience
involuntary mobility but no unemployment) from our calculations.
Accounting for these factors would only widen the gap between
Japan’s low unemployment durations and Canada’s higher ones.
Clearly, we do not find any evidence that “thinness” of mid-career
labor markets or a “lemons” phenomenon hurts Japanese displaced
workers, at least relative to Canadian ones. Instead, two other factors
seem likely to be at work. One is simply the higher overall Canadian
unemployment rate: as noted, despite the Japanese recession, unemployment rates in Japan were less than half of Canadian rates at the
time of these surveys. The second may be the distinctly North American issue of recall expectations: the lack of a clean break with the old
employer (even in the current sample of ex post permanent layoffs)
may discourage search for a new job, thus contributing to the higher
unemployment durations of Canadian displaced workers.
Results from modeling the impact of covariates on the reemployment hazard are presented in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 for Japan and Canada, respectively. In both cases we use a Cox partial likelihood
specification, which assumes the covariates have a proportional effect
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on the hazard and allows for a fully general baseline hazard rate. The
reported coefficients give the effect of each covariate on the log of the
reemployment hazard. In Japan (Table 3.12), both the number of
observed covariates and the sample size are small, and very few
observed characteristics have a statistically significant effect on the
hazard rate. A significant exception is that part-time workers, especially women, have higher reemployment hazards (and hence shorter
jobless durations) than full-time workers. In addition, workers displaced from industry 14 (“other” industries, not elsewhere classified)
have much lower hazards, and hence longer jobless durations, than the
omitted industry, manufacturing.
In Canada we have both a larger sample and a more exhaustive set
of covariates; as a result we are able to show quite a lot more about patterns in jobless durations in Table 3.13. All regressions in this table use
the “Canada A” sample described earlier, though the results change
very little when the smaller, “Canada B” sample is used. The specifications in columns 3 and 6 attempt to replicate the Japanese analysis in
Table 3.12 as closely as possible. In contrast to Japan, these two
regressions show that demographic and (predisplacement) firm characteristics matter a lot for the jobless durations of Canadian displaced
workers. In particular, for men, lower reemployment rates are found
among single workers, those displaced from firms with under 20 workers (the omitted category), visible minorities, and high-tenure workers.
Age has a U-shaped effect on reemployment rates. All these patterns
also hold for women, with two exceptions. Being single has the opposite, though not significant, effect—raising the reemployment hazard—
and education has a strong, positive effect on reemployment rates (high
school diploma is the omitted category). In contrast to Japan, being a
part-time worker has no significant effect on reemployment rates, at
least in the comparably specified regressions of columns 3 and 6.
The remaining columns in Table 3.13 add extra controls to check
for the robustness of the correlations identified above. Columns 1 and
4 add a measure of predisplacement union coverage and province fixed
effects; columns 2 and 5 add these plus the predisplacement wage—as
a proxy for individual characteristics observable to the previous
employer, but not to the econometrician. Interestingly, unionization is
associated with a much higher reemployment hazard for men, but has
no impact for women. In addition, and perhaps surprisingly, while the
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predisplacement wage (mean about 13.5) has a strong effect for men, it
has no effect at all for women. Looking across the three specifications,
most of the coefficient estimates are not strongly affected by the inclusion of additional controls.
In addition to reemployment rates, the COEP provides some
related information concerning the search and employment behavior of
displaced Canadians. For example, by the first survey date, 5.6 percent
of Canadian displaced workers had started their own businesses after
being laid off. Overall, 7.3 percent considered themselves to be selfemployed at the first survey, 4.0 percent full-time and 3.3 percent parttime. But 28 percent of those who were full-time self-employed, and
51 percent of those who were part-time, were also searching for
another job at that point. This compares favorably with the set of all
workers reemployed at that point; 58 percent of all workers who were
reemployed at the first survey date reported that they were still searching for another job. The fact that many Canadian displaced workers
continue searching for other jobs even after becoming reemployed,
combined (as we shall see) with the much higher fraction of Canadian
displaced workers whose first postseparation job pays very much less
than their previous one, suggests that postdisplacement “job shopping”
may play a more important role in how Canadian workers “recover”
from displacement than it does for Japanese workers.

WAGE CHANGES
In this section we conduct an econometric analysis of the wage
changes experienced by displaced workers, using data from the 1993
and 1995 COEP for Canada and the 1995 Employment Mobility Survey for Japan. We first present comparable descriptive information on
the distribution of wage changes, by age and sex, in both countries.
We then examine the structure of displacement-induced wage changes
in a regression framework. In both countries we compare the experiences of displaced workers to those of all workers experiencing a job
separation. The Canadian sample of displaced workers consists of all
permanent layoffs; in Japan we present results for two kinds of displaced workers: workers undergoing shukko and those experiencing
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other involuntary terminations (management convenience, contract
expiration, and mandatory retirement).37 The survey defines shukko
workers as those who move to work under another employer’s command by company order, or by agreement with another employer,
regardless of their formal form of employment affiliation (Japan Ministry of Labor 1997a, p. 357).
The Distribution of Displacement-Induced Wage Changes
Detailed information on the distribution of wage changes experienced by Japanese job changers in the Employment Mobility Survey is
provided in Table 3.14. As noted, Table 3.14 presents results for three
groups of workers: all separations, workers undergoing shukko, and all
other involuntary separations. The Japanese EMS does not ask workers directly about the level of preseparation wages; rather, it simply
presents workers with the five percentage-change categories listed in
the table and asks them to choose one. This makes it difficult to
present results for mean wage changes, of course; we do provide a
rough estimate of a mean, however, by assigning values to each category.38 Finally, recall that, by definition, only workers who are reemployed after a separation can be included in these wage-change
calculations and that the wage information refers to monthly wages
excluding bonuses.
According to Table 3.14, the average Japanese male who changed
jobs in 1995 experienced a 2.2 percent wage gain; if he changed jobs
involuntarily without undergoing shukko, he lost 4.3 percent in wages.
Closer examination of the data, however, reveals that the latter loss is
entirely attributable to workers over 45 years of age: on average men
under this age experience a mean wage gain after an involuntary separation. Men above 55, on the other hand, experience very large mean
wage losses, many of which may be associated with mandatory retirement and with low-wage or part-time work after retirement. Indeed,
the incidence of very large wage reductions among older men who separate involuntarily is remarkable, with almost 40 percent experiencing
a wage reduction of over 30 percent. Also, again especially for men, a
significant fraction of job changers (both overall and involuntary)
experience wage gains, a fraction which declines strongly with age.
Finally, the distribution of wage changes among workers undergoing
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shukko contrasts very strongly with the other distributions in Table
3.14: a much higher fraction of shukko workers experience wage stability across old and new jobs, with almost 90 percent experiencing a
change of less than 10 percent in absolute value. The fact that, at least
for a limited time, the old employer continues to pay the wage of such
workers almost certainly contributes to this wage stability. These
trends differ in two main ways for women. First, large wage reductions among older women undergoing permanent separations are much
less common than among men. This reflects, at least in part, the less
frequent use of mandatory retirement in women’s labor contracts. Second, shukko is very rare among women in Japan.
Table 3.15 gives comparable numbers for Canada. As noted, these
are derived from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys. Unlike the
Japanese EMS, the COEP asked persons surveyed the actual level of
wages in both the pre- and postseparation jobs; Table 3.15 uses these
responses to compute percentage changes.39 The table thus provides an
actual mean wage change and an estimated mean using the same values
as were assigned to the various categories in Japan, for comparability.
In contrast to Japan, however, the Canadian wage data refer to hourly
wages, a fact that is important to bear in mind when interpreting regression results on part-time work below.
The following trends are evident from an examination of Table
3.15. First, as in Japan, displaced workers under the age of about 45 do
not experience economically significant mean wage losses. Also, as in
Japan, mean wage changes among displaced workers, as well as among
all separations, become more negative with age, but the decline is
much less dramatic. Indeed, the fraction of displaced men experiencing large wage losses appears uncorrelated with age in Canada; the
declining mean is largely due to a fall in the fraction of large, displacement-induced wage gains with age.
The clearest contrast in wage change patterns between Japan and
Canada concerns their variance. Looking specifically at prime-age
men (say, age 30–39, before mandatory retirement becomes an issue in
Japan), and at the non-shukko involuntary separations in both countries, it is clear that the fraction of displaced workers experiencing
wage changes of more than 30 percent in absolute value is much
greater in Canada (17.20 + 14.66 = 31.86 percent) than in Japan (5.14 +
3.81 = 8.95 percent for 30- to 34-year-olds and 4.67 + 3.63 = 8.30 per-
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cent for 35- to 44-year-olds). This is particularly noteworthy when we
recall that the Japanese figures are monthly wages, and thus they incorporate any monthly hours variation between jobs. This lower variance
in wage changes in Japan is striking, given the relatively decentralized
wage-setting regimes in both Japan and Canada. It may, however,
reflect greater opportunities to extend collectively bargained wage settlements to nonunion workers, and industry minimum wages that
reduce wage dispersion, in Japan. It clearly reflects something other
than the institution of shukko, since it is very apparent even when
shukko workers are excluded from the sample.
Finally, while (due to this greater dispersion) most age groups are
much less likely to experience a large wage reduction when changing
jobs in Japan than in Canada, the reverse is true for older workers,
especially men separating involuntarily. Thus, our results again reaffirm the notion that adjustment burdens in Japan fall much more disproportionately on older workers than in Canada: not only does the
involuntary separation rate rise with age (as we saw in the previous
section), but so do the chances that such a separation will result in a
large wage loss.
A reader might be surprised by the very small mean wage losses
reported in Table 3.15 for older Canadian workers. Doesn’t this contradict a large U.S. and Canadian literature which shows large wage
losses among older displaced North American workers? The resolution to this puzzle can be found in Table 3.16, which breaks down
Canadians’ wage changes by tenure instead of age, and in Table 3.17,
which provides supplementary information on the distribution of tenure by age in the two countries. Now, sizable mean losses (of 11.0 percent for men and 6.6 percent for women) are evident among workers
with high tenure levels (more than 10 years), and losses increase rather
steadily with tenure on the lost job. It therefore does not follow from
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 that the Canadian labor market is kinder to hightenure displaced workers than the Japanese market: the small wage
losses of older Canadian displaced workers could be due largely to relatively low mean tenure levels among older workers in Canada relative
to Japan.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to information about tenure
levels of Japanese displaced workers in our microdata sample. However, the fact that older Japanese workers have higher tenure levels
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than older Canadian workers is documented in Table 3.17, which is
based on calculations from general household surveys in both countries. This is especially the case for men; for example, a randomly
selected, employed 50- to 54-year-old Japanese man has been on his
current job for 22 years. The analogous figure for Canada is 14.7
years.40 Women’s age-specific tenure levels are remarkably similar in
Japan and Canada. The other noteworthy feature of Table 3.17 is what
happens after age 55: conditional on remaining employed, mean tenure
continues to rise with age among Canadian workers, even past 65.
This is not the case in Japan, at least for men, where the widespread
practice of taking a low-wage “postretirement” job clearly shows up in
the data.
The Structure of Displacement-Induced Wage
Changes: Japan versus Canada
In this subsection we present regression analyses of displacementinduced wage changes in Japan and Canada. The goal is to see whether
the same observable factors accentuate, or mitigate, wage losses experienced by displaced workers in both countries. As in the previous subsection, for Canada we present separate results for all permanent
separations and for permanently laid-off workers. For Japan we consider three populations: all separations, workers undergoing shukko,
and layoffs.
The Japanese results are presented for men and women separately
in Tables 3.18 and 3.19. The dependent variable in all regressions is
the percentage wage change reported by the (reemployed) worker;
because both tails of this dependent variable are truncated, we use censored regression models for doubly truncated dependent variables.41
For the “laid-off” and “shukko” samples, we report separate specifications with and without controls for industry wage premiums. The latter
specification is for comparability with the Canadian data, when we
cannot compute a similar variable.
Three main patterns are clear in Tables 3.18 and 3.19. First, as the
“All Separations” column of both tables indicates (and as the simple
wage-change distributions examined above suggested), separation reason matters. With the exception of workers experiencing outward
shukko, who experience a small wage gain, workers experiencing
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involuntary separations experience larger wage losses than do voluntary separations. In particular, laid-off men (in other words, involuntary, non-shukko separations) are likely to lose 5 percent more in wages
than men separating voluntarily. The somewhat surprising wage gains
among outward-shukko workers might reflect pay incentives employers provide for encouraging workers to accept shukko assignments (to
new jobs) willingly. Such incentives disappear as workers on shukko
assignments are called back.
Second, among involuntary separations, the patterns of wage
changes are very different for shukko versus all other involuntary separations. In virtually all cases, the absolute magnitudes of the coefficients are smaller for workers undergoing shukko. At the same time, as
suggested by the wage-change distributions in the previous subsection,
our estimate of unexplained wage-change variance, sigma, is also
much smaller for shukko workers (less than half the value for laid-off
workers among men). Thus, both measured and unmeasured personal
and firm characteristics matter much less for wage changes among
shukko workers. In part because the preseparation firm sometimes
pays the worker his or her old wage during the initial period at the new
firm, shukko workers thus seem to be relatively insulated from the heterogeneity in wage-change experiences of laid-off workers in Japan.
Third, focusing now on the “laid-off” workers columns, the wage
consequences of displacement vary considerably with workers’ characteristics in Japan. Compared with workers with less than high school
(the omitted group), workers with more education experience larger
wage losses in Japan, with the largest losses among those with junior
college degrees. Firm size also matters: compared to workers remaining in a small firm before and after displacement, men moving into a
large firm experience, on average, 3 percent larger wage gains, while
those leaving a large firm lose 5 percent more. The large premium for
full-time work, of about 10 percent, is unsurprising given that our
monthly wage statistics will reflect hours variation between jobs. Men
who change industry experience 4 percent larger wage losses (women,
2 percent), consistent with the existence of industry-specific capital
(Neal 1995). Especially for men, industry-wage premiums are highly
important in explaining wage changes. Moving into industries which
pay above-average wages raises an individual’s wages; leaving them
reduces wages.42 Finally, and again especially for men, older workers
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clearly lose more from displacement than younger workers. To some
extent this surely reflects their higher tenure levels, which we are
unable to control for in Japan. Especially for workers aged 55–64, it
may also reflect the significant amount of work in “secondary” labor
markets that occurs after mandatory retirement.
In sum, most of the patterns in displaced workers’ wage changes in
Japan will be familiar to analysts of displacement in other countries.
The muted wage changes experienced by shukko workers are of distinct interest, however, as is the association of higher education with
greater wage losses. The magnitudes of the effects of different variables may differ substantially from other countries, however—a question we address in our analysis of Canadian data next.
Results from wage-change regressions for Canada are shown in
Table 3.20. Just as for Japan, we present one set of results for all job
separations in columns 1 and 4 (though in Canada we require these
separations to be permanent). The remaining columns restrict the sample to permanent layoffs only; of these, columns 2 and 5 provide the
fullest possible description of the pattern of wage changes in Canada;
columns 3 and 6 replicate the Japanese regressions essentially exactly
by dropping those covariates not available in the Japanese data (union
status and tenure).43 The dependent variable in all regressions is the
ratio of post- to preseparation hourly wages (based on wage levels
reported by the worker); multiplying Table 3.20 coefficients by 100
thus makes them roughly comparable with those for Japan (Tables 3.18
and 3.19).
Table 3.20 shows the following. First, unlike Japan, education is
essentially uncorrelated with wage changes among separating or displaced workers. Of course, higher education raises both pre- and postseparation wages in Canada (regressions not shown), but the effects are
roughly equal. Thus it would appear that wage premiums associated
with educational credentials are more likely to survive displacement in
Canada than in Japan. Second, focusing on the comparable regressions
in columns 3 and 6, it is clear that firm size “matters” in Canada, as it
does in Japan. Perhaps more unexpectedly, firm size appears to be
much more important in Canada than in Japan: displaced men who
move from a large firm to a small firm in Canada lose 24 percent more
in wages than those in small firms both before and after displacement.
This compares to only a 5 percent larger loss in Japan, where the larg-
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est firm-size category (1,000 or more workers) actually refers to much
larger firms than in Canada (500 or more).44 Despite frequent comments about the importance of dual labor markets in Japan, we thus
find larger firm-size premiums in a North American economy—Canada. This may reflect greater overall wage heterogeneity, as well as
more idiosyncratic rent-sharing, as argued by Teulings and Hartog
(1998).45
In contrast to firm size, part-time status matters much less in Canada than in Japan; in fact the only significant part-time coefficient
implies an hourly wage gain for women moving into part-time jobs.
As in Japan, older workers lose more from displacement, and the magnitude of the age effect is similar. As columns 2 and 5 indicate, controlling for tenure reduces, but does not eliminate, these age effects,
suggesting that pure aging may play a role. Visible minorities lose significantly more from displacement than other Canadians. Because
pure wage discrimination should affect both pre- and postdisplacement
wages equally, this suggests that there might be a search component to
discrimination—jobs in which visible minorities are welcome may be
relatively scarce, prompting them to accept low-wage jobs while
searching in this “thin” market.
Finally, the Canadian data provide evidence on the effects of a
very important variable, aside from tenure, that is absent from the Japanese data: union status. Clearly, workers transiting from union to
nonunion status (“UN”) lose more from displacement, and workers
transiting into union status (“NU”) gain, by between 12 and 20 percent
in all cases. While controlling for union status does not alter the other
regression coefficients much (it reduces the firm size effects a little but
to nowhere near the small Japanese levels), it would be interesting to
see whether similar union effects are present in Japan, where union
coverage rates are similar to Canada’s but where more mechanisms
exist by which union wage settlements might affect nonunion workers.
In sum, a regression-based examination of the patterns in wage
losses experienced by displaced workers in Canada and Japan reveals
both commonalities and differences. Commonalities include increasing wage losses with age, and wage losses that are accentuated when
workers move out of large firms and into small ones. Differences
revolve around the fact that some factors “matter” more for wage
changes in one country than the other, or do not matter at all in one of
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the two countries. Firm size clearly matters more in Canada: in comparable wage-change regressions, estimated firm-size premiums are
much larger there. In contrast, education and part-time status matter
more in Japan. Further investigation into what might explain these
wage-structure differences seems warranted. Finally, it is worth recalling the existence, in Japan but not in Canada, of a group of involuntarily displaced workers who experience no unemployment and whose
wage changes are much more muted than those of laid-off workers:
shukko workers. For some, at least, shukko might be a “kinder, gentler” alternative to displacement that permits industrial adjustment just
the same.

COMBINING INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES: THE
PREVALENCE OF SEVERE SEPARATION-INDUCED
WAGE LOSS
It would appear, based on the analysis so far, that—with the exception of older Japanese men exposed to early retirement risk—displacement, in the sense of involuntary, permanent job loss, is less common
in Japan than Canada. Furthermore, it appears that, with the same
exception, the likelihood of experiencing a large wage decline as a
result of displacement is less in Japan as well. Overall, this would suggest that a randomly selected Japanese worker has more lifetime earnings security than a comparable Canadian worker.46 In this section we
quantify this difference between the two labor markets by computing a
simple, comparable, summary measure of wage security for each. In
particular, we ask: “In any given year, what is the probability that a
randomly selected employed worker of a given age will experience a
permanent job separation which results in an hourly wage loss of more
than 30 percent?” For want of a better term, we call this the “risk of
severe, turnover-induced, wage loss.” In addition to combining information about both the incidence and consequences of displacement,
this indicator might be thought of as a measure of displacement rates
that is not dependent on potential differences in the labeling of separations across countries. Rather than restricting attention to particular
separation reasons, we include all separations and, in a sense, weight
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their “severity” by the wage loss associated with them, thus circumventing these labeling and definitional issues.
Our estimates of per-worker frequencies of separation-induced
wage gains and losses are presented in Table 3.21. The figures
reported there combine the information on wage changes used in the
previous section with the permanent separation rates calculated in
Table 3.5. According to Table 3.21, men’s overall risk of severe, turnover-induced wage loss is under one percent (0.8 percent) per year in
Japan, and more than double that (1.9 percent) in Canada. As
expected, this reflects both a higher male permanent separation rate
and a greater likelihood of experiencing a large wage loss conditional
on changing jobs in Canada. For women, the incidence of severe separation-induced wage loss is also greater in Canada than Japan, but the
difference is much more moderate. This is because, as noted in Table
3.5, Japanese women actually have higher turnover rates than Canadian women.
Together, the age trends in Table 3.21 yield a perhaps-surprising
finding that reinforces some trends noted much earlier, in Table 3.5: If
job security is defined as freedom from the risk of a job change that
results in a wage loss of over 30 percent (or 10 percent for that matter),
older Canadian workers (55+, both men and women) have greater
earnings security than older Japanese workers. Loosely, after a turbulent youth characterized by high turnover, both voluntary (“job shopping”), and involuntary (layoffs, which tend to be ordered by inverse
seniority), Canadian workers tend to settle into permanent jobs where,
by age 55, they are at relatively low risk of large, separation-induced
wage losses. Japanese workers, especially men, enjoy unparalleled
“wage security” when young, but face increasing wage-loss risk as
they age. To some extent, then, older workers may bear a much larger
share of the adjustment burden in Japan than in Canada.
A final question seems natural to ask: “Do younger Japanese workers ‘pay’ for their very high level of job and wage security in any
way?” According to columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 of Table 3.21, which
present parallel statistics on separation-induced wage gains, in at least
one very important sense, the answer to this question is “yes”: their
prospects of increasing their wages by finding a new, better job are
much lower. While in both countries the chances of “moving up” by
switching jobs fall with age, the international differences are dramatic
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in all age categories. In any given year, a 20- to 24-year-old employed
Canadian man has an 11.0 percent chance of raising his wage rate by
30 percent or more by switching employers. The equivalent probability in Japan is 1.3 percent. Even in a man’s late 50s, the international
difference is more than tenfold—1.1 percent in Canada versus 0.1 percent in Japan. Similar but less dramatic differences are present for
women.
Thus, to some extent the greater protection from turnover-induced
wage loss experienced in Japan, especially by young and prime-age
men, is counterbalanced by the fact that fewer wage gains can be had
from turning over. In general, this reflects the fact that the variance of
separation-induced wage changes is much higher in Canada than
Japan. Despite Japan’s low level of unionization and enterprise-level
wage bargaining, these wage-change results are suggestive of a more
compressed overall wage distribution. To the extent that workers are
risk averse, this lower variance can be thought of as raising the level of
“effective” wage security in Japan, again especially among young and
prime-age men.

EMERGING ISSUES: WHERE TO GO FROM HERE?
In this chapter we have described the main institutional elements of
the Japanese and Canadian economies that affect displaced workers,
and we have presented evidence on the incidence and consequences of
displacement in both countries. Our main results have already been
summarized in the introduction; in this concluding section we try to
summarize the main outstanding puzzles our work leaves unanswered
and provide suggestions for what needs to be done next to resolve
them.
Concerning overall separation and displacement rates in Canada
and Japan, a somewhat unexpected finding of this chapter is the rough
similarity in permanent separation rates between the two countries.
This phenomenon—reminiscent of Koike’s (1984, for example) “revisionist” claim that Japanese employment systems do not necessarily
provide more security than “Western” ones—is obscured in some published aggregate statistics by the inclusion of the large number of tem-
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porary separations in North American data, by a tendency to focus on
male workers only, and by the tendency of Japanese statistics (because
they are often based on surveys of firms) to restrict attention to workers
in larger firms. When these factors are adjusted for, overall permanent
separation rates in the two countries are similar, though they are higher
for men in Canada and women in Japan. Clearly this finding needs to
be explored in more detail, with as many data sources as possible, and
with the closest attention to comparability of the data. If it is supported
by further examination, it may have very important implications for
understanding the process of industrial adjustment in Japan, compared
to North American economies. The finding also needs to be reconciled
with the very clear differences in age-specific mean job tenures we see
between Canada and Japan. Tenure is much higher in Japan (at least
among men); this could be consistent with the turnover data if turnover
in Japan is more concentrated among low-tenure workers (for example,
part-time and contract workers) than in North American economies.
A related puzzle concerns the very high fraction of Japanese separations that are voluntary, compared to Canada. Is this a genuine difference, or purely a labeling phenomenon?47 The fact that many fewer
Japanese separations result in large wage declines, plus the fact that in
the aggregate, worker and firm labeling of separations seems to agree
in Canada, certainly suggests that it is genuine. However, it is also true
that many fewer separations result in substantial wage increases in
Japan, so the phenomenon seems to warrant further investigation.
Who are all these quitters in Japan? Are they concentrated in certain
industries or demographic groups? Does the large fraction of voluntary turnover in Japan provide another mechanism for industrial adjustment that is less important in North America? Is the high fraction of
involuntary turnover in Canada a “labeling” response to its particular
employment insurance system?
Another aspect of the composition of separations that deserves further analysis is the much larger share of Japanese separations labeled
as due to the expiration of a fixed-term contract. Despite recent concern over the growth of this form of work in Canada and the United
States, it would appear to be much more prevalent in Japan. Does the
much larger share of contract expirations in separations also substitute
for displacement of “regular” workers as a form of industrial adjustment in Japan?
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A final, and fascinating, issue concerning displacement rates that
positively invites further exploration is the very different effect of age
on the frequency of displacement in the two countries. In Canada, displacement becomes much less common as a worker ages, while in
Japan the opposite occurs. Importantly, this phenomenon involves
more than mandatory early retirement: it is clearly evident for simple
layoffs as well. The Japanese and Canadian labor markets would thus
appear to function very differently over a worker’s lifetime: Canadian
workers enter the market with low job and wage security, but over time
accumulate greater security, in part due to a practice of layoffs by
inverse seniority. In Japan, young workers, especially men, experience
a level of job security that may be unparalleled worldwide. But this
security erodes as they age. While each of these two systems may have
its merits, one might imagine that the Japanese system (loosely one of
layoffs by seniority rather than inverse seniority) might actually be better at allowing organizations to continue renewing their workforce during downturns in demand. The organizational, productivity, and other
consequences of seniority-based, versus inverse-seniority-based, layoff
rules seem to strongly invite further comparative research.
Turning now to the consequences of displacement, another very
striking finding of this chapter is the much longer unemployment durations of Canadian versus Japanese displaced workers. To some extent
this should not be surprising because, at the time of our data, Canada’s
national unemployment rate was more than double Japan’s. Still,
national unemployment rates are, to some extent at least, endogenous
outcomes of institutional differences, and understanding these effects
is particularly important from a policy perspective. Do long “effective” notice periods, resulting from the significant procedural requirements for layoffs in Japan, help explain the short unemployment
durations there? (To answer this question it would be useful to have
survey information on workers’ advance knowledge of a displacement
in Japan.) What is the effect of the significant share of involuntary Japanese separations that are due to the expiration of fixed-term contracts
on mean unemployment durations there? Are the long unemployment
spells in Canada related to its temporary layoff system, with its relative
absence of a “short, sharp, and irrevocable” break from the previous
employer?
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Emerging issues in the analysis of the wage consequences of displacement are several. One concerns the experiences of shukko workers. On the surface, shukko appears to be an attractive alternative to
“standard” layoffs when a firm needs to reduce its workforce, because
no unemployment is experienced and much less wage uncertainty is
involved: our data clearly show that wage changes are much more
muted for shukko than other displaced workers. But are these changes
truly more muted? The survey used here only captures workers within
a year of the separation while most shukko workers are likely still on
the original firm’s payroll. In addition, some of these workers might
still be benefiting from a long list of government wage subsidies available to workers leaving declining industries, described in detail in this
chapter. Longer-term studies of shukko workers would seem to be very
important, and might show much less benign wage effects of this practice.
Looking at wage changes among displaced workers not on shukko,
our most striking finding concerns the much larger variance in wage
changes experienced by Canadian displaced workers. Further study of
this issue first needs to corroborate this very strong finding (which is
based on reported percentage wage changes in Japan) with data based
on reported levels of pre- and postdisplacement wages. Assuming it is
genuine (which, given its magnitude, seems highly likely), further
research needs to ask what explains it. Is it simply a result of a more
compressed overall wage distribution in Japan than in Canada, and if
so, which institutional features of the labor market explain this?
Unionization and minimum wages are not that different in the two
countries; perhaps greater Japanese uniformity in educational standards plays a role. Another contributing factor might be a greater role
of postdisplacement “job shopping” in accounting for wage recovery
from displacement in Canada: Canadian workers might be more willing, or able, to accept low-wage “stopgap” jobs after displacement than
Japanese workers, so the short-term variation in wage changes overstates the long-term effects in Canada.
Relatedly, the current chapter suggests that a more-detailed study
of the role of voluntary labor mobility in career wage growth may
reveal some fascinating differences in how Japanese and North American labor markets work. Clearly, Canadian workers, especially when
they are young, can achieve very substantial wage increases by switch-
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ing firms. This is much harder to do in Japan, but most studies also
indicate that the wage returns to staying with the same employer (i.e.,
the tenure-wage effect) are much higher in Japan than, say, the United
States.48 Thus, wages may grow at a similar rate with age in the two
types of economies, but via very different processes. Relatedly, wage
inequality within a cohort of workers may increase much more with
age in Canada or the United States than in Japan, given the more varied
consequences of turnover for wages in the two systems.
Two other issues emerge from a regression analysis of wage
changes. For one, firm-size wage effects, as estimated from displacedworker data, are (perhaps surprisingly) much larger in Canada than
Japan.49 This finding corroborates Teulings and Hartog’s (1998) claim
that “noncompetitive” wage differentials are actually larger in less-corporatist economies, suggesting that labor allocation may not be more
efficient in those economies. Our findings here do not include annual
bonuses, however, which are a large component of total compensation
in Japan. It would be interesting to see whether the finding also holds
when bonuses are included, and to extend our displacement-based estimates of firm-wage effects to other countries with different wage-setting institutions. The other aspect of wage changes that might warrant
further exploration is the strong, positive effect of education on displacement-induced wage losses in Japan, but not in Canada. Is there
any reason why educational credentials should be less portable across
firms in Japan than elsewhere?
Finally, while many strides have been made with the coming-ofage of panel data sets outside the United States, an important remaining
obstacle to further research on displaced workers outside North America remains gaps in data. As our investigation in this chapter clearly
shows, our understanding of displacement in Japan would be much
improved if the following information were available in microdata on
separating workers: job tenure, union coverage, and a finer disaggregation of workers by separation reason. Job tenure and union coverage
have been shown to have very large effects on wage changes experienced by displaced workers in Canada and elsewhere, and it would
reveal much about the structure of the Japanese labor market to see if
these same effects were present in Japan. Japanese microdata currently
available do not allow us to distinguish separations due to “management convenience” (the closest analogue to a pure “layoff” in North
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America) from mandatory retirements and expirations of fixed-term
contracts. An analysis of just the first group might yield less benign
consequences of displacement than we currently find for Japan.
In sum, this chapter shows that much can be learned, and that much
remains to be learned, about the functioning of different national labor
markets by comparing the experiences of displaced workers among
countries. We can only hope that this chapter, and this volume, will
stimulate more and more of this work.

Notes
NOTE: We thank Garnett Picot and Leonard Landry of Statistics Canada for generously providing customized counts of separation and displacement rates in Canada.
1. For example, according to Hashimoto (1990, p. 50), the labor-force participation
rate among men over 65 was 35.8 percent in Japan, compared with only 16.7 percent in the United States in 1988.
2. Beginning in April 1998, firms were no longer permitted to impose mandatory
retirement below age 60.
3. See Nakamura and Vertinsky (1994) for a more detailed description of keiretsu
relationships.
4. Employment protection legislation has played a key role in the debate over the
causes of high European unemployment over the last decade (see Bertola 1992,
for example).
5. Another legal reason for the difficulty Japanese firms have in laying off workers
is that the standard employment contract for regular workers simply states that a
person is employed by a firm, meaning that workers will obey company orders to
work. Because these contracts are not specific about the tasks workers are
expected to perform, firms are expected to assign workers to whatever tasks are
consistent with permanent employment.
6. A third set of restrictions concern discriminatory discharges, on such bases as
race, sex, and union activity. Such restrictions are set out in provincial Labor
Relations Acts, Human Rights Acts, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
See Arthurs, et al. (1993), pp. 88–95.
7. See, for example, Downey 1989.
8. Each of the ten provinces and two territories have their own employment standards acts and industrial relations acts, though there are many similarities and a
good deal of borrowing and diffusion among jurisdictions. Unlike the United
States, where federal statutes—such as minimum wage—supersede state laws, the
Canadian federal labor jurisdiction is limited to a small subset of industries
nationwide, including banks, transportation, communications, and the federal
public service.
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9. In most cases layoffs are classified as temporary, and hence not subject to notice
requirements if their expected duration is fewer than 13 weeks or (in cases of
mass layoffs) if the employer advises the Director of Employment Standards that
he or she expects to recall the workers within a period of time approved by the
Director. Some jurisdictions require notice of all large-scale layoffs, however,
whether permanent or not.
10. Interestingly, a small number of Canadian jurisdictions require workers to notify
their employers of their intent to quit, though it is unclear whether this provision
has ever been enforced.
11. Other groups receiving special treatment in Japan’s EI system are older workers,
seasonal workers, and day laborers. Workers who become unemployed after 65
years of age receive a lump-sum payment ranging from 50 to 150 days’ wages.
Eligible seasonal workers receive a lump sum which is typically equal to 50 times
the basic daily EI payment. Eligible day laborers receive daily EI payments,
which are available for 13–17 days, depending on past earnings and the number of
days of contribution to EI.
12. The major element of the 1996 reform was a move from weeks to hours of work
to determine eligibility. For example, where previously 12 to 20 weeks of work
were required to meet the entrance requirement, this was modified to 420 to 700
hours. (Many adjustments, such as these, are straightforward conversions based
on a 35-hour week, which is very close to the average for Canadian workers.) In
accord with the move to hours, coverage was extended to all hours of paid
employment in the economy, including those in part-time jobs. In addition, a very
mild degree of experience rating was added to the system which, unlike the system in the United States, had previously not been experience rated at all. However, again unlike the United States, the experience rating is based on the
worker’s history of EI use and not the employer’s.
13. The actual rate used in administering the system is a seasonally adjusted 3-month
moving average.
14. The rough comparability of Canada’s EI system with Japan’s does not extend to
the United States. In 1993 the Canadian system paid Can$18.3 billion in benefits
to a labor force of about 14.5 million people, whereas the American system paid
about US$20.7 billion to a labor force of about 131 million. Given an exchange
rate at that time of 1.30 (Can./U.S.), this implies that per-capita payments in Canada were about 6 times larger than those in the United States.
15. EM programs provide a kind of parallel system to the EI programs, but for workers who are ineligible for EI. Unlike the EI programs, which are financed by a
payroll tax, EM programs are financed mostly by general revenue. One EM-lawbased employment maintenance program of potentially considerable significance
for displaced workers is the subsidy for promoting training of middle-aged and
older workers (Chuukonen rodosha to juko shoreikin). Under this program, middle-aged and older workers (40 years or older) are eligible to get a 50 percent subsidy for taking training and education courses for the purpose of preparing
themselves for new jobs after their retirement from their present jobs, up to a

252

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.
22.

23.

Abe, Higuchi, Kuhn, Nakamura, and Sweetman

maximum of 100,000 yen. For more information on EM-based employment
maintenance programs, see Japan Ministry of Labor (1997c).
Small and medium-size enterprises satisfy one of the following conditions: 1)
book-value capitalization does not exceed 10 million yen for firms in retail and
service sectors; 30 million yen for firms in the wholesale sector; or 100 million
yen in other sectors; or 2) the number of regularly employed workers does not
exceed 50 for firms in retail and service sectors; 100 in the wholesale sector; or
300 in other sectors.
See Glenson and Odaka (1976), Higuchi (1991, 1996) and Okochi, Karsh, and
Levine (1974) for a description of shunto, as well as other historical and institutional aspects of the Japanese labor market.
It should be noted that Japanese bonuses are paid to all regular workers regardless
of their union status, including such nonmanagerial staff as security personnel,
school teachers, and government employees. In this sense, unlike bonuses paid to
executives in North America, Japanese bonuses are used primarily as a means to
keep firms’ wage bills flexible over time while maintaining employment.
One difference, which in part explains the Canada-U.S. gap in unionization rates,
is that “certification votes” are not usually required to establish a union in Canada.
Rather, signatures are collected over an extended period.
In addition to these two mechanisms, nationwide minimum wages exist for two
industries: the metal mining industry (7,085 yen, effective March 30, 1997) and
non-metal mining industries (5,772 yen, effective May 17, 1989). Minimum
wages can also result from mandatory extension of collective bargaining agreements, although there are only two cases of this in all of Japan.
The “departures” sample does not contain information about the subsequent jobs
or unemployment experienced by the workers involved.
It is generally thought that employer compliance with this reporting requirement
is quite good, because, by submitting the form, the employer can cease remitting
payroll taxes on behalf of the worker. One exception to this is for workers in jobs
involving under 15 hours per week, who during our sample period were exempt
from UI payroll taxes (and ineligible for UI benefits).
We also examined rates for 1988 in both countries and a number of intervening
years in Canada. There are few differences and little evidence of a time trend, as
Picot, Lin, and Pyper (1997) have already noted for Canada. It is perhaps worth
noting, however, that imposing the firm-size and job-length restrictions in the
Canadian data causes separation rates to drop quite precipitously: a large fraction
of Canadian separations (and perhaps Japanese ones as well—we have no way of
knowing for Japan) are from very short jobs in very small firms. Finally, note that
in both the Japanese and Canadian data presented in Table 3.5 persons who separate more than once a year will be counted as adding to the separation rate more
than once. Given the restriction to jobs lasting one month or more, a single individual could, potentially, contribute up to 11 separations per year to the counts in
both countries.
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24. In other work, Kuhn (1999) has argued that ROEs substantially undercount separations among teenage workers in Canada. This is especially important before
1997, because a much larger fraction of teens than any other age group work part
time, and part-time workers were not subject to employment insurance premiums
until 1997. Therefore, we shall largely ignore teens in our discussion of separation and displacement rates.
25. When work is very sparse, workers are sometimes told not to come in to work in
Japan. Unlike in Canada, however, this would not be counted as a separation
because the worker is still considered to be employed by the firm.
26. Recall that we are ignoring the numbers for teens in Canada, due to the likelihood
of a large undercount of their separations in our data.
27. Presumably workers whose contract ended are included in the “other” category in
Canada, though it is possible that some are coded in the “short work” category.
In the Canadian UI (now EI) system, the category “dismissed” is read as “dismissed for cause” and implies that the worker would not, after 1993, normally be
eligible for UI benefits.
28. For the purposes of this analysis, we further exclude multiple job holders who
separated from a job which is not their “main” job.
29. Because there is no specific category on the ROE form for “end of contract,”
these may include some workers whose limited-term contracts ended. More
likely, however, contract terminations will be coded as “other.” According to
Table 3.7, however, including these in our count of displacements would make
only a minor difference to Canadian displacement rates, because firms use the
“other” category for only 4.6 percent of male separations and 3.5 percent of
female separations (compared with “shortage of work” frequencies of 61.8 and
47.5 percent, respectively).
30. As pointed out in the previous footnote, adding contract terminations to the count
of Canadian displacements would increase the displacement rate only marginally.
31. Retirements (voluntary or otherwise) are not included in our Canadian data.
Despite the fact that mandatory retirement remains legal in Canada (unlike in the
United States), it is our impression that the vast majority of retirements in Canada
are voluntary and thus should not properly be included in any count of displacements.
32. Although it is possible that some workers would have been recalled beyond the
end of the survey, the final panel was approximately 57–63 weeks after the initial
separation so any subsequent recall would have been beyond the maximum possible duration of unemployment insurance benefits. Also, although the survey
experienced about 20 percent attrition between the first and last panels, when the
same tabulations are performed on the subsample of those who responded to both,
the column and row percentages are remarkably similar to those for the entire
sample.
33. To investigate the possible influence of workers finding temporary jobs while
awaiting recall, we calculated the fraction of workers who obtained a first job and
were observed subsequently to return to their former employer. In our data win-
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dow only about 0.8 percent of workers (from the set labeled as laid off by at least
one party) did this; so we do not believe it would have a large influence.
In this survey, unlike the published statistics in Table 3.6, “management convenience” includes mandatory retirements and also job terminations of workers on
nonregular contracts such as casual and term contracts. To the extent that these
workers’ unemployment durations are longer than layoffs of regular workers, our
estimates for Japan will overestimate durations among the latter group.
As the advance-notice literature (Jones and Kuhn 1995, for example) shows, a
substantial fraction of jobless durations will be exactly zero if workers receive,
and make use of, substantial prenotification periods. This may be the case in
Japan, though our data do not distinguish workers with exactly zero joblessness
from others with under a month of joblessness.
Alternatively, we could have picked a single interview date and selected the sample based on labor-force attachment at that date. This raises the issues of which
date to use, however, and how to treat individuals who exit from the survey
between dates. Overall, we prefer the above “bracketing” approach because it is
simpler.
It would, of course, be very interesting to dissaggregate these three forms of
involuntary terminations, but this is not possible in the microdata file provided by
the Ministry of Labor. Note also that the microdata file of Japan’s Employment
Mobility Survey does not distinguish temporary and permanent shukko assignments; thus our results should be interpreted as applying to a population-weighted
average of the two.
Workers experiencing wage losses of over 30 percent were assigned a value of –30;
those experiencing losses of 10 to 30 percent a value of –15. A similar pattern was
followed for workers experiencing gains. Workers experiencing wage changes of
–10 to +10 percent were assigned a value of zero.
The percentage change is calculated as 100 × (post – pre)/pre, where pre- and
post- refer to wages before and after separation.
The Canadian figures in Table 3.17 are based on our own calculations from the
1994 Survey of Labor and Income Dynamics (Statistics Canada 1997). The
nature of the establishment size question in this survey does not allow us to duplicate precisely the Japanese data’s restriction to workers in establishments of at
least 10 workers. Therefore, to “bracket” the Japanese definition, we provide
results with no establishment-size restriction, and for workers in establishments of
20 or more persons. Usually the latter generate higher mean tenures, but for the
specific case of men aged 50–54 the two measures happen to coincide exactly.
Just as for the calculation of means in Table 3.14, workers experiencing wage
changes of –30 to –10 percent are assigned a value of –15, and workers experiencing gains of 10 to 30 percent are assigned a value of +15. Workers experiencing changes of –10 percent to +10 percent are assigned a value of zero.
Industry wage premiums were calculated from aggregate statistics as the average
wage in the industry divided by the overall average wage. Statistics refer to
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monthly regular wages (not including bonuses, overtime, and so forth) of workers
on regular contracts (not fixed-term or part-time).
We keep visible minority status in the Canadian regressions, however, despite the
absence of a Japanese counterpart. This does not affect the results materially.
In both Canadian and Japanese data sets, “firm” sizes actually refer to establishments, not (necessarily) entire companies.
Teulings and Hartog presented a wide array of evidence that corporatist countries
(those with centralized wage setting) have fewer “noncompetitive” wage differentials, such as firm-size effects, than decentralized economies. In the case of Japan
(p. 175) they found that its industry wages are less sensitive to output prices than
those in Canada and the United States. They attribute this to informal bargaining
coordination. Tachibanaki (1996) reported large firm-size wage premiums for
Japan, probably larger than the United States (though he makes no direct comparison). Our much smaller estimates are most likely explained by the fact that our
displacement-based measures implicitly control for individual fixed effects,
unlike Tachibanaki’s cross-section estimates. That said, our estimated firm-size
wage premiums for Japan might be larger if bonuses were included in our wage
measure, as they are in Tachibanaki’s work. (Ito (1992, 234) presented simple
tabulations suggesting that bonuses are a larger fraction of compensation in large
than small Japanese firms.)
This greater level of security in Japan is also enhanced by the shorter unemployment durations there; because unemployment effects of displacement tend to be
temporary we do not incorporate these differences in our summary measure of
total earnings security here.
Hashimoto (1990, 77–81) argued that the quit-layoff distinction may be less
meaningful in Japan than in the United States or Canada.
See, for example, Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, 1992), and Clark and Ogawa
(1992). One limitation of these studies, however, is that they are all based on
cross-section data. The limitations of using such data to estimate tenure-wage
profiles are well known (see, for example, Topel 1991); thus it would be of great
interest in future work to use Japanese panel data to estimate tenure effects, using
techniques similar to Topel’s.
Existing estimates of Japanese firm-size wage premiums (Tachibanaki 1996, for
example) tend to be based on cross-section data only, and will therefore be contaminated by unobserved worker quality differences between firms.
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Table 3.1 Notice Requirements for Termination of Employment in
Various Jurisdictions of Canada, 1997

Jurisdiction
Federal
Alberta

British
Columbia

Manitoba

Individual terminations
Length of
Employer
service
notice (wk.)
3 months +
2
1
3 mo. – <2 yr.
2
2 yr. – <4 yr.
4
4 yr. – <6 yr.
5
6 yr. – <8 yr.
6
8 yr. – 10 yr.
≥10 yr.
8
3 mo. – <1 yr.
1
1 – <3 yr.
2
≥3 yr.
3
For each addit. year
8
of employ., 1 wk. to
max. 8 wk.
1+ mo.
1 pay
period

New Brunswick

6 mo. – <5 yr.
≥5 yr.

2
4

Newfoundland

1 mo. – <2 yr.
≥2 yr.

1
2

Nova Scotia

3 mo. – <2 yr.
2 – <5 yr.
5 – <10 yr.
≥10 yr.
3 mo. – <1 yr.
1 – <3 yr.
3 – <4 yr.
4 – <5 yr.
5 – <6 yr.
6 – <7 yr.
7 – <8 yr.
≥8 yr.

1
2
4
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Ontario

Mass terminations
No. of
Employer
employees notice (wk.)
50+
16
No special provision

50–100
101–300
300+

8
12
16

50–100
101–300
300+
10 or more, if
they represent
25% of the
employer’s
workforce
50–199
200–499
500+
10–99
100–299
300+

10
14
18
6

8
12
16
8
12
16

50–199
200–499
500+

8
12
16
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Individual terminations
Mass terminations
Length of
Employer
No. of
Employer
Jurisdiction
service
notice (wk.)
employees notice (wk.)
Prince Edward
6 mo. – <5 yr.
2
No special provision
≥5 yr.
4
Island
1
10–99
2 mo.
Quebec
3 mo. – <1 yr.
2
100–299
3 mo.
1 – <5 yr.
4
300+
4 mo.
5 – <10 yr.
≥10 yr.
8
≥3 mo. – <1 yr.
Saskatchewan
1
10–49
4
2
1 – <3 yr.
50–99
8
4
3 – <5 yr.
100+
12
6
5 – <10 yr.
≥10 yr.
8
Northwest
90 d. – 3 yr.
2
25–49
4
Territories
For each addit. year
8
8
50–99
of employment,
12
100–299
add 1 wk. to max.
300+
16
8 wk.
1
25–49
4
Yukon
6 mo. – <1 yr.
2
50–99
8
1 – <3 yr.
3
3 – <4 yr.
100–299
12
4
300+
16
4 – <5 yr.
5
5 – <6 yr.
6
6 – <7 yr.
7
7 – <8 yr.
≥8 yr.
8
SOURCE: Human Resources Development Canada, Employment Standards Legislation in Canada; latest figures are available at: http://labor-travail.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/
policy/leg/e/
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Table 3.2 Worker-Reported Advance Knowledge or Formal Notice of
Permanent Layoff among Workers Experiencing Permanent
Layoffs in Canada (%)
Advance knowledge
Formal notice
Duration of
notice (wk.)
Men
Women
Men
Women
<1
37.90
43.97
32.83
29.20
1
23.41
26.18
27.36
26.76
2
18.26
12.28
20.57
19.22
3
7.17
4.71
9.81
11.19
4
2.68
1.61
3.40
3.89
5–8
5.87
5.17
3.78
5.85
9–12
2.38
1.48
1.33
1.21
13–16
0.80
2.04
0.00
1.22
17+
1.50
2.49
0.95
1.46
Receiving
63.36
60.47
35.52
44.01
notice
NOTE: The durations presented are conditional on having received notice, or having
expected the layoff. The sample for this table is workers who were labeled as a layoff
either by themselves or the firm and did not experience a recall in the survey window.
Columns may not total to 100% due to rounding error.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the 1995 Canadian Out of Employment Panel
Survey.
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Table 3.3 Employment Insurance Entitlements in Japan
A. EI payments as replacement ratios
Daily wage on last job ( ¥ )
Payment ratio (%)
Workers under age 60
3,190–4,239
80
4,240–10,249
80–60
10,250–17,770
60
Workers age 60 to 65
3,190–4,239
80
4,240–10,249
80–60
10,250–13,249
60–50
13,250–19,390
50

B. Duration of maximum EI entitlements (days)
Full-time workers
Years insured

Part-time workers

1–5

5–10

10–20

20+

1–5

5–10

10–20

20+

90

90

180

n.a.a

90

90

180

n.a.

30–44

90

180

210

210

90

180

180

210

45–59

180

210

240

300

90

180

180

210

240

300

300

300

210

210

210

210

Under 45
(30 for
part-time)

240

240

240

240

180

180

180

45–65

300

300

300

300

210

210

210

Regular EI program
Age (yr.)
Under 30

60–65
b

Special provisions
Age (yr.)

a

n.a. = Not applicable.
b
For disabled and other hard-to-employ workers.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997c).
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Table 3.4 Minimum Wages as a Percentage of Prevailing Wages in
Selected Countries
Minimum wage
(as % of mean wage)
Definition, year
Japan
36
Weighted regional minimum wage (4,868 ¥
per day) over mean contract wage for
establishments with at least 10 employees,
1995
Canada
38
Weighted jurisdictional averages over mean
manufacturing wage, 1994
U.S.A.
38
Federal minimum over mean industrial wage
(excl. agriculture and forestry), 1994
Germany
55
2,214 DM per day over mean manufacturing
wage, 1993
France
84
36.98 F per hour over mean industrial wage
(excl. agriculture and forestry), 1995
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997b).
Country
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Table 3.5 Annual Separation Rates for 1995
Canada
All separations

Permanent
separations

Japan, all
separations

15–19

18.0

11.4

28.5

20–24

75.5

44.3

18.7

25–29

47.0

23.8

12.4

30–34

36.5

16.6

8.8

35–39

32.5

13.5

7.1

40–44

28.0

11.0

7.4

45–49

25.3

9.5

5.9

50–54

26.2

9.5

7.0

55–59

30.3

11.2

10.7

60+

29.0

12.4

31.7

All ages

35.9

16.8

11.9

15–19

16.6

11.1

20.7

20–24

66.9

42.3

24.9

25–29

45.0

21.9

26.4

30–34

35.6

14.5

19.4

35–39

30.7

12.0

15.2

40–44

25.3

9.0

12.6

45–49

24.8

8.5

10.9

50–54

24.1

8.1

11.9

55–59

27.6

9.6

13.7

60+

28.8

12.9

25.0

All ages

34.1

15.7

18.3

Gender/age (yr.)
Men

Women

(continued)
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Table 3.5 (continued)
Canada
All separations

Permanent
separations

Japan, all
separations

15–19

17.3

11.3

24.7

20–24

71.4

43.3

21.7

25–29

46.1

23.0

17.7

30–34

36.1

15.6

12.0

35–39

31.7

12.8

9.8

40–44

26.7

10.1

9.4

45–49

25.1

9.0

7.9

50–54

25.3

8.9

8.8

55–59

29.2

10.5

11.8

60+

28.9

12.6

29.5

Total

35.1

16.3

14.3

Gender/age (yr.)
Both

NOTE: In both countries, the separation rate is defined by the number of job separations during the year divided by the number of regularly employed workers on June
30.
SOURCE: For Japan, calculated from Ministry of Labor (1989) for 1988 and (1996)
for 1995. For Canada, the numerator comes from special tabulations from Statistics
Canada, based on ROE files from Human Resources Development Canada. The
denominator is from the June Labour Force Survey of the year in question.

Table 3.6 Reasons for Job Separations in Japan 1995 (%)

Men
Women
Both

Contract
finished
11.6

Involuntary
Management Mandatory
conveniencea retirement
Firing
11.3
7.8
6.5

Death or
injury
3.2

Total
40.4

Marriage
0.2

Voluntary
Nursing
care
Childbirth
0
0.1

Totalb
59.6

8.6

6.0

3.0

3.5

1.6

22.7

8.7

5.5

1.0

77.4

10.1

8.7

5.5

5.0

2.4

31.7

4.3

2.6

0.5

68.2

0.9
0.8
0.5
0.8
1.0
2.5
4.1
6.9
5.6
4.8

22.3
14.7
15.1
18.4
25.9
30.8
38.5
38.6
59.0
72.8

1.0
8.0
12.5
4.8
1.1
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.0

0.3
2.3
8.5
6.0
3.0
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.0
n.a.c

0.0
0.2
0.4
0.3
0.4
1.3
1.7
0.5
0.5
0.8

77.7
85.3
84.9
81.5
74.0
69.5
61.5
61.3
40.9
27.1

263

Age (yr.)
<19
11.7
1.0
0.0
8.7
20–24
4.8
3.3
0.0
5.8
25–29
4.6
5.1
0.0
4.9
30–34
5.2
6.3
0.0
6.1
35–39
6.3
11.1
0.0
7.5
40–44
9.8
14.0
0.0
4.5
45–49
12.0
17.0
0.1
5.3
50–54
11.5
15.6
0.4
4.2
55–59
18.6
19.7
10.2
4.9
60+
23.6
8.8
34.2
1.4
a
Management convenience in this table includes shukko assignments.
b
Includes other voluntary reasons.
c
n.a. = Not applicable.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1996).
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Table 3.7 Firm- and Self-Reported Reasons for Separation in Canada
Firm-reported
reason
Men
Voluntary
departure
Dismissal

Shortage
of work
Injury or
Illness
Other

Return to
school
Total

Quit

Dismissed

Self-reported reason
Laid off

Illness

Other

Total

818
59.97
67.38
130
8.32
10.71
155
2.58
12.77
10
3.42
0.82
87
19.21
7.17
14
46.67
1.15
1,214
12.51
100.00

37
2.71
8.49
94
6.01
21.56
136
2.27
31.19
2
0.68
0.46
167
36.87
38.30
0
0.00
0.00
436
4.49
100.00

332
24.34
4.73
1,130
72.30
16.11
5,331
88.82
75.98
53
18.15
0.76
158
34.88
2.25
12
40.00
0.17
7,016
72.30
100.00

61
4.47
17.13
27
1.73
7.58
38
0.63
10.67
214
73.29
60.11
16
3.53
4.49
0
0.00
0.00
356
3.67
100.00

116
8.50
17.01
182
11.64
26.69
342
5.70
50.15
13
4.45
1.91
25
5.52
3.67
4
13.33
0.59
682
7.03
100.00

1,364
100.00
14.06
1,563
100.00
16.11
6,002
100.00
61.85
292
100.00
3.01
453
100.00
4.67
30
100.00
0.31
9,704
100.00
100.00

Women
Voluntary
departure
Dismissal

Shortage
of work
Injury or
illness
Other

Return to
school

927
67.76
74.16
173
8.60
13.84
88
2.35
7.04
13
2.86
1.04
45
16.19
3.60
4
36.36
0.32

28
2.05
8.89
72
3.58
22.86
106
2.83
33.65
3
0.66
0.95
106
38.13
33.65
0
0.00
0.00

195
14.25
3.82
1,506
74.89
29.49
3,247
86.79
63.59
41
9.03
0.80
111
39.93
2.17
6
54.55
0.12

94
6.87
17.31
41
2.04
7.55
23
0.61
4.24
381
83.92
70.17
4
1.44
0.74
0
0.00
0.00

124
9.06
19.11
219
10.89
33.74
277
7.40
42.68
16
2.47
2.47
12
4.32
1.85
1
9.09
0.15

1,368
100.00
17.40
2,011
100.00
25.58
3,741
100.00
47.58
454
3.52
5.77
278
100.00
3.54
11
100.00
0.14

Total

1,250
315
5,106
543
649
7,863
15.90
4.01
64.94
6.91
8.25
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given respectively in each cell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel (COEP) survey. See Lacroix and Van Audenrode (2000)
for a more detailed description of the COEP data and methods.
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Table 3.8 Estimated Annual Displacement Rates in Canada and Japan,
1995 (various definitions)
Worker group/
age (yr.)
Men
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40–44
45–49
50–54
55–59
60+
All ages

Canadaa
Permanent
layoffs

Japanb
MCc

MC + CFd

MC + CF + MRe

2.4
12.3
7.9
6.3
5.7
5.0
4.5
4.5
5.1
4.7
6.1

0.4
0.8
0.9
0.8
0.1
1.6
1.3
1.5
2.3
2.8
1.3

n.d.f
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
2.7

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
3.7

Women
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40–44
45–49
50–54
55–59
60+
All ages

1.6
7.2
4.6
3.3
3.1
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.5
2.8
3.4

0.1
0.6
0.8
0.6
1.3
0.9
1.4
1.1
2.3
2.1
1.1

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
2.7

n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
n.d.
3.2

Both
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40–44

2.0
9.8
6.4
4.9
4.5
3.8

0.2
0.7
0.9
0.7
1.1
1.3

3.1
1.8
1.7
1.4
1.7
2.2

3.1
1.8
1.7
1.4
1.7
2.2
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Canadaa
Japanb
Worker group/
Permanent
age (yr.)
layoffs
MCc
MC + CFd MC + CF + MRe
45–49
3.6
1.3
2.3
2.3
50–54
3.6
1.4
2.4
2.4
55–59
4.1
2.3
4.5
5.7
60+
4.0
2.6
9.6
19.6
Total
4.9
1.2
2.7
3.5
NOTE: In both countries, displacement is defined by the number of job separations
during the year for specified reasons, divided by the number of regularly employed
workers on June 30.
a
In Canada we restrict attention to permanent separations only.
b
In Japan, “management convenience” includes shukko assignments. We do not have
access to separation shares for “contract finished” and “mandatory retirement” in
Japan that are broken down by both age and gender.
c
MC = management convenience.
d
CF = contract finished.
e
MR = mandatory retirement.
f
n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE: For Japan, Ministry of Labor (1996) for 1995. For Canada, the numerator
comes from special tabulations from Statistics Canada, based on ROE files from
Human Resources Development Canada. The denominator is from the June Labour
Force Survey of the year in question.
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Table 3.9 Firm and Worker Recall Expectations in Canada
Firms’
Men’s recall expectation
recall
expectation No
Yes Unsure Total
No
1,465 1,201
683
3,349
43.74 35.86 20.39 100.00
59.87 33.52 44.61
44.3
Yes

Total

982
23.31
40.13

2,382
56.55
66.48

848
20.13
55.39

4,212
100.00
55.7

Women’s recall expectation
No
1,310
46.08
70.35

Yes
933
32.82
35.77

552
20.02
29.65

1,675
60.75
64.23

Unsure Total
600
2,843
21.10 100.00
53.10
50.1
530
19.22
46.90

2,757
100.00
49.2

2,447 3,583 1,531 7,561
1,862 2,608 1,130 5,600
32.2
47.4
20.3 100.00
33.3
46.5
20.2 100.00
NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given
respectively in each cell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP) Survey.
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Table 3.10 Recall Expectations versus Realizations in Canada
Observed
returns
Men
No

No

Workers’ expectations
Yes
Unsure
Total

Firms’ expectations
No
Yes
Total

1,281
49.21
85.51

919
35.31
38.31

403
15.48
59.26

2,603
100.00
56.87

1,292
49.64
67.50

1,311
50.36
49.23

2,603
100.00
56.87

Yes

217
10.99
14.49

1,480
74.97
61.69

277
14.03
40.74

1,974
100.00
43.13

622
31.51
32.50

1,352
68.49
50.77

1,974
100.00
43.13

Total

1,498
32.73
100.00

2,399
52.41
100.00

680
14.86
100.00

4,577
100.00
100.00

1,914
41.82
100.00

2,663
58.18
100.00

4,577
100.00
100.00

810
51.20
84.64

510
32.24
30.18

262
16.56
55.74

1,582
100.00
50.75

975
61.63
65.13

607
38.37
37.47

1,582
100.00
50.75

147
9.58
15.36

1,180
76.87
69.82

208
13.55
44.26

1,535
100.00
49.25

522
34.01
34.87

1,013
65.99
62.53

1,535
100.00
49.25

Women
No

Yes

Total

957
1,690
470
3,117
1,497
1,620
3,117
30.70
54.22
15.08
100.00
48.03
51.97
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
NOTE: In vertical order, counts, row percentages, and column percentages are given
respectively for each cell. The sample is those who are observed to be reemployed.
The return to the predisplacement employer is not constrained to be the first job
obtained by the worker following the separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from the Canadian Out-of-Employment Panel
(COEP) survey.
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Table 3.11 Kaplan-Meier Cumulative Reemployment Rates for
Displaced Workers in Japan and Canada
Duration
(months)
0–1
1–2
2–3
3–4
4–5
5–6
6–7
7–8
8–9
9–10
10–11
12
Median
(interpolated)
Sample size
Total
censored
Percent
censored

Japan
Men
Women
0.314
0.313
0.576
0.526
0.633
0.619
0.701
0.696
0.732
0.721
0.767
0.747
0.795
0.776
0.805
0.802
0.828
0.844
0.834
0.867
0.859
0.892
n.d.c
n.d.
1.7
1.9

Canada Aa
Men
Women
0.164
0.115
0.269
0.196
0.364
0.264
0.425
0.308
0.469
0.351
0.515
0.402
0.546
0.440
0.577
0.473
0.621
0.519
0.654
0.550
0.682
0.572
0.701
0.590
5.7
8.6

Canada Bb
Men
Women
0.171
0.124
0.283
0.215
0.386
0.290
0.449
0.339
0.495
0.388
0.543
0.443
0.577
0.482
0.613
0.518
0.660
0.568
0.697
0.601
0.728
0.624
0.748
0.640
5.1
7.5

778
243

634
192

3,756
1,208

2,682
1,138

3,271
932

2,243
858

31.2

30.3

32.1

42.4

28.4

38.2

NOTE: All columns present 1 minus the Kaplan-Meier survivor function for jobless
durations. Medians are interpolated assuming a uniform distribution of durations
within the cell containing the median.
a
Canada A drops individuals who were out of the labor force at all dates they were
interviewed after the separation.
b
Canada B drops individuals who were out of the labor force at any date they were
interviewed.
c
n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE: Japanese numbers calculated from a Special Supplement (1996, 1997) to
the Japanese Labor Force Survey (Japan Ministry of Labor 1996, 1997). Our sample
includes separations due to the following reasons: layoffs, bankruptcy, declined business and other company convenience reasons, where the latter include mandatory
retirements and expiration of fixed-term contracts. The vast majority of workers
starting a shukko assignment would not be considered to be undergoing a termination
of employment and would thus not be included in this sample. A small number of
“one-way” shukko workers might be so classified, however, and would thus appear in
our data. Canadian numbers are calculated from the 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.
The Canadian sample refers to “permanent layoffs”: workers separating due to
“shortage of work” who do not return to the preseparation employer.
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Table 3.12 Cox Proportional Hazard Coefficients for Displaced
Workers’ Jobless Durations in Japan
Variablea
Age
(Age)2
Junior high
Junior college
University
Single
Small firm
Large firm
Part time
IND4
IND5
IND7
IND8
IND9
IND10
IND11
IND12
IND13
IND14
YUKOb
No. of obs.
N. of exiting
N. of censored
Log likelihood
χ2

Men
–0.0080
–0.0001
0.0797
0.0567
–0.0912
0.0006
–0.0325
0.0905
0.1624*
–1.6202
0.2094*
–1.1779
0.3072
–0.0296
0.1567
–0.0221
–0.1211
0.6815
–0.4828***
–0.1503
778
535
243
–4514.792
69.72927***

(0.0197)
(0.0002)
(0.0928)
(0.1461)
(0.1051)
(0.0010)
(0.0972)
(0.1454)
(0.0986)
(1.0117)
(0.1213)
(1.0098)
(0.1569)
(0.1133)
(0.3136)
(0.3694)
(0.1230)
(0.5948)
(0.1194)
(0.1152)

Women
–0.0389
(0.0269)
0.0003
(0.0003)
–0.0190
(0.1093)
–0.1209
(0.1128)
0.0483
(0.2072)
–0.0697
(0.1006)
0.0506
(0.1138)
–0.2194
(0.1596)
0.3083***
(0.0885)
–0.1859
(1.0080)
–0.1811
(0.2132)
–0.1264
(1.0142)
0.2231
(0.2777)
–0.0046
(0.1233)
0.5257*
(0.2979)
0.1041
(0.4241)
–0.0945
(0.1304)
–0.3231
(0.3162)
–0.4598***
(0.1337)
0.0400
(0.1393)
634
442
192
–3541.226
64.35557***

NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. *** = Significant at the 1% level; * = significant at the 10% level.
a
IND4 = mining; IND5 = construction; IND7 = electricity, gas, water service; IND8 =
transportation; IND9 = wholesale and retail trade; IND10 = finance; IND11 = real
estate; IND12 = service; IND13 = government service; IND14 = “other.”
b
YUKO is a published macroeconomic variable given the ratio of vacancies to job
seekers by age-gender group.
SOURCE: Calculated from a Special Supplement to the Japanese Labor Force Survey
(Japan Ministry of Labor). Our sample includes separations due to the following reasons: layoffs, bankruptcy, declined business, and other company convenience reasons.
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Table 3.13 Cox Proportional Hazard Coefficients for Displaced
Workers’ Jobless Durations in Canada
Variables
Pre-union

Men
2b
1a
0.202*** 0.165***
(0.051)
(0.052)

3
—c

4a
0.014
(0.083)

Women
5b
0.009
(0.084)

6
—

Age/10

0.068
(0.135)

0.016
(0.136)

0.080
(0.136)

0.180
(0.183)

0.174
(0.183)

0.161
(0.182)

Age2/100

–0.036**
(0.017)

–0.031*
(0.017)

–0.042**
(0.017)

–0.044*
(0.024)

–0.043*
(0.024)

–0.047**
(0.024)

Single

–0.170*** –0.155*** –0.177***
(0.055)
(0.056)
(0.055)

0.109
(0.071)

0.110
(0.071)

0.111
(0.071)

Vismind

–0.280*** –0.282*** –0.261***
(0.061)
(0.061)
(0.060)

–0.247*** –0.246*** –0.207***
(0.075)
(0.075)
(0.074)

Tenure

–0.025*** –0.026***
(0.005)
(0.005)

–0.033*** –0.033***
(0.009)
(0.009)

Part-time

0.029
(0.101)

Predispl.
wage
Firm sizee
20–99

—

–0.006
(0.103)
0.009***
(0.003)

—
0.033
(0.102)
—

–0.111
(0.070)
—

–0.114
(0.071)
0.002
(0.004)

—
–0.095
(0.071)
—

0.271*** 0.244*** 0.290***
(0.063)
(0.064)
(0.063)

0.298*** 0.297*** 0.284***
(0.084)
(0.084)
(0.085)

100–499

0.136
(0.084)

0.093
(0.085)

0.174**
(0.082)

0.216**
(0.103)

500+

0.160
(0.120)

0.108
(0.122)

0.187
(0.118)

0.421*** 0.416*** 0.355***
(0.129)
(0.129)
(0.125)

0.212**
(0.103)

0.216**
(0.101)

Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada

Men
2b

Women
5b

Variables
1a
Education
Elem.
–0.097
(0.119)

–0.092
(0.119)

–0.090
(0.118)

–0.189
(0.194)

–0.186
(0.194)

–0.195
(0.194)

–0.080
Some
high sch. (0.062)

–0.080
(0.062)

–0.080
(0.061)

–0.235**
(0.094)

–0.235**
(0.094)

–0.257***
(0.094)

0.013
Some
post-sec. (0.072)

0.002
(0.072)

0.011
(0.072)

0.162*
(0.091)

0.161*
(0.091)

0.176*
(0.090)

College

0.068
(0.077)

0.052
(0.077)

0.043
(0.077)

0.245***
(0.083)

0.243***
(0.084)

0.252***
(0.084)

Univ.

–0.066
(0.086)

–0.090
(0.086)

–0.091
(0.085)

0.205**
(0.089)

0.201**
(0.089)

0.246***
(0.088)

0.092
(0.095)

0.081
(0.095)

0.172*
(0.093)

–0.130
(0.172)

–0.131
(0.172)

–0.156
(0.169)

Trades

3

4a
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6

0.011
0.012
0.009
0.013
0.013
0.01
Pseudo R2
No. of obs.
2,988
2,988
2,988
2,191
2,191
2,191
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the postdisplacement non-employment duration. Sample used is the “Canada A” sample
described in Table 3.11. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5%
level; * = significant at the 10% level.
a
Also included in the regression are 6 region dummy variables and 15 predisplacement
industry variables.
b
Also included are the variables from note a, and the predisplacement wage.
c
A dash (—) indicates that the variable was not included.
d
Vismin = visible minority.
e
Firm sizes are only in the 1995 data, so these variables should be interpreted as firm
size interacted with a dummy for the 1995 COEP. Size 1–19 is omitted.
SOURCE: Calculated by authors.
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Table 3.14 Distributions of Wage Changes by Separation Reasons and Age in Japan (%)
Gain of
over 30%

10% – 30%
gain

10% loss –
10% gain

10% –
30% loss

Loss of
over 30%

Meana
(estimated)

Sample

5.44
11.18
8.59
6.53
5.14
4.67
3.13
1.95
1.55
1.51

28.48
36.35
34.78
32.87
31.16
28.86
23.29
15.39
11.22
13.31

47.74
38.24
41.18
45.12
47.05
51.34
58.16
51.31
39.34
59.40

12.25
10.70
11.68
11.57
12.84
11.51
10.19
15.69
20.12
13.17

6.09
3.53
3.78
3.91
3.81
3.63
5.23
15.66
27.78
12.62

2.2
6.1
4.9
4.0
3.2
2.9
1.3
4.2
–9.2
–3.3

53,175
2,066
9,918
9,336
7,243
10,112
7,450
3,736
2,585
729

Involuntary separations,b
excluding shukko
All ages
2.82
<19
9.70
20–24
6.75
25–29
3.55
30–34
3.23
35–44
3.68

17.62
26.87
30.11
25.72
21.89
22.49

44.35
44.03
42.70
50.33
51.49
55.78

18.75
14.18
14.42
15.74
18.41
13.85

16.46
5.22
6.02
4.66
4.98
4.19

–4.3
3.2
2.6
1.2
0.0
1.1

4,683
134
548
451
402
787

Age (yr.)
Men
All separations
All ages
<19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–44
45–54
55–59
60–64
65+

45–54
55–59
60–64
65+
Shukko

1.53
0.91
0.82
0

15.83
8.85
6.14
11.43

50.83
36.33
28.10
42.86

17.08
25.39
25.10
17.14

14.72
28.52
39.84
28.57

–4.1
–10.8
–14.6
–9.4

720
768
733
140

All ages
<19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–44
45–54
55–59
60–64

0.71
1.92
0.60
2.27
1.22
0.27
0.45
0.55
0

5.58
9.62
6.55
7.85
7.15
6.65
3.85
2.58
12.5

87.79
82.69
87.50
83.42
85.69
89.17
90.90
85.64
47.92

4.25
5.77
4.17
2.79
4.72
3.02
4.19
6.45
25.00

1.67
0
1.19
3.66
1.22
0.89
0.61
4.79
14.58

–0.1
1.2
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.4
–0.1
–1.9
–6.2

5,464
52
336
573
657
1,459
1,792
543
48

65+

—c

—

—

—

—

—

—
(continued)
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Table 3.14 (continued)
10% – 30%
gain

10% loss –
10% gain

10% –
30% loss

27.87
35.62
27.55
25.23
29.15
30.63
26.61
24.05
19.35
16.36

47.91
45.37
46.73
43.65
44.46
47.20
53.47
58.72
59.24
65.45

13.58
10.89
16.21
17.36
13.31
10.77
11.80
9.19
9.24
7.27

Involuntary separations,b excluding shukko
All ages
3.00
21.34
<19
5.59
24.48
20–24
3.21
24.78
25–29
3.27
17.44
30–34
3.27
22.86
35–44
4.27
23.61
45–54
1.34
15.63

55.73
54.55
52.62
51.50
55.10
54.62
64.71

14.79
12.59
16.18
20.16
10.20
14.08
14.45

Age (yr.)
Women

Gain of
over 30%

Meana
(estimated)

Sample

5.32
2.64
4.98
8.98
6.19
3.88
3.89
5.17
9.38
8.64

2.2
4.6
1.6
–0.1
2.6
4.1
2.3
1.5
–0.5
–0.6

34,886
1,589
9,702
5,478
3,005
7,782
5,035
1393
682
220

5.14
2.80
3.21
7.63
8.57
3.41
3.87

0.3
2.6
1.3
–1.7
0.3
1.7
–0.6

3,131
143
686
367
2,760
703
595

Loss of
over 30%

All separations
All ages
<19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–44
45–54
55–59
60–64
65+

5.32
5.48
4.52
4.78
6.89
7.52
4.23
2.87
2.79
2.27

55–59
60–64
65+
Shukko

1.70
0.79
3.23

24.68
17.46
12.90

54.89
51.59
61.29

13.19
11.90
12.90

5.53
18.25
9.68

0.6
–4.4
–1.9

235
126
31

All ages
<19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–44
45–54
55–59

2.61
0.00
0.00
5.00
9.30
0.00
1.56
7.41

9.26
0.00
6.36
6.25
9.30
12.50
12.50
14.81

81.00
90.91
90.00
81.25
74.42
77.5o
81.25
66.67

5.46
9.09
3.64
6.25
6.98
7.50
3.13
3.70

1.66
0.00
0.00
1.25
0.00
2.50
1.56
7.41

0.9
–1.4
0.4
1.1
3.1
0.0
1.4
1.7

421
11
110
80
43
80
64
27

60–64

—c

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

65+
—
—
—
—
—
NOTE: Wage changes refer to monthly wages which do not include bonuses. Involuntary separations
consist of mandatory retirement, company convenience, contract termination, and shukko.
a
Estimated mean assigns valules 30%, 15%, 0, –15%, and –30% to each of the five-wage categories.
b
Involuntary separations consist of mandatory retirement, company, convenience, contract termination,
and shukko.
c
Cell sizes too small to report.
SOURCE: Japan Ministry of Labor (1997).
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Table 3.15 Distributions of Wage Changes by Separation Reasons and Age in Canada (%)
Age (yr.)
Men

Gain of
over 30%

All permanent separations
All ages
19.46
15–19
27.88
20–29
24.85
30–39
17.20
40–49
15.21
50–59
9.41
60 +
15.22
Permanent layoffs
All ages
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60 +

17.03
18.07
22.52
16.00
13.98
9.05
12.50

Loss of
over 30%

Meana
(estimated)

Meanb
(actual)

10% – 30%
gain

10% loss –
10% gain

10% – 30%
loss

15.86
22.42
17.51
16.13
12.94
10.98
10.87

34.50
21.82
28.95
35.97
38.51
51.37
41.30

16.47
17.58
16.65
16.03
17.64
13.33
19.57

13.70
10.30
12.04
14.66
15.70
14.90
13.04

1.6
6.0
4.0
0.8
–0.9
–2.0
–0.7

5.9
17.9
9.0
2.1
1.9
–9.2
6.0

3,278
165
1,171
1,023
618
255
46

14.66
25.30
16.09
14.41
13.01
10.86
12.50

36.99
21.69
31.02
38.34
39.81
51.13
42.50

16.82
22.89
16.60
16.73
17.28
14.48
17.50

14.50
12.05
13.77
14.53
15.92
14.48
15.00

0.4
2.2
2.5
0.1
–1.2
–2.2
–1.5

–0.4
3.3
3.6
–0.6
–3.1
–3.3
–3.0

2,455
83
777
819
515
221
40

Sample

Women
All separations
All ages
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60 +
Permanent layoffs
All ages
15–19
20–29
30–39
40–49
50–59
60 +

19.13
27.45
21.86
17.45
16.25
16.76
10.00

16.32
19.61
16.99
16.01
15.83
13.29
20.00

30.00
27.45
28.20
30.97
28.96
37.57
45.00

18.97
16.67
18.57
18.90
22.08
14.45
15.00

15.58
8.82
14.38
16.67
16.88
17.92
10.00

0.7
6.0
2.0
–0.2
–1.1
–0.5
0.8

2.8
14.2
6.0
–0.8
–2.5
0.5
–3.3

2,420
102
883
762
480
173
20

18.38
26.83
20.91
17.86
15.60
16.67
11.11

14.26
12.20
15.38
13.79
14.76
10.14
22.22

31.50
34.15
29.59
32.04
29.81
38.41
44.44

19.39
14.63
18.54
20.00
22.01
15.94
11.11

16.48
12.20
15.58
16.31
17.83
18.84
11.11

–0.2
4.0
1.1
–0.5
–1.8
–1.5
1.7

–2.4
4.7
–1.0
–1.9
–3.9
–5.4
1.4

1,578
41
507
515
359
138
18

a

“Actual” mean is the percentage difference between mean pre- and postseparation wages in each age-gender category.
Estimated mean assigns values 30%, 15%, 0, –15%, and –30% to each of the five wage change categories. “Actual” mean is the percentage difference between mean pre- and postseparation wages in each age-gender category.
SOURCE: Derived from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.
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Table 3.16 Mean Wage Changes by Tenure for Permanently Laid-Off
Workers in Canada
Group
All
<1
1–3
3–5
6–10
>10
Men
Change (%)
–1.34
2.61
–0.31
–5.48
–5.13
–11.05
N
2,497
1,382
382
223
187
323
Women
Change (%)
–2.42
0.81
0.79
–7.84
–4.35
–6.59
N
1,610
853
336
177
129
115
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from 1994 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics.

Table 3.17 Mean Tenure by Age and Gender for All Employed Workers
in Japan and Canada
Japan
Canada Aa
Canada Bb
Age (yr.)
Men
Women
Men
Women
Men
Women
All
12.9
7.9
9.0
6.7
9.6
7.9
<17
1.1
1.2
0.5
0.5
0.5
0.5
18–19
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.8
1.0
0.9
20–24
2.7
2.7
1.8
1.6
2.1
1.6
25–29
5.1
5.2
3.1
3.4
3.1
3.6
30–34
8.5
7.7
5.5
5.2
6.3
6.1
35–39
11.9
9.3
7.8
6.3
8.4
7.4
40–44
15.8
10.5
10.8
8.6
12.4
10.0
45–49
19.3
11.2
13.0
8.8
14.4
9.7
50–54
22.1
13.0
14.7
11.7
14.7
13.1
55–59
21.8
14.4
17.8
12.7
18.3
15.4
60–64
13.4
13.3
18.2
15.6
16.1
15.1
65+
12.8
16.1
21.0
14.5
24.1
15.0
NOTE: The sample consists of employees at establishments with 10 or more workers
in June 1995. Figures are for the individual’s “main” job, defined as the one with the
highest annual hours in 1994.
a
Specification A imposes no establishment-size restriction.
b
Specification B restricts to establishments with at least 20 employees.
SOURCE: For Japanese data, Japan Ministry of Labor, Survey of the Wage Structure
(1996). For Canadian data, authors’ calculations from the Survey of Labour and
Income Dynamics for 1994.

Table 3.18 Determinants of Wage Changes for Male Workers Who Found Jobs within One Year in Japan

Variable
Constant

(1) All separations
15.985***
(0.905)

(2A)a “Laid-off”
workers
10.036***
(3.141)

(2B)a “Laid-off”
workers
1.559*
(0.823)

(3A) Shukko
workers
3.248***
(0.988)

(3B) Shukko
workers
–0.028
(0.450)

High school

–1.003***
(0.179)

–2.037***
(0.599)

–2.472***
(0.597)

0.119
(0.333)

–0.083
(0.330)

Junior college

–3.256***
(0.340)

–5.299***
(1.369)

–5.940***
(1.370)

–0.272
(0.587)

–0.499
(0.585)

University

–1.770***
(0.225)

–1.327
(0.843)

–2.153***
(0.830)

0.167
(0.352)

–0.124
(0.345)

Firm >1,000
(postsep.)
Firm 100–999
(postsep.)
Firm >1,000
(presep.)
Firm 100–999
(presep.)
Part time
(postsep.)
Part time
(presep.)

5.032***
(0.180)
0.781***
(0.164)
–7.415***
(0.190)
–2.606***
(0.152)
–9.154***
(0.398)
7.929***
(0.352)

0.930***
(0.281)
0.981***
(0.287)
–0.566**
(0.243)
–0.907***
(0.246)
2.521
(1.869)
8.401***
(2.103)

1.077***
(0.277)
1.100***
(0.285)
–0.474**
(0.241)
–0.848***
(0.246)
2.4
(1.872)
8.392***
(2.106)

3.3970***
(0.720)
–0.562
(0.583)
–5.911***
(0.725)
–0.685
(0.604)
–13.869***
(1.287)
11.025***
(1.553)

3.302***
(0.722)
–0.476
(0.583)
–5.337***
(0.722)
–0.262
(0.603)
–13.76***
(1.290)
11.187***
(1.557)

(continued)
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Table 3.18 (continued)
Variable
Shukko1
(out)

(1) All separations
2.257***
(0.299)

(2A)a “Laid-off”
workers
—

(2B)a “Laid-off”
workers
—

(3A) Shukko
workers
—

(3B) Shukko
workers
—

Shukko2
(back)

–4.665***
(0.309)

—

—

—

—

Laid off

–5.399***
(0.232)

—

—

—

—

Change IND

–0.781***
(0.137)
–0.887
(0.857)

–3.250***
(0.5348
7.607**
(3.153)

0.223
(0.200)
–1.317
(0.888)

–0.0790
(0.185)
—

–8.4258***
(0.734)

–16.575***
(2.455)

Industry wage
premium
(postsep.)
Industry wage
premium (presep.)
Year

–4.422***
(0.506)
—

—

–2.121***
(0.761)

—

–1.677***
(0.137)

4.687***
(0.616)

5.303***
(0.577)

–0.230
(0.191)

–0.017
(0.182)

Age 35–44

–1.037***
(0.172)

0.799
(0.727)

0.757
(0.721)

0.058
(0.243)

0.088
(0.242)

Age 45–54

–2.387***
(0.200)

–3.946***
(0.773)

–4.243***
(0.774)

–0.332
(0.237)

–0.361
(0.237)

Age 55–64

–9.415***
(0.222)

–11.251***
(0.706)

–12.166***
(0.696)

–2.401***
(0.342)

–2.542***
(0.340)

Σ

14.402***
(0.049)

16.311***
(0.200)

16.377***
(0.201)

6.664***
(0.065)

6.674***
(0.065)

Log likelihood
–197583
–16607.1
–16630
–17874.5
–17882.4
No. of obs.
52,414
4,603
4,603
5,443
5,443
NOTE: Double-truncated censored regression results by job-loss status. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard
errors. *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level, all based on
asymptotic t-ratios.
a
Laid-off workers category includes all involuntary separations excluding shukko: management convenience, contract termination, and mandatory retirement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 3.19 Determinants of Wage Changes for Female Workers Who Found Jobs within One Year in Japan

(3A) Shukko
workers

(3B) Shukko
workers

(1) All separations

(2A) “Laid-off”
workersa

(2B) “Laid-off”
workersa

Constant

6.030***
(1.163)

7.799**
(3.288)

4.485***
(0.814)

2.697
(5.977)

3.402
(1.667)

High school

–1.642***
(0.224)

–1.573*
(0.593)

–1.634***
(0.591)

–1.821
(1.285)

–1.784
(1.279)

Junior college

–3.566***
(0.290)

–4.486**
(0.894)

–4.560***
(0.892)

–2.676
(1.638)

–2.648
(1.627)

University

–3.151***
(0.424)

–3.456**
(1.464)

–3.507**
(1.464)

–3.632**
(1.690)

–3.605**
(1.671)

Firm > 1,000
(postsep.)

3.007***
(0.211)

3.848***
(0.685)

3.873***
(0.684)

–0.629
(1.177)

–0.621
(1.153)

Firm 100–999
(postsep.)

1.153**
(0.179)

1.029**
(0.517)

1.064**
(0.515)

–0.370
(1.121)

–0.367
(1.116)

Firm > 1,000
(presep.)

–6.523***
(0.247)

–6.170***
(0.788)

–6.167***
(0.788)

–0.002
(1.121)

–0.048
(1.117)

Firm 100–999
(presep.)

–2.743***
(0.174)

–3.100***
(0.526)

–3.085***
(0.526)

–0.378
(1.004)

–0.393
(1.003)

Part time (postsep.)

–11.700***
(0.206)

–9.117***
(0.654)

–9.176***
(0.653)

–2.501
(1.978)

–2.481
(1.974)

Part time (presep.)

10.643***
(0.200)

10.006***
(0.651)

10.049***
(0.650)

4.469***
(1.697)

4.464***
(1.697)

SHUKKO1 (out)

0.687
(0.900)

—

—

-—

—

SHUKKO2 (back)

–3.286***
(1.070)

—

—

—

—

Laid off

–1.736**
(0.265)

—

—

—

—

Change IND

–0.861***
(0.165)

–2.028***
(0.507)

–2.263***
(0.476)

1.854*
(0.981)

2.057**
(0.880)

Industry wage

1.825*
(1.075)

–0.269
(3.124)

—

–2.372
(6.755)

—

–2.572***
(0.949)

–3.141
(2.520)

—

3.121
(5.588)

—

Year

–0.947***
(0.162)

–0.722
(0.529)

–0.492
(0.484)

–1.000
(0.970)

–1.118
(0.854)

Age 35–44

0.952***
(0.203)

–0.623
(0.625)

–0.677
(0.617)

–1.984*
(1.162)

–1.945**
(1.158)

Age 45–54

–0.796***
(0.246)

–2.996***
(0.698)

–3.125***
(0.686)

–0.691
(1.295)

–0.587
(1.276)

Age 55–64

–2.153***
(0.361)

–3.303***
(0.858)

–3.515***
(0.844)

–3.540*
(1.849)

–3.330*
(1.810)

premium (postsep.)
Industry wage
premium (presep.)

(continued)
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Table 3.19 (continued)

Σ

(1) All separations

(2A) “Laid-off”
workersa

(2B) “Laid-off”
workersa

(3A) Shukko
workers

(3B) Shukko
workers

13.939***
(0.058)

12.580***
(0.171)

12.584***
(0.171)

8.393***
(0.301)

8.397***
(0.302)

–130038

–11,639.7

–11,640.6

–1,448.45

–1,448.6

34,551

3,109

3,109

417

417

3,109
Log likelihood
No. of obs.

417

NOTE: Double-truncated censored regression results by job-loss status. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors.
*** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10% level, all based on asymptotic t-ratios.
a
Laid-off workers category includes all involuntary separations excluding shukko: management convenience, contract termination, and
mandatory retirement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Table 3.20 Determinants of Wage Changes for Permanent Separations and Laid-Off Workers Who Found Jobs within
One Year in Canada

Variable
UUc

All separations
(1)
0.045**
(0.020)

Men
Displaced workers
(2)a
(3)b
0.030
—
(0.021)

All separations
(4)
0.102***
(0.034)

Women
Displaced workers
(5)a
(6)b
0.110***
—
(0.042)

UNd

–0.136***
(0.024)

–0.164***
(0.028)

—

–0.124***
(0.034)

–0.151***
0.041

—

NUe

0.196***
(0.031)

0.184***
(0.038)

—

0.180***
(0.036)

0.128***
(0.043)

—

Elem.

0.030
(0.041)

0.031
(0.043)

0.023
(0.042)

0.052
(0.045)

0.106**
(0.052)

0.120**
(0.055)

Some high

–0.032*
(0.020)

–0.014
(0.022)

–0.026
(0.022)

0.005
(0.028)

0.012
(0.033)

0.007
(0.034)

Some post

–0.024
(0.024)

–0.025
(0.028)

–0.010
(0.029)

0.009
(0.025)

0.003
(0.031)

0.005
(0.030)

College

–0.017
(0.026)

–0.022
(0.032)

–0.026
(0.033)

0.037
(0.027)

–0.002
(0.033)

–0.004
(0.034)

Univ.

0.011
(0.028)

–0.025
(0.034)

–0.036
(0.034)

(0.028)

0.070**
(0.034)

0.042
(0.034)

–0.041
(0.026)

–0.027
(0.029)

–0.029
(0.029)

0.023
(0.039)

0.004
(0.050)

0.025
(0.053)

Trades

(continued)
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Table 3.20 (continued)

Variable
Firm 20–99 (pre)f

All separations
(1)
–0.013
(0.025)

Men
Displaced workers
(2)a
(3)b
–0.022
–0.031
(0.030)
(0.031)

All separations
(4)
–0.029
(0.030)

Women
Displaced workers
(5)a
(6)b
–0.056
–0.065
(0.044)
(0.044)

Firm 100–499 (pre)

–0.059
(0.036)

–0.057
(0.049)

–0.075
(0.051)

–0.180***
(0.049)

–0.204***
(0.062)

–0.254***
(0.060)

Firm 500+ (pre)

–0.207***
(0.061)

–0.176**
(0.071)

–0.244***
(0.073)

–0.158**
(0.073)

–0.121
(0.078)

–0.193***
(0.073)

Firm 20–99 (post)

0.029
(0.023)

0.009
(0.028)

0.026
(0.029)

0.044
(0.030)

–0.005
(0.043)

–0.002
(0.042)

Firm 100–499 (post)

0.083***
(0.032)

0.077*
(0.039)

0.103***
(0.039)

0.138***
(0.049)

0.141**
(0.066)

0.163***
(0.062)

Firm 500+ (post)

0.167***
(0.055)

0.149**
(0.064)

0.221***
(0.070)

0.197***
(0.060)

0.041
(0.098)

0.094
(0.101)

Part-time (pre)

–0.029
(0.037)

–0.044
(0.050)

–0.034
(0.052)

–0.008
(0.024)

–0.023
(0.029)

–0.014
(0.029)

Part-time (post)

–0.080***
(0.030)

–0.020
(0.033)

–0.028
(0.035)

0.042**
(0.020)

0.059**
(0.024)

0.071***
(0.024)

Change industry

–0.019
(0.014)

–0.026*
(0.016)

–0.019
(0.016)

–0.012
(0.018)

–0.018
(0.022)

–0.033
(0.021)

Tenure (pre)g

–0.007***
(0.002)

–0.007***
(0.002)

–0.007***
(0.002)

–0.006**
(0.003)

Age 35–44

–0.027
(0.018)

–0.024
(0.020)

–0.043**
(0.019)

Age 45–54

–0.070***
(0.024)

–0.062**
(0.027)

Age 55–64

–0.053*
(0.031)

Vismin
Intercept

—

—

–0.022
(0.020)

–0.012
(0.025)

–0.015
(0.024)

–0.094***
(0.027)

–0.035
(0.028)

–0.063*
(0.032)

–0.058*
(0.031)

–0.053
(0.033)

–0.092***
(0.032)

–0.007
(0.057)

–0.029
(0.066)

–0.039
(0.067)

–0.058***
(0.020)

–0.043*
(0.023)

–0.040*
(0.023)

0.052*
(0.027)

0.040
(0.030)

0.037
(0.030)

0.173***
(0.029)

0.188***
(0.037)

0.059***
(0.019)

0.005
(0.031)

–0.026
(0.038)

–0.024
(0.027)
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Industry
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Province
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
R2
0.096
0.094
0.013
0.073
0.08
0.015
Nh
2,697
1,995
1,995
2,027
1,289
1,289
NOTE: Ordinary least squares regression results (heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors in parentheses). The dependent variable is
the ratio of pre- to postdisplacement wages. *** = Significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 10%
level.
a
Restricted to permanent layoffs. Equations 1, 2, 4, and 5 include 15 predisplacement industry dummy variables.
b
Restricted to permanent layoffs. Equations include 15 predisplacement industry variables but drop union status and tenure.
c
UU = union to union.
d
UN = union to nonunion.
e
NU = nonunion to union.
f
Firm sizes are only in the 1995 data, so the variables should be interpreted as firm size interacted with a dummy for the 1995 COEP.
g
Tenure is measured in years.
h
The number of observations in each regression reflects the number of respondents who answered all of the relevant questions.

Group

Wage loss
>30%
(1)

Canada
Wage loss
Wage gain
>10%
>10%
(2)
(3)

Wage gain
>30%
(4)

Wage loss
>30%
(5)

Japan
Wage loss
Wage gain
>10%
>10%
(6)
(7)

Wage gain
>30%
(8)

Men
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34
35–39
40-44
45–49
50–54
55–59
60+
All ages

1.1
4.7
2.6
1.9
1.7
1.2
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.9

3.1
11.0
6.0
4.1
3.4
2.9
2.5
2.3
2.3
2.4
4.2

5.1
18.8
8.3
4.6
3.8
2.6
2.3
1.7
2.1
3.1
5.1

3.0
11.0
4.7
2.5
1.9
1.4
1.3
0.7
1.1
1.9
2.8

0.4
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.2
0.4
0.4
0.6
1.5
6.8
0.8

1.7
2.5
2.2
1.5
1.0
1.3
0.8
1.2
2.9
10.5
2.1

8.7
8.0
4.9
3.3
2.0
1.9
1.6
2.0
1.5
4.1
3.8

1.3
1.3
1.2
0.5
0.2
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.6

Women
15–19
20–24
25–29
30–34

0.9
4.9
2.5
1.7

2.7
12.0
5.7
4.0

4.7
15.9
7.0
4.3

2.7
8.7
3.8
2.1

0.8
2.0
2.3
2.0

2.6
6.5
7.9
5.2

8.0
8.4
6.6
6.5

1.8
2.6
2.2
2.3
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35–39
40–44
45–49
50–54
55–59
60+
All ages

1.5
1.1
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.9

3.3
2.4
2.5
2.0
1.8
2.6
4.2

3.4
2.5
1.9
2.2
1.8
3.2
4.8

1.7
1.3
0.8
0.8
1.0
1.3
2.4

0.6
0.5
0.5
1.4
1.0
2.8
1.4

3.1
2.3
1.8
3.8
2.4
4.8
4.4

4.0
4.9
3.4
3.3
3.9
3.0
5.6

1.0
0.8
0.7
0.3
0.7
0.0
1.4

Both
15–19
1.1
2.9
4.9
2.9
0.6
2.1
8.3
1.5
20–24
4.6
11.4
17.5
10.0
1.3
4.2
8.3
1.9
25–29
2.5
5.8
7.8
4.3
1.1
4.1
5.8
1.6
30–34
1.8
4.0
4.5
2.3
0.8
2.5
4.3
0.9
35–39
1.6
3.4
3.6
1.8
0.3
1.7
2.6
0.4
40–44
1.1
2.7
2.6
1.4
0.4
1.7
3.0
0.4
45–49
1.3
2.5
2.1
1.0
0.5
1.2
2.3
0.4
50–54
1.1
2.2
2.0
0.8
0.9
2.0
2.5
0.4
55–59
1.1
2.1
2.0
1.0
1.4
2.9
2.1
0.3
60+
1.0
2.4
3.2
1.7
5.7
8.9
3.8
0.2
All ages
1.8
4.2
5.0
2.6
1.0
2.9
4.5
0.9
NOTE: All data refer to 1995, except the Canadian wage-loss distributions which are from the merged 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys.
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Appendix
Japanese Industries Eligible for Employment
Maintenance and Adjustment Subsidies
SPECIAL EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT INDUSTRIES
As of January 29, 1998, there were 72 special employment adjustment industries in Japan. Together these industries included 86,954 establishments
employing 723,022 workers. They are listed below.
As an example of how such industries become designated, consider the
most recent. On January 29, 1998, the Ministry of Labor designated part of industry 2969, in particular the manufacturing of stone cutting machines, as a
special employment adjustment industry. The stated reason for this designation was a decline in output due to increased imports of cheap tombstones and
other stone products from China and South Korea; the period of designation
(which can be extended) was February 1, 1998 to January 31, 2000. This industry has 12 establishments and 187 workers.
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Table 3.A1 Special Employment Adjustment Industries
Industry
2969 (part)
1465 (part)
1226 (part)

Description
Effective period
Stone cutting machines
1998.2.1~2000.1.31
Coloring process of Yuzen silk cloth 1998.2.1~2000.1.31*
Manufacturing frozen seafood (herring, 1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
salmon, cod, . . .)

1229 (part)
1362, 1363
1423
1425 (part)
143
1441
1442 (part)
146 (part)

Preprocessing of herrings
1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
Manufacturing fish powder
1998.7.1~1999.6.30*
Wool textile manufacturing
1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
Flax textiles (excl. jute)
1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
Throwing (silk) manufacturing
1996.4.1~1999.3.31
Cotton, synthetic textiles
1996.9.1~1999.8.31*
Silk textiles
1996.9.1~1999.8.31*
1996.8.1~1999.7.31*
Textile coloring process (excl.
manual coloring, lace coloring and
textile, piecemeal coloring
processes)
1996.7.1~1999.6.30*
1465 (part) Manual textile coloring (excl.
coloring of Yuzen, scarfs, and
handkerchiefs)
1472, 1479 Fish net and other net production
1996.9.1~1999.8.31
(incl. repair)
1481
Embroidery lace manufacturing
1997.11.1~1998.10.31
1484
Cloth string manufacturing
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1485
Thin width textile products
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1491
Hair processing
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
151
Production of overcoats and shirts 1996.4.1~1998.3.31
(excl. traditional Japanese types)
152
Knit jackets and shirts
1997.7.1~1999.6.30
Leather clothing and products
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1541,
4921 (part), manufacturing and wholesale
4922 (part),
4929 (part),
1564
Socks manufacturing
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1595
Towel manufacturing
1997.1.1~1998.12.31

Worker Displacement in Japan and Canada

Industry
1622 (part)

1633
1811
1852
1899 (part)
2297 (part)
2312
232
2391
2393
2395
241
244
2461,
2472 (part)
248
2514
2523 (part)
2529 (part)
2542,
2547 (part)
2543,
2547(part)
2551
2583 (part)
2584 (part)
2595
2645

Description
Wood sheets manufacturing (excl.
bamboo plated and decorative
sheets)
Wooden box manufacturing (excl.
lunch boxes)
Chemical pulp production
Paper bags with square bottoms
Cloth paper pipes
Flat yarn
bicycle tires and tire tubes
rubber and plastic sandals
Cloth with rubber back and related
products
Rubber material
Recycled rubber manufacturing

295

Effective period
1995.9.1~1999.8.31

1995.7.1~1999.6.30
1997.10.1~1999.9.30
1996.12.1~1998.11.30
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.11.1~1999.10.31*

Tanned leather production
Leather shoes and sandals
Bags and briefcases

1996.9.1~1998.8.31
1995.8.1~1999.7.31
extended
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*

Fur manufacturing
Glass ware
Steel framed concrete pipes
Cement sheets
Kitchen pottery products

1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1997.1.1~1998.12.31
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
1995.12.1~1999.11.30*

Pottery decorative products

1995.12.1~1999.11.30*

Fire resistant bricks
Stone products for buildings
Insulation plats (excl. wall
material)
Asbestos products
Iron processing

1995.10.1~1999.9.30*
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
1995.10.1~1999.9.30*
(continued)
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Table 3.A1 (continued)
Industry
Description
Effective period
2662
Die production
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2811 (part) Production of cans
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2821
Western kitchen silverware
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
2824
Tools (excl. grinding metals)
1996.6.1~1998.5.31
2831 (part) Steel connecting pipes (excl. die
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
pipes)
2842 (part) Metal window frames and doors
1996.5.1~1998.4.30
2851 (part) Aluminum, aluminum kitchenware 1996.6.1~1998.5.31
2892
Metal spring
1996.5.1~1998.4.30
295 (part)
Textile mills production (excl.
1996.9.1~1998.8.31
sewing machines)
2981 (part) Typewriter production
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
3012
Transformer production (excl.
1995.11.1~1999.10.31
those for electronic equipment)
313
Bicycles, parts
1995.11.1~1999.10.31*
3251 (part), Binoculars, parts
1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
3254 (part)
3253,
Motion picture machinery, parts
1996.4.1~1998.3.31
3254 (part)
332
Gun production
1996.10.1~1998.9.30
3432 (part) Cloth dolls production
1995.8.1~1999.7.31*
3434 (part) Baseball gloves, mitts
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
3434 (part) Ski equipment
1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
3434 (part) Air guns, hunting rifles
1996.6.1~1998.5.31
3453
Button production
1996.10.1~1998.9.30
3454 (part) Needle production
1995.12.1~1999.11.30*
3475 (part) Umbrellas, parts
1995.7.1~1999.6.30*
3476
Matches
1997.7.1~1999.6.30
3911 (part) Railway (freight only)
1997.3.1~1999.2.28
459 (part)
Volume measurement industry
1996.6.1~1998.5.31
*The effective periods for these industries have been extended.
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The following is the list of employment adjustment subsidy industries as
of January 29, 1998.a
Table 3.A2 Employment Adjustment Subsidy Industries
Industry

Description (effective region)

Effective period

1299(part)

Kaiware daikon salad leaf sprouts
(all)

1996.10.18~1998.9.30*

1465(part)

Scarf and handkerchief coloring
(all)

1996.11.1~1998.10.31*

1532,1534

Knit underwear and pajamas (all)

1997.12.1~1998.11.30

1611

General lumber mills (all)

1997.10.1~1998.9.30

1622 (part) Wood sheets (all)

1997.11.1~1998.10.31

1711

1998.2.1~1999.1.31

Wood furniture, excl. lacquer
painted (all)

2242 (part) Synthetic foam (Komatsu, etc.)

1997.4.1~1998.3.31

2513 (part) Glass light bulbs (all)

1997.4.1~1998.3.31

2523 (part) Concrete pile

1998.2.1~1999.1.31

2544

Electrical pottery insulation material 1996.10.1~1998.9.30*
(all)

2546

Pottery tiles (all)

1997.7.1~1998.6.30

2549 (part) Pottery plant pots (all)

1998.2.1~1999.1.31

2644

1997.7.1~1998.6.30

Steel pipes (all)

2663

Die production

1997.11.1~1998.10.31

2864

Electric gilding (all)

1996.6.1~1998.5.31*

4232 (part) River cruising operator

1996.10.1~1998.9.30*

452 (part)
459 (part)

1997.7.1~1998.6.30

Port transportation

*The effective periods for these industries were extended.
a
As of June 1, 1998 this list grew: a total of 51 industries with 511,921 establishments
were certified to be employment adjustment subsidy industries. They employed
846,957 employees.
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“I get knocked down, but I get up again.”
Chumbawumba, 1997
Industrial restructuring, changes in technology, and recession are
all associated with worker displacement, the involuntary separation of
an employee from a job. Workers also leave jobs for personal reasons,
but because these are considered voluntary actions and presumably not
as closely linked with economic hardship, there is less concern over the
consequences of this type of movement. The media in Britain and
Australia, and perhaps because of this the general public, are also preoccupied with the idea of declining job security (see, for example,
Kelley, Evans, and Dawkins 1998). Whilst job security is difficult to
quantify, public concern could arise not only from a belief that a longterm employment relationship is now less likely, but also from a belief
that, if unlucky enough to lose a job, a replacement job is likely to be of
lower quality, to pay lower wages, and to be less stable.
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In this chapter we examine the consequences of job loss for displaced workers in Britain and Australia. Fallick (1996) and Kletzer
(1998) provide useful summaries of over ten years of research into the
issue in North America. As yet, however, the evidence from Britain
and Australia is sparse.
For Britain, Gregory and Jukes (1997) provided the first evidence
of the effects of unemployment on the subsequent earnings of a sample
of unemployed male benefit claimants. They find, on average, an earnings penalty of around 10 percent compared with men who remain in
jobs. The research in this chapter draws on data from the British
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) over the period 1991 to 1996 to
broaden the scope of inquiry on job displacement in Britain by including all unemployment spells (claimant or otherwise) and spells of economic inactivity (allowing for discouraged job seekers), together with
information for women and/or part-time working. The analysis highlights which groups are most likely to experience displacement, which
groups are most likely to get back into work, and the earnings changes
associated with reentry into work.
For Australia, a range of case-study–type evidence is available
which suggests that displaced workers face considerable difficulties in
obtaining new jobs, but does not provide clear conclusions on the
effects of displacement on future wages (Borland 1998). In this chapter, data from two sources are used to extend existing research. First,
aggregate-level data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)
and Labor Force Survey (LFS) are used to describe patterns and trends
in the incidence of displacement and labor market outcomes for displaced workers. Second, individual-level data from the Youth in Transition Survey (YTS) are used to examine the consequences of
displacement for young workers in Australia in the mid 1980s and
early 1990s. The analysis provides a more detailed treatment of postdisplacement employment and wage outcomes for displaced workers
in Australia than in previous studies—for example, by presenting
information on average employment outcomes over the two-year
period following displacement.
The next section provides background information on the labor
markets in Britain and Australia in the 1980s and 1990s. The third section describes the institutional and legal framework surrounding job
displacement in Britain and Australia. The fourth section outlines the
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data sources used for each country and presents findings from analysis
of the incidence of displacement and the consequences of job loss. The
last section presents a summary of the main results for each country
and attempts to offer a comparative perspective on how institutional
differences between Britain and Australia might have affected wage
and employment outcomes for displaced workers in those countries.
Differences between the data sources—in particular, the Australian
data source is restricted to younger workers whereas the British data
source covers all age groups—mean that the scope for such comparisons is somewhat limited. However, some conclusions regarding the
role of institutional factors are preferred.

LABOR MARKET BACKGROUND
Britain
At the beginning of the nineties, Britain entered a recession that
was to last until the end of 1992. Unemployment reached a peak of
around 3 million, some 10.5 percent of the workforce, in the spring of
the following year. The recession primarily affected men. Male
employment fell by 1.3 million in the three years between 1990 and
1993, while female employment fell by only 150,000 over the same
period. The economic downturn helped increase the movement of
many men—mostly, but not entirely, over age 50—into economic
inactivity. The number of men outside the labor force grew by around
700,000 over the recession period and continued to rise over the rest of
the nineties, albeit more slowly. Manufacturing and the distribution
and retail sectors bore the brunt of the fall in employment: 600,000
jobs were lost in manufacturing between 1990 and 1993 and 400,000
jobs in distribution and trade. Younger workers were hit worst by the
recession. The employment rate for those aged 20–24 years fell from
75.5 percent to 66.0 percent, some 500,000 workers, from 1990 to
1993, compared with the national fall from 75.2 percent to 70.6 percent
over the same period.
The labor market in the early years of recovery was dominated by a
rise in the share of part-time and temporary jobs. By the end of 1996,

304

Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth

when the British sample stops, the employment rate had recovered to
72 percent, up by some 600,000 from its 1993 low. Of the net new-job
creation 200,000 were for full-time work and 400,000 for part-time
work. Half of the net growth in employment was accounted for by
temporary jobs. Youth (20–24) employment fell, however, by a further
300,000. This may, in part, be explained by an increased enrollment in
tertiary education. Three-quarters of all net employment growth
between 1993 and 1996 was accounted for by the public sector and
finance industries. Over the same period the increase in earnings inequality that had begun at the start of the eighties continued apace, until
1996 when inequality stopped rising. By 1996, the gross hourly earnings of the lowest decile had fallen to 53 percent of the median, while
hourly earnings of the top decile had risen to 220 percent of median
earnings. The typical entrant back into work after a spell of nonemployment could expect to receive earnings around the bottom quartile of the aggregate earnings distribution, some 69 percent of median
earnings in 1996.
Australia
Individual-level data on displaced workers in Australia used in this
study are from the early to mid 1980s and early 1990s, and primarily
for workers aged 18 to 22 years. Hence in this subsection a range of
descriptive information on the Australian labor market in the 1980s
and 1990s—in aggregate and for persons aged 15–24 years—is presented.
In 1978, the average unemployment rate in Australia was 7.8 percent, with that for 15- to 24-year-olds at 14.4 percent. Both these rates
attained a local maximum in 1983 at 9.9 and 17.9 percent, respectively; declined to a trough of 5.7 and 10.4 percent in 1989; and rose to
a higher peak in the recession of the early 1990s of 10.7 percent for the
population as a whole in 1993, and 19.5 percent for youth in 1992.
This 1990s recession was also distinguished by a substantially larger
share of the unemployed population in long-term unemployment; for
example in 1993, 36.9 percent of the unemployed had been in that state
for over a year, compared with 31.2 percent in 1984. Some reversal of
the above increases has now taken place. In May 1998 the rate of
unemployment for the working-age population was at 8 percent.
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Along with being higher for younger than older labor-force participants, the incidence of unemployment has been particularly high for
those with low levels of educational attainment or whose last job was
in an unskilled blue-collar occupation, and for some immigrant groups
(Borland and Kennedy 1998).
Changes in employment/population and labor-force participation
rates also took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The aggregate employment/population rate varied procyclically but displayed little overall
trend. As in most industrialized countries, however, the stability of the
aggregate employment/population rate disguises opposing trends for
males and females. For females both employment and labor-force participation have increased since the mid 1970s, while for males there
has been a decrease in participation over this period (see for example,
Gregory 1991 and EPAC 1996).1 Focusing on persons aged 15–24
years, employment and labor-force participation also remained remarkably constant throughout this period (employment at about 60 percent,
participation at about 68 percent). However, significant changes
occurred in the composition of employment: the full-time employment/
population rate declined substantially—from 52 percent in 1980 to 38
percent in 1995—while the part-time employment/population rate
increased to compensate. Underlying the change in the composition of
employment has been an increase in schooling and university participation, from 34 percent in 1987 to 44 percent in 1995.
The 1980s and 1990s in Australia were characterized by relatively
little real wage growth. Between 1978 and 1984, average real weekly
earnings of full-time employees grew by a total of 7.6 percent, but fell
after that. Only by 1995 had average real weekly earnings recovered to
their 1984 level. These trends were similar for youths, although
declines in the 1980s were larger for them. (This latter finding could
be due to changes in the composition of the full-time youth labor
force.) Earnings dispersion was relatively stable from the early to late
1980s, but then increased during the first half of the 1990s (Gregory
1993 and Borland and Wilkins 1996).
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INSTITUTIONS
Institutional factors are generally supposed to have an important
role in determining both the incidence of worker displacement and subsequent outcomes for displaced workers. In this section we identify the
key institutional features which are likely to be relevant for understanding what happens to displaced workers—employment-protection
legislation; the unemployment benefit system; and wage-setting institutions. Employment-protection legislation may affect whether and
how firms are able to lay off workers. Differential costs of layoffs may
also influence the incidence of worker displacement. Unemployment
benefits may affect the jobless duration and search activities of displaced workers. Wage-setting institutions help determine both the
wages displaced workers surrender and their wages at reemployment.
Britain
Employment protection
How easy is it for firms to make their employees redundant in Britain and what are the costs to firms? Employment-protection legislation, as covered by the Statutory Redundancies Payments Scheme
(1965), has operated largely unchanged since its inception. This covers mandatory severance pay, advance notice, legal requirements, and
procedures for dismissal. There are relatively few legislative constraints on the ability of firms to make redundancies. The qualifying
period—before general rights exist to claim redundancy payments and
unfair dismissal—was extended, first, from six months to one year in
1979 and, then, to two years in 1985 for full-time jobs and five years
for part-time jobs. In 1995, an EU antidiscrimination ruling was
brought in which equalized the qualification period at two years tenure
for all. If a worker qualifies for redundancy rights then the entitlements are as follows:
• there is a minimum notice period of one week for each year of
service, up to a maximum of 12 weeks.
• an employer must make a lump-sum payment to any employee
dismissed because of redundancy, calculated using a formula
based on length of service and age. This is then multiplied by the
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worker’s weekly earnings (with a ceiling imposed currently at
£210), as follows:
– 0.5 week’s pay for each complete year of service between ages
18 and 21,
– 1 week’s pay for each complete year of service between ages 22
and 40,
– 1.5 weeks’ pay for each complete year of service between ages
41 and 60.
There is a maximum, national, service period of 20 years. Service
before age 18 and after age 60 does not count toward redundancy-compensation entitlement. Since qualification for these general rights
requires two years’ tenure, then the minimum notification period is two
weeks, irrespective of hours worked, and the minimum compensation
lies between one and three weeks’ pay. The maximum amount an
employer might be required to pay as a statutory redundancy payment
is £6,300 (20 x 1.5 x 210), around one-third average annual earnings.
Unions tend to negotiate supplements that raise the compensation and
notification period substantially. Employers sometimes make larger
payments as an incentive for the workforce to take “voluntary” redundancy. A statutory redundancy payment is not liable to tax and any
nonstatutory “golden handshake” is also tax free if it is under £30,000.
If the employer fails to make the statutory payment, the employee
must present a complaint in writing to an Industrial Tribunal within six
months. A right to time off during the period of dismissal notice to
look for work or make arrangements for training exists after two years
of employment. There is a penalty of two-fifths of weekly pay for each
week if the employer does not allow this. The employee also has the
right to have recognized trade unions consulted by employers before
redundancy proposals are put into effect. This requires no minimum
length of employment. Employers wishing to make 100 or more workers redundant at the same time are obliged to give 90-days’ notice to
the Secretary of State for Employment and to consult with the employees’ representatives. Firms wishing to make between 20 and 100
workers redundant are obliged to give 30-days’ notice to the same parties (Selwyn 1996). Workers on fixed-term contracts are excluded
from redundancy rights if they agree in writing to exclude their rights
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to make any claim, even if their jobs last for more than two years.
Such a clause is now common in many fixed-term contract agreements.
General rights apply against “unfair dismissal” after two years, including an award of compensation by an Industrial Tribunal if a claim is
made within three months of the dismissal. Any employer who dismisses a woman for some reason connected to her pregnancy, for
example, may well be dismissing her unfairly.
Unemployment benefits
Once displaced, what can workers expect to receive from the state?
To receive any benefit workers must first register with the state
employment service and sign a weekly declaration that they are available for, and actively seeking, work. The British unemployment benefit system encompasses both contribution-based insurance (UI) and
means-tested assistance (UA). Both benefits are paid out of general
taxation revenue. National Insurance Contributions (NIC) are compulsory for all employees earning above a minimum level, currently £63 a
week, as a given percentage of gross pay. Employees who do not pay
NICs are not eligible for UI payments and must therefore apply for
means-tested assistance. No contributions are required on jobs paying
below £63 a week, but NICs are levied on all earnings once the wages
rise above this threshold. This profile creates what is called an “entry
fee,” crossing above which incurs a sharp rise in the tax burden. As a
result, more part-time jobs may be created than would otherwise be,
and this may affect the new-job wage-offer distribution and hence the
cost of job loss.2
To be entitled to contributory unemployment benefit a displaced
worker must have been employed continuously for two years immediately prior to displacement and must have earned a wage higher than
the contribution lower limit (£63 per week). Before 1988 a worker
could have been credited with NICs during a spell of unemployment
and still qualified for benefit. Since 1983, unemployment benefit in
Britain has been paid at a flat rate (£48.25 in 1996), irrespective of previous earnings for a set period. In 1996, the duration period for receipt
of UI was reduced from 12 to 6 months. After exhaustion of UI, claimants are transferred to means-tested assistance payments. This benefit
is levied at the level of the household rather than the individual and
pays a claimant the difference between the household’s weekly net
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income and their needs level or “applicable amount.” UI claimants can
also claim UA simultaneously since the flat rate UI payment is normally below the amount a family would get on UA. In addition, those
living in rented accommodations can claim means-tested help with
their housing costs (Housing Benefit). Successful claimants will normally have all of their rent paid, except a nominal amount. Those who
own their residences can claim help with their mortgage payments after
a 6-month spell of unemployment. Council Tax Benefit, help with
local authority taxes, is also paid to those on means-tested benefit, such
that 100 percent of their Council Tax is paid.
Individuals can receive means-tested assistance indefinitely, provided they satisfy eligibility requirements. For an unemployed worker
this requires a weekly declaration of availability for work at the local
Jobcentre, administered by the government employment service.
Recent attention has been given to the growing numbers of economically inactive men of working age. Over most of the period covered by
this chapter, many of these individuals were claiming long-term sickness benefit (SI). This is a means-tested benefit paying around £30
above the rate for UA, with eligibility determined by a general practitioner. Claimants could move off unemployment benefit into SI after a
period of six months claiming means-tested income support. Claims
were also allowed after a 6-month period out of work receiving
employer-contributed statutory sick pay. It is possible therefore that
some displaced workers who could not find a job immediately may
have ended up receiving a sickness benefit. In 1995, concerned with
the growth in claims, the government replaced SI with Incapacity Benefit, restricting the role of the general practitioner to an “objective” test
of a medical basis for the ability to perform work-related activities.
These myriad variations in benefits and the uncertainty surrounding likely wage offers make the calculation of potential replacement
rates facing displaced workers very difficult. OECD estimates of
“typical replacement ratios” for the United Kingdom are shown in
Table 4.A1 in the appendix. Replacement rates are relatively low until
housing benefits are taken into account. Thereafter they approach parity with the income brought home by a worker earning two-thirds of
the average production worker’s salary.
The employment service offers a range of training, advice, and
support schemes aimed at helping the unemployed back into work.
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Claimants are required to produce evidence that they are actively seeking work and/or had “good cause” for turning down a job they were
offered. They are also encouraged, but not obliged, to complete a Back
to Work Plan containing goals that they have to achieve during the
unemployment spell. This is reviewed after an unemployment spell of
13 weeks and from then on the claimant is referred to the plethora of
support schemes and advisory networks available at that time. These
initiatives target various categories of unemployment duration—currently JobClubs (6 months unemployed), JobPlan Workshops (12
months), Restart courses (24 months)—and try to match jobseekers to
posted vacancies, placement in relevant employment-subsidy programs, remotivation counselling, and improvement in the extent and
quality of their job search. Recruitment subsidies and work programs
were not in place during the sample period, though the government has
recently introduced a wage subsidy scheme, The New Deal, for those
unemployed in excess of six months. Schmitt and Wadsworth (1998)
provide more details on changes to the benefit system over time and
the consequences for unemployment outflows.
Wage-setting institutions
What are the principal forces shaping wages in Britain and what
might be the consequences for displaced workers looking to reenter
work? Wages are relatively free of regulations governing pay determination. Over the sample period, the Conservative administration
encouraged, but did not mandate, decentralized determination of
wages. There was no national minimum-wage regulation applicable in
the United Kingdom over the sample period. Wages Councils, which
had previously set minimum rates of pay for around 2 million low-paid
workers in selected industries, were abolished in 1993, except in agriculture. Union density in Britain, which continues to fall, is currently
estimated to be around 30 percent, and only around 20 percent in the
private sector. Collective bargaining coverage has no legal status.
Employers must agree as to whether unions are recognized for negotiation purposes. Recent estimates show that collective representation has
also been considerably undermined, with just 37 percent of employees
covered by collective agreements in 1996, but with 70 percent coverage in large public sector workplaces (Cully and Woodland 1997). If
pay is not determined through collective bargaining, then management
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or a “review body” in the public sector decides (Beatson 1995). Gregg
and Wadsworth (1997) provided an analysis of the changing nature of
wages being offered to the non-employed.
Australia
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia assigns powers to make legislation between state and federal governments. The
power to regulate industrial relations matters is divided between these
two: Federal powers are those explicitly stated in the Constitution, and
residual powers are assigned to the states. For example, section
51(xxxv) of the Constitution allows the federal government to make
laws with respect to “conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and
settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one
state.”
Regulation of the terms and conditions of employment in Australia
occurs through: a) Provisions of state and federal government workplace relations legislation; and b) The “award system” whereby a system of industrial tribunals specify and enforce a set of minimum terms
and conditions for workers in specific occupation or industry groups.
In what follows we discuss these two sources of employment regulation in turn.
Employment protection
In Australia any employment contract of indefinite duration
between an employer and employee will generally be terminable by
notice (Creighton, Ford, and Mitchell 1993, p. 225). Currently, regulation of the appropriate notice period for worker retrenchment in Australia occurs through workplace relations legislation and through the
wage-setting system. First, some states in Australia have enacted legislation which requires (or can be used to require) employers to provide
advance notification of dismissal (Social Justice Consultative Council,
1992). Second, awards setting out minimum terms and conditions of
employment may contain provisions relating to minimum-notice periods.
Prior to 1984 most awards (federal and state) contained provisions
to the effect that “Employment . . . shall be terminated by a week’s
notice on either side given at any time during the week or by the pay-
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ment or forfeiture of a week’s wages at the case may be” (Creighton,
Ford, and Mitchell 1993, p. 225). The Termination, Change and
Redundancy (TCR) Test Case decision handed down by the Federal
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission in 1984, however, provided
a stronger set of conditions governing worker retrenchment which
could henceforth be included in awards. These conditions specify minimum requirements for advance notification of retrenchment, severance payments, and such other employer obligations as providing time
off for job interviews.
Provisions from the TCR Test Case relating to advance notice and
severance payments for retrenched workers are as follows (Creighton,
Ford, and Mitchell 1993, pp. 225–226):
• Advance Notice:
“(i) Where an employer has made a definite decision that the
employer no longer wishes the job the employee has been
doing done by anyone and this is not due to the ordinary and
customary turnover of labor and that decision may lead to termination of employment, the employer shall hold discussions
with the employees directly affected and their union.
(ii) The discussions shall take place as soon as practicable after
the employer has made a definite decision . . .
(iii) For the purposes of the discussion the employer shall, as
soon as practicable, provide in writing to the employees concerned and their union, all relevant information about the proposed terminations including the reasons for the proposed
termination, the number and categories of employees likely to
be affected, and the number of workers normally employed and
the period over which the terminations are likely to be carried
out.”
• Severance Pay:
“. . . an employee whose employment is terminated [made redundant] . . . shall be entitled to the following amount of severance pay in
respect of a continuous period of service:
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Severance pay

1 year or less
nil
1 year and less than 2 years
4 weeks’ pay
2 years and less than 3 years
6 weeks’ pay
3 years and less than 4 years
7 weeks’ pay
4 years and over
8 weeks’ pay
*Week’s pay means the ordinary time rate of pay for the
employee concerned.”
Incorporation of these TCR Test Case conditions into awards
seems to have been far from complete. Pearce, Bartone, and Stephens
(1995, p. 20) reported that in 1990 only 25 percent of federal awards
included provisions from the TCR Test Case. Moreover, it is important to note that the redundancy conditions from the TCR Test Case do
not apply to employees with less than one year’s continuous service,
where an employer can demonstrate incapacity to pay, and in some circumstances, to employers who employ fewer than 15 workers. On the
other hand, there are other groups of employees—such as public sector
employees for whom redundancy conditions are specified in special
legislation regulating public sector employment—who would have
much stronger notice provisions than those specified in the TCR Test
Case.
Unemployment benefits
The Australian social security system is primarily a social assistance scheme. Payments are funded from general taxation revenue and
are based on a person’s current need, rather than on previous levels of
earnings or duration of employment. Payments are generally available
to all residents of Australia, subject to eligibility and duration of residency.
Unemployment benefit payments are available to persons who
have lost or left employment and to persons who are unable to obtain
work on leaving school. Receipt of benefits is subject to an income test
that allows some nonbenefit earnings before benefits are withdrawn at
a dollar-for-dollar rate. A waiting period of 13 weeks applies for persons who should be able to support themselves during the initial period
of an unemployment spell (for example, persons who have received
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recreation leave or termination payments from an employer, or who
have considerable financial assets).
There is no limit on the duration of receipt of unemployment benefits provided that an unemployed person is willing and able to undertake paid employment and is actively seeking work (for example, for
some unemployed persons the “activity test” involves keeping a jobsearch diary).
Unemployment benefit replacement rates vary, depending on
whether an unemployed person is single or married, has any children,
and owns or rents housing. For example, in 1983 the unemployment
benefit for a married person with dependent spouse was $137.30, for
unmarried persons aged 16–17 years without dependents was $40.00,
for unmarried persons aged 18 years and above without dependents
was $68.65, for unmarried persons aged 18 years and above with
dependents was $82.35, and for each child of an unemployed person
with dependents was $10 (Commonwealth Department of Social Security 1983). At the same time, average weekly earnings for a full-time
employee were $172 for a 15- to 19-year-old, $270 for a 20- to 24year-old, and $318 for employees as a whole (Australian Bureau of
Statistics 1983).
Table 4.A2 in the appendix presents some more-recent summary
information on replacement rates in Australia compared to average
rates for the OECD. Three main features are evident. First, for none of
the cases where an unemployed person would shift to full-time
employment at the average earnings level do unemployment benefits
exceed average earnings. Second, both in absolute terms and relative
to OECD averages, replacement rates in Australia are higher for couples with children than couples with no children, and higher for couples than for single persons.
Third, the longer duration of
unemployment benefits in Australia than in most other countries means
that, whereas replacement rates in Australia are below the OECD average in the first month of unemployment, this ordering is reversed in the
sixtieth month of unemployment. It is also important to note that in
Australia persons receiving unemployment benefits are eligible for
other non-cash benefits—in particular, the Health Care card provides
access to reduced-cost medicines and public transport travel.
Displaced workers who shift out of the labor force will also be eligible for social security benefits. Age pensions are available to males
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over age 65 and females over 61. Persons who have a medical condition which prevents full-time work are eligible for disability support
pensions. And service pensions are available to male war veterans
over age 60 and female war veterans over age 55. Each of these pensions is subject to income and assets tests (see Commonwealth Department of Social Security 1997).
Wage-setting institutions
There are three main dimensions to the regulatory structure for
wage setting in Australia:
a) Regulation of the wage bargaining process and of the form of
agreement over terms and conditions of employment which can
be made between a worker and employer;
b) Regulation providing for intervention by a third party (industrial
tribunal) in the process of wage bargaining, and in the determination of terms and conditions of employment; and
c) Regulation promoting collective organization of workers and
providing a right for collective organizations to represent workers in negotiations over terms and conditions of employment.
Most workers in Australia have minimum terms and conditions
specified in “awards.” These are written documents which are ratified
and enforced by industrial tribunals at either the state or federal level.
Individual awards generally cover workers within specific occupation
or industry groups. Each award specifies a range of minimum wage
rates for workers with different skill levels in that occupation or industry group. Hence a multitude of different minimum wage rates exist in
the economy. The conditions in an award may be agreed by consent
between a union and employers and then ratified by the relevant industrial tribunal or may be arbitrated by the industrial tribunal.
The principle of “common rule” means that any decision of an
industrial tribunal about conditions in an award will be extended to all
workers in the workforce group covered by that award, regardless of
union status. Award coverage remained high and relatively constant in
the period from the 1950s to 1990s. In 1954 the proportion of workers
covered by awards was 90 percent (Dabscheck and Niland 1981, p.
274), and in May 1990, this proportion was 80 percent—33.5 percent
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covered under federal awards, and 46.5 percent under state awards
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 1990). It is important to note, however, that for a large proportion of these workers minimum wage conditions specified in awards are not binding. Estimates for 1995 suggest
that about 25 percent of workers had rates of pay at award levels (Australian Industrial Relations Commission 1997, p. 124).
Industrial tribunals have an important function in wage determination in Australia. These tribunals exist at both the federal and state
level, and may have general coverage (for example, the Federal Industrial Relations Commission) or coverage restricted to specific occupation groups (such as the Federal Coal Industry Tribunal). At the
federal level the wage-determination process involves a three-tier system: a) national wage cases where the federal industrial tribunal
adjusts wages for all workers covered by federal awards (often with
flow-ons to workers covered by state awards); b) industry cases where
the federal industrial tribunal is concerned with setting conditions in a
specific award; and c) over-award negotiations or enterprise-level
negotiations which occur directly between employers and employees
and do not involve an industrial tribunal. Although a greater proportion of workers are covered by state tribunals than federal tribunals,
federal tribunals are generally considered to be more important in the
regulation of wage setting in Australia (see, for example, Dabscheck
and Niland 1981, p. 273). In particular, wage increases granted to
workers covered by federal awards in national wages cases would usually flow on to workers covered by state awards.
The importance of industrial tribunals in wage setting—and hence
the degree of centralization in wage bargaining—has varied over time.
In some periods, uniform national wage increases have constituted the
only source of wage increase for workers covered by awards (wage
indexation phases of 1975–1981 and 1983–1985, for example). At
other times, the most important source of wage increases is from overaward or enterprise-level negotiations (for example, between 1974 and
1975).
Trade unions have a key role in representing workers in bargaining
over terms and conditions of employment in Australia. The important
function of unions, and incentives for union organization, have been
effected through legislation which assures access to industrial tribunals
for registered trade unions and which provides exclusive jurisdiction

They Get Knocked Down. Do They Get Up Again?

317

over members through the process of registration (Creighton, Ford, and
Mitchell 1993, pp. 923–925). The main types of unions in Australia
are occupational unions which cover workers performing tasks in a single generic category (for example, Federated Clerks Union); partial
industrial unions which draw members from a single industry but do
not have exclusive jurisdiction of that industry (for example, Australian Railways Union); and general unions which organize workers irrespective of occupation or industry classification (for example,
Australian Workers’ Union).
As in a number of other industrial countries, union density has
declined in Australia over the past two decades. In 1976, 51 percent of
workers were union members; but by 1996 this had declined to 31 percent (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1996). Between 1990 and 1996 a
dramatic decrease in the number of trade unions (from 299 to 132) also
occurred, largely reflecting a process of union amalgamations.
The description of the regulation of wage setting in Australia
applies to most of the period after the 1940s. Since 1993, however,
there have been a number of important developments in the regulation
of wage bargaining in Australia. Since these developments have not
had a significant effect on wage outcomes until very recently, they are
not directly relevant for the analysis of the experiences of displaced
workers in Australia that will be undertaken in this chapter. Nevertheless it seems worthwhile to present a brief overview of the main
changes. The primary recent developments in federal regulation of
wage bargaining in Australia (Commonwealth Department of Industrial Relations 1996) have been to
• Change legislative provisions for wage bargaining so that enterprise-level bargaining is the main method for workers to obtain
changes in terms and conditions of employment.
• Reduce the role of the federal industrial tribunal in wage setting,
its main function now being to guard the interests of employees
not able to gain wage increases through enterprise bargaining via
arbitration on general “safety net” wage increases.
• Provide scope for employers to enter formal agreements with
workers without a legal requirement for union involvement in the
wage-bargaining process.

318

Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth

Summary
A fair degree of similarity appears to exist between institutional
factors in Britain and Australia. In both countries, levels of employment protection are relatively low. The OECD ranks Britain and Australia as having respectively the fourth and seventh lowest levels of
employment protection out of 20 OECD countries (see Nickell and
Layard 1999). The unemployment benefit system in the two countries
are also quite similar. Benefits are provided for an unlimited period,
but subject to a job-search activity test (which has been progressively
tightened in each country from the 1980s onwards). Benefit replacement rates in both countries are below the OECD average in the first
month of unemployment for single adults and couples with no children.
They are about the same as the OECD average for couples with children. In the sixtieth month benefit replacement rates in Britain and
Australia are above the OECD average for couples both with and without children. The main difference between the two countries appears
to be in wage-setting institutions. Wage setting in Australia—over the
relevant periods for this study—appears to have been more highly regulated than in Britain. There has been a more comprehensive system of
minimum wages in Australia, and wage setting has involved a much
greater role for centralized regulatory bodies. Trends in union density
in the two countries, however, have been quite similar.
What do institutional factors suggest about the experiences of displaced workers in Britain and Australia? First, the similarity in levels
of employment protection indicates that this should not be a source of
significant differences in rates of worker displacement between Britain
and Australia (although employment protection might be important for
explaining differences between these countries and European countries
with much stricter regulation of worker dismissals). Second, differences in wage-setting institutions might be expected to cause differences in the way in which displaced workers respond to job loss. In
particular, the system of minimum wages and centralized wage setting
in Australia—compared to Britain—may reduce the chances that displaced workers find new jobs with earnings below those in their predisplacement jobs. Hence, differences in wage-setting institutions may
cause adjustment to job loss to occur through non-employment to a
greater degree in Australia than Britain. By contrast, the unemploy-
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ment benefit system in each country does not seem likely to be a source
of differences in job-search behavior or non-employment durations of
displaced workers in the two.

RESULTS
This section presents findings on the experiences of displaced
workers in Britain and Australia. The data sources used for the empirical analysis for each country are described, and some descriptive information on the incidence of worker displacement is presented. The
main parts of the empirical analysis involve an examination of the
earnings and employment consequences of job loss for displaced
workers.
Several authors have provided evidence from the United States to
the effect that job displacement involves reductions in wages (Hamermesh 1987; Topel 1991; Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993;
Stevens 1997; Farber 1993, 1997). The reasons advanced for this are
loss of firm-specific human capital, loss of good job-match capital, or
loss of wage premiums. United States evidence also suggests that the
costs of job displacement rise with age, tenure in previous job, and loss
of a union job. Moreover, earnings appear to fall within the job prior to
displacement. Earnings do recover after a new job is secured, but not
all these losses are recouped after reentry. Stevens (1997) suggested
that this occurs largely because of subsequent, repeated job loss.
For Britain, Gregg and Wadsworth (1997) have shown that the
wages of jobs taken by those who were out of work have fallen relative
to others in work. In part this decline is due to higher job-specific
returns, rewards to seniority, and experience at the firm, which cannot
be transferred. As the wage returns to experience rise within any occupation or skill group, then the job currently held is likely to pay more
than any new job gained after a displacement. The longer a worker has
been in the job, the greater this penalty will be if some or all of the
returns to accumulated on-the-job experience are lost in the next job.
So the costs of job loss may be higher among older and more experienced workers or wherever job loss is a relatively rare event.
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Evidence from the United States also suggests that displaced workers experience increases in non-employment and a reduction in hours
of employment following displacement (Swaim and Podgursky 1991;
Ruhm 1991; Farber 1993). Important determinants of the duration of
non-employment for displaced workers appear to be macroeconomic
conditions prevailing at the time of displacement and factors, such as a
worker’s job tenure and union membership status, which affect the
extent of earnings losses from cross-industry mobility (and hence
determine the scope of a displaced worker’s job search).
Kletzer and Fairlie (1998) found that earnings losses for young displaced workers in the United States are substantial and persistent
(around 10 percent five years following job loss). Gustafson (1998)
obtained similar results on earnings losses and also found that young
displaced workers have significantly lower employment probabilities
and (for those obtaining jobs) lower hours of work than young laborforce participants who have not experienced displacement. This
research suggests that young workers potentially have as much to lose
from displacement as their older counterparts.
Britain
Data
There is no equivalent to the Displaced Workers Survey in Britain
with which to try and investigate the costs of displacement. Our estimation of the cost of job loss utilizes the information contained within
the labor market histories embedded in the British Household Panel
Survey, a panel survey of around 5,500 households. The BHPS has
been carried out annually since 1991 and currently runs for six waves.
Information on labor market status for around 8,000 working age individuals—together with gross monthly pay, hours, and other job characteristics, if in work—is recorded between September and December of
each year. Details of any changes in labor market status from the September of the previous year until the interview date are recorded in a
series of job history spell data.3 Data on monthly earnings in each spell
are also recorded, and respondents are asked why they left their previous employment.
Our basic strategy is to compare earnings data in the current job
with earnings in the previous job, with or without an intervening spell
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out of employment. The principal earnings information in the BHPS is
the individual’s usual gross monthly pay in the job. Because hours of
work are only asked at the date of interview and not in the job history
data, we are unable to calculate hourly earnings. There is information
on whether each job is full- or part-time and we use this wherever possible. We exclude those who report very low earnings, below £5 a
week. At these earnings, if true, most recipients will be transitory labor
market participants. Earnings are deflated by the Retail Price Index
into September 1995 prices. Students in full-time education and individuals on maternity leave are removed from the sample, as are those
under the age of 18 and those over pensionable age. Missing data on
several variables, notably previous job tenure, reduce the final sample
to 25,442 person years, of which 791 are displaced workers with
weekly wage information before and after displacement.
We focus on the earnings changes of four groups: 1) workers
reporting no change in employer over the year (stayers);4 2) workers
who lost a job either through redundancy or dismissal (displaced); 3)
workers who came to the end of a temporary contract (temporary); and
4) workers who left their last job for other reasons, such as for family
or health or retirement (leavers). The sum of the displacement, temporary, and leaver rates gives the total separation rate. We also distinguish between those who found a job without an intervening spell of
joblessness and those who did not.
The British institutional system often blurs the distinctions among
the four categories. If employed for less than two years prior to displacement, a worker is not eligible for redundancy pay. Yet the term
“redundancy” is a commonly accepted phrase used to cover any involuntary separation. Also, unlike in the United States, “getting the sack”
is a common phrase that does not necessarily imply that the dismissal
was justified by the behavior of the individual (for example, poor time
keeping). Hence for many workers the terms are essentially interchangeable. We do distinguish, however, between workers displaced
from industries where employment is falling and those displaced from
industries where employment is rising, in an attempt to enforce some
exogeneity over the cause of job loss. Temporary contract holders are
exempt from redundancy rules and so are best looked at separately.
Unlike in continental Europe a temporary contract is not normally a
probationary period prior to starting a permanent job.
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Incidence of displacement
Our first step is to identify the principal characteristics associated
with displacement in Britain. Table 4.1 outlines average annual separation and displacement rates derived from pooling the six years of the
BHPS. We calculate for each wave how many were in work at September 1 of the previous year, and then count how many were observed
separating from that job within a year. On average, one in five
employees, some 5 million workers, separated from their jobs over a
year. Some 4.7 percent of employees lost their jobs each year as the
result of displacement. Of these, one-third did not experience any joblessness (data not shown). The ending of a temporary contract was
around one-third as common as displacement in the stock of jobs as a
whole, but since only 7 percent of employees were on such contracts,
the separation rate is very high. Displacement rates are around 1 percentage point higher in industries in which net employment falls over
the year. One in 8 displacements are classified as sackings by the
respondents but when focusing on those with more than two years of
job tenure this ratio falls to 1 in 12. The final two rows contrast separation rates between industries with growing and falling workforces.
Separation rates in the former are higher, because a larger quit rate
dominates the lower displacement rate.
Men are more than twice as likely to be displaced as women, 6.4
percent compared to 2.9 percent (Table 4.2). The displacement rate for
younger workers, under the age of 25, at 7.3 percent, is nearly twice
that of other age groups. There is less evidence that education affects
displacement. The difference between the highest and lowest education groups, at around 0.7 percentage points, is not large. There is
some variation in displacement rates across industries. Construction
has the highest rate at 13.2 percent and public services the lowest, at
around 1.4. Displacements in the service sector are less common than
in manufacturing. The incidence of displacement falls with job tenure.
There is a 7.9 percent chance that a worker in a job for less than 12
months will lose his or her job and a less than 4 percent chance of displacement for a worker in a job for five years or more. These numbers
are consistent with the findings of Gregg and Wadsworth (1998) for
Britain who used a different data source. Longer job tenure is not associated with a lower likelihood of displacement followed by a spell out
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of employment. This is a little surprising, since longer tenured workers
should have longer official notification periods with which to try and
find alternative work.
In order to determine the principal characteristics associated with
displacement, holding other observed factors constant, we next consider multinomial logit estimates of the probability that, within a year,
the worker will 1) be displaced, 2) quit his or her job, or 3) come to the
end of a temporary contract. The default category is the set of job stayers. Table 4.3 gives the results. The coefficients are marginal effects
relative to the sample mean probabilities of belonging to each category.5 Consistent with Table 4.2, young, single males with less education working in a full-time job in a small firm in manufacturing or
construction with job tenure under two years are all more likely to be
displaced from work, though the gender and age differences are statistically significant only for temporary contract terminations. The last
column of Table 4.3 gives marginal effects from a binary logit estimation of the probability that a displaced worker will find a new job only
after a spell of joblessness. Here we remove those in temporary contracts from the sample so that the base category is the set of displaced
workers who undertake a job-to-job move. The estimates are less precise, but part-time and low-tenured workers appear much more likely
to experience a spell out of work between jobs.
Time out of work
We next examine the duration pattern of joblessness following displacement in more detail. Table 4.4 takes the sample of workers in a
job in September of the year prior to the survey and compares the likelihood of being in work one year later by type of job separation. The
numbers are annual averages over the six waves. Around one-half of
all displaced workers are in employment one year after the initial September observation, compared with around two-thirds of all those who
separate from their jobs. Those displaced workers with no nonemployment spell between jobs are nearly twice as likely to be in work
in the two observation points than displaced workers who are out of
work for some finite length of time.
Kaplan-Meier estimates of monthly survival and hazard rates for
the time taken to return to work, allowing for censoring based on the
Cox likelihood model, are outlined in Table 4.5. We follow Gu and
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Kuhn (1998) by including any displaced workers with no jobless spell
in the likelihood function with duration set to one month and all other
durations increased by one month.6 Any displaced workers not back in
employment are treated as right censored at the number of months of
the ongoing jobless spell. The first observation on the hazard is therefore the proportion of displaced workers who find a new job without a
spell of joblessness (21.6 percent). Thereafter the hazard falls with the
duration of joblessness to around 10 percent at month 10.
The determinants of the probability of displacement and the time
taken to return to work are given in Table 4.6. The first columns
present Cox proportional hazard estimates of jobless duration including job-to-job movers; the second columns exclude job-to-job movers.
Men are both more likely to lose their jobs and are some 10 percent
less likely to return to work. Long job tenure is associated with a
quicker return to work. However, as column 2 shows, once job-to-job
moves are excluded, long job tenure is no longer associated with a
longer period of joblessness.
Earnings consequences of job loss
How much do displaced workers lose? Table 4.7 summarizes the
mean of the difference in weekly log real earnings before and after displacement. As a comparison we show the annual earnings change
recorded for workers who remain in the same job over the year.
Weekly wages of the average displaced worker are around 10 percent
lower in the new job than in the job lost (row 3). If the displaced
worker moves from one full-time job to another, the penalty is only
around 4 percent.7 Weekly earnings of those who remain with their
employer rise by around 5 percent over a year. So displaced workers
not only experience wage losses relative to their previous job but they
also forego general increases in wage levels. The total pay penalty is
then 14 percent and 10 percent for those working full-time both before
and after displacement. For those moving directly from one job to
another the wage falls by just 2 percent. Hence wage falls are mainly
limited to those displaced workers experiencing some time out of
work, and some of the observed fall is due to shorter hours after displacement. The wage gaps for all exits into non-employment (including quits and those leaving temporary jobs) are smaller, which suggests
that displacement does have distinct labor market effects. Those leav-
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ing temporary jobs or quitting a job and moving directly into a new job
achieve wage gains above those staying with the same employer.
There is considerable variation around these averages. Comparison of earnings changes by individual characteristics are given in Table
4.8. Part (a) of the table looks at all reemployed workers; part (b)
restricts attention to workers in full-time jobs both before and after separation. Women experience weekly wage losses around twice those of
men, but the gap is lower for full-time job changes. Older workers and
those out of work longer also face higher pay cuts than the average.
The weekly wage loss for those over 50 is around 18 percent. Education is not correlated with the size of earnings loss. There is little evidence that the pay gap widens with job tenure, beyond one year in the
previous job. Coming from a declining industry also makes little difference. The biggest variations, however, remain where displacement
results in a spell out of work.
We now explore the size of these wage changes, controlling for
observed differences in worker and firm characteristics in Table 4.9.
We present weekly, full-time to full-time moves only and regressions
that control for part-time status, to be as clear as possible about what is
going on. Displacement that results in time out of work remains
strongly significant, but this increases with longer durations out of
work. The biggest falls in earnings are associated with those coming
back into smaller firms than the ones they left. The results do not confirm the effect of job tenure on displacement found elsewhere (Kletzer
1998). Age is a weakly significant determinant of earnings changes
but the point estimates for over 50s are large. Gender only matters for
weekly wages, reflecting a greater propensity for women to return parttime after displacement. Displacement from a declining industry
makes little difference. This is important as displacement here is perhaps a little more exogenous to the abilities of the worker.
Table 4.9 also examines whether there are any distinguishing characteristics between displaced and temporary-contract workers that are
associated with lower earnings on return to work. We present results
for the entire set of displaced and temporary workers with or without a
spell out of work and the subsets who move full-time to full-time. The
results are not always well determined, but the length of time out is
negatively associated with the change in earnings for displaced workers. Those out for more than 12 months experience a cost of job loss
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17 percent greater than displaced workers who move immediately to
another job. For the full-time sample, older workers experience wage
losses around 15 percent above the base group.
Table 4.10 estimates the cost of job loss for displaced workers relative to stayers, conditional on the characteristics outlined in Table 4.8.
We present simple OLS estimates of the difference in log wage growth
between job stayers and displaced workers. Other types of separation
are included as intercept terms. The raw weekly cost is 16.9 percent if
a spell out of work is observed. Controlling for worker and firm characteristics makes little difference to these estimates. Termination of a
temporary contract that results in a spell out of work reduces earnings
growth by only around 2 percent. Moving to a new job directly after
displacement leads to a loss of earnings in the order of 5 percent.
However, compared to those quitting and moving to a new job the gap
is large.
Australia
Data
The empirical analysis in this section draws on two main types of
data. First, we use aggregate-level evidence on the rate of worker displacement and reemployment probabilities for displaced workers,
which are available for various years between 1975 and 1997. Second,
we use individual-level data on earnings and employment outcomes of
young workers in Australia that allow displaced workers to be identified.
The sources for the aggregate-level data are the Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) Labor Mobility Survey, a periodic supplement to
the ABS Labor Force Survey; and two special surveys of displaced
workers, also undertaken as supplements to the ABS Labor Force Survey. The first of these (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993) focused
on the state of Victoria only; the second (Australian Bureau of Statistics 1997) was Australia-wide. The displaced worker surveys collected
information on whether a respondent had been displaced from a job in
the previous three-year period; the characteristics of the job from
which the respondent had been displaced; reason for displacement;
respondent’s labor-force status at the survey date; and the respondent’s
personal characteristics.
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The data source for detailed analysis of displaced workers in Australia is the Youth in Transition Survey (YTS). This is a series of longitudinal surveys conducted by the Australian Council for Educational
Research. Surveys of cohorts born in 1961, 1965, 1970, and 1975 have
been undertaken.8 Individuals in each cohort were initially sampled in
their mid teens (for example, the 1961 cohort were initially sampled as
14-year-olds), and then in each subsequent year through to 1995.9 In
the initial survey for each cohort a range of background information
was collected relating, for example, to country of birth, parents’ educational attainment, and mathematics aptitude. In each subsequent
annual survey two main types of information relevant to this study
were collected. First, respondents completed a diary showing educational and labor-force status in each month throughout the preceding
year. Second, respondents provided information on details of laborforce status, earnings, hours and weeks worked, and occupation in the
survey month (October).
A sample of displaced workers was extracted from the YTS by
defining displacement to occur where being “laid off” was a “very
important” or “fairly important” reason for losing their last job. Information on reason for job loss in the preceding year is available for persons in the 1961 cohort for 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1993, and in the
1965 cohort for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1993. Information on the construction of other variables is presented in the appendix.
Data from the YTS has a number of shortcomings for analyzing
experiences of displaced workers. The primary one is that the sample
is likely to display length sampling bias. That is, since the sample of
displaced workers is drawn from a subset of respondents who were
unemployed at the survey date (only those persons were asked questions about reasons for job loss), displaced workers who have relatively
long spells of unemployment will tend to be overrepresented, and those
with short spells of unemployment will tend to be underrepresented.
To attempt to overcome this problem, each observation is weighted by
the inverse of the duration of the completed non-employment spell.
The rationale for making this correction is that, in a steady state, the
probability of sampling a spell at any instant of time is proportional to
its completed length. Hence, by weighting each observation by the
inverse of its length, the entire density function for completed new
spell durations is obtained.10 For an incomplete spell, a completed
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spell duration is estimated as the weighted average of all completed
spells lasting longer than that incomplete spell. The weights are used
in all subsequent analyses of the sample of displaced workers.11
One aspect of the length bias problem which cannot be addressed
is that—since a displaced worker must be unemployed to be observed
as displaced—there is no information on displaced workers who had an
immediate transition to employment following displacement. For this
reason the results should be interpreted as conditional on experiencing
some joblessness. Two other shortcomings should also be noted. First,
since a question on reason for job loss was asked only in four years for
each cohort, the sample of displaced workers which can be obtained is
quite small. Second, the sample of displaced workers from the YTS is
unrepresentative of the general population of displaced workers in that
it is restricted to a group of relatively young workers who were displaced at trough points in the Australian labor market.12 For example,
Farber (1993) found that the difference in employment outcomes
between displaced and nondisplaced workers is greater during recessions than expansions.
Incidence of displacement
Time-series information on annual rates of job separation from the
ABS Labor Mobility Survey—together with the rate of unemployment—are displayed in Table 4.11. “Rate of job separation—displacements” can be interpreted as the rate of worker displacement. This is
equal to the number of workers who ceased a job during the year
whose reason for ceasing that job was being laid off or a business closure divided by the total number of persons who held a job during the
year. Other rate-of-separation measures are similarly defined.13 It is
evident that the annual rate of aggregate job separation is about 25 percent. The annual rate of job separation due to displacement is about 5
percent; and the rate due to job loss is about 9 percent. The aggregate
rate of job separation is inversely correlated with the rate of unemployment. Job separation rates due to displacement and job loss display a
positive correlation with the rate of unemployment. Over the period
between 1975 and 1997, the aggregate rate of job separation displays a
slight downward trend. The rate of job separation due to displacements
does not show any particular trend.
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Average displacement rates for workers in disaggregated gender
and tenure categories can also be calculated using information from the
ABS Labor Mobility Survey.14 Table 4.12 shows the average rate of
displacement in Australia from 1983 to 1997. A number of findings
emerge. First, displacement declines with years of tenure of an
employee (in particular for employees with up to five years of tenure);
second, the rate of displacement is generally higher for male than
female workers; and third, the amount of cyclical variation in the rate
of displacement is largest (in absolute terms) for workers with low tenure.
Other evidence on the incidence of worker displacement is available from the population surveys of displaced workers undertaken in
Victoria in 1993, and for Australia in 1997. The main findings from
the surveys—summarized in Table 4.13—are that
• Between October 1990 and 1993 about 10 percent of workers in
Victoria were displaced from a job. Between July 1994 and 1997
about 7 percent of workers in Australia were displaced.
• Rates of displacement are higher for male than female workers,
but they do not display a strong correlation with age.
Farber (1997, p. 121) reported that the proportion of persons in the
United States displaced from employment between 1991 and 1993 was
12.8 percent, and between 1993 and 1995 was 15.1 percent. Over the
period from 1981 to 1995 in the United States the three-year displacement rates for various subperiods were found to range from 9.0 to 15.1
percent. Hence it appears that the three-year job displacement rate
found from the Australian displacement survey is quite similar to rates
found for the United States.
Time out of work
Aggregate-level information on labor market outcomes for displaced workers is available from the ABS surveys of retrenched workers. This information—on the labor-force status at the survey date of
workers displaced in the previous three years—is also presented in
Table 4.13. It shows that
• In October 1993 the rate of employment of persons in Victoria
who had been displaced in the previous three-year period was
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50.8 percent; and in July 1997 the rate of employment of persons
displaced in Australia in the previous three years was 54.7 percent.
• The probability of reemployment among displaced workers was
lowest for persons in older age groups (50+ years), whose last job
was in a blue-collar occupation, and who were from a NESB
country. It is higher for men than women, and lower for persons
without postschool qualifications than for those with postschool
qualifications.
Information on the employment status of displaced workers from
the ABS retrenched worker surveys appears comparable to information
presented by Ruhm (1998, Table 4) on the labor-force status at February 1996 of workers displaced in the United States between 1993 and
1995. Ruhm found that 71.6 percent of displaced workers were in
employment at the survey date. This is considerably higher than the
employment ratios for displaced workers of around 50 to 55 percent
found from the Australian surveys. It suggests the possibility that
employment costs of displacement are higher in Australia than the
United States. However, it is also necessary to take into account that
the labor market in the United States was much stronger than in Australia during this period of the mid 1990s, so that at least part of the difference in employment outcomes for displaced workers may be
explained by cyclical factors.
Tables 4.14 to 4.17 present information on labor-force outcomes
for young displaced workers using individual-level data from the YTS.
These tables are based on a sample of persons unemployed at the survey dates who are classified as displaced workers. In the calculations
for each table the weighting method (using the inverse of completed
duration of the spell of non-employment) described above has been
applied.
Table 4.14 presents information on the labor-force status of the
sample of displaced workers at 6 and 12 months after the date of displacement. First, it is clear that a substantial proportion of displaced
workers remain unemployed and out of the labor force in the year after
displacement. Second, there is no significant change in the nonemployment probability of displaced workers between 6 and 12
months. What does happen, however, is that the composition of
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employment for displaced workers in employment shifts to some
degree from part-time to full-time jobs. Third, some effect of educational attainment is apparent—in particular, having completed high
school or having a postschool qualification is associated with a higher
probability of full-time employment for female displaced workers.
An alternative aspect of labor-force transitions for displaced workers is to examine the duration of spells of non-employment which follow displacement. The Kaplan-Meier hazard results for exit from nonemployment and survival function in non-employment for displaced
workers are presented in Table 4.15. Over the 12 months following
displacement the hazard rate displays a downward trend; however,
there is a relatively large degree of month-to-month volatility.
To further explore the process of transition to reemployment,
regression analysis of the determinants of the time to exit from nonemployment for displaced workers has been undertaken. The analysis
involves estimation of a weighted probit regression where the dependent variable is a monthly observation of whether a displaced worker
exited from non-employment in that month, conditional on not having
exited previously. Explanatory variables included are age at time of
displacement, reading and mathematical aptitude test scores (with
interactions with a dummy variable for the 1961 cohort to allow for
differences in the tests between cohorts), rate of unemployment in last
occupation, and dummy variables for gender, year, country of birth,
and whether a respondent completed high school or had a postschool
qualification.
The main results from the regression analysis of determinants of
exit from non-employment are shown in Table 4.16. A first main finding is that—consistent with the Kaplan-Meier hazard function—the
probability of reemployment declines with spell duration. For each
extra month of non-employment the probability of exit from nonemployment declines by about 1 percent (evaluated at the mean value
of other explanatory variables). Alternative specifications of the spellduration variable (quadratic and cubic specifications) were also tested;
however, F-tests could not reject the hypothesis that the extra explanatory terms were insignificant. The second finding is that a range of
other explanatory variables—age, whether completed high school or
have a postschool qualification, gender, and rate of unemployment in
last occupation—are found to affect the probability of exit from non-
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employment. Age is inversely related to the probability of reemployment, suggesting that older displaced workers (more than 30 years old)
find it relatively more difficult to find a new job. One explanation for
this finding may be that rates of job turnover are higher for workers
aged 15–24 years than for those 25–34 years, so that the flow of job
vacancies may also be higher for the younger group of workers (Borland and Kennedy 1998). However, it is important to note that—due to
collinearity between the age and year variables—age is only significant
in specifications without year dummy variables. Hence the age variable may be proxying for year effects. Males who are displaced have a
higher probability of reemployment than do female displaced workers,
and displaced workers in occupations with relatively high rates of
unemployment have a relatively lower probability of reemployment.
Finally, it appears that high-skill workers—who have completed high
school or have a postschool qualification and have higher levels of
aptitude in reading—have higher exit probabilities from non-employment than low-skill workers. Other explanatory variables, such as
reading and math aptitude, are not found to affect the probability of
exit from non-employment.
An alternative perspective on the labor-force experience of displaced workers is to examine average hours and weeks of work in the
period following displacement. Table 4.17 shows the weighted average ratio of weeks and hours of work in the quarter preceding displacement to weeks and hours of work in each of the first eight quarters after
displacement. Displaced workers are found on average to have worse
employment outcomes in every quarter in the two years following displacement than in the quarter preceding displacement. This difference
is generally statistically significant for the first six to seven quarters
following displacement.
Findings from the YTS therefore suggest that the costs to displaced
workers from time out of employment may be quite substantial. However, in interpreting results on employment outcomes for displaced
workers from the YTS, a number of factors must be taken into account.
First, since the sample of displaced workers excludes those who moved
immediately to a new job, the adverse employment consequences of
displacement may be overestimated. Second, labor-force mobility
(transitions into and out of employment, for example) is higher for
younger than older labor-force participants so that the apparent employ-
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ment consequences of displacement may be in some part due to the age
of the sample of workers.
Earnings consequences of job loss
The other main cost of job loss occurs through changes in earnings
following displacement. To address this issue in the YTS, data on
weekly earnings for both displaced and nondisplaced workers can be
taken from the years prior to and following each sample year in which
information on reason for job loss is available. For displaced workers,
weekly earnings in the predisplacement job are observed for the sample of workers who were in their predisplacement job 12 months prior
to the time of the survey question on displacement (that is, in the preceding October). Hence this information on earnings ranges from 1 to
11 months prior to displacement. Weekly earnings in postdisplacement jobs are observed for the samples of workers in employment 12,
24, and 36 months following the time of the survey question on displacement (that is, in October in subsequent years). For nondisplaced
workers, weekly earnings data that will match with data for displaced
workers is obtained by using the same set of years around those sample
years in which information on reason for job loss is available. All displaced and nondisplaced workers with observations on weekly earnings are included in the respective samples.
As an example, for the 1961 cohort, information on reason for job
loss is available in 1981. Hence, information on weekly earnings is
obtained (if available) for 1980, 1982, 1983, and 1984 for all workers
who were displaced and nondisplaced in October 1981. This means
that the sample of nondisplaced workers may include some workers
who experienced job loss during this period but did not have the status
of a displaced worker in October 1981; and it will also include voluntary job switchers. Unfortunately the data set does not allow these separate types of workers to be identified.
Weekly earnings in different years are adjusted to constant dollars,
using the Consumer Price Index. Note that since the information is on
weekly earnings it may reflect changes in weekly hours of work as well
as hourly wage rates. Information on hours of work is not available for
a sufficient number of observations to allow the analysis to be undertaken using hourly wage rates.
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A factor to take into account in interpreting findings on the effect
of job loss on earnings is the potential role of selection effects. One
aspect of selection effects is that to the extent that displaced workers
who obtain reemployment are not representative of all displaced workers—and, as seems likely, are of higher ability than average—the
change in weekly earnings may be an overestimate of the change for all
displaced workers.
Table 4.18 shows the weighted average difference between log real
weekly earnings in displaced workers’ jobs 1–2, 2–3, and 3–4 years
after displacement and log real weekly earnings in the predisplacement
job, and data on average changes in log real weekly earnings for nondisplaced workers taken from the same time periods as for displaced
workers. It is evident that both displaced and nondisplaced workers
experience growth in weekly earnings over time. Some differences,
however, do emerge in comparing earnings changes over time. Focusing on the sample of full-time workers (in order to minimize composition effects) it appears that the difference in earnings outcomes
between displaced and nondisplaced workers tends to increase over
time. In the period 1–2 years after displacement there is no significant
difference in the change in log weekly earnings for displaced and nondisplaced workers. In the period 2–3 years after displacement, earnings of nondisplaced workers are about 7 percent higher than for
displaced workers, and by 3–4 years this difference has become 16 percent. (These latter findings, however, are based on a very small number of observations for displaced workers.)
To conclude the analysis of earnings outcomes for displaced workers, a regression analysis of the determinants of earnings and changes
in earnings was undertaken using data on real weekly earnings predisplacement and 1–2 years postdisplacement. The effect of displacement
is examined by including as an explanatory variable a dummy variable
for whether a worker was classified as displaced at the relevant survey
date.
The findings are presented in Table 4.19. Log weekly earnings in
pre- and postdisplacement years are significantly lower for females
than males, are decreasing with the rates of unemployment in a
worker’s occupation category, higher for full-time than part-time
workers, and follow a quadratic pattern with age. Displaced workers
have lower weekly earnings than nondisplaced workers although the
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effect is only statistically significant for postdisplacement earnings
where year dummies are included as explanatory variables. The
change in log weekly earnings is significantly negatively related to age
(reflecting a decreasing rate of increase in earnings), and is significantly affected by switching between part-time and full-time employment. The effect of displacement on the change in log real weekly
earnings is not statistically significant. Hence these findings provide
some limited evidence that displaced workers have a lower level of
earnings than nondisplaced workers, but little evidence of short-term
earnings losses due to job loss.
Summary
Analysis of the experiences of Australian displaced workers suggests two main findings. First, these workers experience substantial
periods of non-employment following displacement. Second, for
younger displaced workers there do not appear to be significant shortterm earnings consequences from displacement.15 One possible explanation for these findings is the nature of labor market institutions in
Australia. The absence of a wage adjustment for displaced workers —
or more generally in response to adverse demand conditions—would
suggest that adjustment should then take place through employment.
This appears to be consistent with our findings on employment outcomes for displaced workers. It is also worth noting that other casestudy evidence on displaced workers has generally found little effect
on earnings of displaced workers who are reemployed but significant
effects on employment outcomes for displaced workers (see Borland
1998).
As has been noted earlier, it is also necessary, however, to recognize how selection effects might have affected the findings. First, the
sample of displaced workers excludes those workers who shifted to a
new job without an intervening period of non-employment. Second,
the sample of displaced workers in new jobs—from whom earnings
information is obtained—may be of greater average ability than the
entire group of displaced workers. Hence, estimates of the employment and wage costs of job loss for Australia derived in this chapter are
likely, respectively, to over- and underestimate the true consequences.
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CONCLUSIONS
Every year around 5 to 6 percent of workers in Britain and Australia will lose their jobs as a result of layoff, plant closure, or the end of a
contract. Job loss is most likely to occur within the first year of any
job. Most displaced workers will return to work within a year, though
a significant proportion do not.
In Britain, the median length of joblessness is around three months.
Displaced workers will enter jobs that pay weekly wages, on average,
around 10 percentage points less than those they left behind. Compared with those who remain continuously in the same post, the wage
gap is around 15 percent. However, much larger penalties are experienced by displaced workers with longer seniority, and those out of
work for 12 months or more.
In Australia, for the sample of young displaced workers examined,
job loss has significant consequences for future employment. A large
proportion of displaced workers remain out of work for some period
following displacement, and average hours of work per quarter postdisplacement remain below average hours of work in the quarter preceding displacement for the two years after job loss. By contrast, for the
sample of young workers examined, there do not appear to be significant short-term consequences for labor market earnings due to job loss.
What do these findings suggest about the role of institutional factors in determining experiences of displaced workers? Differences
between the data sources make it very difficult to provide any definitive answers to this question. One point to emerge is that rates of separation and worker displacement do appear quite similar in Britain and
Australia for the 1990s. In both countries the average rate of separation is about 20 percent; and the average rate of worker displacement
around 5 percent. Hence displacements constitute about 25 to 30 percent of total separations.
It is more difficult to make comparisons of the process of adjustment to job loss for displaced workers in Britain and Australia. The
case of Australia—with its highly regulated system of wage setting
where there have been relatively large costs to displaced workers in the
form of time out of employment but little apparent effect on earnings
from job loss—does seem consistent with the hypothesis that where
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institutional factors prevent wage adjustment to an adverse demand
shock there will be greater employment adjustment. However, it is
also necessary to note that for Britain there is no evidence of large
earnings losses for young displaced workers. This suggests that it
would be necessary to exercise caution before attributing the absence
of earnings losses in Australia to the effects of wage-setting institutions
rather than to age-specific determinants of the adjustment process.

Notes
We are grateful for many helpful comments from Jaap Abbring and Peter Kuhn. LFS
and BHPS data for Britain are supplied by the ESRC Data Archive at Essex University
with permission of OPCS. YTS data for Australia are supplied by the Australian
Council of Education Research.
1. Specifically, men’s employment rate fell from 74.4 percent in 1978 to 67.4 percent in 1995; women’s increased from 40.5 to 49.7 percent over the same period.
Trends in labor-force participation rates were very similar.
2. The government explicitly recognized this problem in its 1998 budget, raising the
zero contribution threshold by one-third and imposing a flat NIC rate of 12.5 percent on all earnings above this threshold. This change came too late for the period
covered by our data.
3. Attempts to match the current spell in the last wave to a particular spell in the job
history data in the following wave proved fraught with errors. The September
data across the waves matches better. This is because the September first information is requested in every wave. The spell histories then count forward from
this point until the date of interview and backward to September first of the previous year. Matching the current job from the previous wave is hampered both
because the interview date floats between September and April of the following
year and because of resulting recall error in dating events between last September
and the previous interview data. See Halpin (1997) or Paull (1997) on problems
in spell data and recall error across waves in the BHPS.
4. “Stayers” includes individuals promoted within a firm to a new job title.
5. The marginal effect of variable xi on the probability of being in category j, Pj is
given by dPj/dxi = Pj[bj – Σk Pk bk] where bj is the coefficient on variable i in category j. The sample means of the stayer, quit, temporary, and displaced categories
are 0.78, 0.14, 0.03, and 0.03.
6. Gu and Kuhn (1998) pointed out that the Cox likelihood function depends only on
the ranking of the durations and therefore is invariant to the addition of a scalar.
This allows the inclusion of the zero duration job-to-job displaced in the likelihood, unlike other parametric models.
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7. These numbers are similar to the findings of Gregory and Jukes (1997) for unemployed men. There is only a very small hourly wage penalty, on average, to being
displaced but this is mainly a selection effect, as the monthly wage gap is much
smaller for those where hourly wages are defined. t-Tests on the equality of the
means of the stayer and displaced groups confirm that the weekly and hourly
mean pay changes are significantly different in the two groups.
8. Further details on the Youth in Transition survey are available from Marks (various years) and from http://www.acer.edu.au/lsay/longitud.htm.
9. The only exception is that a survey for the 1961 cohort was not undertaken in
1985 or 1988 due to resource constraints.
10. Let f(d) be the density of completed new spell durations, and g(d) be the density
of completed durations of spells observed at any point in time. In a steady state:
f(d) = k(g(d)/d) where k is a constant. Because f(d) must integrate to one, therefore k is equal to the integral over d of g(d)/d. Hence, weighting each observation
by the inverse of its length gives the density for all new completed spell durations.
11 An alternative approach would be to use maximum likelihood techniques to
jointly address the length-sampling bias and censoring issues.
12. Cyclical peaks in the rate of unemployment occurred in quarter 2 of 1983 and
quarter 3 of 1993.
13. “Rate of job separation - aggregate” is equal to the number of workers who ceased
a job during the year divided by the total number of persons who had a job during
the year; and “Rate of job separations - job losers” is equal to the number of workers who ceased a job during the calendar year whose reason for ceasing that last
job was retrenchment or ill health, seasonal or temporary job divided by the total
number of persons who had a job during the year.
14. Average rates of job separation - displacement for employees in disaggregated
tenure (or gender) categories are calculated as
Prob(Dit = 1|Tit = j) = [Prob(Tit = j|Dit = 1) x Prob(Dit = 1)] / [Prob(Tit = j)]
where Prob(Dit = 1|Tit = j) is the probability that an employee is displaced in time
period t given that the employee is in tenure (or gender) category j; Prob(Tit = j|Dit
= 1) is the probability than an employee is in tenure (or gender) category j given
that the employee has been displaced in time period t; and Prob(Dit = 1) and
Prob(Tit = j) are, respectively, the probabilities than an employee is displaced and
that an employee is in tenure (or gender) category j in time period t (Farber 1993,
p. 89).
15. These findings seem consistent with Gray (1999), who finds—using a different
longitudinal data set covering young workers in Australia in the early 1990s—that
in general unemployment experience does not have a strong effect on future
hourly wages, but does have a significant influence on future hours of work.

Table 4.1 Average Annual Separation and Displacement Rates in Britain, 1990–96 (%)
Job to job

Categories

Total
separations Total

All industries

Exit
Displacements

Temp.
job

Quit

Total

Redundant

Sack

Displacements

Total

Temp.
job

Quit

Total

Redundant

All
displaceSack
ments

20.9

11.9

0.7

9.8

1.6

1.4

0.2

9.0

0.9

5.0

3.1

2.7

0.4

4.7

Declining
industry

19.4

10.9

0.7

9.8

1.6

1.4

0.2

8.2

0.7

4.0

3.5

3.2

0.3

5.1

Growing
industry

22.8

12.9

0.7

9.8

1.5

1.3

0.2

9.9

1.0

6.1

2.8

2.3

0.5

4.3

All industries

15.9

8.7

0.4

7.1

1.2

1.1

0.1

7.1

0.3

4.3

2.5

2.3

0.2

4.0

Declining
industry

14.8

8.2

0.4

6.5

1.3

1.2

0.1

6.5

0.2

3.4

2.9

2.7

0.2

4.5

Growing
industry

17.0

9.2

0.3

7.8

1.1

1.0

0.1

7.7

0.4

5.2

2.1

1.9

0.2

3.5

Tenure in
previous jobs ≥2

SOURCE: BHPS.
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Table 4.2 Separation and Displacement Rates by Worker and Firm Characteristics in Britain
Separation rate

Displacement
rate

Job-to-job
displacement

Exit and
displacement

% job to job in
displacements

Female

18.6

2.9

1.0

1.9

35.0

Male

23.1

6.4

2.1

4.3

32.7

Youths <25

35.9

7.3

2.1

5.1

29.8

Prime 25–49

18.9

4.3

1.6

2.7

37.6

Mature 50+

16.9

4.4

1.1

3.3

23.9

Single

26.1

5.8

1.8

4.0

30.6

Married

18.8

4.4

1.5

2.8

34.7

None

19.0

5.5

1.4

4.1

26.0

Lower Intermed.

21.8

4.8

1.7

3.1

35.6

Upper Intermed.

19.2

2.6

1.1

1.5

41.2

Degree

20.6

6.2

2.0

4.2

31.9

Category
Gender

Age (yr.)

Marital status

Qualifications

Job tenure (yr.)
<1

35.9

7.9

2.8

5.1

36.0

≥1 – <2

23.8

5.3

1.7

3.6

31.5

≥2 – <5

16.7

3.7

1.1

2.6

30.9

≥5 – <10

13.1

3.3

1.2

2.1

37.2

10+

13.6

3.5

1.0

2.5

28.5

Agriculture/energy

18.3

5.4

2.0

3.3

38.0

Manufacturing

21.9

7.8

2.1

5.6

27.6

Construction

36.9

13.2

5.0

8.2

37.7

Distribution

24.4

5.0

1.9

3.1

37.4

Transport

18.7

4.7

1.7

3.0

36.5

Banking

22.8

4.8

2.0

2.8

42.1

Private services

23.9

2.5

1.2

1.2

50.0

Public services

14.6

1.4

0.4

1.0

27.7

Industry
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Table 4.3 Who Is Displaced? Multinomial Logit and Binary Logit
Estimates for Britain
Multinomial logit

Independent variables
Characteristic
Male
Single
Children
Age 25–49 yr.
Age ≥ 50 yr.
Qualifications
Upper intermed.
Lower level
None
Occupation
Professional
Other nonmanual
Unskilled manual
Job tenure (yr.)
<1
1–2
5–10
10+

Quit

Temporary

Displaced

Binary logit
Prob. (jobless
spell), given
displaced

–0.042**
(0.004)
–0.001
(0.005)
–0.044**
(0.005)
0.032**
(0.008)
–0.009
(0.007)

–0.003
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
0.004**
(0.001)
0.010**
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.004
(0.003)
0.001
(0.003)
0.003
(0.004)
–0.001
(0.003)

0.075
(0.045)
0.004
(0.050)
0.049
(0.047)
0.052
(0.082)
–0.056
(0.065)

–0.030**
(0.008)
–0.018**
(0.006)
–0.034**
(0.009)

–0.006**
(0.002)
–0.010**
(0.002)
–0.011**
(0.002)

0.009**
(0.004)
0.006
(0.004)
0.012**
(0.004)

–0.013
(0.085)
–0.003
(0.073)
0.058
(0.091)

0.010
(0.008)
0.044**
(0.008)
0.035**
(0.006)

0.005
(0.003)
0.012**
(0.002)
0.007**
(0.002)

0.005
(0.003)
0.005
(0.004)
0.005
(0.003)

0.017
(0.067)
–0.023
(0.067)
–0.077
(0.055)

0.049**
(0.005)
0.013**
(0.006)
–0.056**
(0.007)
–0.068**
(0.008)

0.016**
(0.002)
–0.001
(0.001)
–0.017**
(0.003)
–0.023**
(0.004)

0.028**
(0.003)
0.006**
(0.003)
–0.009**
(0.003)
–0.008**
(0.003)

0.220**
(0.048)
0.073
(0.058)
–0.106
(0.068)
–0.193**
(0.077)
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Multinomial logit

Independent variables
Industry
Agriculture/energy
Manufacturing
Construction
Retail
Transport
Financial sector
Private services
Industry declining
Firm size
<10

343

Quit

Temporary

Displaced

Binary logit
Prob. (jobless
spell), given
displaced

0.004
(0.007)
0.005
(0.007)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.050**
0(.006)
0.010
(0.010)
0.018**
(0.007)
0.061**
(0.009)
–0.015**
(0.004)

0.007**
(0.003)
–0.001
(0.002)
0.005
(0.003)
–0.002
(0.002)
–0.001
(0.003)
–0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
–0.005
(0.003)

0.030**
(0.007)
0.040**
(0.003)
0.049**
(0.005)
0.034**
(0.004)
0.028**
(0.005)
0.028**
(0.004)
0.029**
(0.007)
0.002
(0.002)

–0.022
(0.128)
–0.023
(0.092)
–0.217**
(0.108)
–0.061
(0.090)
–0.167
(0.114)
–0.149
(0.097)
–0.082
(0.119)
0.025
(0.046)

0.035**
0.001
0.011**
–0.005
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.053)
10–25
0.014**
0.003**
0.008**
–0.006
(0.005)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.054)
Part-time
–0.121**
–0.004**
–0.014**
0.310**
(0.007)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.083)
N
23,346
781
Psuedo R
0.095
0.135
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Coefficients in logits are marginal effects
and their standard errors relative to sample mean of each category. Equations also
include controls for region and year. ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from BHPS data.
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Table 4.4 Labor-Force Status One Year Later in Britain
(annual averages)
Group

Self-employed

Employed

Unemployed

Inactive

6.3

65.3

15.9

12.5

All separations
All displaced
Job to job
Exit

7.0

53.6

34.9

4.5

13.4

79.5

5.2

1.9

3.8

40.5

49.9

5.8

All not displaced
Job to job

7.8

88.6

2.8

0.8

Temporary job

8.6

84.3

6.6

0.5

Not temporary job

7.8

88.9

2.5

0.8

2.9

33.6

23.6

39.8

Temporary job

4.7

47.0

35.6

12.7

Not temporary job

2.6

31.3

21.5

44.6

Exit

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from BHPS data.

Table 4.5 Kaplan-Meier Estimates of Hazard and Survival Rate of
Return to Work in Britain
Time out after displacement
(months)

Hazard rate

Survival rate

0

0.366

0.633

1

0.204

0.504

2

0.178

0.414

3

0.201

0.331

4

0.154

0.279

5

0.128

0.243

6

0.172

0.202

7

0.120

0.178

8

0.110

0.158

9

0.132

0.137

10

0.106

0.123

NOTE: Job-to-job moves all measured as ending spell at month 0. Initial sample =
853, of which 313 are job-to-job, 475 displaced, and 75 right-censored.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.6 Cox Estimates of Time to Return to Work for Displaced
Workers in Britain
Including job-to-job movers

Independent variables

Coeff.
(std. err.)

Fraction
of
baseline

Excluding job-to-job movers
Coeff.
std. err.)

Fraction
of
baseline

Male

0.049
(0.089)

1.05

0.093
(0.119)

1.09

Single

–0.010
(0.093)

0.99

–0.014
(0.122)

0.98

Children

–0.241**
(0.091)

0.79

–0.304**
(0.121)

0.74

Age 25–49 yr.

0.252
(0.157)

1.28

0.321
(0.194)

1.38

Age ≥ 50 yr.

0.367**
(0.128)

1.44

0.338 **
(0.170)

1.40

Upper intermed.

–0.065
(0.167)

0.94

0.001
(0.230)

1.00

Lower level

–0.061
(0.143)

0.94

0.019
(0.200)

1.01

None

–0.036
(0.174)

0.96

0.134
(0.234)

1.14

Professional

–0.010
(0.131)

0.99

0.016
(0.172)

1.01

Other nonmanual

–0.200
(0.131)

0.82

–0.362**
(0.171)

0.70

Unskilled manual

–0.059
(0.110)

0.94

–0.233
(0.150)

0.79

<1

–0.496**
(0.095)

0.61

–0.481**
(0.124)

0.62

1–2

–0.187
(0.116)

0.83

–0.198
(0.155)

0.82

5–10

0.167
(0.134)

1.18

0.072
(0.206)

1.07

Qualifications

Occupation

Job tenure (yr.)

(continued)

346

Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth

Table 4.6 (continued)
Including job-to-job movers

Independent variables
10+

Coeff.
(std. err.)

Fraction
of
baseline

Excluding job-to-job movers
Coeff.
(std. err.)

Fraction
of
baseline

0.076
(0.151)

1.07

–0.264
(0.247)

0.77

Agriculture/energy

0.376
(0.249)

1.45

0.489
(0.329)

1.63

Manufacturing

0.330
(0.173)

1.39

0.369
(0.224)

1.44

Construction

0.525**
(0.207)

1.69

0.425
(0.281)

1.52

Retail

0.315
(0.171)

1.37

0.326
(0.221)

1.39

Transport

0.444**
(0.214)

1.55

0.404
(0.291)

1.50

Financial sector

0.369**
(0.184)

0.45

0.196
(0.246)

1.22

Private services

0.706**
(0.228)

2.02

0.852**
(0.313)

2.35

Industry declining

–0.046
(0.090)

0.95

–0.002
(0.114)

1.00

<10

–0.076
(0.103)

0.93

–0.129
(0.138)

0.88

10–25

–0.053
(0.102)

0.94

–0.116
(0.134)

0.89

–0.544**
(0.141)

0.58

–0.299
(0.166)

0.75

Industry

Firm size

Part-time

N

853

540

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Additional coefficients in Cox are measured relative to baseline hazard. Equations also include controls for region and year.
** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.7 Mean Log Weekly Wage Growth by Labor Market Status
in Britain
Mean changea

Full time – full timeb

Stayers (22,113)

0.045
(0.302)

0.055
(0.283)

All exits (1,770)

–0.073
(0.582)

–0.004
(0.503)

All displacements (791)

–0.097
(0.581)

–0.044
(0.509)

Job to job (297)

–0.015
(0.486)

0.009
(0.469)

Exit (494)

–0.146
(0.626)

–0.081
(0.534)

All temporary (485)

0.013
(0.552)

0.086
(0.495)

Job to job (199)

0.066
(0.553)

0.098
(0.502)

Exit (286)

–0.023
(0.548)

0.076
(0.491)

–0.052
(0.566)
0.210
(0.572)

0.013
(0.487)
0.237
(0.554)

Labor market status

Exit and quit (990)
Job to job and quit (1,754)
a

Sample size in parentheses.
Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

b

348

Borland, Gregg, Knight, and Wadsworth

Table 4.8a Mean Weekly Wage Growth by Labor Market
Status in Britain (%)
Job to job
and
displaced

Stayers

All
displaced

Exit and
displaced Temporary

Women

4.9

–15.9

–4.3

–24.7

–0.1

–6.4

Men

4.2

–6.2

0.4

–9.7

3.8

–4.0

Youths (< 25)

10.7

–5.2

1.8

–7.9

4.3

–3.4

Prime (25–49)

4.4

–9.6

0.0

–16.1

0.9

–2.9

Mature (50+)

1.3

–18.0

–15.1

–19.8

–6.4

–20.9

<6 months

n.a.a

–11.8

n.a.

–11.8

–1.9

–12.4

6+ months

n.a.

–15.6

n.a.

–15.6

–5.2

–24.0

None

2.6

–10.2

–0.5

–16.4

–8.8

–7.5

0 level and
equiv.

5.0

–10.0

–2.3

–14.5

1.2

–4.0

A level/degree

4.5

–8.6

–0.2

–13.8

7.4

–8.1

<1

6.1

–13.3

–3.9

–16.4

0.8

–3.7

≥1 – <2

6.4

–7.7

–4.0

–9.8

3.6

0.4

Other
exits

Independent
variables

Age (yr.)

Time out

Education

Job tenure (yr.)

≥2 – <5

5.1

–6.5

3.5

–14.1

6.4

–5.8

≥5 – <10

2.7

–7.9

–1.9

–15.9

–13.2

–8.6

Expanding
ind.

5.1

–8.2

0.9

–14.3

2.7

–4.0

Declining ind.

3.9

–10.7

–3.4

–14.7

–0.2

–6.3

Industry

a

n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.8b Mean Log Weekly Wage Changes: Full-Time to Full-Time
in Britain (%)
Job to job
All
and
Exit and
Other
Stayers displaced displaced displaced Temporary exits
Independent
variables
Women

7.0

–5.6

0.4

–12.3

10.1

2.5

Men

4.6

–3.9

1.2

–6.8

7.4

0.3

Youths (<25)

11.7

3.2

7.0

1.7

14.8

4.4

Prime (25–49)

5.2

–5.6

0.8

–10.7

6.5

2.3

Mature (50+)

2.7

–11.5

–7.1

–14.6

–0.7

–11.0

<6 months

n.a.a

–7.3

n.a.

–7.3

7.8

–0.4

6+ months

n.a.

–8.4

n.a.

–8.4

5.8

–15.3

None

3.3

–2.3

7.5

–10.4

–5.8

–2.1

0 level and
equiv.

6.1

–6.7

–2.0

–9.9

10.0

1.1

A level/degree

5.4

0.5

3.4

–1.6

13.2

2.3

<1

7.6

–5.7

–3.1

–6.8

9.1

3.7

≥1 – <2

6.9

0.5

–0.3

1.0

14.2

4.2

Age

Time out

Education

Job tenure (yr.)

≥2 – <5

6.1

–5.2

5.2

–14.3

4.9

–1.4

5+

3.5

–6.5

0.5

–17.5

3.6

0.6

Expanding ind.

6.5

–2.6

3.0

–7.2

10.1

3.0

Declining ind.

4.7

–5.6

–0.8

–8.6

6.9

–0.2

Industry

a

n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.9 OLS Log Wage-Growth Regressions for Separating Groups
in Britain
Independent variables
Constant
Male
Age 25–49 yr.
Age 50+ yr.
Higher intermediate
Degree
Tenure 2–5 yr.
Tenure 5+ yr.
Firm size down
Industry declining
Out <6 mo.
Out 6–12 mo.
Out 12+ mo.
Part-time then
Part-time now

Displaced
All
FT-FTa
0.089
0.101
(0.066)
(0.069)
0.018
0.050
(0.042)
(0.042)
–0.063
–0.098
(0.052)
(0.056)
–0.112
–0.152 **
(0.070)
(0.071)
0.050
0.072
(0.044)
(0.044)
0.081
–0.016
(0.053)
(0.053)
0.004
–0.030
(0.054)
(0.054)
0.019
–0.075
(0.093)
(0.040)
–0.102**
–0.021
(0.039)
(.039)
–0.012
–0.106
(0.039)
(0.046)
–0.096**
–0.105**
(0.045)
(0.046)
–0.113 **
–0.110**
(0.054)
(0.055)
–0.179
–0.170**
(0.110)
(0.111)
0.519**
—
(0.147)
–0.611**
—
(0.147)

Temporary contract
All
FT-FT
0.105
0.197**
(0.072)
(0.070)
–0.002
–0.003
(0.052)
(0.054)
–0.012
–0.094
(0.056)
(0.056)
–0.049
–0.133
(0.089)
(0.094)
0.065
0.061
(0.056)
(0.059)
–0.155
–0.191
(0.236)
(0.293)
0.025
–0.063
(0.077)
(0.079)
–0.082
–0.049
(0.106)
(0.122)
–0.086
–0.089
(0.052)
(0.050)
–0.002
–0.012
(0.048)
(0.050)
–0.040
–0.035
(0.065)
(0.067)
–0.040
–0.047
(0.063)
(0.064)
0.314
0.141
(0.191)
(0.223)
0.139
—
(0.131)
–0.496**
—
(0.085)

R2
0.150
0.027
0.131
0.025
N
791
688
485
398
NOTE: White adjusted standard errors in parentheses. ** = Statistically significant at
the 5% level.
a
FT = Full-time.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.10 OLS Log Wage-Change Estimates for Britain
Independent variables

All

FT–FT

Constant

0.046**
(0.002)

0.095**
(0.006)

0.044**
(0.003)

0.088**
(0.006)

Job to job and displaced

–0.061**
(0.028)

–0.054**
(0.027)

–0.061**
(0.026)

–0.055*
(0.028)

Exit and displaced

–0.169**
(0.028)

–0.169**
(0.026)

–0.131**
(0.023)

–0.152**
(0.027)

Job to job and temp.

0.020
(0.039)

0.022
(0.038)

0.009
(0.032)

0.015
(0.036)

Exit and temp.

–0.069**
(0.034)

–0.040
(0.031)

0.042
(0.033)

–0.013
(0.034)

Exit and quit

–0.098**
(0.018)

–0.0077**
(0.017)

–0.047**
(0.016)

–0.057**
(0.016)

Job to job and quit

0.164**
(0.014)

0.161**
(0.015)

0.166**
(0.013)

0.159**
(0.014)

Men

—

–0.025**
(0.005)

—

–0.020**
(0.005)

Youth (<25 yr.)

—

0.058*
(0.007)

—

0 .068**
(0.007)

Age (50+ yr.)

—

–0.024**
(0.006)

—

–0.023**
(0.006)

Degree

—

–0.001
(0.005)

—

–0.014**
(0.006)

≤2 – <5

—

–0.012**
(0.006)

—

–0.014**
(0.006)

≤5 – <10

—

–0.025**
(0.005)

—

–0.025**
(0.006)

Industry declining

—

–0.020**
(0.004)

—

–0.016**
(0.005)

Sample size

25,276

25,276

22,424

22,424

R2

0.023

0.101

0.026

0.036

Previous tenure (yr.)

NOTE: White adjusted standard errors in parentheses. A dash (–) means the variable
was not included. ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.11 Annual Rates of Job Separation

Year

a

Unemployment
rate

Rate of separation
Displaced

Job losers

Aggregate

1975

4.6

5.9

9.8

24.9

1976

4.7

n.d.a

n.d.

n.d.

1977

5.7

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

1978

6.2

5.7

9.5

24.8

1979

5.9

5.1

8.5

23.0

1980

5.9

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

1981

5.6

4.4

6.2

25.0

1982

6.7

7.2

10.2

24.8

1983

9.9

5.6

8.4

22.4

1984

8.5

4.7

8.0

23.3

1985

7.9

4.1

7.6

24.6

1986

8.0

4.6

8.8

24.5

1987

7.8

4.4

9.0

25.4

1988

6.8

4.1

7.6

26.2

1989

5.7

4.4

9.3

25.5

1990

7.0

6.5

10.1

23.2

1991

9.5

6.4

10.1

21.4

1992

10.5

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

1993

10.7

5.4

9.3

22.2

1994

9.2

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

1995

8.1

4.6

8.7

23.0

1996

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

n.d.

1997

8.4

4.4

7.6

21.4

n.d. = No data available.
SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Labor Mobility Survey, various years.

Table 4.12 Average Rate of Job Displacement in Australia from 1983 to 1997
1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Male

0.059

0.043

0.046

0.045

0.073

0.060

0.052

0.048

Female

0.050

0.038

0.041

0.043

0.052

0.043

0.039

0.038

<1

0.136

0.096

0.097

0.095

0.131

0.104

0.098

0.096

≥1 – <3

0.051

0.036

0.042

0.044

0.084

0.062

0.045

0.046

≥3 – <5

0.040

0.022

0.030

0.023

0.045

0.044

0.028

0.031

≥5 – <10

0.023

0.016

0.019

0.017

0.028

0.027

0.024

0.026

10+

0.020

0.015

0.012

0.014

0.029

0.024

0.020

0.020

Gender

Tenure (yr.)

SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics, various years, Catalogue no. 6209.0.
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Table 4.13 Incidence of Displacement and Reemployment of Displaced
Workers in Australia
Probability of
displacement

Probability of
reemployment at
survey date

0.108

0.508

Male

0.129

0.525

Female

0.082

0.472

18–24

0.103

0.501

25–34

0.117

0.597

35–44

0.105

0.571

45–54

0.100

0.471

55–64

0.122

0.197

—

0.584

Population
Victoria: 1990–93
Total
Gender

Age (yr.)

Education
Univ. degree +
Trade qualification

—

0.648

Completed H.S.

—

0.490

Not completed H.S.

—

0.358

Immigrant – ESB

—

0.581

Immigrant – NESBb

—

0.418

<1

—

0.430

≥1 – <3

—

0.595

≥3 – <5

—

0.581

Country of birth
Australia

0.528
a

Tenure (yr.)

≥5 – <10

—

0.587

10+

—

0.386

Occupation
Manager/professional

—

0.591

Tradesperson

—

0.604

Clerical/sales

—

0.517

They Get Knocked Down. Do They Get Up Again?

Probability of
displacement

Probability of
reemployment at
survey date

—

0.383

0.073

0.547

Male

0.091

0.552

Female

0.052

0.536

Total

0.078

0.536

Male

0.098

0.560

Female

0.055

0.466

18–24

—

0.486

25–34

—

0.593

35–44

—

0.620

45–54

—

0.575

55–64

—

0.326

<1

—

0.451

≥1 – <3

—

0.606

≥3 – <5

—

0.634

≥5 – <10

—

0.626

10+

—

0.579

Population
Plant and machine operators,
laborers etc.
Australia: 1994–97
Total
Gender

Victoria: 1994–97

Age (yr.)

Tenure (yr.)

Occupation

a

Manager/professional

—

0.648

Tradesperson

—

0.591

Clerical/sales

—

0.550

Plant and machine operators,
laborers, etc.

—

0.452

ESB = English-speaking background.
NESB = Non-English-speaking background.
SOURCE: Australian Bureau of Statistics 1993, 1997.

b
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Table 4.14 Labor Force Status of Displaced Workers in Australia
Employed,
full-time

Employed,
part-time

Unemployed

Out of
labor force

Male

0.44

0.18

0.26

0.12

198

Female

0.36

0.21

0.31

0.12

178

NCHS

0.43

0.15

0.30

0.12

104

CHS/postschool qualif.

0.46

0.21

0.22

0.11

94

NCHS

0.27

0.25

0.35

0.13

73

CHS/postschool qualif.

0.42

0.19

0.29

0.10

105

Male

0.51

0.10

0.22

0.17

179

Female

0.43

0.09

0.26

0.22

162

Population

No. of
observations

Six months after displacement
Aggregate

Educational attainment
Male

Female

Twelve months after displacement
Aggregate

Educational attainment
Male
NCHS

0.48

0.13

0.21

0.18

88

CHS/postschool qualif.

0.54

0.07

0.22

0.17

91

NCHS

0.28

0.08

0.38

0.24

60

CHS/postschool qualif.

0.52

0.10

0.19

0.19

92

Female
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Table 4.15 Estimated Kaplan-Meier Hazard and Survival Rate of Return
to Work in Australia
Time out after displacement
(months)

Hazard rate

Survival rate

1

0.284

0.716

2

0.168

0.596

3

0.241

0.454

4

0.184

0.365

5

0.145

0.314

6

0.134

0.274

7

0.114

0.246

8

0.108

0.224

9

0.183

0.190

10

0.083

0.178

11

0.065

0.170

12

0.159

0.151

NOTE: Sample size is 390, of whom 305 are observed returning to work. Maximum
observed duration in sample is 40 months.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 4.16 Determinants of Probability of Exit from Non-employment—
Marginal Effects for Australia
Covariates
Year dummies

Col. 1

2

No

Yes

Observations

4,403

4,403

Spell duration

–0.0082**
(0.0010)

–0.0077**
(0.0010)

Age

–0.0063**
(0.0019)

0.0078
(0.0222)

Immigrant

–0.0458
(0.0246)

–0.0382
(0.0243)

Completed high school/postschool
qualification

0.0307**
(0.012)

0.0342**
(0.0123)

Reading aptitude

0.0028
(0.0026)

0.0040
(0.0027)

Reading aptitude × cohort 1

0.0001
(0.0031)

–0.0019
(0.0038)

Math aptitude

0.0024
(0.0020)

0.0016
(0.0021)

Math aptitude × cohort 1

–0.0005
(0.0021)

–0.0007
(0.0030)

Female

–0.0238**
0.0115)

–0.0271**
(0.0115)

Rate of unemployment in last occupation

–0.0074**
(0.0023)

–0.0074**
(0.0025)

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects are calculated at average
values of other explanatory variables. Marginal effects for dummy variables are for
effect of a change from 0 to 1 in that variable. ** = Statistically significant at the 5%
level.
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Table 4.17 Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Work Time in Australia (ratio of worktime in quarter
postdisplacement to worktime in quarter prior to displacement)
Quarter
postdisplacement

Total hours
All

Males

Total weeks
Females

All

Males

Observations
Females

All

Males

Females

1

0.213**

0.214**

0.220**

0.221**

0.203**

0.223**

389

205

184

2

0.518**

0.533**

0.519**

0.556**

0.585**

0.520**

377

198

179

3

0.576**

0.591**

0.578**

0.598**

0.599**

0.597**

354

189

165

4

0.631**

0.649**

0.631**

0.619**

0.651**

0.578**

345

183

162

5

0.701**

0.740**

0.676**

0.677**

0.727**

0.616**

332

176

156

6

0.717**

0.802**

0.630

0.703**

0.776**

0.610**

309

165

144

7

0.743**

0.780

0.718

0.723**

0.767

0.664

276

152

124

8

0.791

0.831

0.764

0.748

0.796

0.684

268

148

120

12.06

a

n.a.

n.a.

Average
predisplacement

425.13

433.97

398.34

NOTE: ** = Statistically significant at the 5% level.
n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations
a

12.06

12.06

n.a.

Table 4.18 Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Average Log Weekly Earnings in Australia (postdisplacement
job minus predisplacement job)
Years after
displacement

Full-time + part-time
All

Males

Full-time
Females

All

Males

Females

1 – <2 yr.
Displaced
Difference
No. of obs.

0.456
(0.058)
94

0.456
(0.070)
61

0.455
(0.112)
33

0.342
(0.048)
74

0.355
(0.064)
47

0.312
(0.060)
16

Nondisplaced
Difference

0.428
(0.017)

No. of obs.

1,085

0.407
(0.022)
539

0.449
(0.026)
546

0.324
(0.014)
921

0.336
(0.019)
492

0.310
(0.019)
429

≥2 – <3 yr.

Displaced
Difference
No. of obs.

0.593
(0.063)
56

0.637
(0.086)
35

0.518
(0.101)
21

0.460
(0.061)
43

0.511
(0.073)
28

0.366
(0.113)
15

Nondisplaced
Difference
No. of obs.

0.700
(0.024)
670

0.700
(0.034)
329

0.700
(0.035)
341

0.537
(0.019)
549

0.561
(0.027)
282

0.511
(0.028)
267
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Table 4.18 (continued)
Years after
displacement

Full-time + part-time
All

Males

Full-time
Females

All

Males

Females

≥3 – <4 yr.

Displaced
Difference
Obs.

0.764
(0.123)
33

0.723
(0.159)
19

0.819
(0.193)
14

0.581
(0.100)
27

0.592
(0.145)
17

0.561
(0.191)
10

Nondisplaced
Difference
Obs.

0.903
(0.032)
412

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.

0.877
(0.042)
207

0.929
(0.050)
205

0.746
(0.026)
345

0.775
(0.035)
181

0.713
(0.036)
164

Table 4.19 Determinants of Ratio of Predisplacement and Postdisplacement Weekly Earnings in Australia
Dependent
variable
Explanatory
variablesa

Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr.
postdisplacement)

Log (weekly earnings
predisplacement)

Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr.
postdisplacement/weekly
earnings predisplacement)

Year dummies

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Observations

1,177

1,177

1,177

1,177

1,177

1,177

Constant

–2.806**
(0.759)

–3.136**
(0.937)

1.013
(0.596)

2.082**
(0.771)

1.222**
(0.106)

1.310**
(0.324)

Displaced

–0.137
(0.084)

–0.199**
(0.084)

–0.084
(0.066)

–0.055
(0.070)

0.007
(0.089)

0.070
(0.091)

Female

–0.086**
(0.025)

–0.068**
(0.024)

–0.092**
(0.019)

–0.093
(0.020)

–0.003
(0.027)

–0.022
(0.026)

Age

0.517**
(0.066)

0.547**
(0.082)

0.257**
(0.052)

0.154**
(0.068)

–0.036**
(0.003)

–0.044**
(0.017)

Age2

–0.008
(0.001)

–0.008**
(0.001)

–0.003**
(0.001)

–0.001
(0.001)

—

—

Complete H.S./postschool qualifications

–0.012
(0.026)

–0.010
(0.025)

–0.011
(0.021)

–0.010
(0.021)

–0.006
(0.028)

–0.008
(0.027)

Rate of unemployment in
last occupation

–0.014**
(0.004)

–0.002
(0.004)

–0.011**
(0.003)

–0.011**
(0.004)

0.003
(0.005)

–0.009
(0.005)
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Table 4.19 (continued)
Dependent
variable
Explanatory
variablesa

Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr.
postdisplacement)

Log (weekly earnings
predisplacement)

Log (weekly earnings 1–2 yr.
postdisplacement/weekly
earnings predisplacement)

Immigrant

0.023
(0.044)

0.024
(0.042)

0.012
(0.034)

0.015
(0.034)

FT

1.007**
(0.034)

1.067**
(0.033)

0.056**
(0.031)

0.086*
(0.031)

FT to FT

—

—

—

—

–0.090
(0.054)

–0.139**
(0.053)

FT to PT

—

—

—

—

–0.859**
(0.082)

–0.914**
(0.079)

PT to FT

—

—

—

—

0.926**
(0.067)

0.934**
(0.065)

0.720

0.750

0.652

0.654

Adj. R2

F-statistic

380.39**

268.79**

277.49**

172.45*

–0.007
(0.047)
—

–0.007
(0.046)
—

0.427

0.421

98.44**

75.01**

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. A dash (—) means the variable was not included. ** = Statistically significant at the 5%
level.
a
FT = full-time; PT = part-time.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Appendix
Data Construction
BRITAIN
Each wave of the BHPS has an individual file and a job-history file. The
individual file contains three reference points about jobs, the current job, the
Sept. 1 this year job and the Sept. 1 last year job. Each of these has a job identifier, in the form of the spell number in the spell history that relates to this reference point. For some individuals whose current state is the same as that in
the previous year, the current spell identifier in later waves links these jobs.
Otherwise, linking job spells between waves is tenuous, based upon matching
information about the jobs. The simplest way to join the waves is to assume that
the Sept. 1 reference points can be reasonably linked. Thus the Sept. 1 this year
of the previous wave should correspond to the Sept. 1 last year of the current
wave.
Problems can arise, resulting from the nature of the current job, which corresponds to the interview date in that wave. This job spell has the only recorded
information about certain important job-description variables, specifically the
variables for the number of hours worked, full-time or part-time status, temporary or permanent status, and union membership. Only six observation points
are available for these variables. It can be difficult to match this current job
spell to a subsequent wave, except by matching such basic information about
the jobs as the start date, occupation, and industry. Inconsistencies in recorded
information can make this very difficult, since even the labor-force state for the
spell does not always match for the best link points of Sept. 1 this year and Sept.
1 last year. The design of the survey provides some overlap information when
the waves are linked, and also when the job history is linked to the individual
response, such that corresponding dates or periods of any state might be
matched.
DEFINING DISPLACEMENT
To define a displaced worker, responses are coded on the basis of a selfdefined “reason for leaving last job” question.1 The range of classifications allows us to separate layoffs from redundancy and end-of-temporary-job-contract. In Britain the two categories layoffs and redundancy are usually
synonymous. “Short-term layoffs,” after which workers can be recalled to the
same job, do not usually occur in Britain. Britain also differs from many main-
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land European countries, in which (sometimes enshrined in law) short-term
contracts must be followed by a permanent job if the contract is renewed.
Short-term contracts are used in Britain but they are not linked explicitly to any
future permanent status.
The tenure of the job is an important part of statutory redundancy provisions, however, with two years’ tenure being the significant threshold within
this law beyond which entitlement to redundancy and sickness pay begins.
Inconsistencies in recorded information can mean that the spell lengths are
not always clear. One obvious example is that some exit job spell lengths are
greater than the age of the respondent. Both start and end dates suffer problems
and spells can overlap, or there can be undefined gaps, even when only months
and years are used.
Reconciling the data from the individual (indresp) and job-history (jbhist)
record files, sourced from different question specifications and sequences within the survey, there is a reasonable level of agreement, but some differences exist which are not generally systematic. Reconciling information within a wave
(matching the indresp and jbhist) results in generally better agreement than reconciling consecutive waves, but data conflicts between them result in multiple
possible records rather than a single panel record for some individuals. The
analysis relies on spell lengths, so for missing start dates substantial effort was
spent in processing the data, but only if the start year was not missing (since it
was deemed too difficult to make any reasonable assumptions about the year).
Thus an effort was made to reduce untrue left and right censoring. Following
Paull (1997), only months and years are used for dates. Seasons are recoded to
months. We assume that years suffer less recall error than months and that any
time gap is an error, since spells in the job history are recorded consecutively.
Where consecutive spells exist within a wave, the previous spell end month is
substituted for a missing start month if the year is the same, and for the current
spell the interview month is substituted if the start year is the same as the interview year. For end dates (which only exist for job history spells, not the current job), where consecutive spells exist within a wave, the missing previous
spell end month is replaced with the following spell start month.
Spell lengths for the current spell are created by taking the recorded tenure
variable measured in days and dividing by 30, since no end date exists. For all
other spells, (the end year x 12 plus the end month) – (start year x 12 plus the
start month) is constructed.
Race, age, and gender are only asked when the respondent first enters the
panel, and must be copied across. Spell identifiers and job identifiers are used
to match job information in the spells and the only file data where a job descriptor data item is missing.
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The annual employment by industry is also added to the data set in the form
of a change variable. This data is sourced from the published statistics 1990–
1995 in the Employment Gazette. It is matched to the industry the displaced
worker left from.
In order to minimize selection bias due to attrition, we use all individuals
observed at any wave and do not restrict the panel to only those present in all
waves.
AUSTRALIA
Variable Definitions
Displaced worker: Persons who did not have a job at the time of the survey
and who responded that being “laid off” was a “very important” or “fairly important” reason for ending their last job. Questions on reasons for job loss were
asked in October 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1993 for the 1961 cohort, and in October 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1993 for the 1965 cohort.
Months since displacement: Date of displacement is identified as first
month prior to survey date in which the respondent did not work full-time or
part-time.
Educational attainment: Variable constructed from information on years
of schooling and on whether a postschool qualification was obtained. Individuals reporting having completed high school or reporting having any
postschool qualification are classified as being in the category “Complete HS/
Postschool qualifications.”
Age: Equal to year of displacement minus year of birth.
Year: Equal to year of displacement.
Reading aptitude/Math aptitude: Scores from tests administered to respondents as 14-year-olds by Australian Council of Education Research.
Rate of unemployment in last occupation: Rate of unemployment by 1digit CCLO occupation (From ABS, Labor Force Survey, Catalogue No.
6203.0, selected issues).
Weekly earnings in predisplacement job/Weekly earnings X to (X + 1)
years after displacement: Information obtained from question on “weekly earnings last week.”
Total weeks of work in quarter, x months after displacement: Information
from labor market diary. Respondents answering that they were employed
part-time or full-time in a month were assumed to have 4 and one-third weeks
of work in that month.
Total hours of work in quarter x months after displacement: Information
from labor market diary. Respondents answering that they were employed
part-time in a month were assumed to have worked for 85 hours in that month.
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Respondents answering that they were employed full-time in a month were assumed to have worked 170 hours in that month.
Total weeks/hours of work in quarter prior to displacement: Information
from labor market diary. Date of displacement is identified as first month prior
to survey date in which the respondent did not work full-time or part-time. Total weeks/hours of work in the preceding quarter are then calculated using the
same assumptions as for weeks/hours of work per quarter after displacement.

Appendix Note
1. The following choices are offered: promoted/left for a better job, left for a different job, was made redundant/company went bankrupt, was dismissed or sacked, a
temporary job ended, took retirement, stopped for health reasons, left to have a
baby, children/home care, care of other person, other reason.
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Table 4A.1 Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates for Single-Earner
Households in Britain, 1995
% of APWa

% of 2/3 APW

16

24

Couple – no children

26

39

Couple – 2 children

35

52

Couple – 2 children – housing benefit

77

90

25

38

77

90

Group
First month, no social assistance
Gross – single
Net of tax/other

60th month, with social assistance
Gross – couple no children
Net of tax/other
Couple – 2 children – housing benefit

NOTE: Gross replacement rates are before tax. Net replacement rates are after tax and
other benefits.
a
APW = average production worker earnings.
SOURCE: OECD (1997, Table 2.1).

Table 4A.2 Unemployment Benefit Replacement Rates for Single-Earner
Households in Australia, 1995
Australia

OECD

Single

22

52

Couple (no children)

40

52

Couple (no children)

49

60

Couple (2 children)

64

68

Couple (2 children, housing benefits)

71

73

Couple (no children)

40

19

Couple (2 children, housing benefits)

71

67

Replacement rate in 1st month of unemployment
Gross replacement rate

Net replacement rate

Replacement rate in 60th month of unemployment
Gross replacement rate

NOTE: Gross replacement rates are before tax. Net replacement rates are after tax and
other benefits.
SOURCE: OECD (1997, Table 2.1).
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INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we describe the evolution of earnings and employment, postdisplacement and post-other-separation, for workers in
France and Germany. Although the literature on displaced workers
(those who experienced involuntary separations from stable jobs for
reasons beyond their control) in North America is already extensive,
the European literature is limited. We consider two labor markets in
which layoffs are heavily regulated (as opposed to the relatively flexible Canadian and United States labor markets). We exploit administrative data from both countries that match workers to their employers
and have the advantages (relative to survey-based analyses) of providing large, representative samples of a wide range of workers from all
sectors, thereby allowing for the straightforward construction of control groups. Administrative data have the additional advantage that
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reported earnings and employment durations are precisely measured
and not subject to recall bias.
One particularity of our approach is that we focus our attention on
workers whose separation is a result of the closure of the employing
firm (in the case of France) or plant (in the case of Germany). This is
for two main reasons. First, our administrative data do not allow us to
distinguish the reason for separation when the separation is not related
to the employer's shutting down. Second, our measure avoids the frequently cited problem of relying on workers to accurately report the
reason for separation. This is particularly important in heavily regulated labor markets like those of France and Germany, since the administrative procedures that must be followed in the case of layoffs are
typically much longer and more complicated than the procedures surrounding quits. For this reason, declared quits in these countries may
frequently be layoffs disguised so as to avoid the administrative complications. Furthermore, workers often misreport firing for cause as a
layoff—and these two events can have very different implications for
the non-employment durations and earnings losses involved.
A second issue is that we consider non-employment, as opposed to
unemployment, durations following displacement. We do so partly
because our data for France do not allow us to discern whether the
worker is actively looking for employment when not employed (as the
ILO definition of unemployment requires). In Germany we observe
only unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance durations,
although individuals may experience spells of unemployment while
being ineligible for benefits. We also limit ourselves to non-employment because the complexity of the unemployment insurance schemes
(see the section on institutions below) brings the explicit modeling of
their role beyond the scope of this chapter.1
In addition to describing the institutional context in France and
Germany, our analysis focuses on non-employment durations and earnings changes experienced by workers who have stayed with a single
firm for at least four years as the principal measures of interest. More
precisely, we look at prime-age males in the age range of 26–55 (for
France) and 25–56 (for Germany). We distinguish between workers
who separate from their firm (in the case of France) or plant (in the
case of Germany) as a result of a closure (referred to as displaced
workers) and those who separate for unknown reasons. This last cate-
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gory includes workers who are fired for cause, workers who leave the
firm or plant because they receive a better offer, and workers who drop
out of the labor force.2 The literature has concentrated primarily on
these measures,3 finding that displaced workers tend to experience
earnings losses both pre- and postdisplacement and that workers displaced as a result of a firm or plant closure tend to have shorter nonemployment durations than workers who separate from from their
employers involuntarily for other reasons (Gibbons and Katz 1991).
The structure of our chapter is as follows. We begin by describing
the institutional setting surrounding layoffs and unemployment benefits in France and Germany. This discussion provides the context in
which the subsequent results need to be considered. Then, after
describing the data sources we use, we describe the incidence of displacement in the two countries. We then proceed with a more detailed
analysis of the non-employment durations following displacement, followed by a description of the earnings changes associated with displacement. The next section provides results of a regression analysis
of earning changes before, around, and after displacement, and the
final section summarizes our results and concludes.

INSTITUTIONS
Both France and Germany have detailed regulations concerning
layoffs and unemployment compensation. For each country, we
describe the institutions surrounding layoffs, followed by a brief
description of the unemployment benefit system and the main prevailing-wage-setting mechanisms.
France
Following is a brief summary of the labor law and jurisprudence
surrounding worker displacement, or layoffs for economic reasons.4
An excellent reference for this (in French) is Lefebvre (1996).
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Laws concerning layoffs for economic reasons (displacements)
The legislation and jurisprudence surrounding displacements distinguishes four classes of layoffs: individual, fewer than 10 employees
over 30 days, more than 10 employees over 30 days, and bankruptcy or
reorganization.5 One common characteristic of all displacements is that
the employer is required to offer the option of participating in a partially employer-funded retraining scheme to all employees who will be
laid off. This retraining program is run by the fund that finances unemployment benefits (ASSEDIC) and made available.
• Individual displacements have to meet the obligations surrounding both individual layoffs for personal reasons and layoffs of
fewer than 10 employees over 30 days (with the exception of the
obligation to inform the works council; see below). The obligations attached to the layoffs for personal reasons include an invitation to a “reconciliation” meeting at which the layoff will be
discussed, an actual holding of the reconciliation meeting (to
which the worker can bring an outside representative), and a notification-of-layoff letter, all with required delays and notice periods. The displaced employee must also be guaranteed priority in
future hiring for all jobs for which he or she is qualified, and this
obligation runs for one year following the layoff.
• The case of displacements involving fewer than 10 employees in
a 30-day period is more complicated than that of individual displacements. First, the works council (or personnel representatives in firms too small to have a works council, that is, with
fewer than 50 employees) must be consulted. The employer must
provide all useful information to the works council concerning
the economic circumstances that motivate the layoffs, the number
of employees to be laid off by occupational category, the criteria
used to determine the order of layoffs (in other words, which
employees will go), and a preliminary calendar for the layoffs.
Each employee must still be invited to a “reconciliation” meeting,
and the layoff letters can be sent out only after the appropriate
waiting period following this meeting.
• In the case of displacements involving more than 10 people in a
30-day period, things become even more complicated. The enter-
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prise must devise a “social plan” which, in addition to proposing
ASSEDIC retraining programs, must describe the possibilities for
an internal reclassification within the enterprise (when the enterprise is larger than 50 employees) and the steps the enterprise is
prepared to take in terms of helping laid-off employees become
self-employed, providing training in new fields, or reducing the
workweek. Along with all of the information described in the
previous case, this plan has to be given to the works council,
when one exists, or to the personnel delegates for consultation.
The works council can request the help of an “expert accountant”
to evaluate the different aspects of the employer’s social plan and
explanations for the layoffs. The local labor ministry office also
receives a copy of the social plan, and both the works council and
the labor ministry can make suggestions to which the employer
must respond. There must be two meetings held with the works
council, or three if the works council brings in an accountant.
There are specified delays between the meetings which vary with
the size of the proposed layoff, but there is no obligation to meet
individually with each employee in this case. The selection of the
individuals to be laid off will typically be determined by a governing collective agreement, but in the absence of such an agreement it is the employer who fixes the criteria after consultation
with the works council. The layoff letters can be sent out only
after a fixed delay following the final meeting with the works
council.
• The conditions surrounding layoffs in the case of bankruptcy or
court-ordered reorganization are similar to those for the previous
case, except that it is the court-appointed administrator who
makes the proposals, and the judge responsible for overseeing the
liquidation or reorganization must approve all layoffs.
Advance notice and severance pay
The forewarning that workers receive before being laid off varies
according to the size of the layoff, whether or not an expert accountant
is called in, the size of the firm, and whether the employer and
employee agree upon a buyout of the notice period. The time taken by
just following the legal procedure (prior to the official advance notice
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that starts running from the moment the layoff letter is received) can
vary from 1) 35 days between the mailing of the invitation to the “reconciliation” meeting to 2) the sending out of the layoff letter (in the
case of an individual displacement), to 3) 74 days or more from the
date at which the first works council meeting is held (in the case of a
layoff of 10 or more people in 30 days, with expert accountant called
in, not counting the time it takes to devise the social plan or respond to
suggestions made by the works council and the labor ministry). After
the layoff letters are sent out, the official advance-notice period begins.
This period is a function of seniority: a minimum of one month for
employees with six months to two years of seniority, and two months
for employees with at least two years of seniority. If a collective agreement exists that provides for longer notice periods, the longer periods
prevail.
Severance pay is a function of seniority, whether or not the employee had accrued unused paid vacation time, and whether the
employer buys off the official notice period. In general, the base rate
of severance pay is 1/10th monthly earnings per year of seniority (if
seniority is greater than two years), with an additional 1/15th monthly
earnings per year of seniority if seniority is greater than 10 years. The
worker also recovers the value of unused paid vacation time, plus one
to two months of earnings in the case where the notice time is bought
off, corresponding to the level of seniority.
Unemployment benefit eligibility and levels
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, workers must meet the
following conditions.6 First, they must have been employed for a sufficiently long period preceding the start of the episode of unemployment.
There are five criteria defining the minimum number of days or hours
worked over a reference period.7
Second, they must be enrolled on the National Job Search Agency
(ANPE) lists. Third, they cannot have voluntarily quit their previous
job although layoffs, even for cause, are acceptable.8 Fourth, they must
be actively looking for a job or, if over 57-1/2 years old, must reside in
France. Fifth, they must be younger than 60 or between 60 and 65 and
ineligible for retirement with full benefits. Sixth, they must be physically able to hold down a job. Finally, they cannot be “seasonally
unemployed”; that is, they can not have come from a job that is classi-
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fied as seasonal, nor can they have had a job that, for two of the prior
three years, had regular periods of inactivity at more or less the same
calendar dates each year.
Unemployment benefits are taxable as revenue and are made up of
a base rate that applies for a first period, then a “digressivity coefficient” which lowers the benefits for a second period. The daily base
rate is comprised of a fixed component (56.95 francs in June 1996) and
a variable component corresponding to 40.4 percent of reference earnings. The total can neither exceed 75 percent of the reference level of
earnings nor be less than a statutory minimum level (138.84 francs in
June 1996). There are also provisions relating to high-earnings workers that guarantee them at least 57.4 percent of their reference earnings.
The digressivity coefficient and the durations of the benefit periods
are functions both of the age of the worker and his or her “length of
affiliation” (cumulative seniority in any covered employers during a
reference period). Durations range from 1) 122 days (four months) for
workers with only 122 days or 676 hours of eligibility over the previous eight months (all at the second-period rate with a digressivity coefficient of 0.75) to 2) an 821-day (27-month) first period and a 1,004day (33-month) second period, with digressivity coefficient of 0.92, for
workers over 55 years old with 821 days or 4,563 hours of eligibility
over the preceding 36 months. Thus, if a 56-year-old person worked
27 out of the 36 months preceding a spell of unemployment, he or she
would have a right to five years of benefits, with the lowest rate still
being 92 percent of his or her previous benefit level.9
Wage-setting institutions
During the period of time covered by our French data (1984–
1989), the French industrial relations environment was undergoing
significant changes. Although union membership was steadily declining, union coverage remained relatively stable. This phenomenon was
due largely to the policy of contract extension. This policy allows the
Ministry of Labor to take a collective agreement negotiated by an
employers’ association and several union confederations and extend
its coverage to all other enterprises in the same region or sector, or all
individuals in the same occupation, as those covered by the contract,
regardless of their participation or membership in the employers’ association or union confederation that actually negotiated the contract.10
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Despite the high level of contract coverage, important modifications of the structure of collective bargaining were brought about by
the Auroux laws of 1982. Two of the most important features were 1)
the establishment of works councils and the definition of their consultative role in mass layoffs (see above) and 2) the requirement to engage
in bargaining at the enterprise level for all firms over a minimum size.
Although there was no obligation to come to an agreement, the fact that
employers were required to negotiate locally encouraged a gradual
shift of collective bargaining over wages from a centralized to a more
decentralized level. This shift reduced the frequency with which the
national, often extended, agreements had their salary grids renegotiated. Given the constant increase in the real minimum wage over the
period (see below), the share of contracts for which the lowest earners
on the salary grid earned more than the minimum wage fell from 15.3
percent in January of 1983 to 3.6 percent in January of 1985.11
The first minimum-wage law in France was enacted in 1950, creating a guaranteed hourly wage rate that was partially indexed to the rate
of increase in consumer prices. Beginning in 1970, the original minimum-wage law was replaced by the current system (called the SMIC,
for salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance), linking the
changes in the minimum wage to both consumer price inflation and
growth in the hourly blue-collar wage rate. In addition to annual formula-based increases in the SMIC, the government legislated increases
many times over the next two decades. The statutory minimum wage
in France regulates the hourly regular cash compensation received by
an employee, including the employee’s part of any payroll taxes.
Although the original minimum wage program (called the SMIG,
for salaire minimum interprofessionnel garanti) was only partially
indexed—in particular, the inflation rate had to exceed 5 percent per
year (2 percent from 1957 to 1970) to trigger the indexation—the real
minimum wage did not decline measurably over the entire post-war
period and increased substantially during most decades.12 The French
minimum wage lies near most of the mass of the wage-rate distribution
for the employed workforce. In 1990, the first mode of the wage distribution was within 5 francs of the minimum wage and the second mode
was within 10 francs of the minimum. In the overall distribution, 13.6
percent of the wage earners were at or below the minimum wage and
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an additional 14.4 percent were within an additional 5F per hour of the
SMIC.13
Germany
Employment security and dismissal protection
German dismissal protection is based on an extensive system of
legal rules and collective contracts. Historically, dismissal protection
is rooted in a framework of directives developed during the Weimar
Republic. It was developed in the 1950s to 1970s, and went through a
process of amendments during the 1970s and 1980s (see Büchtemann
1990).
One can distinguish between general dismissal protection and specific dismissal protection, with the latter applying to individuals in specific situations. The general dismissal protection was first regulated in
the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) and in the Kündigungsschutzgesetz (KSchG). Since those were enacted, however, it has
undergone a number of slight revisions.14 The most notable is the
Employment Promotion Act (Beschaftigungsforderungsgesetz), or
EPA of 1985, which is discussed below in more detail.
The KSchG applies to all blue- and white-collar workers with more
than six months of uninterrupted tenure in firms with more than six
regularly employed workers. According to Büchtemann (1990), it covers about 80 percent of all blue- and white-collar workers.
The general dismissal protection regulations as laid out in the
KSchG are supplemented by regulations which apply to individuals in
specific circumstances. For instance, specific regulations apply to
handicapped people, people on maternity leave, and people who are
serving in compulsory military or civil service. In 1987–1988, 16 percent of all dismissals fell under these complementary rules (see
Büchtemann 1990).
According to the KSchG, all dismissals of employees who are
employed for more than six months without interruption, which are initiated by the employer, are invalid if they are socially unacceptable.
Accordingly, dismissals of all individuals to whom the KSchG applies
have to be justified by the employer. Acceptable reasons for dismissal
may be due to the firm’s concerns or macroeconomic shocks (or the
employee’s absenteeism or illness, for example). In the case of dis-
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missals caused by economic difficulties on the side of the firm, the
KSchG stipulates that social criteria (such as seniority) should be used
to determine which employees are to be dismissed. Employees who
feel that they have been unjustly dismissed have the right to sue the
employer in the labor courts. In 1987, about 10 percent of dismissals
were brought to court by dismissed employees, although in very few
cases did this lead to a continuation of the employment relation (see
Büchtemann 1990). In addition, German dismissal protection has a
strong collective component. For every dismissal, the works council
has to be consulted.
Concerns about the negative effects of the rather rigid dismissalprotection regulations on firms’ employment policies led to the
Employment Promotion Act of 1985. The EPA introduced some
deregulating measures which do not replace, but rather complement,
existing employment-protection regulations. They mainly promote
fixed-term contracts as an instrument for enhancing flexibility. More
specifically, the EPA allows fixed term contracts to be established
without a particular reason (which was not the case before). Contracts
are limited to a duration of 18 months, and they are not renewable. The
EPA originally limited them to five years, but this was extended twice.
At present its applicability lasts until the year 2000 (see Rogowski and
Schömann 1996).
Advance notice and severance pay
The advance-notice period in Germany varies according to the size
of the layoff, the seniority of the worker, and whether he or she is a
blue- or white-collar worker.15 Furthermore, there are a number of collectively bargained regulations as well as firm-worker specific agreements that include notice provisions. The legal advance-notice
regulations stipulate four weeks of notice for blue-collar workers who
have been employed for at least five years, and 12 weeks for white-collar workers. After 20 years of employment with the same firm, these
periods rise to 12 weeks and 24 weeks for blue- and white-collar workers, respectively (see Buttler, Brandes, Dorndorf, Gaum, and Walwei
1992).
If a firm dismisses a considerable fraction of its workforce, the layoffs have to be reported to the local employment office and to the
works council. For instance, a firm which employs between 21 and 59
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workers has to report if the number of dismissals exceeds six workers
within a period of 30 working days; a firm which employs between 60
and 499 employees has to report layoffs of more than 25 workers, or
when layoffs exceed 10 percent of the firm’s workforce; a firm which
employs more than 499 workers has to report if layoffs exceed 30
workers.
If the reduction in the firm’s workforce exceeds certain numbers,
the works council can demand a social plan. For instance, when dismissals exceed 20 percent of the workforce (or at least six workers for
a firm of size 21–59 or more than 36 workers for a firm of size 60 to
249), a social plan can be demanded. Social plans describe the conditions surrounding severance pay and other payments.
Unemployment benefit eligibility and levels
The German unemployment compensation scheme distinguishes
between unemployment insurance benefit (Arbeitslosengeld (AG)) and
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe (AH)). To be eligible for
AG, the employee must have contributed to the system for at least 12
months over the preceding three years. The system is financed by
employer and employee contributions in equal parts (each part amounting to 3.25 percent of the employee’s salary). There is a waiting period
of 12 weeks if the separation was induced by the employee, but receipt
of AG starts immediately if the separation was caused by the employer.
The compensation is based on previous net earnings, and it amounts to
67 percent of the previous net wage (60 percent for employees without
children). There is an upper threshold (5,200 DM in 1984 and 6,000
DM in 1990, for instance). AG can be received for up to 32 months,
with the duration of the entitlement period depending on age and the
length of contributions to the scheme.16
If AG is exhausted, or if the employee is not eligible for AG, he
can claim AH. A condition for receiving AH in case of non-eligibility
for AG is having been in insured employment for at least 150 days during the prior year. Like AG, AH is based on previous earnings; it
amounts to 57 percent of previous net earnings (50 percent for employees without children). AH is means tested, and its duration is unlimited.
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Both AG and AH are granted conditional on the recipient's agreement to accept reasonable employment (zumutbare Beschaftigung) and
are not subject to income tax.
Wage-setting institutions
In Germany, wages are determined by (annual) negotiations
between unions and employer federations (tariff parties, or Tarifparteien). Workers are represented in collective bargaining by unions
that are organized nationwide according to industries (see Schmidt
1994 for more details). Union membership is not tied to a particular
job or firm; union workers usually remain with the union irrespective
of their mobility decisions, as well as through spells of non-employment.
Collective bargaining takes place on industry and regional levels.
During negotiations, parties have legally guaranteed autonomy. The
results of the negotiations are laid down in tariff contracts (or Tarifvertraege), which determine working conditions and wages. These contracts are registered at the Ministry of Labor. Since the union is the
legal representative of all workers covered by collective bargaining
(irrespective of the workers’ union status), collective agreements apply
to all workers within the respective segment.
There are no legal minimum wages in Germany; however, tariff
contracts which specify wage levels for specific groups in specific sectors can be considered as an elaborate system of minimum wages.
To enforce their bargaining position, unions have the right to call
strikes and employers have the right to lock out employees (Aussperrung), although this latter instrument is regulated by a number of legal
rules. If the two parties have difficulties reaching a compromise, they
may call for a mediator. The legal rules concerning the bargaining procedures, as well as the commitment that binds the two parties to the
agreed contract, are laid down in the tariff contract law (Tarifvertragsgesetz).
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DATA
We use administrative data from Social Security records for Germany, and payroll taxes for France, in some cases supplemented with
data from other sources. We briefly describe these data sources below.
France
Base data set
The base data set for France is the Annual Social Data Reports
(Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales, or DADS), which is a
random 1/25 sample of the French population.17 All people born in
October of an even-numbered year, with the exception of civil servants
(but including those employed by publicly held companies), are in the
data set whenever they are employed.18 These data cover the period
1976–1996, with the exception of 1981, 1983, and 1990, since the
French National Statistics Institute (INSEE) did not collect the 1/25
sample in those years. These data include earnings information from
all employers of all of these individuals, with both individual and
employer identifiers attached to each year-individual-enterprise-establishment observation.19 We also have the number of days worked during the course of the year and the job start and end dates (if the job
began or ended during the year). We impute information using auxiliary regressions run on other data sets to determine the job start dates
for the left-censored spells.20 Temporary layoffs (of a length shorter
than one calendar year) are not considered as interruptions of an
employment spell. With this information, we can calculate seniority at
each job for each year. We observe seniority, gender, age, occupation,
region, full- or part-time employment status (but not hours), and sector
on all jobs held by the individual, and we can measure the length of
non-employment spells between jobs.
There are two problems with using this data set to study displaced
workers. First, we do not know education, marital status, or number of
children, for example. The Permanent Dynamic Sample (Echantillon
Dynamique Permanent, or EDP), provides some additional information though. INSEE collected data on individuals born on the first four
days of October that could be located in the 1968, 1975, 1982, or 1990
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censuses, or for whom one of the following was available: the individual’s birth, marriage, or death certificate or the birth, death, or marriage of a parent or child of the individual concerned. Most of the
demographic information of interest comes from matches with the censuses. Since the EDP sampling frame overlaps that of the DADS in
even-numbered years, it was possible to obtain a data set with all of the
relevant variables from the combination of the DADS and the EDP.21
The remaining problem is to know the reason behind a separation.22 We use a two-step approach to identifying displacements, or
more precisely, firm deaths.23 First, we use the Unified System of
Enterprise Statistics (Systeme Unifie de Statistiques d’Entreprise, or
SUSE), to determine the last year in which the employing firm filed
accounts with any of France’s administrative authorities.24 We then
look at all of the observations in the DADS that correspond to a given
enterprise (not establishment). If the last year in which we observe
data corresponding to the enterprise is 1996, we consider all separations from that employer as being for reasons other than firm death.25
If, on the other hand, we observe a firm for which the last year with
DADS data is, say, 1985, we compare this date to the date found in the
SUSE (where available). We consider the latter of the two dates for a
given enterprise as its estimated death date, and we consider enterprises that filed accounts or were paying employees in 1996 as ongoing.
For the “dying” enterprises, we attempt to control for false firm
deaths (change of firm identifier without cessation of activity) with the
following procedure. Given that we only observe a random sample of
1/25 of any firm’s employment, we apply the procedure only to firms
with at least three observed employees.26 For these firms, we test the
hypothesis that 50 percent or more of the firm’s actual employees leaving the enterprise at its estimated death date were employed by the
same subsequent employer, conditional on the total number of
observed employees and the share of those who move together to the
same subsequent firm identifier. This procedure is described in detail
in Appendix A.27
Based on this dating procedure and correction, we construct two
definitions of displacement. In the first, the worker separates from the
firm within the calendar year preceding the calendar year of the firm’s
death.28 In the second, we widen the window to two years preceding the
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year of the firm’s death. We report below results based on the
two-year window definition, since our procedure for dating firm deaths
is not very precise (particularly when SUSE data are involved) and
because advance-notice provisions may mean that some workers separate from their firm prior to its actual shutdown (see Appendix B).29 All
other separations are classed as “other separations.”
It should be noted that, given the sampling scheme of the DADS,
this approach over-attributes separations to the “displaced” category.
This is even more likely to be the case for separations from small firms,
especially when the separation occurs near the end of the sample
period. Our selection criterion reduces the risk of this source of overclassification somewhat (see below). Nevertheless, all of our results
for France should be interpreted with this in mind.30
The sample retained for analysis
From the overall data base, we focus in particular on men between
26 and 50 years of age with four or more years of seniority in 1984.31
These restrictions were imposed so that we could restrict our attention
to adult,32 high-attachment workers without a risk that they would take
early retirement in the later years in the sample.33 We exclude all individuals with more than three different employers in any given year, as
well as all individuals who held multiple jobs simultaneously at any
point during our analysis window.34 As a further control against early
retirement, our duration analyses exclude all workers who, following
separation from their employer, experienced a censored non-employment spell that pushed them above 56 years old (the minimum age for
men to receive early retirement). Appendix C shows the differential
effect of imposing this latter restriction by age at separation.35
We focus on individuals observed during the window of 1984–
1989 for three reasons. First, given our definition of firm death for
workers not matched to SUSE firms, we wanted to allow a time period
after the end of the analysis period during which we might observe
people in a “dead” firm, in order to minimize incorrect classifications.
Second, given the data missing from 1983 and 1990, this is the longest
period without interruption in our data. Finally, this sample window
makes the French data comparable with the German data (see below).
In general, we concentrate on the first separation observed for the
individual in the sample window (1984–1989), and, in so doing, ignore
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the issue of multiple displacements (Stevens 1997).36 As mentioned
above, our data include information on the year, age, education, seniority, log real annual gross earnings, sector of activity, skill level
(unskilled blue-collar, skilled blue-collar or white-collar), region and,
of course, the reason for separation (displacement or other, calculated
according to the procedures described above), if it occurred. Appendix
D provides descriptive statistics for the full sample in 1984.
For the analyses of displacement incidence and earnings changes
surrounding separations, we aggregated our data to one observation per
individual per year.37 In years preceding the separation, if the individual was employed by the employer from whom he or she will eventually separate, we keep the descriptive information (sector, occupation,
seniority) corresponding to that job. For all other individual-year combinations, the descriptive information corresponds to the job the person
held for the longest duration during the year, and in the case of ties, the
job that provided the highest gross earnings.
The earnings measure used for the French data is the log of Total
Average Real Daily Earnings,38 corresponding to the log of the average
of daily labor earnings from all sources, weighted by the number of
days worked in the particular job (measured in thousands of 1980
francs).39 The precise formula is
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where RAE is the real gross annual earnings received by individual i in
year t from firm j, dwi,j,t is the number of days worked by individual i
in firm j during year t, and J(i,t) is the set of firms j in which individual
i worked during year t.
Germany
Base data set
The data used for Germany, which will be referred to as the IAB
data, are comprised of three components. The core data are drawn
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from the Beschaftigungsstichprobe (BS) of the Institut fur Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) in Nürnberg. The BS is a 1 percent
sample from the overall employees’ statistics, the so-called historic file
Historikdatei (HD), of the Federal Department of Employment in
Nürnberg, which is constructed as an insurance account, and contains a
continuous employment history for each employee covered by the
social security system. The BS is drawn in two stages (see Bender,
Hilzendegen, Rohwer, and Rudolph 1996 for details) and covers a
period of 16 years (1975–1990). It comprises 426,363 individuals in
the longitudinal dimension and, on average, around 200,000 individuals in the yearly cross-sectional dimension.
On January 1, 1973, an integrated reporting procedure for health,
retirement, and unemployment insurance was introduced in Germany.
The data collected using this process form the basis for the HD. The
procedure requires employers to report any commencement and termination of an employment relation which is subject to social security
contributions. Additionally, to guarantee continuity in the registration
of employment histories, employers have to provide information on
every ongoing employment relation which is subject to social security
payments on December 31 of every year. The information reported by
the employer each time includes individual characteristics, such as
gender, nationality, and educational attainment, as well as gross earnings over the past employment spell which served as the basis for
social security contributions.40 Furthermore, the HD also contains
information on spells of interrupted employment relations, like maternity leave or obligatory military and civil service.
The HD does not include individuals who are below the earnings
threshold which makes social security contributions compulsory unless
they have been in an employment relation which was subject to social
security contributions at an earlier stage of their career. It further
excludes the self-employed, state civil servants, and individuals who
are in compulsory military service or alternative compulsory activities.
For 1980, Herberger and Becker (1983) estimate that the HD comprises 79 percent of the total labor force.
In addition to information available in the BS, the IAB data contain
information from a second important data source, the Leistungsempfangerdatei (LD) of the employment office. The LD contains data covering spells for individuals who received certain benefit payments from
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the Federal Department of Employment. These payments include
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance, and payments
while participating in training and retraining programs. This additional
data source allows us to follow individuals during periods of registered
non-employment, too. It is important to note, however, that not all
spells of registered non-employment are included in the LD. For
instance, active labor market programs (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmassnahmen) are not covered. Furthermore, individuals have to fulfill certain
requirements to be eligible for unemployment benefits or unemployment assistance (see above). Those who do not fulfill these requirements are likewise not included in the LD.
The IAB data set combines information on individual employees
(from the BS and the LD) with plant information. Every individual in
the HD is associated to a plant with a plant identifier. In a separate step
and using the entire database, information about individuals is
regrouped at the plant level. This allows us to add plant information to
individual records contained in the IAB data. In particular, information about plant size and the educational structure of the workforce, as
well as industry information, is added. The plant-level statistics, however, concern only those individuals who are covered by the social
security system.
The sample retained for analysis
From the overall database, we extract a sample of high-attachment
workers. We select male workers who were between 25 and 50 years
old in 1984. We use this age group to avoid including separations for
early retirement and to exclude individuals who might not yet have finished their schooling.
Although our observation window covers the period between 1975
and 1990, we concentrate our analysis on the last decade. The reason
is that the earnings information before 1984 is only of limited use.
Until 1983, whether wages reported to the authorities contained additional payments, like holiday or Christmas money, was up to discretion
of the employer. It was compulsory to include these payments after
1983. Additional payments constitute a substantial part of the wage
bill of German employees—around 7 percent (see Dustmann and VanSoest 1997). Furthermore, these payments are likely to be correlated
with variables like seniority, industry, and firm size. For these reasons
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we decided to use earnings information only for the period between
1984 and 1990.
We select all workers who had been continuously employed with
the same establishment for at least four consecutive years in 1984.
Between 1984 and 1990 (the last year of our observation window)
these workers either stayed with their establishment or they separated.
Temporary spells of unemployment or non-employment with subsequent continued employment at the previous plant are not considered
as separations.
We distinguish two types of separations: separations due to plant
closure and separations for other reasons. We define a worker as a displaced worker if his separation is related to the establishment closing
down or to a significant reduction in the number of employees. We
adopt three alternative definitions: a worker is displaced if his plant
closes down within one year of his departure (definition 1), within two
years of his departure (definition 2), or if he separates from a plant at
which employment falls by at least 40 percent within two years of his
departure (definition 3). A plant closure occurs if the number of
employees within a plant drops to zero.41
The strictest definition is the first one. By using this definition, we
may exclude workers who left earlier because they foresaw a closure,
or who were dismissed while the firm cut down on size prior to closure.
The last definition avoids this problem, but it may include workers who
separate for other reasons. In most of the analysis, we adopt the second
definition. We use the first and last definition to check the robustness
of our results. Appendix Table 5.B1 describes how these measures differ.
Another problem with the type of data we use is censoring. If individuals lose their jobs, they may or may not return to the sample within
the observation window. Those who do not return may change into
states not recorded by our data, like nonparticipation, retirement,
self-employment, or civil service; they may also leave the country.
This type of censoring is a particular problem with administrative data.
The question is how to treat censored observations. Analyses of
non-employment duration, or reemployment probabilities, are sensitive
to the definition of the underlying sample and have to be understood in
that light. We decided not to impose any restrictions; results should
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therefore be understood as referring to the whole population of workers
conditional on separation or displacement.
For illustrative purposes we use information about whether individuals claim unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance
after separations as a device to sort out individuals with a high likelihood of leaving the sample. After at least four years of continuous
employment (which is one of our criteria to enter the sample), every
individual is, in principle, eligible for both types of benefits. Workers
who intend to return to the labor market are most likely to claim benefits. We single out workers who do not return to the sample after separation and who do not claim benefits. Appendix E splits up the total
sample of workers who separate from a firm into those who return into
employment within the observation window (74 percent) and those
who do not (26 percent). Of those who do not return, 30.6 percent
claim benefits.
Appendix F displays sample statistics of worker characteristics for
the year 1984: we distinguish among workers continuously employed
between 1980 and 1990; workers whose first separation between 1984
and 1990 was a displacement (where displacement refers to separation
from a plant within two years of the plant closing down); and workers
whose first separation between 1984 and 1990 was for unknown reasons.
The numbers in the table indicate that average gross daily earnings
of workers who are in continuous employment over the entire period
are higher than those of workers who separate for unknown reasons or
who are displaced. Continuously employed workers also have higher
seniority in 1984, with more than 44 percent being with their firm for
more than 10 years (as compared to 27 percent for displaced workers,
and 24 for workers who separate for unknown reasons). Interesting are
the numbers on plant size, which we measure in 1982, two years before
any closure can take place in our sample. The average plant size for
continuously employed workers is 3,086, as compared to 1,653 for
other separations, and 160 for displacements. Accordingly, workers
who are displaced according to our definition separate predominantly
from small firms. The distributions are not symmetric, as indicated by
a comparison between the median and the mean.
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The Incidence of Displacement in France and Germany

We address the question of the incidence of permanent job loss, or
displacement, in our data by two approaches. First, we look at the
share of observations that correspond to displacements and separations
for other reasons in our data, and then we estimate probit models of the
incidence of displacements and other separations. We follow different
approaches for the two countries.
For France, we consider the share of individuals in a given year
who experience each sort of separation. Whereas Table 5.1 breaks
annual incidence for our sample down by year, we restrain our attention to the 1984 sample year for the decomposition of the incidence of
separation and the estimation of its determinants in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
This is because all individuals in the 1984 sample year have at least
four years of seniority on their first job that year, whereas individuals
observed in later years may be on postseparation jobs with low seniority, and thus the distribution of job types in later years will not necessarily be comparable with that of the year on which the sample
selection criterion was applied.
For Germany, we split our sample into three groups: Those who
are continuously employed with the same firm over the entire period
between 1980 and 1990 (32,594 individuals), those whose first separation (after 1984) is a displacement (3,273 individuals), and those
whose first separation (after 1984) is a separation for unknown reasons
(12,933 individuals). In Table 5.4, we display characteristics of these
three samples, where the decomposition is by variables measured in
1984. In Table 5.5, we estimate simple probability models, which
relate the probabilities of being in any of the three groups to individual
characteristics, again measured in 1984.
France
Table 5.1 describes the incidence of permanent separation, defined
as the share of individuals in a given year experiencing a given type of
permanent separation, in our data for all unique individual-year combinations.42 Note that, as we are aggregating jobs to the individual-year
level, a person can experience both displacement and other separation
in the same year. Thus, the sum of the number of individual-years with
displacements and other separations may exceed the number of indi-
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vidual-years with any separation. This table covers all separations that
occur in our sample window, not just first separations, since (as noted
above) considering only first separations would bias our sample
increasingly toward stable individuals in the later years, thereby seriously underestimating the incidence of separation toward the end of
our sample window. The spike in 1989 is due to the fact that we are
missing data from 1990 (see below), and our coding algorithm would
attribute all changes in employer identifier between 1989 and 1991 to
the 1989 observation year, whereas at least some changes in employer
certainly occurred during the (missing) 1990 observation year.43 We
include women as a reference, although in what follows we restrict our
attention to men.
We find that the incidence of separation increased in France to a
peak at 1987 for both men and women, and then declined in the
remainder of the sample window. Whereas the share of individuals
experiencing displacements seems to have peaked in 1988 for men, the
figures for women suggest a peak around 1986. The increase for men
toward the end of the sample is likely related to the onset of the recession that began in the early 1990s, while the peak for women in 1986
corresponds to the slump that began in mid 1986 and ran through
spring 1987.44 Furthermore, there seem to be no major, consistent differences between men and women over the entire sample period in
terms of either the share of separations in the total or the share of displacements. Since maternity leave, albeit generous by North American
standards, typically does not last longer than a full calendar year, and
since women are guaranteed a job with their previous employer upon
returning from maternity leave, such a lack of differences in separation
and displacement rates is less surprising.45
A similar breakdown of our data, aggregated to the individual-year
level, by seniority on the lost job and by age, all measured in the 1984
data year is presented in Table 5.2. Although 96 individuals experienced both a displacement and another separation, we count only the
first separation in the top half of the table, since the elimination of multiple-job holders implies that the second separations are from lowseniority jobs that follow the first separation.
Table 5.2 shows that, although there is a clear decline in the share
of separations in total observations and the share of displacements in
total observations with previous job seniority in France (with the
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exception of the relatively underpopulated 8–10 years of seniority category), the share of separations represented by displacements (defined
as separations in the two calendar years preceding the calendar year of
firm closure) is relatively invariant to seniority, and may even be
slightly increasing.46
Although the share of displacements and separations in the total
seems reasonable by North American standards, the share of separations attributed to the displaced category is quite high. This is likely
due to two main reasons. First, given the sampling frames in our data,
most departures from small firms will be classed as displacements,
since the chances of observing another sampled individual in the firm
or observing firm financial data after the separation are very low. Second, we are classifying separations occurring in a relatively long window preceding the calendar year of firm death as displacements. This
approach will mislabel all separations that occur within the window but
are independent of the firm’s impending demise as displacements.
Unfortunately, given our data constraints, there is little we can do
about these problems.
A final point worth noting regarding Table 5.2 is that the share of
individuals experiencing a displacement, or any sort of separation, is
highest for the youngest and oldest age categories. Given that younger
workers are less stable than older workers, the results for young people
are not surprising. Despite our restraining our attention to workers
who are at most 50 years old in 1984, the possibility that some of these
workers’ employers may offer exceptional early retirement plans could
explain the results for older workers.47 For this reason (as mentioned
above), we impose an additional control for early retirement in our
analyses for postseparation non-employment durations.
In order to get a more precise view of the determinants of displacement, we estimate probit models of the incidence of 1) displacement,
2) other types of separation, and 3) all separations combined on our
data from 1984. The reference category is all alternative states (other
separations and no separations for model 1, displacements and no separations for model 2, and no separations for model 3). Constraining ourselves to 1984 data provides us with estimates of the determinants of
annual probabilities of each sort of separation, and has the advantage of
substantially reducing the risk of separations into early retirement, as
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the oldest workers at this date are 50 years old. Table 5.3 presents the
results of these models.48
The table suggests that the highest educational categories are the
most likely to separate for reasons other than firm closure, while the
only diploma that affects displacement is an advanced vocational education (which reduces the risk of displacement relative to those without
any educational certification). The probability of both displacement
and other sorts of separations is not significantly related to age in 1984,
a result which has also been found for the United States (Seitchik
1991). However, the most senior workers are clearly less likely to
experience a separation, ceteris paribus, among the workers in our
sample. Although the differences among 4–6, 6–8, and 8–10 years of
seniority are not significant, all have a significantly higher probability
of experiencing a displacement than workers with 10 or more years of
seniority. These results are consistent with Table 5.2 and further reinforce the idea that the incidence of worker displacement declines with
the seniority of the worker. Similar results are found for workers with
4–8 years of seniority (relative to 10 and above) when considering separations for other reasons. Many theoretical models predict a decline
in mobility with job seniority, so this result is not surprising.
Germany
In Table 5.4 we report numbers on continuously employed workers
over the period 1980–1990 (our reference group), and the number of
displaced workers and workers who separate for unknown reasons during our sample window.49 Recall that our selection criterion is that all
workers joined the plant in 1980 or earlier. Seniority and age refer to
1984.
On average, 6.71 percent of all workers who have been in continuous employment with one firm between 1980 and 1984 experience a
separation between 1984 and 1990 because the plant closes down.
This percentage is slightly higher at the lower seniority levels, and
lower at the higher seniority levels, indicating that plants which close
down tend to have workers with lower levels of seniority. One reason
may be that these plants are younger. There is no clear age pattern; displaced workers account for 20.19 percent of the by-age sample of separated workers.
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Among the continuously employed workers, 44 percent have been
with the same plant for at least 10 years in 1984; for displaced workers
and workers who separate for unknown reasons, this number is lower:
26 percent and 24 percent respectively. Accordingly, although we
used the same selection criterion to construct our samples (to have
been with the same firm for at least four years in 1984), the distribution
of seniority differs according to their future separation status. The age
distribution is more similar among the three groups, with more than 70
percent of workers concentrated in the age range between 30 and 50.
To investigate the effect of observables on the separation and displacement probability in finer detail, we estimate simple probit models
(Table 5.5), where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual
is displaced or separated for unknown reasons (“other separations”)
over the period 1984–1990.50 The values of regressors refer to 1983,
the last year before a separation could take place. The benchmark
group are workers who are continuously employed with the same firm
between 1980 and 1990.
We first discuss displacement. The estimates compare characteristics of workers in plants which close down between 1984 and 1990
with characteristics of workers in plants which do not; this is conditional on the two groups being employed for at least four years in 1984,
and the latter group being employed between 1980 and 1990 with the
same plant.
Age has a nonsignificant effect on the displacement probability
(Table 5.5). This may be interpreted as an indication that the age structure of workers in firms which close down is not different from that of
the reference group. The displacement probability decreases slightly
with seniority—workers affected by a closure over the 1984–1990
window are characterized by less tenure than workers who are not.
The benchmark for the education categories are workers without
apprenticeship and without a high school degree. The negative signs of
higher education dummies indicate that the skill mix of workers
affected by displacement is weighted toward lower education groups,
compared to our reference group.
The results for “other separations” are quite different. Remember
that workers separated for unknown reasons include workers who are
fired for cause, as well as workers who quit. Here, age has a strong
negative effect. This is to be expected, given that age should affect the
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separation probabilities for both groups of workers in this category
negatively. First, firing of workers becomes more expensive the older
they are because of institutional regulations; and second, age is positively related to the match quality, and the mobility of workers
decreases with age. Unlike displaced workers, higher education now
has a positive effect on the separation probability. This may indicate a
higher degree of mobility for the well educated.
Durations out of Work

In North America, displaced workers often experience periods out
of work following their displacement prior to finding another job. In
the more heavily regulated labor markets of France and Germany,
advance-notice requirements are meant to reduce or eliminate periods
out of work. The analysis of non-employment durations following displacement in France and Germany may provide additional insight into
the functioning of the labor markets in these countries, and into the role
that differences in the institutional environment might play in determining the speed of reemployment. In both countries, we focus on the
first separation that occurs within our sample windows.
France
Table 5.6 breaks down all first separations in our data by seniority
and describes the share of separations which are followed by a period
out of work. This is further broken down into displacements and other
sorts of separations.
The numbers in Table 5.6 demonstrate that the percentage of those
who experience a non-employment spell after separating from the firm
declines with seniority in France. Furthermore, the share of positive-duration non-employment spells is lower in general for displaced
workers than for workers who separate for unknown reasons, with the
difference being the most flagrant for the least senior workers.
Overall, Table 5.6 shows that approximately 22 percent of workers
who lose stable jobs because of firm closure never experience an interruption in their employment histories as a result of their displacement.
This may be due to the employment-protection legislation described
above. In fact, given the rigidity of the employment-protection legislation and the long advance-notice periods it implies, one might wonder
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why the share of direct transitions is not higher. This is probably due
to the length of the window we use for defining displacement, which
includes separations that are not necessarily related to the firm closure
and thus do not necessarily benefit from such generous employmentprotection legislation.
To offer a sense of the duration of non-employment spells when
they do occur, we show the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the nonparametric survival functions of postseparation non-employment spells for all
spells of positive duration (in Figure 5.1). Note that these results are
conditional on experiencing a non-employment spell of positive length,
and that (as is always the case in duration modeling) our estimates are
sensitive to the treatment of censored observations.51
Displaced workers clearly leave non-employment at a faster rate
than workers who separate for other reasons. These differences are
highlighted by the differences in long-term non-employment between
displaced workers and those who separate for other reasons. In France,
less than 18 percent of displaced workers who experience a nonemployment spell are still without employment five years after displacement, while roughly 30 percent of workers who separate for other
Figure 5.1 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions, France
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reasons and enter non-employment are without a job five years after
separation.52
Of course, the differences between displaced workers and other
separators in France may only be superficial: the Kaplan-Meier survivor functions we have drawn in Figure 5.1 do not consider the differences in the characteristics of the two populations. It may simply be
the case that other separators have characteristics that make finding a
new job harder and, thus, these workers would take longer to find new
jobs irrespective of the reason for the separation. To control for
observable heterogeneity in the populations, we estimate durations of
non-employment by using proportional hazard models with
Weibull-distributed baseline hazards for France.53 The effects of different covariates on non-employment durations following separations
are given in Table 5.7 for workers with at least four years of seniority
on the job of their first separation.54
We estimate models with 1) both types of workers and an indicator
variable for firm closure, as well as separately for 2) displaced workers
and 3) workers who separate for other reasons. The first specification
is equivalent to imposing an identical baseline hazard and identical
coefficients on all covariates except the constant across the second and
third specifications.
Table 5.7 shows that the shape parameter of the Weibull model is
always less than 1, indicating that the conditional probability of leaving
unemployment decreases over time (decreasing hazard). This is consistent with the nonparametric hazard underlying Figure 5.1. The
results in the first column show that individuals who separate because
of a closure have a higher conditional probability of reentering
employment than individuals who separate for other reasons. This can
be explained by the set of individuals in the samples we are analyzing;
since we only consider individuals who experience a non-employment
spell of positive duration, the group of workers who separate for other
reasons may consist mainly of workers who were fired for cause.
Seniority in the preseparation firm seems to slow exit from nonemployment in France for both sorts of separations, and this effect
seems slightly stronger for displaced workers (relative to those who
separate for other reasons). In general, most types of education seem
to help workers leave non-employment faster, relative to workers without any degree, although which degrees help the most varies by reason
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for separation. For displaced workers, those with an advanced vocational school or a graduate school or grande école degree find new jobs
the fastest, while among workers who separate for reasons other than
firm closure, the degrees that count are a high school baccalauréat, an
undergraduate, or a grande école or graduate school degree (the vocational degrees are marginally less important). The results for displaced
workers suggest the importance of being able to signal a particular
competency after one’s firm closes via an advanced vocational certification or a relatively specialized graduate degree. One explanation
could be that since firm closure is such a dramatic event, when a firm
closes it may be a sign of ill health in the industry in general. As such,
workers who are able to point to advanced skills may find it easier to
get new jobs than those whose abilities are more closely linked to their
previous employer’s industry. The results for other separators may
reflect the value that a more general education might have in counterbalancing the negative signal sent by a firing for cause, as well as the
extensive networks that some grandes écoles have available to help
place their alumni who might otherwise have difficulty.
Germany
The number and the percentage of workers who experience a
non-employment spell in Germany are reported in Table 5.8. On average, about 50 percent of workers who separate from their firms immediately find another job. The number is slightly lower for displaced
workers (39.5 percent), and slightly higher for workers who separate
for unknown reasons (51.6 percent). The likelihood of a non-employment spell decreases slightly with job tenure, particularly for displaced
workers.
Figures on non-employment include all individuals who do not
experience a job-to-job transition, including individuals who leave the
labor force into other states (see discussion above). The numbers are
therefore not directly interpretable as the percentage of individuals
who experience non-employment after a separation and would like to
remain in the labor market. Figures for this type of worker will generally be lower.
Next, we investigate the duration of spells of non-employment for
those individuals who experienced a non-employment spell after separation. Figure 5.2 shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival
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Figure 5.2 Kaplan-Meier Survivor Functions, Germany

functions of postseparation non-employment spells for all spells of
positive duration. Observations are treated as censored if they have not
reentered the workforce at the end of the observation window (December 1990). The graphs indicate that displaced workers leave nonemployment at a faster rate than workers who separate for other reasons.
In order to learn about the relation between individual characteristics and the conditional probability of reentering employment after a
separation, conditional on having had a non-employment spell, we estimate durations of non-employment using Cox models, which avoid
parametric assumptions about the baseline hazard. The effect of different covariates on non-employment durations following separation are
given in Table 5.9. We estimate the models separately for displaced
workers and workers who separate for other reasons.
In the first model, we do not distinguish between the two types of
separation. We include an indicator variable which is equal to 1 if separation is due to closure. As already indicated by the Kaplan-Meier
estimates, workers who are displaced and experience a subsequent
non-employment spell are more rapidly reabsorbed by the labor market
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than workers who separate for other reasons. This latter group is likely
to include primarily workers who were dismissed for cause, since
workers who quit because they received better outside offers are
unlikely to experience non-employment spells after separation.
The seniority variables refer to seniority prior to separation.
Seniority plays no role in changing the rate of exit from non-employment for workers who are displaced for unknown reasons, but it
increases the conditional probability of a return to work for displaced
workers. Recall that seniority also reduces the probability of experiencing a non-employment spell for these workers. Age has a negative
effect for both groups, indicating that older workers find it more difficult to get a job offer than younger ones, regardless of the reason for
separation. The educational indicators are marginally significant.
They indicate a negative relationship between education and the conditional probability of exit from non-employment for displaced workers. This may reflect the higher level of benefits for educated
workers.55
Earnings before and after Separation

The literature notes that wage losses occur, in particular, for workers who lose jobs in which they had a high level of seniority. It has
also been noted that these wage losses begin prior to displacement, and
that measuring wage losses by comparing only the final wage on the
job from which the worker was displaced with the new wage is likely
to underestimate the size of these losses. In this section, we describe
the time paths of daily earnings and changes in earnings growth in the
years surrounding separations.
France
Figure 5.3 plots average daily earnings for French workers who
were continuously employed over the at-risk period (1984–1989),
workers whose first separation was a displacement during that period,
and workers whose first separation was for another reason during that
period. We include only individuals with strictly positive average
daily earnings for our calculations.56 For expository purposes, we look
in particular at individuals whose first separation took place in 1987, if
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Figure 5.3 Average Daily Earnings Over Time by Type of Separation,
France

at all. We consider separations from all years combined starting with
the next table.
In France, average daily earnings increased faster between 1986
and 1988 for workers displaced in 1987 than for workers who were
continuously employed over the entire 1984–1989 period with the
same employer and for those whose first separation was in 1987 and
for reasons other than firm closure. Figure 5.3 illustrates that average
real daily earnings grew by 2.01 percent for continuously employed
workers between 1986 and 1988 and by 7.80 percent for other separators over the same interval, while average daily earnings jumped by
16.43 percent for displaced workers across the 1986–1988 interval.57
Part of this might be due to what is called “partial unemployment” in
the period leading up to firm closure. In France, a firm can negotiate a
contract with the unemployment insurance fund to put its workers on
partial unemployment, in which case the worker receives a fixed fraction of his or her prior salary with the costs split between the employer
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and the unemployment insurance fund. The worker does not report to
work, but maintains the employment relationship. If employers report
only their (lower) share of the (lower) workers’ earnings paid during
this period while not reducing the reported number of days for which
compensation was paid, this would artificially lower the predisplacement earnings level. However, Figure 5.3 does not show such a preseparation drop in relative earnings, and even if such a phenomenon
were present, it seems unlikely that average daily earnings in France
would decline around separation.58
Another interesting point to draw from Figure 5.3 is the order of
earnings levels among the three categories. It appears that in the time
before separation, displaced workers have earnings that are, on average, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously employed
or separated for reasons other than displacement. Workers who separate from their employers in France for the first time (in the 1984–1989
window) by displacement in 1987 earn 11.8 percent less in 1984 than
those whose first separation is for other reasons, who in turn earn 1.3
percent less than workers who are continuously employed over the
whole period. During the period preceding separation, there seems to
be very little difference between continuously employed workers and
those who separate for reasons other than displacement, while throughout this period displaced workers earn less. Still, in the period immediately after the separation, average daily earnings for displaced workers
who have found new jobs have almost completely caught up with continously employed workers, being only 1.2 percent below, while workers who separate for other reasons and are employed in the year after
separation pull ahead of continuously employed workers, earning 3.2
percent more.
A final point worth noting is the dip in average real daily earnings
between the year following separation and two years after separation,
for both displaced workers and those who separate for other reasons.
Since we are calculating the averages used to draw Figure 5.3 from
employed individuals only, this dip (or rather, lack of recovery) could
be due to a composition effect. It may be that workers who take longer
to find a job after separation earn less on their new job than those who
find their new job sooner (and already have a year of seniority). We
explore this idea further below.
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Table 5.10 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at
long differences (of at least two periods) in average daily earnings
around the displacement or separation date by seniority (prior to separation), distinguishing among continuously employed workers, displaced workers, and workers who separate for other reasons. For the
continuously employed, the table simply provides two-year differences
in average real earnings. For displaced and other separated workers,
the numbers refer to the earnings difference between the new job in the
year after the separation year (if a new job has been found) and the old
job in the year prior to the separation year. Otherwise the numbers
refer to the difference between the earnings in the first year in which a
new job has been found and the old job. We have also differentiated
workers who are observed in employment, at the earliest, two calendar
years after separation; we refer to these workers as “slow displaced”
and “slow other separations.”
Table 5.10 confirms the intuition derived from Figure 5.3. Considering all displacement dates simultaneously, we find that displaced
workers as a whole make faster earnings gains than continuously
employed workers or workers who separate for other reasons. Earnings losses occur on average for both displaced and other separating
workers who take more than a year to find a new job. Despite the fact
that slow job finders make up a relatively small share of workers who
eventually find jobs following separation within our sample window, it
will become clear in our earnings regressions below that it is important
to distinguish them from workers who find new jobs within the first
calendar year after separation.
Germany
Average daily earnings for German workers who were continuously employed over the at-risk period (1984–1990), workers whose
first separation was a displacement and took place in 1988, and workers whose first separation was for another reason and took place in
1988 are plotted in Figure 5.4. The separation year 1988 is omitted.
Only employed individuals contribute to the averages on which the figures are based. We do not include workers who are not employed in a
given year after separation.
The figure indicates that displaced and other separated workers
experience earnings growth at a rate similar to continuously employed
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Figure 5.4 Average Daily Earnings Over Time by Type of Separation,
Germany

workers between the pre- and postseparation year. Another interesting
point is that it appears that displaced workers have daily earnings that
are, on average, lower than other sorts of workers, be they continuously
employed or separated for reasons other than displacement.
Table 5.11 considers the raw averages in more detail, looking at
long differences (of at least two years) in average earnings around the
displacement or separation date. We distinguish among different levels of seniority (prior to separation), and among continuously
employed workers, displaced workers, and workers who separate for
other reasons. For the continuously employed, the table simply provides two-year differences in average earnings. For displaced and separated workers, the numbers refer to the earnings difference between
the new job in the year after the separation occurs and the old job in the
year prior to the separation. Obviously, this includes only workers
who have found a job in the year after separation. The columns “Displaced I” and “Separated I” report earnings growth of workers who are
observed in employment, at the earliest, two calendar years after sepa-
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ration. Although the earnings data are top coded—overall, 12.7 percent of the sample is affected in 1983 (see data section for details)—we
do not account for this in Table 5.11. This point is considered explicitly below.
Table 5.11 indicates that average two-year earnings growth for
continuously employed workers is 4.6 percent. Pre- to postdisplacement earnings growth for displaced workers and workers separated for
unknown reasons are 2.8 percent and 3.2 percent, respectively. The
numbers confirm the intuition derived from Figure 5.4 that workers
who separate continue to make earnings gains. Gains have a slight tendency to decrease with seniority, but a clear pattern is visible only for
workers separated for unknown reasons.
The picture looks entirely different, however, for workers who are
only able to find a job, at the earliest, two years after displacement
(“Displaced I” and “Separated I”). Here earnings decrease substantially: they drop by 7.3 percent for displaced workers and by 14.2 percent for workers who separate for other reasons. The large earnings
loss of the latter group may reflect the likelihood that this group consists mainly of workers who have been laid off for cause.
A problem in our data is that we observe closures only at the plant
level. Therefore, some plants may disappear due to reorganization, and
workers may continue to work in the same firm, but in a plant with a
different identifier. Although this event is not likely to be frequent, it
may distort our results. On the basis of the data we have available, it is
not possible to sort out these “false” plant closures.
Workers whose plants disappear because of a reorganization
should appear as direct transitions. We have therefore computed earnings losses for displaced workers who have experienced a non-employment spell after separation lasting at least one week. This will most
likely eliminate workers who change plant numbers for reorganizational reasons. However, it also restricts the sample to lower quality
workers—workers who are not able to find a new job immediately.
Accordingly, the corresponding numbers may be seen as lower bounds
for earnings losses incurred by displacement. We report these results
in the column, “Displaced II.” A total of 644 displaced workers experience a non-employment spell of at least six days after displacement
and are reemployed in the year after displacement. Their average earnings loss is –1.46 percent. Earnings losses are clearly higher for work-
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ers with higher levels of seniority before displacement. This may be an
age effect, or it may indicate the loss of firm-specific human capital
incurred by these workers.
We conclude from these numbers that average losses incurred by
displacement are, in the worst case, around 1.5 percent. At the same
time, those workers who are continuously employed experience an
earnings increase of about 4.6 percent. Assuming that this number
reflects the earnings growth that workers who are displaced would
have experienced had their plants not closed down, the worst case scenario is that the decline in earnings growth associated with a plant-closure-related displacement is about 6 percent. More serious earnings
losses are experienced by workers who are not able to rejoin the labor
market in the year after displacement, however.
Regression Analysis of Pre- and Postseparation Earnings

In this section, we compare the pre- and postseparation earnings
paths of displaced and continuously employed workers more generally.
As a descriptive tool, we estimate simple earnings regressions on various subpopulations. The general estimation strategy is as follows.59
We regress the logarithm earnings on time-invariant and timevarying individual specific characteristics (xi and zit), time effects δ,
and a vector of indicator variables kis, which switch from 0 to 1 s years
after separation, or –s years before separation. Depending on the
specification, the coefficients on the kis variables measure the difference in the level of earnings of workers s years before or after separation and the earnings of either continuously employed workers, or the
difference in earnings with respect to other workers who separate for
the same reason measured in a reference year,60 conditional on time
effects and observable individual characteristics. We also add the
variables ksιτ, which take on the value 1 in the after-separation period
for those individuals who are not observed in employment in the year
after separation. The parameter on these variables, ξ, picks up a negative permanent effect for those individuals who remain out of work for
more than one year after separation. Finally, uit is a disturbance term.
Thus, our estimation equation is as follows:
(2)

ln ωit = X i β1 + zit β 2 + δ t + ∑ ksir + uit ,
r∈ω
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where (w) is the set of postseparation dates and (A) is the set of preand postseparation dates (with or without an indicator for the year
immediately preceding separation, depending on the specification).
France
The results of estimating this model on average daily earnings in
France are shown in Table 5.12.61 To ease interpretation of the results,
we replace the indicator variable for five years before separation with
an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for all individuals who
separate (the variable Separated). This allows us to sweep out the average difference between separators and the continuously employed, and
we can interpret the coefficients on the other relative year indicators
(Sepi ) in terms of an earnings path for workers who separate.
The first column compares workers who are displaced because of
plant closure between 1984 and 1989 with workers who are continuously employed over that period. The second column compares continuously employed workers with workers who separate for unknown
reasons. As mentioned above, these latter separations consist of voluntary quits and firings for cause. The variable Perm takes on the value 1
in all years following the first separation if it took the individual more
than 12 months to find a job after displacement. As mentioned above,
the variable Separate takes on the value 1 for all workers who separate,
and the Sepi variables assume the value 1 in the ith year prior to or following the worker’s first separation. Thus the coefficient on Separate
can be interpreted as the difference in earnings five years prior to separation for workers who will eventually separate from their employers
relative to the continuously employed, and the coefficients on the Sepi
variables are interpreted as variations in earnings for workers who will
eventually separate relative to their earnings five years before separation. Note that we are considering only the first separation as the reference in these regressions, and that we have excluded earnings in the
separation year for workers who separate. The reason is that the earnings in the separation year may come from both pre- and postseparation employers, and the interpretation of this coefficient would be
unclear.
Table 5.12 shows that, even after controlling for observable individual characteristics, workers who separate because of firm closure
earn 8.8 percent less than continuously employed workers five years
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prior to the actual separation.62 This could be due in part to unobserved
heterogeneity across individuals, in other words, to individuals employed by firms that will close who would be earning less anyway.63
Alternatively, it could be that low-wage firms have a higher risk of
going out of business than better paying firms.64
This gap increases slightly as the displacement date approaches,
with the dip being significant only in the year immediately preceding
displacement, in which earnings of displaced workers are approximately 2.8 percent lower than they were five years before displacement. Workers who separate for reasons other than firm closure start
with earnings closer to the continuously employed (5.4 percent below),
but the preseparation dip starts sooner (three years prior to separation)
and is much larger, with earnings in the year preceding separation
being approximately 5.1 percent lower than they were five years before
separation.
Table 5.12 also shows that both displaced workers and other separators make earnings gains between the year before separation and the
year after separation. However, as suggested by Figure 5.3 and Table
5.10, there is a significant additional penalty to taking a long time to
find a job after separation. For displaced workers, slow job finders
earn an extra 4.7 percent less than other displaced workers postseparation, while the penalty for slow job finding is more than twice as large
(10.1 percent) for workers who separate for other reasons. The result
for displaced workers could be interpreted in the context of a declining
reservation wage, in which case workers who take longer to find jobs
would have, on average, lower reemployment wages. On top of this
“penalty” comes an additional negative signal for workers who separate for other reasons: For workers who take longer than a year to find
a new job, the separations are more likely to have been firings for cause
than voluntary quits, and thus these workers would receive, on average,
lower wage offers as the market infers that they have a lower value of
marginal product.
Finally, the earnings path in the postseparation period shows that,
on average, the gains made by workers around the separation date are
eliminated and become losses as time passes, so that displaced workers
five years after displacement are earning essentially the same as they
were earning in the year immediately preceding displacement. The
postseparation decline is not as dramatic for workers who separate for
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other reasons. Given the concave form of seniority returns in France,
such a pattern is surprising, since returns are steepest in the first few
years with an employer.65 This declining pattern may suggest that our
specification of a fixed-intercept shift in the postseparation period for
all slow job finders may not be a flexible enough functional form to
capture the heterogeneity in earnings that is correlated with the speed
of reentry into the labor market.66
Germany
Parameter estimates of Equation 2 for Germany, where we use the
sample of displaced workers and the year preceding displacement as
the reference earning level are displayed in Table 5.13. All regressions
are tobit specifications, which take care of the top coding occurring in
our data. The first column includes all workers who separate from a
plant that closes down within two years of the worker’s departure. Relative to the workers’ average earnings in the year before a closure, displacement leads to a 1–2 percent wage decrease in the years after
closure; four years after closure, their wage disadvantage relative to
their position before a closure becomes insignificant. Workers who are
not observed in employment in the year after displacement face a permanent additional wage loss of about 19 percent. Wages more than
one year before displacement do not vary much from wages in the predisplacement year.
We have run the same regression, using our alternative definitions
for displacement. When considering a worker as displaced if he separates from a firm within one year of the firm’s closing down (which
reduces the number of observations to 13,539), the permanent loss for
workers who have not rejoined the labor market in the year after displacement is again 19 percent; the average wage loss in the three years
after displacement is 3 percent. Using the third definition (contraction
by at least 40 percent), the respective numbers are 20 percent and 4.3
percent (this corresponds to 35,031 observations). All these numbers
are fairly close, indicating that our results are quite robust to the definition of a displacement.
The second column in Table 5.13 reports results for displaced
workers who experienced a non-employment spell of at least six days
after separation. The permanent effect of not having found a job in the
year after displacement reduces now to 12 percent (which is probably
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due to a change in average wages of the reference group). Displacement is associated with a wage loss in the first job in the year after displacement of 4.1 percent, and of 2.0 percent two years after
displacement, both relative to wages in the year before displacement.
The difference becomes insignificant thereafter.
These results, which are quite robust to different definitions of displacement and different samples indicate that wage losses of displaced
workers relative to their predisplacement wages are fairly moderate.
Furthermore, there is a slight decline of wages in the three years
before separation. As already indicated in Table 5.11, losses are substantial if the worker does not find a job in the year after separation.
In Table 5.13 we compare the wage position of a displaced worker
after displacement to his predisplacement wage. Next, we estimate a
specification similar to the one underlying the results in Table 5.13,
where this time we pool displaced workers (or workers separated for
unknown reasons) and continuously employed workers. We add an
additional indicator variable for the year immediately preceding displacement. This gives us the wage profile of displaced (separated)
workers, relative to continuously employed workers, in the years
before and after displacement. Results are displayed in Table 5.14.
As already indicated in Figure 5.4, wages of displaced workers
are, on average, 10 percentage points lower than wages of continuously employed workers. This difference may be due to firm effects,
or may be a result of workers of lower quality selecting into firms
which close down. The immediate pre- to post-wage difference is
again small—about 0.9 percent.
Compared with continuously
employed workers, displaced workers continue to have lower wages.
Again, those who are not in work in the year after displacement suffer
substantial permanent losses.
The second column displays results for workers who separate
from their firm for unknown reasons. Here, wages begin to decline
about two years before separation, but do not differ from those of continuously employed workers before that. After separation, wages are
on average 4 percentage points lower, as compared to those of continuously employed workers. Again, workers who have not found a job
in the years after displacement suffer substantial losses.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this section, we bring together the results from the two countries
and briefly relate them to the existing literature from North American
studies of worker displacement. It bears repeating that we focus on
prime-age men in stable jobs (at least four years of job seniority). Furthermore, our definition of displacement, used throughout this chapter,
is a separation within two years of firm closure in France and within
two years of plant closure in Germany.
Incidence

Worker displacement seems to be slightly more frequent in France
than in Germany.67 Among our sample of high-seniority workers, 2.78
percent experienced a displacement in France in 1984, whereas 6.71
percent of eligible German men had a displacement as their first separation during the 1984–1990 window (a seven-year interval). This suggests that a lower bound on annual incidence of worker displacement
due to plant closures might be below 1 percent in Germany. Both of
these numbers, and the German figures in particular, are lower than
what has been found for the United States; Farber (1997) found a probability of experiencing a displacement of 6.9 percent for the 1984–
1985 two-year period using the Displaced Worker Supplements of the
Current Population Survey. However, this may be due largely to the
fact that Farber (1993) considered all self-reported displacements,
whereas (for data reasons) we restrict our attention to firm and plant
closures.68
As a share of total separations, worker displacements are more
important in France than in Germany. Part of this difference may be
due to our different definitions of displacement (firm closure in France,
plant closure in Germany).
In both France and Germany, age is not significantly related to the
probability of displacement. The highest levels of education are negatively related to the probability of being displaced in both countries as
is seniority in 1984. All of these results are generally consistent with
what has been found for the United States (Fallick 1996).
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Duration

In both France and Germany, a large share of displaced workers
transit to their subsequent employers without spending any time in
non-employment. The share of direct transitions is always higher for
displaced workers than for workers who separate for other reasons, and
the share of displaced workers making direct transitions increases
slightly with seniority. There is a larger share of direct transitions in
the German data than in the French data, which may be due to the differences in the definitions of displacement (firm closure in France versus plant closure in Germany).
The durations of spells out of the workforce, when they occur, are
shorter in both countries for displaced workers than for those who separate for other reasons. The long-term non-employment rate for displaced workers in France seems slightly lower (around 20 percent after
five years) than that of Germany (around 27 percent), and the gap in
the survivor functions between displaced and other separating workers
is larger in Germany. Recall that our administrative data suffer from
the problem of censoring—some individuals do not return into the
labor force after separating from their job within the observation window. They may have changed into other states, like self-employment
(in Germany), or retirement, or they may have left the country. Therefore, one has to be cautious when interpreting these results as durations
in non-employment.
Estimations of duration models confirm the faster exit of displaced
workers in both countries. However, displaced workers with high
seniority tend to leave non-employment more slowly than those with
low seniority in France, whereas the reverse is true in Germany.69
Earnings Changes

In both countries, we find a result that is contrary to the majority of
North American results on worker displacement. Displacement does
not seem to be associated with large earnings losses. In the French
case, average daily earnings of displaced workers actually increase,
relative to continuously employed workers, between the year preceding
and the year following displacement. In Germany there is still a small
drop in average daily earnings relative to continuously employed
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workers, but the drop is less than 1 percent in relative earnings terms.
One explanation for our different results may be the way the earnings
variable is constructed: While we use data on daily earnings, which are
calculated using employment periods only, many North American
studies use data on quarterly or yearly earnings, without taking account
of the number of days worked. Furthermore, some studies (Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993) substitute zero earnings for workers who
are not in work, while we construct our comparisons conditional on
employment.
We do find an important earnings differential associated with taking longer than a year to find a new job following displacement for
both countries. In France, this corresponds to a 5 percent earnings disadvantage relative to other displaced workers who are reemployed
within the calendar year following displacement, while it is between 13
and 20 percent in relative terms in Germany.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the labor markets of France and Germany, although
different along certain dimensions, seem to provide roughly similar
outcomes for displaced workers. One reason for these similarities may
be similar institutional regulations, like employment protection offered
by labor law. Our analysis is purely descriptive and we have not
attempted to attribute findings, and differences from the North American literature, to differences in institutional regulations. This is a
promising avenue for future research.

Notes
1. See, for example, Bonnal and Fougère (1993, 1996) for France, and Hunt (1995)
for Germany.
2. Note that our age selection criteria are designed to eliminate retirement as a destination after separation from one’s employer.
3. See Fallick (1996) for a survey.
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4. French labor law distinguishes between layoffs for economic reasons and layoffs
for personal reasons, such as inadequate performance or misconduct.
5. There are special considerations for large companies that lay off at least 10 people
over a 3-month period without passing the 10-people-in-30-day limit, but these
will not be treated here.
6. The links between the unemployment benefits schedules and eligibility requirements are quite complicated. What is presented here is a short synopsis of the
important points of the unemployment insurance law prior to the substantial
reforms that took place in 1996.
7. A worker can qualify by satisfying any one of these criteria: a) 122 days or 676
hours of work over the 8 months preceding the end of the labor contract; b) 192
days or 1,014 hours of work over the 12 months preceding the end of the labor
contract; c) 243 days or 1,352 hours of work over the 12 months preceding the
end of the labor contract; d) 426 days or 2,366 hours of work over the 24 months
preceding the end of the labor contract; or 821 days or 4,563 hours of work over
the 36 months preceding the end of the labor contract. The end of the labor contract is defined as the last day of the notice period, regardless of whether this was
bought off or not. Workers who become unemployed due to the closure of their
plant are not required to satisfy criterion “a.” The levels and duration of benefits
vary according to the criterion satisfied, with the most difficult criterion, “e,” providing the highest benefits. Criterion “e” entitles the worker to higher and longer
benefits than “b.”
8. Note that the eligibility rules for unemployment insurance give the worker the
incentive to declare all separations as involuntary, while the administrative procedures described above give the firm the incentive to declare separations as voluntary. This conflict of interest often introduces a bargaining situation in the case
where the employer intends to lay off a small number of workers. The firm can
make side payments to the worker such that the worker declares the separation as
voluntary (if asked) and does not apply for unemployment benefits. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that this is a relatively frequent phenomenon.
9. Note that, upon expiration of unemployment benefits, individuals may be eligible
for the Minimum Insertion Allowance (Revenu minimum d’insertion, or RMI).
The RMI is a means-tested income support that has conditions and levels not
directly linked to unemployment duration, previous wages, or labor market histories.
10. See Margolis (1993) for a detailed discussion of the institutional context surrounding contract extension in France, as well as an analysis of the implications
of contract extension for wage setting and firm participation in employers’ associations.
11. See Bughin (1985).
12. The inflation threshold was removed in 1970 with the reform that converted the
SMIG into the SMIC.
13. For a detailed analysis of the minimum wage in France, see Abowd, Kramarz,
Margolis, and Philippon (2000).
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14. It has been complemented by the Arbeitsschutzbereinigungsgesetz (1969), the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (1972), and the Gesetz zur Anderung des KSchG
(1978), among others.
15. The differential treatment of blue- and white-collar workers was abolished in
October 1993. We report here the regulations that were in force up to 1993, since
our data covers the period up to 1990.
16. If an unemployed person fulfills the above criteria, the minimum period of eligibility is 156 days. Depending on the duration of contribution payments and the
age of the applicant, this period can be extended to up to 832 days (see Kittner
1995, p. 192, for details).
17. An exhaustive DADS data set file does exist for use primarily by the tax authorities, but we were only given access to the 1/25 sample.
18. Note that these data include self-employed workers who pay themselves salaries.
Self-employed workers who act as pure residual claimants will not be included.
Unfortunately, the data do not allow us to separate self-employed wage earners
from other wage earners.
19. Our earnings data are available as 8-byte numeric variables and are subject to neither top nor bottom coding. All labor earnings are reported.
20. See Abowd, Finer, Kramarz, and Roux (1997) for details. Given that our analysis
sample begins in 1984 and that we consider seniority as a categorical variable for
which the largest category is more than 10 years, our results are robust to most
estimation error in the job start date due to the imputation for the left-censored
spells.
21. For individuals for whom EDP data are not available, we use a multinomial logit
to impute the probability that the individual had each of the educational degrees
possible. See the data appendix of Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis, and Philippon
(1999) for more details.
22. From 1988–1992 (1990 excluded), INSEE introduced two variables distinguishing whether the observation corresponded to a plant that had ceased to exist as an
“economic” or “administrative” entity. The main difference between these variables is that firms occasionally continue to exist “administratively,” but with zero
workers, after their “economic” death. The manner by which mergers and acquisitions affect the plant identifier in our data is rather involved. Unfortunately,
these data have serious inconsistencies, as individuals whose observations correspond to the economic or administrative death of their plant in the year t are just
as likely to still be employed by the plant, and receiving a salary, in the year t + 1
as they are to have separated from the plant. Thus we do not consider these variables informative for the analysis of worker displacements.
23. Our approach to defining displacements is based on a combination of firm
account data and payroll data. An alternative approach, such as considering separations that occur simultaneously with large reductions in firm employment as
displacements (see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993), is not feasible with
our data, as firm employment is not available for all employees at all dates.
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24. The SUSE data used here are a sample of enterprises in France with differential
sampling probabilities based on reporting requirements which vary with employment (the largest firms appear with probability 1). Depending on the size of the
firm and the type of accounts it sends to the relevant regulating and tax authorities, information may be available on a detailed balance sheet, income statement,
and flow-of-funds statement. The smaller enterprises are not required to provide
as much detailed information. Here we use the presence of any information on
the firm as a sign of its continued existence. Therefore, we do not lose firms when
they pass below the threshold for providing detailed accounts.
25. For separations in years prior to 1996, the firm clearly continues to exist, as workers employed by it are observed. For 1996, we are unable to determine whether
the firm will disappear in 1997. These observations could theoretically be considered displacements, but given our eventual sample selection restrictions (see
below), the question of how to classify these observations is moot.
26. The requirement that there be at least three observed employees means that, in
expectation, the corresponding firm has at least 75 employees. It prevents us from
arbitrarily classifying all departures from small firms as false firm deaths. On the
other hand, it may cause us to miss all false firm deaths among the smallest firms
in our sample. Unfortunately, given that we only have access to the 1/25 sample
of employment, we cannot improve upon the treatment for small firms beyond the
SUSE sampling scheme. SUSE data are available from financial reports that are
mandatory for firms with total sales of at least 500,000 F per year (or at least
150,000 F per year for firms in service industries) and are optional for all others.
27. We are grateful to Peter Kuhn for suggesting this algorithm.
28. We consider the year preceding the year of firm death since, with SUSE data at
least, we do not know the precise date within the year at which the firm ceased
operations. Furthermore, a firm whose fiscal year ends after June 30 of the year
t + 1 will have year t + 1 SUSE information, even if operations ceased in year t.
29. Results based on the more strict definition of displacement, considering only
those separations occurring within one year of firm disappearance, are available
upon request. A table indicative of the importance of the definitional differences
can be found in Appendix B.
30. There exist other data sources that allow us to identify layoffs at the plant level
and to classify them by type (economic or personal reasons). However, these data
do not allow us to tell which workers are among those laid off, and they are subject to an even more restrictive sampling scheme than the SUSE data. One possible avenue for future research might assign a probability that a separation
corresponds to a layoff for economic reasons, as opposed to relying on a simple
indicator variable to denote that reason for each separation.
31. Margolis (1999) and Margolis (2000) treat both men and women.
32. Because of the complex interplay between youth employment-promotion schemes
(for which eligibility ends at 25 years of age) and the minimum wage in France
(see Abowd, Kramarz, Lemieux, and Margolis 2000), we begin considering individuals after they become 26 years old.
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33. Note that this does not mean that there will be no workers with seniority of less
than four years in our data. In particular, for the earnings-change models, we use
postseparation information during which workers who have experienced a separation will typically have less than four years of seniority.
34. This latter constraint eliminates 15.2 percent of the individuals from the DADS
and 16.7 percent of the individual-year combinations that satisfy our eligibility
criterion (26- to 50-year-old men with at least four years of seniority in some job
in 1984). In particular, 32.7 percent of the yearly observations corresponding to
workers whose first separation was a displacement, and 28.6 percent of the yearly
observations of workers whose first separation was for other reasons, are eliminated due to the restriction against simultaneous job holding. This may bias our
results. Similar models that allow for simultaneous job holding are estimated in
Margolis (1999, 2000).
35. Note that the entire, nonselected sample was used in the determination of firm
“death” dates.
36. In order to give a more accurate picture of the incidence of worker displacement,
we consider all separations in our sample. Considering only first separations
would severely underestimate the incidence of worker displacement in the later
years of our sample.
37. The duration analyses are based on data with one observation per individual, corresponding to the first separation observed in our sample window.
38. As our data do not allow us to measure revenues from non-labor-market sources,
our earnings measure is available only for years in which labor market earnings
are strictly positive.
39. It should be noted, however, that using such a measure can obscure the role of
part-time employment on earnings (Farber 1999). Margolis (1999) shows how
conclusions concerning earnings movements are sensitive to the earnings measure, in particular by comparing log(annual earnings) with log(daily earnings)
measures.
40. Accordingly, the sample is left-truncated and right-censored. The truncation
refers to the lowest level of earnings for which social security contributions are
obligatory; the right-censoring refers to the highest level of earnings subject to
contributions.
41. While we observe separations of workers at the exact date of occurrence, information on plant size is measured at a fixed date each year. Plant size refers to
employment in June of the relevant year. Accordingly, the time of closure cannot
be exactly dated.
42. Recall that we are looking only at permanent separations in this chapter and that
individuals who spend less than a full calendar year on temporary layoff are not
therefore considered as separators.
43. The discussion that follows supposes that the separations attributed to 1989 were
more or less evenly distributed between 1989 and 1990.
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44. Recall that we are using separations in the two calendar years preceding the calendar year in which the firm identified disappears as our criterion for distinguishing
displacements from other separations.
45. Women in France are guaranteed eight weeks of maternity leave by law, of which
two are indented to be taken before childbirth and six after. However, collective
agreements often extend the durations of available maternity leave, sometimes to
16 weeks or more. Furthermore, the employment relation is not interrupted
because of maternity leave, and the woman is guaranteed a comparable position to
the one she left upon returning from maternity leave.
46. These results concerning incidence of displacement are comparable to the studies
cited by Fallick (1996), who noted that job seniority was negatively related to the
incidence of displacement in the United States.
47. The fact that the share of displacements in total separations is lower for 50- to 55year-olds than for 35- to 40-year-olds suggests that the phenomenon generating
the additional separations is not necessarily linked to firm closure.
48. Appendix G presents the results of a similar estimation, but there the reference
group is only those workers who remain continuously employed with the same
employer throughout the 1984–1989 sample window.
49. Our distinction between displaced and separated workers refers to the reason for
the first separation after being in continuous employment between 1980 and 1984.
50. Recall that separation status refers to the first separation only.
51. In France, we treat all spells that do not end before December 31, 1989, as censored.
52. Informal discussions with ASSEDIC administrators suggest that, in 1998 at least,
approximately one-third of individuals drawing unemployment insurance
exhausted their benefits. These figures are roughly consistent with the survivor
function measured a decade earlier and shown in Figure 5.1.
53. The estimated Kaplan-Meier hazards underlying Figure 5.1 are roughly linear and
decreasing in the log of the hazard rate, which suggests that a Weibull-distributed
baseline hazard is the most appropriate parametric specification. Semiparametric
(Cox) models were not estimable under the material constraints (memory allocation and CPU time) imposed by INSEE.
54. Note that, since the parameter estimates refer to the proportionality factor in the
hazard function, a positive coefficient means that higher levels of the corresponding variable are associated with higher values of the hazard function and thus
shorter expected non-employment durations.
55. Benefit payments are proportional to the most recent earnings prior to separation.
56. Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), on the other hand, supposed that workers not in employment after separation had zero earnings and kept these workers
in the sample for the calculation of their average earnings changes.
57. Note that the earnings change for other separators combines individuals who left
their jobs for better outside offers with workers who were fired for cause and
workers who were laid off from firms that did not shut down within the following
two calendar years.
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58. One might ask why displaced workers did not leave earlier if they were going to
have such large earnings gains associated with changing employers. There are
several possible explanations. First, the employment-protection legislation provided them with job security with their previous employer that they stood to lose
if they changed earlier. The prospect of imminent firm closure reduced the value
of this nonwage component of job-specific utility, however, thus making outside
offers relatively more attractive. A second possible explanation is that the offer
arrival rate for on-the-job search may be lower than that for off-the-job search (or
search during the notice period). In this case, workers whose first separation was
a displacement may simply not have received another offer prior to their separation. A third explanation is that 1988 was a good year for the French economy,
with 3.95 percent GDP growth, relative to an average of 1.51 percent over the
1984–1987 period (BLS Macroeconomic Statistics, http://stats.bls.gov/flsdata.htm). As such, there may have been better outside offers in 1988 than in earlier years. Finally, since postdisplacement wages are only measured for
reemployed workers, the sample of workers contributing to the 1986 and 1988
averages are not the same. In particular, the set of workers employed in 1988 may
not be representative of all workers displaced in 1987.
59. Our estimation strategy resembles that of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993).
60. For France, the reference year is five years prior to separation. For Germany (see
Table 5.13), it is the year immediately preceding separation.
61. See Margolis (1999) for estimates of this model using log(total annual earnings)
as the dependent variable. Margolis (2000) estimated a similar model but with
individual fixed effects.
62. Note that, for a given coefficient β on a regressor x in Tables 5.12–5.14, _log(y) =
βx. To calculate the percentage change in y induced by x, i.e., (yt + 1 – yt)/yt, one
typically makes use of the approximation log(1 + x) = x. This approximation is
not valid when x is far from zero, and thus the coefficients are not directly interpretable as percentage changes in the dependent variable. For this reason, we
have used the exact formula, i.e., (yt + 1 – yt)/yt = exp(β) – 1, in the discussion of
these tables.
63 See Margolis (1999) for further analyses in this direction.
64. Abowd et al. (1999) show that the firm-specific component of earnings is negatively related to the probability of firm survival on the same DADS and SUSE
data, but the estimates are relatively imprecise.
65. See Margolis (1996) for a detailed analysis of returns to seniority in France.
66. Margolis (2000) estimated a similar specification with individual fixed effects on
a data set that does not eliminate individuals with simultaneous job holding and
found that the size of the postseparation decline in average daily earnings was
reduced, but not eliminated. One alternative strategy, as used by Jacobson,
LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), might be to include all workers in the postseparation period, but to attribute zero earnings to workers who have yet to find jobs.
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67. A word of warning is necessary when comparing our results for incidence. The
figures for France refer to the number of individuals who experience a type of
separation per year, while the numbers for Germany refer to the number of individuals whose first separation in a seven-year period is of a given type. Thus, the
figures are not directly comparable; nevertheless, we attempt to draw some conclusions below.
68. Given that the Displaced Worker Supplements are survey based, they may be subject to measurement error as a result of individuals misreporting firings for cause
as layoffs.
69. As a comparison, Swaim and Podgursky (1991) found that the rate of exit from
non-employment among displaced workers decreased with seniority in the United
States.
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Table 5.1 Incidence of Permanent Separations of Long-Tenure Workers by Year in France
Total
observations

Total
separations

Total
displacements

Other
separations

Separations in
total (%)

Displaced in
total (%)

1984

99,479

8,309

2,821

5,584

8.35

2.84

1985

95,842

8,620

3,487

5,244

8.99

3.64

1986

93,009

8,730

3,365

5,478

9.39

3.62

1987

91,458

10,517

3,633

7,000

11.63

4.02

1988

86,479

8,439

3,557

5,006

9.73

4.10

1989

85,317

15,459

6,349

9,380

18.12

7.44

Σ

550,854

60,074

23,212

37,649

10.91

4.21

1984

57,595

5,274

2,142

3,172

9.16

3.72

1985

54,588

5,113

2,044

3,119

9.37

3.74

1986

52,267

5,275

2,245

3,069

10.09

4.30

1987

50,226

5,094

1,895

3,242

10.14

3.77

1988

48,699

4,790

1,888

2,961

9.84

3.88

1989

47,465

8,184

3,301

5,010

17.24

6.95

Σ

310,840

33,730

13,515

20,573

10.85

4.35

Yeara
Men

Women

NOTE: Long tenure = four or more years.
a
Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.

Table 5.2 Incidence of Permanent Separation by Previous Seniority and Age in France in 1984
Group (years)

Total
observations

Total
separationsa

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

19,920

2,488

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

24,026

8 ≤ Seniority <10

2,791

Other
separations

Separations in
total (%)

Displaced in
total (%)

Displaced in
separations (%)

728

1,760

12.49

3.65

29.26

2,235

753

1,482

9.30

3.13

33.69

259

124

135

9.28

4.44

47.88

52,742

3,327

1,163

2,164

6.31

2.21

34.96

99,479

8,309

2,768

5,541

8.35

2.78

33.31

25 ≤ Age < 30

11,963

1,135

406

752

9.49

3.39

35.77

30 ≤ Age <35

26,154

2,267

765

1,523

8.67

2.92

33.75

35 ≤ Age < 40

19,431

1,553

539

1,034

7.99

2.77

34.71

40 ≤ Age <45

20,400

1,560

528

1,043

7.65

2.59

33.85

45 ≤ Age < 50

14,322

1,112

351

774

7.76

2.45

31.56

≤ 10 Seniority
Σ

50 ≤ Age < 55
Σ

Total
displacements

7,209

682

232

458

9.46

3.22

34.02

99,479

8,309

2,821

5,584

8.35

2.84

33.95

NOTE: Multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level. Numbers refer to the 1984 data year.
Of these individuals, 96 experienced both displacements and other separations in 1984. Only the first separation is counted in the displacements and other separations columns in the top half of the table, as the second separations are (by design) from low-seniority jobs.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Variable
Age
Age2/100
4 ≤ Seniority < 6
6 ≤ Seniority <8
8 ≤ Seniority < 10
Elementary school
Junior high school
High school
Basic vocational school
Advanced vocational school
Undergraduate
Graduate school and
grande école

Displacements
–0.0048
(0.0136)
0.0081
(0.0177)
0.1400***
(0.0224)
0.1016***
(0.0215)
0.1378***
(0.0463)
–0.0895
(0.0689)
0.0918
(0.1020)
0.1011
(0.1262)
–0.0748
(0.0658)
–0.2412**
(0.1184)
0.1072
(0.1185)
–0.0696
(0.1114)

Other separations
–0.0077
(0.0108)
0.0146
(0.0139)
0.3563***
(0.0178)
0.1849***
(0.0170)
0.0194
(0.0436)
–0.0047
(0.0550)
0.0185
(0.0852)
0.1022
(0.1013)
–0.1150**
(0.0541)
–0.0812
(0.0846)
0.1829**
(0.0911)
0.3318***
(0.0772)

All separations
–0.0065
(0.0096)
0.0126
(0.0124)
0.3236***
(0.0155)
0.1784***
(0.0150)
0.0884**
(0.0362)
–0.0326
(0.0487)
0.0584
(0.0743)
0.0783
(0.0912)
–0.1113**
(0.0474)
–0.1472*
(0.0767)
0.1787**
(0.0821)
0.2452***
(0.0711)

Constant
–2.2219***
(0.2755)
–1.6680***
(0.2144)
–1.5684***
(0.1911)
No. of obs.
99,479
99,479
99,479
Log likelilhood
–12,251
–20,886
–27,552
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates include data from 1984 only, aggregated to one observation per individual. All
models also include controls for previous seniority, sector (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories). Reference groups: No educational certification and 10 or more years of seniority. Models estimate probability of specified type of separation relative to all alternative situations. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically signiticant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at
the 10% level..
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Table 5.3 Probit Models of Incidence of Separation, Total and by Type of Separation Relative to All Alternative
States for France in 1984

Table 5.4 Breakdown of Separations by Type and Seniority for Germany
Displaced (%)

Continuously
employed

Total

Other separations

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

5,246

4,285

3,596

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

4,505

3,009

2,395

614

20.40

8.17

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

8,539

4,913

3,806

1,107

22.53

8.23

Variable

10 ≤ Seniority

Displacements
689

In separations

In total

16.07

7.23

14,304

3,999

3,136

863

21.58

4.72

32,594

16,206

12,933

3,273

20.19

6.71

25 ≤ Age < 30

4,066

2,686

2,214

472

17.57

6.99

30 ≤ Age < 40

10,746

5,921

4,795

1,126

19.01

6.76

40 ≤ Age < 50

14,830

6,243

4,870

1,373

21.99

6.52

Σ

50 ≤ Age
Σ

2,952

1,356

1,054

302

22.27

7.01

32,594

16,206

12,933

3,273

20.19

6.71

NOTE: Seniority and age refer to 1984.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.
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Table 5.5 Probability of Displacement or Separation between 1984 and
1990 in Germany—Marginal Effects
Variable
Age/100
5 ≤ Seniority <7

Displacements
0.005

(0.020)

0.003

(0.004)

–0.039***

(0.006)

–0.088***

(0.005)

–0.035***

(0.003)

–0.153***

(0.005)

0.008***

(0.003)

–0.006

(0.005)

–0.023

(0.019)

0.052

(0.032)

0.016

(0.015)

0.046**

(0.020)

–0.014***

9 ≤ Seniority
No apprentice, high school
Apprentice, high school

(0.030)

(0.003)

7 ≤ Seniority <9
Apprentice, no high school

Other separations
–0.238***

Polytechnic

–0.028***

(0.007)

0.061***

(0.012)

University

–0.018**

(0.009)

0.141***

(0.014)

(0.008)

0.053***

(0.011)

Education unknown

0.026***

Sector
2: Energy

–0.085***

(0.001)

3: Mining

–0.062***

(0.005)

–0.189

(0.014)

4: Manufacturing

–0.146

(0.012)

–0.092***

(0.022)

5: Construction

–0.038***

(0.007)

–0.001

(0.023)

0.119***

(0.031)

6: Distributional services

–0.063***

(0.006)

–0.004

(0.023)

7: Industry services

–0.078***

(0.003)

–0.055**

(0.021)

8: Consumer services

–0.069***

(0.003)

–0.081***

(0.024)

9: Public services

–0.101***

(0.003)

–0.112***

(0.019)

No. of obs.

36,689

44,402

Probability

0.086

0.244

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. All estimations refer to 1983. Excluded categories: agricultural sector, no apprenticeship, no high school and 3 ≤ seniority <5.
Comparison group: continuously employed in same plant, 1984–1990. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.

Table 5.6 Non-Employment Spells after First Separation by Seniority in France
All separationsa
Seniority level

Number

Non-empl. spell
(%)d

Displacementsb
Number

Other separationsc

Non-empl. spell
(%)e

Number

Non-empl. spell
(%)f

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

1,699

85.40

437

79.63

1,262

87.40

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

2,912

84.38

802

81.92

2,110

85.31

8 ≤ Seniority <10

2,685

83.99

762

82.94

1,923

84.40

10 ≤ Seniority

8,998

79.06

2,406

74.44

6,592

80.75

16,294

81.48

4,407

77.79

11,887

82.86

Σ

NOTE: Statistics include only first separations and impose the retirement constraint (see text).
a
Total number of separations, by seniority.
b
Number of displacements.
c
Number of other separations.
d
Percentage of non-employment spells in total.
e
Percentage of displacements that are followed by a positive-duration non-employment spell.
f
Percentage of other separations that are followed by a positive-duration non-employment spell.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.7 Weibull Proportional Hazard Models for Return to Work for France
Variable

All separations

Separated for unknown reason

Constant

–1.4272***

(0.2757)

–1.5000***

(0.3018)

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

–0.4538***

(0.1306)

–0.4079***

(0.1429)

Displaced
0.3903
–0.5210***

(205.6546)
(0.1772)

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

–0.4928***

(0.1389)

–0.4261***

(0.1528)

–0.5817***

(0.1858)

10 ≤ Seniority

–0.4807***

(0.1276)

–0.4106***

(0.1398)

–0.5827***

(0.1719)

Firm closure

0.2081**

(0.1049)

n.a.a

—

n.a.

—

Age

0.0080

(0.0286)

0.0064

(0.0317)

0.0102

(0.0382)

Elementary school

0.2461

(0.2101)

0.3020

(0.2333)

0.1395

(0.2776)

Junior high school

0.2906

(0.2570)

0.4343

(0.2743)

–0.0313

(0.3860)

High school

0.6020**

(0.2685)

0.6739**

(0.2967)

0.5216

(0.3601)

Basic vocational
school

0.3829*

(0.2042)

0.5054**

(0.2287)

0.1283

(0.2670)

Advanced vocational
school

0.4219*

(0.2530)

0.5048*

(0.2708)

0.2810

(0.3744)

Undergraduate

1.0114***

(0.2611)

1.4623***

(0.2940)

0.1666

(0.3535)

Graduate school and
grande école

0.6371***

(0.2459)

0.6628**

(0.2679)

0.5379

(0.3411)

1985

–0.0187

(0.1192)

–0.0825

(0.1307)

0.1043

(0.1633)

1986

0.1601

(0.1267)

0.0811

(0.1381)

0.3163*

(0.1746)

1987

0.2202*

(0.1302)

0.1505

(0.1422)

0.3519**

(0.1782)

1988

0.1938

(0.1395)

0.1367

(0.1529)

0.2986

(0.1897)

1989

0.2968**

(0.1462)

0.1606

(0.1613)

0.5577***

Weibull shape
parameter

0.4335

0.4311

0.4464

No. of obs.

13,838

10,136

3,702

No. of failures

8,350

5,698

2,652

Log likelihood

–25,938

–18,134

–7,701

(0.1984)

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 31, 1989. All
models include controls for sector of preseparation firm (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories). Reference groups: 1984, 4–6
years of seniority, and no educational certification. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5%
level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.8 Non-Employment Spells after Separation by Seniority in Germany
All separationsa

Displacementsb

Number

Non-empl. spell
(%)d

Number

Non-empl. spell
(%)e

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

1,749

54.94

281

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

2,422

50.28

458

Seniority level

Other separationsc
Number

Non-empl. spell
(%)f

51.60

1,468

55.58

46.28

1,964

51.22

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

3,977

52.07

863

44.38

3,114

54.30

10 ≤ Seniority

8,043

46.15

16,721

33.01

6,371

49.59

16,191

49.16

3,274

39.46

12,917

51.62

Σ
a

Total number of separations, by seniority.
b
Number of displacements.
c
Number of separations.
d
Percentage of non-employment spells in total.
e
Percentage of displacements that are followed by positive-duration non-employment spells.
f
Percentage of separations that are followed by positive-duration non-employment spells.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.

Table 5.9 Cox Models for Return to Work for Germany
Variable
Age/100
6 ≤ Seniority < 8
8 ≤ Seniority < 10
10 ≤ Seniority

All separations
–3.1258***
0.0310

(0.2257)
(0.0571)

Separated for unknown reason
–3.5590***

(0.2599)

Displaced
–1.8075***

0.0293

(0.0641)

0.0801

(0.4644)
(0.1286)

0.0641

(0.0532)

0.0340

(0.0602)

0.2053*

(0.1178)

–0.0217

(0.0617)

–0.1062

(0.0703)

0.2880**

(0.1324)

Closure

0.4035***

(0.0388)

n.a.a

Apprentice, no high school

0.3749***

(0.0407)

0.4084***

(0.046)

No apprentice, high school

0.1485

(0.3041)

0.1886

(0.3367)

–0.0092

(0.7159)

Apprentice, high school

0.0099

(0.1709)

0.3215

(0.1936)

–0.6717*

(0.3636)

Polytechnic

0.1972

(0.1309)

0.3311**

(0.1421)

–0.2354

(0.3427)

University

0.0879

(0.1276)

0.1994

(0.1302)

–1.8720*

(1.0043)

Education unknown

0.0524

(0.0721)

0.0764

(0.0842)

–0.0361

(0.1404)

1985

0.1230***

(0.0486)

0.1528***

(0.0565)

0.0886

(0.0967)

1986

0.2224***

(0.0549)

0.2278***

(0.0629)

0.2249**

(0.1143)

1987

0.1694***

(0.0621)

0.2408***

(0.0709)

1988

0.1709***

(0.0696)

0.2146***

1989

0.1533**

(0.0784)

0.2347***

1990

–0.0167

(0.1027)

–0.0879

—

n.a.
0.2669***

—
(0.0826)

–0.0342

(0.1305)

(0.0796)

0.0635

(0.1438)

(0.0884)

–0.0739

(0.1734)

(0.1171)

0.6807**

(0.2101)
(continued)
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Table 5.9 (continued)
Variable

All separations

Separated for unknown reason

Displaced

No. of obs.

5,019

3,998

1,021

No. of failures

3,720

2,813

907

Log likelihood

–28,924

–21,269

–5,558

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 1990. Reference
group: no apprenticeship, no high school. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; *
= statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
n.a. = not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from IAB data.

Table 5.10 Two-Period Earnings Growth by Seniority at Date of First Separation in France
Continuously
employed
Group

All
displaced

%Δw

Obs.

%Δw

Slow
displaceda

Other
separations

Slow other
separationsa

Obs.

%Δw

Obs.

%Δw

Obs.

% Δw

Obs.

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

4.70

13,712

16.62

825

–9.34

175

10.43

1,521

–12.02

349

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

4.38

35,453

12.22

1,642

1.48

213

8.91

2,180

–25.92

531

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

3.55

31,659

13.51

1,375

–3.67

154

10.05

1,464

–11.04

238

10 ≤ Seniority

2.58

138,298

9.87

4,708

–6.07

441

3.37

4,194

–23.56

556

3.15

219,122

11.88

8,550

–4.64

983

6.85

9,359

–20.12

1,674

Σ

NOTE: Data correspond to one observation per individual per year.
a
“Slow” refers to individuals who were not reemployed in the calendar year following the separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.

437

438

Table 5.11 Two-Period Log Earnings Growth, by Seniority at Date of First Separation for Germany
Group
Seniority

Displaced
%Δw

No.
obs.

Displaced Ia
%Δw

No. obs.

Displaced IIb
%Δw

No. obs.

Separated
%Δ w

No. obs.

Separated Ic
%Δw

No. obs.

Cont. employed
%Δw

No. obs.

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

2.44

242

–20.43

15

0.83

89

4.58

1,048

–8.21

102

3.50

12,603

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

5.74

397

7.04

22

2.60

111

4.31

1,422

–12.72

107

3.98

22,305
50,482

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

1.93

737

–3.42

41

–2.10

190

2.94

1,979

–13.07

135

4.82

10 ≤ Seniority

2.36

1,288

–15.45

34

–3.57

254

2.46

3,273

–23.66

113

3.14 167,374

2.75

2,665

–7.29

112

–1.46

644

3.21

7,730

–14.24

458

4.64 255,331

Σ
a

Workers who have not found a job in the year after displacement.
b
Workers who experience a non-employment spell of at least one week after displacement.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 5.12 Log Average Real Daily Earnings Regressions for France
Variable
a

Separated
b

Displacements
–0.0917***

(0.0068)

Other separations
–0.0553***

(0.0060)

Sep-4

–0.0042

(0.0084)

–0.0035

(0.0075)

Sep-3

–0.0121

(0.0080)

–0.0230***

(0.0069)

Sep-2

–0.0124

(0.0077)

–0.0256***

(0.0067)

Sep-1

–0.0281***

(0.0075)

–0.0520***

(0.0066)

c

Perm

–0.0479***

(0.0109)

–0.1061***

(0.0069)

Sep1

0.1265***

(0.0080)

0.1349***

(0.0073)

Sep2

0.0377***

(0.0082)

0.0255***

(0.0075)

Sep3

0.0196**

(0.0086)

–0.0137*

(0.0077)

Sep4

–0.0049

(0.0094)

–0.0187**

(0.0083)

Sep5

–0.0250**

(0.0115)

–0.0162*

(0.0098)

Age

0.0465***

(0.0010)

0.0472***

(0.0010)

Age /100

–0.0440***

(0.0012)

–0.0448***

(0.0012)

1985

–0.0004

(0.0022)

–0.0006

(0.0022)

2

1986

0.0081***

(0.0022)

1987

–0.0081***

(0.0022)

–0.0050**

(0.0023)

1988

–0.0045*

(0.0023)

–0.0044*

(0.0023)

1989

0.0016

(0.0023)

–0.0025

(0.0024)

Elementary
school

0.0553***

(0.0053)

0.0439***

(0.0055)

Junior high
school

0.2207***

(0.0080)

0.2151***

(0.0082)

High school

0.3447***

(0.0096)

0.3533***

(0.0100)

Basic vocational
school

0.1357***

(0.0051)

0.1180***

(0.0053)

Advanced
vocational school

0.2807***

(0.0075)

0.2677***

(0.0077)

Undergraduate

0.4108***

(0.0092)

0.4018***

(0.0093)

Graduate school
and grande école

1.0866***

(0.0081)

1.0687***

(0.0081)

–2.8427***

(0.0205)

–2.8827***

(0.0210)

Constant

0.0106***

(0.0022)

(continued)
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Table 5.12 (continued)
Variable
No. of obs.
2

R

Displacements

Other separations

402,174

433,627

0.3608

0.3339

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Reference groups = 1984 and no educational certification. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically
significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
Separated = 1 for all observations corresponding to individuals who separate at some
point between 1984 and 1989.
b
The Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year before or after separation.
c
Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.13 Earnings Regressions for Censored Regression Models for
Germany: Displaced Workers Only
Variable

Non-employment spella

All

Sep–6b

–0.0029

(0.0222)

–0.0403

(0.0691)

Sep–5

0.0023

(0.0142)

–0.0586

(0.0390)

Sep–4

0.0275***

(0.0113)

0.0231

(0.0282)

Sep–3

0.0156

(0.0098)

0.0217

(0.0227)

Sep–2

0.0062

(0.0088)

0.0052

(0.0196)

c

Perm

–0.2159***

(0.0170)

–0.1310***

(0.0191)

Sep1

–0.0161**

(0.0080)

–0.0414***

(0.0176)

Sep2

–0.0222***

(0.0086)

–0.0207

(0.0190)

Sep3

–0.0246***

(0.0093)

–0.0015

(0.0207)

Sep4

–0.0121

(0.0103)

0.0280

(0.0225)

Sep5

–0.0103

(0.0118)

0.0415*

(0.0250)

Sep6

–0.0280

(0.0156)

0.0411

(0.0317)

6.2292***

(0.3114)

5.4975***

(0.6326)

–6.9903***

Age
2

Age /100

(0.3771)

–6.3207***

(0.7638)

1985

0.0002

(0.0086)

–0.0097

(0.0185)

1986

0.0355***

(0.0090)

0.0308

(0.0196)

1987

0.0733***

(0.0095)

0.0561***

(0.0209)

1988

0.1045***

(0.0100)

0.0654***

(0.0223)

1989

0.1140***

(0.0106)

0.0560***

(0.0234)

1990

0.1165***

(0.0113)

0.0647***

(0.0251)

Apprentice, no high
school

0.1892***

(0.0056)

0.1722***

(0.0108)

No apprentice, high
school

0.4315

—

0.3151***

(0.1262)

Apprentice, high
school

0.3751***

(0.0222)

0.1775***

(0.0512)

Polytechnic

0.6356***

(0.0194)

0.4961***

(0.0611)

University

0.6990***

(0.0231)

0.7647***

(0.0813)

Education unknown

0.0893***

(0.0095)

0.0602***

(0.0183)

Constant

2.8313***

(0.0630)

2.9633***

(0.1275)
(continued)
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Table 5.13 (continued)
Variable
No. of obs.
Pseudo R

2

All

Non-employment spella

19,018

4,995

0.295

0.176

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Base education group = no apprentice, no
high school degree. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically
significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
a
Spell = at least six days after separation.
b
Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year.
c
The Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year after separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Table 5.14 Earnings Regressions for Censored Regression Models for
Germany
Variable
Sep–6

Displaced
–0.118***

(0.0177)

Separated
0.020***

(0.0089)

Sep–5

–0.107***

(0.0107)

0.014***

(0.0059)

Sep–4

–0.084***

(0.0082)

0.008*

(0.0047)

Sep–3

–0.095***

(0.0068)

–0.002

(0.0040)

Sep–2

–0.105***

(0.0058)

–0.007

(0.0034)

Sep–1

–0.112***

(0.0050)

–0.021***

(0.0029)

Perma

–0.217***

(0.0150)

–0.289***

(0.0074)

Sep1b

–0.121***

(0.0045)

–0.047***

(0.0027)

Sep2

–0.125***

(0.0049)

–0.040***

(0.0030)

Sep3

–0.124***

(0.0054)

–0.041***

(0.0033)

Sep4

–0.110***

(0.0061)

–0.034***

(0.0037)

Sep5

–0.101***

(0.0074)

–0.040***

(0.0045)

Sep6

–0.110***

(0.0108)

–0.050***

(0.0063)

Age

0.051***

(0.0007)

0.055***

(0.0006)

–0.055***

(0.0008)

–0.060***

(0.0008)

1985

0.015***

(0.0019)

0.016***

(0.0018)

1986

0.053***

(0.0019)

0.055***

(0.0018)

1987

0.080 *** (0.0019)

0.083***

(0.0018)

1988

0.116***

(0.0019)

0.122***

(0.0018)

1989

0.111 ***

(0.0019)

0.117 ***

(0.0018)

1990

0.100 ***

(0.0019)

0.104***

(0.0019)

Apprentice, no high
school

0.175***

(0.0012)

0.184***

(0.0012)

No apprentice, high
school

0.330***

(0.0081)

0.341***

(0.0075)

Apprentice, high
school

0.408***

(0.0050)

0.434***

(0.0045)

Polytechnic

0.549***

(0.0031)

0.571***

(0.0029)

University

0.604***

(0.0038)

0.625***

(0.0033)

Education unknown

0.080***

(0.0026)

0.082***

(0.0025)

Age2/100

(continued)
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Table 5.14 (continued)
Variable
Constant
No. of obs.
Pseudo R

Displaced
3.143***

2

(0.0150)

Separated
3.045***

(0.0140)

267,044

323,916

0.4950

0.4255

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Base education group = no apprentice, no
high school degree. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; * = statistically
significant at the 10% level.
a
Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one
year.
b
The Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year after separation.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Appendix A
Correction for False Firm Deaths in France
Suppose we observe n1 workers associated with firm j1 in the last available
year for the firm (prior to 1996), and a share p1k were observed the following
year in firm jk , k ≠ 1. Using p1k as an estimator of ~
p1k , the true share of workers moving from firm j1 to firm jk, we take a normal approximation to the underlying binomial distribution under which the standard error of p1k is σ1k =
p1k (1 − p1k ) . Thus, if for any k, k ≠ 1, p + 2σ ≥ 0.5, we cannot reject the
1k
1k
n1
hypothesis
that at least 50 percent of the firm’s workforce moved together to
the same successor firm ( ~
p1k ≥ 0.5) at the 95 percent confidence level. If this
is the case for any k ≠ 1, we consider only separations to firms for which we
can reject ~
p1k ′ ≥ 0.5, i.e., for which p1k ′ + 2σ 1k ′ < 0.5, to be real separations.
All of these are classified as separations for reasons other than displacement,
since there is at least one possible successor firm to j1. All changes in firm
identifier for individuals moving to firm k ′′ with p1k ′′ + 2σ 1k ′′ ≥ 0.5 are considered to be false firm deaths, and are not coded as separations.1 In the event that
the test statistic is less than 0.5 for all k, k ≠ 1, we maintain the estimated firmdeath date. This procedure leads us to reclassify 26 percent of our estimated
firm deaths in France as false firm deaths.

Appendix Note
1. We nevertheless restart the seniority counter at zero the year following the false
firm death. This is because the individuals moving to a new firm identifier in this
manner are “new employees” for the successor firm, despite their experience with
the predecessor firm.
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Appendix B
Definitions of Displacement
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Table 5.B1 Type of Closures for France and Germany
Total
separations

Closure within 1 yr.

Closure within 2 yr.

Contraction by 40%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

1984

8,309

2,498

30.06

2,821

33.95

n.d.b

—

1985

8,620

3,159

36.65

3,487

40.45

n.d.

—

1986

8,730

2,993

34.28

3,365

38.55

n.d.

—

1987

10,517

3,072

29.21

3,633

34.54

n.d.

—

1988

8,439

3,238

38.37

3,557

42.15

n.d.

—

1989

15,459

5,622

36.37

6,349

41.07

n.d.

—

Σ

60,074

20,582

34.26

23,212

38.64

n.d.

—

1984

3,181

432

13.58

637

20.02

1,101

34.64

1985

2,777

423

15.23

625

22.50

1,097

39.50

1986

2,464

402

16.31

530

21.50

955

38.75

1987

2,030

323

15.91

460

22.66

774

38.12

1988

1,821

294

16.14

420

23.06

729

40.03

1989

2,117

263

12.42

375

17.71

755

35.66

Country: year

%

Francea

Germany

a

1990

1,805

227

12.57

227

12.57

5.70

31.57

Σ

16,191

2,364

14.59

3,274

20.21

5,981

36.93

For France, multiple observations in the same year are aggregated to the unique individual-year level.
n.d. = no data available.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS and IAB data.
b

Appendix C
Impact of Retirement Constraint in France

Proportion classed as retail

Figure 5.C1 Impact of Retirement Constraint by Age at First Separation
for France

Age at separation (years)
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Appendix D
Descriptive Statistics for France
Table 5.D1 Sample Statistics for 1984 for France

Variable

Continuously
employed
1984–89

First separation:
displacement

First separation:
other reason

Age

37.82 (6.93)

37.65 (7.20)

38.26 (7.37)

Log (average daily
earnings)a

–1.65 (0.45)

–1.81 (0.50)

–1.73 (0.57)

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

0.17

0.22

0.26

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

0.23

0.25

0.26

8 ≤ Seniority <10

0.03

0.04

0.03

10 ≤ Seniority

0.58

0.48

0.46

No educational
certification

0.20

0.20

0.20

Elementary school

0.26

0.26

0.26

Junior high school

0.06

0.06

0.06

High school

0.04

0.04

0.04

Basic vocational school

0.29

0.30

0.29

Advanced vocational
school

0.06

0.06

0.06

Undergraduate university

0.04

0.04

0.04

Graduate school and
grande école

0.05

0.05

0.05

No. of obs.

54,918

16,876

27,685

NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Table constructed with one observation per person per year.
a
In thousands of 1980 francs.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.
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Appendix E
Treatment of Censoring in Germany
Values for Germany appear in Table 5.E1. There are 16,195 first separations between 1984 and 1990. Of those, 4,242 do not return to the labor force
within the observation period, and 2,943 do not claim benefits. In the subsample of workers who are displaced (according to definition 2 above), only 8 percent do not claim benefits after separation and do not return into the sample.

Table 5.E1 Separation and Censoring in Germany
Group
First separations, 1984–90
Return to work
Do not return to work

No.

Percent

16,195

100.00

11,953

73.81

4,242

26.19

Claim benefits

1,299

30.62

Do not claim benefits

2,943

69.38
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Appendix F
Descriptive Statistics for Germany
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Table 5.F1 Sample Statistics for 1984 for Germany
Variable
Age
Daily wage

a

Continuously employed
1984–90

First separation:
displacement

First separation:
other reason

39.42

(7.30)

39.10

(7.30)

37.59

(7.40)

85.01

(21.07)

77.15

(21.07)

83.15

(21.88)

Log of daily wage

4.41

(0.30)

4.30

(0.30)

4.38

(0.27)

4 ≤ Seniority < 6

15.89

—

18.74

—

26.52

—

6 ≤ Seniority < 8

13.79

—

17.24

—

17.47

—

8 ≤ Seniority < 10

25.76

—

29.13

—

25.23

—

10 ≤ Seniority

44.47

—

26.90

—

23.81

—

No apprentice, no high school

19.55

—

18.41

—

17.21

—

Apprentice, no high school

68.72

—

71.22

—

66.85

—

No apprentice, high school

0.37

—

0.26

—

0.47

—

Apprentice, high school

1.05

—

0.96

—

1.44

—

Polytechnic

3.53

—

1.49

—

4.46

—

University

2.63

—

1.03

—

4.46

—

Education unknown

4.10

—

6.59

—

5.09

—

Plant size, 1982
Plant size, 1982 (Median)

3,086

160

(394 )

369

(8,376)
—

34

—

1,653
173

(5,003)
—

0.59

—

3.72

—

1.83

—

Sector
1: Primary
2: Energy

2.59

—

0.39

—

0.98

—

3: Mining

1.08

—

1.39

—

1.86

—

54.40

—

42.45

—

46.37

—

7.95

—

21.41

—

11.60

—

13.09

—

20.61

—

19.18

—

6.08

—

4.52

—

6.79

—

1.24

—

1.03

—

1.38

—

12.93

—

4.42

—

9.97

—

4: Manufacturing
5: Construction
6: Distributional services
7: Industry services
8: Consumer services
9: Public services
No. of obs.

32,235

3,003

10,266

NOTE: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
a
In German Marks (deflated to 1975 prices).
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Appendix G
Probit Models for the Incidence of Displacement
Using the Continuously Employed as the
Reference Group in France
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Table 5.G1 Probit Models of Incidence of Separation by Type Relative to
Continuously Employed in France in 1984
Variable
Displacements
Other separations
Age
–0.0104
(0.0145)
–0.0090
(0.0113)
Age2/100
0.0184
(0.0188)
0.0165
(0.0145)
4 ≤ Seniority < 6
0.2268*** (0.0240)
0.3764*** (0.0181)
6 ≤ Seniority < 8
0.1453*** (0.0227)
0.1989*** (0.0177)
8 ≤ Seniority < 10
0.1529*** (0.0489)
0.0414
(0.0462)
Elementary school
–0.1076
(0.0728)
0.0112
(0.0578)
Junior high school
0.0989
(0.1072)
0.0273
(0.0886)
High school
0.1504
(0.1303)
0.0940
(0.1076)
Basic vocational
–0.1130
(0.0697)
–0.1009*
(0.0569)
school
Advanced vocational
–0.2434*
(0.1244)
–0.0669
(0.0877)
school
Undergraduate
0.1933
(0.1216)
0.2030** (0.0940)
0.0065
(0.1165)
0.3766*** (0.0802)
Graduate school and
grande école
Constant
–2.0991*** (0.2920)
–1.6256*** (0.2243)
No. of obs.
71,794
82,603
Log likelihood
–11,264.46
–19,432.70
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates include data from 1984 only,
aggregated to one observation per individual. All models also include controls for
sector (15 categories) and skill level (3 categories). Reference groups: no educational
certification and 10 or more years of seniority. Models estimate the probability of
specified type of separation relative to workers who were continuously employed
with the same firm throughout the sample window (1984–1989). *** = Statistically
significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from DADS data.

Appendix H
Weibull Proportional Hazard Model for Germany
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Table 5.H1 Weibull Proportional Hazard Models for Germany
Variable
Age
6 ≤ Seniority < 8
8 ≤ Seniority < 10
10 ≤ Seniority

All separations
–3.2793***
0.0248

(0.2255)
(0.0570)

Other separations
–3.7131***

(0.2597)

Displacements
–1.9628***

(0.4639)

0.0228

(0.0641)

0.0664

(0.1284)

0.0633

(0.0531)

0.0293

(0.0602)

0.2250**

(0.1177)

–0.0232

(0.0617 )

–0.1118

(0.0704)

0.3081***

(0.1321)

Displacement

0.4250***

(0.0387)

—

—

—

—

Apprentice, no high
school

0.4008***

(0.0407)

0.4332***

(0.0468)

0.3000***

(0.0826)

No apprentice, high
school

0.2073

(0.3041)

0.2422

(0.3367)

0.0591

(0.7156)

Apprentice, high
school

0.0200

(0.1710)

0.3562 *

(0.1935)

–0.7274**

(0.3639)

Polytechnic

0.2319*

(0.1309)

0.3627***

(0.1421)

–0.2392

(0.3426)

University

0.0909

(0.1276)

0.2074

(0.1302)

–1.9875**

(1.0042)

Education
unknown

0.0522

(0.0721)

0.0748

(0.0842)

–0.0251

(0.1404)

1985

0.1383***

(0.0485)

0.1707***

(0.0564)

0.0949

(0.0963)

1986

0.2598***

(0.0547)

0.2658***

(0.0626)

0.2745***

(0.1137)

1987

0.2319***

(0.0619)

0.3066***

(0.0706)

0.0180

(0.1302)

1988

0.2537***

(0.0694)

0.2971***

(0.0794)

0.1344

(0.1437)

1989

0.2703***

(0.0781)

0.3438***

(0.0879)

0.0447

(0.1732)

1990

0.0950

(0.1026)

0.0222

(0.1170)

0.7691***

(0.2106)

Constant

–2.3947***

(0.1054)

–2.1522***

(0.1184)

–2.8565***

(0.2349)

Weibull shape
parameter

0.51

0.49

0.56

No. of obs.

5,019

3,998

1,021

No. of failures

3,720

2,813

907

Log likelihood

–9666.48

–7531.57

–2087.78

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Right censoring occurs when the individual is not reemployed by December 1990. *** = Statistically significant at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level; * = statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Appendix I
Estimates Comparing Different Definitions
of Displacement for Germany
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Table 5.I1 Constrained Earnings Regressions for Germany: Displaced Workers
Variable
Perm

a

Within 1 year

Within 2 years

40 Shrinkage

–0.2087***

(0.0220)

–0.2161***

(0.0169)

–0.2318***

(0.0123)

Sep1b

–0.0233***

(0.0075)

–0.0228***

(0.0062)

–0.0331***

(0.0045)

Sep2

–0.0333***

(0.0083)

–0.0291***

(0.0069)

–0.0410***

(0.0050)

Sep3

–0.0353***

(0.0094)

–0.0307***

(0.0078)

–0.0435***

(0.0056)

Sep4

–0.0286***

(0.0106)

–0.0189***

(0.0088)

–0.0360***

(0.0063)

Sep5

–0.0339***

(0.0127)

–0.0162

(0.0104)

–0.0437***

(0.0075)

Sep6

–0.0499***

(0.0176)

–0.0343**

(0.0144)

–0.0576***

(0.0105)

Age

6.3572***

(0.3513)

6.1706***

(0.2909)

5.8927***

(0.2112)

Age /100

–7.1835***

(0.4260)

–6.9319***

(0.3529)

–6.4522***

(0.2561)

1985

–0.0065

(0.0091)

–0.0007

(0.0076)

0.0042

(0.0055)

2

1986

0.0351***

(0.0093)

0.0389***

(0.0078)

0.0437***

(0.0056)

1987

0.0720***

(0.0096)

0.0710***

(0.0081)

0.0769***

(0.0058)

1988

0.1064***

(0.0100)

0.1065***

(0.0084)

0.1114***

(0.0060)

1989

0.1183***

(0.0105)

0.1133***

(0.0088)

0.1204***

(0.0063)

1990

0.1259***

(0.0114)

0.1167***

(0.0096)

0.1204***

(0.0068)

Apprentice, no
high school

0.1816***

(0.0064)

0.1883***

(0.0052)

0.2041***

(0.0038)

No apprentice,
high school

0.3962***

(0.0510)

0.4260***

(0.0442)

0.3774***

(0.0314)

Apprentice, high
school

0.3247***

(0.0267)

0.3799***

(0 .0211)

0.4318***

(0.0147)

Polytechnic

0.6629***

(0.0222)

0.6363***

(0.0181)

0.6263***

(0.0098)

University

0.6635***

(0.0258)

0.6933***

(0.0216)

0.6787***

(0.0120)

Education
unknown

0.0952***

(0.0109)

0.0918

(0.0089)

0.1097***

(0.0065)

Constant

2.8071***

(0.0709)

2.8521***

(0.0586)

2.9082***

(0.0427)

No. of obs.

15,346

21,519

39,669

Pseudo R2

0.2743

0.2980

0.3618

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Base education group = no apprentice, no high school degree. *** = Statistically significant
at the 1% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level.
a
Perm = 1 for observations after separation if time between the two jobs exceeded one year.
b
Sepi variables equal 1 in the ith year before or after separation.
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INTRODUCTION

Belgium and Denmark offer marked contrasts in many of their
labor market institutions. Belgium has long been considered by many
as exemplifying the economic problem known as Eurosclerosis.
Indeed, Belgium did have (and to some extent still has) almost all of
the negative institutional characteristics often associated with poor
economic performance: high job protection, rigid wages, and generous
unemployment insurance compensation. Denmark, on the other hand,
has long been considered as an example of a country that has successfully achieved a good balance between social protection and economic
growth. Below we shall discuss the differences between the two countries in detail, but in Table 6.1 we present some of the features of the
two labor markets along with those of a selection of other countries, to
provide some context. These rankings are taken from the World Eco-
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nomic Forum’s 1997 global competitiveness report.1 The table gives
the rankings (for 5 out of 53 countries) for various labor market indicators. In each case a lower ranking (closer to 1) means “more advantageous for employers” (or, as conventionally seen, as bad for workers).
Of particular note is the fact that Belgium consistently has high scores,
indicating “negative” institutional characteristics. On the other hand,
Denmark is much more mixed. For example, it is seen as having generous unemployment insurance (UI) provisions but it also has the lowest impediments to hiring and firing (lower even than Singapore or
Hong Kong).
Belgium and Denmark are both small open economies whose primary trading partner is Germany. They also both have a relatively generous social safety net. The major difference between their labor
markets is the higher firing costs in Belgium. Thus it is very tempting
to compare the outcomes of workers in the two countries who are displaced from a long-tenure job to identify how these outcomes differ
and whether they can be attributed to the differences in firing provisions. This comparison is made even more attractive by the availability of two comparable administrative data sets describing the Belgian
and Danish labor markets. In this work, we will use these data sets to
compare worker displacement and worker adjustment to displacement
in Belgium and Denmark.

LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Employment Protection

As in the United States, Belgian law recognizes the basic principle
of employment at will. Thus, with a few exceptions (for example,
union activity and pregnancy) employers rarely have to demonstrate
just cause when dismissing an employee. Unlike the United States,
however, laying off workers can be very costly in Belgium due to significant legislated notice periods and severance payments, especially in
the case of white-collar workers. In Belgium, the required advancenotice period for blue-collar workers is four weeks for workers with
fewer than 20 years of service, and eight weeks for those with more
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than 20 years. Low-wage white-collar workers are given three months
of notice plus three months for every five completed years of seniority.2 For high-wage white-collar workers, these are lower bounds. The
actual period of notice has to be set in agreement between the employer
and the employee. When no accord can be reached, the length of
notice is set by the labor courts. According to Blanpain (1994), the
length of notice courts grant to these high-paid employees is a function
of age, specialization, tenure, and wage. These lengths can go as high
as 36 months. Of course, these restrictions do not apply during trial
periods (generally two weeks for blue-collar workers, but up to six
months for white-collar workers). It is worth noting that during the
period considered here, protections were sharply reduced for some categories of white-collar workers. In addition to notice, Belgian workers
(both blue- and white-collar workers) are given large severance payments in case of plant closings. These payments amount to roughly
one month of salary per year of seniority, plus some additional compensation for high-wage and older workers. Mass layoffs also require
some severance pay, although much less generous than plant closings.
In contrast to this, the Danish industrial relations system is characterized by a small amount of interference from the state, which
includes some very limited employment-protection legislation. There
are two major provisions in the legislation, which are both about
advance notice. The first provision, which is limited to white-collar
workers, requires that advance notice be given. The length depends on
the tenure of the worker, with a maximum length of six months. This
set of rules was enacted in 1938. The second set of provisions encompasses the different rules about mass layoffs enacted by the European
Union (EU). The Danish legislation has followed the minimum
required by these EU rules, which have undergone some changes since
Denmark joined the EU in 1973. The restrictions on the behavior of
the employers are moderate: they have to submit a notice to the
regional labor market board and they have to go into negotiations with
their employees before the layoff can be enacted. Other than this, general rules about employment protection are absent from the Danish
labor market. Thus there is a complete absence of severance pay,
unless it has been agreed upon in a voluntary contract between the
employer and the single employee. Such agreements are relatively
uncommon. Just as in Belgium, procedures for dismissal are also
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absent; that is, employers are not required to act “fairly” or in a
“socially responsible” way. It should be noted, however, that there are
some provisions for specific groups in the labor market; these include,
for example, pregnant workers, and workers on maternity leave, and
persons elected by their fellow workers as representatives for negotiations with the employer. These provisions do not apply in the case of
mass layoffs, however.
Employment-protection provisions also play a close-to-negligible
role in Danish unions’ collective agreements. With few exceptions,
Danish collective agreements do not include such employment-protection provisions as advance notice and severance or redundancy pay.
One of the reasons for this absence can be traced back to the formation
of the Danish collective bargaining system. As in most other countries,
Danish employers tried to avoid recognizing the right of workers to
organize and bargain collectively. After a four-month nationwide general lockout in 1899, the Confederation of Danish Employers conceded. In return for recognition the trade unions granted the employers
the “right to manage” in the “general agreement” between the two
organizations, which was the main outcome of the conflict. The interpretation of “right to manage” is the (nearly) unlimited formal right of
the employers to decide which workers to hire and which workers to
fire.
Wage Setting

Union membership is very high in Belgium, and coverage rates are
even higher. All firms with 25 or more employees are de facto unionized, since they are required to have an elected works council, and only
union members can be elected to these councils. Nonunionized firms
are covered by any relevant contract that has been extended. Inside
firms, workers can choose not to be union members. Those who do so
won’t pay dues, but they will still be covered by all the relevant agreements. They cannot be candidates to the works councils, but they can
vote. Finally, two or more unions can coexist and compete for membership inside the firm.
Wage bargaining in Belgium has a pyramidal structure, in which
contracts can be bargained at the national, industry, and firm level.
Agreements struck at a higher level immediately become lower bounds
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for bargaining at lower levels. These of course limit downward realwage flexibility at the firm level, especially given the fact that as a general rule, Belgian wages are automatically indexed. The main feature
of the structure of the Belgian pattern of wage bargaining pertinent to
our study is the portability of seniority. Workers changing jobs
between firms within the same bargaining unit (often an industry) keep
their accrued seniority. This considerably limits a worker’s ability to
accept a wage cut, even if he or she is willing to do so.
As in Belgium, the Danish labor market is heavily unionized, with
80–90 percent of Danish workers being members of trade unions. The
share of workers covered by collective agreements is not known;
recent figures of as low as 50 percent have been suggested, although a
more likely figure is about 75 percent.3
For the time period considered below, centralized negotiations in
the private sector took place every second year between the Confederation of Unions, which represents both skilled and unskilled workers,
and the Confederation of Employers. For wages the negotiations
establish a minimum wage level, so that in more decentralized negotiations afterwards (at the plant level, for example) lower wage levels
cannot be agreed to. Other items in the centralized wage negotiations
are provisions about holidays, working hours, and overtime. Bargaining can also occur at several lower levels, including between single
employers and shop-stewards, and can cover a wider range of issues.
Interference by the state in the bargaining process is limited to the
centralized level and, then, only to instances where agreement has not
been reached. The state does not extend contracts between employers
and unions to employers who are not covered by collective agreements.
There are no formal minimum wage laws in Denmark. This implies
that despite the fact that the Danish system at face value looks very
unionized and centralized, there are loopholes with respect to the
acceptance of wage reductions.
Unemployment Insurance Provisions

The Belgian system of unemployment insurance is said to be one
of the most generous in the world (Burda 1988). As a general rule,
benefits do not expire in Belgium. They are reduced, however, after
both one and two years of unemployment. In fact, a closer look at the
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Belgian UI system indicates that it hardly qualifies as an insurance system. First, students can qualify for benefits even if they have never
been employed. Second, and more importantly, benefits are means
tested. The official replacement rate is 60 percent of the lost wage during the first year of unemployment and 40 percent after that. But, practically, these rates are meaningless. Many UI recipients receive
compensation based entirely on family status and income. Thus
“heads” of households receive a flat amount which can be higher than
60 percent of their lost wages, while the benefits of most other workers
are limited by a cap and are often below 60 percent of their lost wages.
Third, while there is a search requirement attached to UI benefits, this
requirement is hardly ever enforced.
At the beginning of this century the Danish state began to subsidize
the unemployment insurance system run by trade unions, who had set
up special UI funds for this task. Since a reform of the system in about
1970, the UI funds no longer bear the marginal burden of expenditures
for unemployment benefit. Each person pays a fixed fee in order to be
a member of the UI system and the Danish state covers the remaining
part of the expenditures. The UI funds are, in principle, separate
administrative units, but in practice there is a close connection between
the unions and the UI funds. The funds are closely regulated by the
state, however, with respect to benefit levels, entitlements, and so on.
One of the duties resting on the UI funds is to test that unemployed
members actually search for a job. The general impression is that there
is considerable variation across UI funds with respect to the efficiency
with which this task is carried out.
Eligibility for unemployment benefit in Denmark is limited to persons who are members of an unemployment insurance fund. About 80
percent of Danish private sector workers are members of a UI fund. In
order to become a member, workers have to fulfill a requirement of
work experience. In the 1980s, six months of work within one year
was required. However, persons who graduate from schools aiming at
a particular trade or as skilled workers in an apprenticeship system also
have a right to become members of a fund.
Concerning benefit levels, the Danish UI system is closer to a true
insurance scheme than the Belgian one in that it does not have a means
test for benefits. At the same time, however, it also has many features
(such as the absence of differentiation with respect to risk) that reduce
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the insurance element. It is considered generous compared to most
other countries, both with respect to the level and duration of benefits.
The maximum amount in unemployment benefit is 90 percent of the
previous wage, but this is obtained only by workers with low previous
wage levels. At the beginning of the 1980s, the benefit level was
capped at about the average wage level for workers in the private sector. Since that time, this maximum has been eroded considerably so
that now the average replacement ratio is about 65 percent. Thus, Danish workers with high wage levels have a replacement ratio that is
somewhat lower than in many other countries. Formally, there is a
maximum duration period, but until the beginning of the 1990s unemployed workers could become eligible for continued benefits by participating in a public employment scheme. This implied that the duration
period was practically unlimited.
Although the administration of UI funds is in the hands of individual trade unions, there is also a government labor exchange system that
is directly responsible for matching unemployed workers and vacancies. When a firm notifies the labor exchange of a vacancy, the latter is
required to identify a suitable unemployed worker and send him or her
for an interview. If the worker is offered the job and refuses, the labor
exchange is required to contact the UI fund and the worker loses benefits for five weeks. This is the formal procedure, but the unions also
take an active role in finding jobs.
Overall, it is extremely difficult to make cross-country comparisons of the “harshness” of the pressure unemployed are exposed to
from authorities, labor unions, or social norms in society. Within
Scandinavia, however, there is no doubt that the Danish system is more
easygoing than the Swedish and the Norwegian systems. This applies
both with respect to the formal rules and to the way workers are
assigned to jobs. One of the reasons is that trade unions in the other
Scandinavian countries are organized as industrial unions, while the
Danish ones are organized according to trade or education. Thus, the
Danish system is somewhat more hesitant with respect to the demand
that the unemployed search for jobs for which they have not been educated.
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DATA

In this chapter, the aim of our procedures with respect to data
selection and definition of variables is to come as close as possible to
similar definitions for Belgium and Denmark, so that the results for the
two countries are as comparable as possible. When it is possible or
desirable we adopt the definitions in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993), which is the main study on displaced workers using administrative data for the United States. This implies that the results in this
study are to a certain extent comparable to the results for the United
States as presented in the study by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan.
In some instances we could come close to their study for one of our
countries, but not for the other. In such cases we have chosen to select
the sample to maximize comparability between Belgium and Denmark.
A detailed description of the underlying data sets and our selection of
extracts therefrom, with a discussion of a broad range of comparability
issues between countries, is provided in the appendix to this chapter.
In what follows we provide a broad overview of the main data issues
relevant to understanding and interpreting our empirical results.
The Data Sets

For Belgium, we use administrative data from the Belgian social
security system. All Belgian workers, with the exception of tenured
employees of the federal government, are included in that database.
The data provide one record per employee per employer per year, plus
information about potential spells of unemployment. In these records,
we directly observe the age and gender of the worker, the wage, the
number of days worked, and a broad occupational classification (either
blue-collar or white-collar). From these records, it is possible to reconstruct employee and firm histories and a (censored) measure of tenure.
We do not, however, directly observe the reasons for separation from a
job. Nor do we observe any family characteristics, so that we cannot
reconstruct UI benefit entitlements. In our computations for both
countries, public sector jobs will be excluded (although workers who
are displaced from a private firm and find a job in the public sector will
be included).
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The Danish data are based on the fact that all Danish residents have
a personal number. A very wide variety of transactions are recorded
against these personal numbers. These data are then centralized and
collated by Danmarks Statistiks and are available for research purposes
(subject to very stringent controls to maintain confidentiality). Thus,
in principle, it is possible to track all adult Danish residents from 1980
to 1994 (the latest year for which information is available) and to analyze a wide variety of behavior. Moreover, individuals can be linked to
one another to form households and they can also be linked to the
plants at which they work, which can also be followed over time. Thus
there is considerable scope for research into the labor market encompassing demographic and plant information. In this study we take a
subsample of workers in private firms and follow them from 1980 to
1991. Unfortunately, although the initial sample size is reasonably
large (37,319 workers), we are left with only a few workers in specific
strata, which somewhat limits the precision of some of the analysis.
For example, the restriction to high-tenure workers leaves only 15,860
workers and the number of these displaced in our chosen reference
year is only 547!
In both countries we focus on displacements that occurred in one
particular “reference year,” close to the end of the data series available
to us. Reference years were chosen to allow us to follow workers for
up to three years after displacement, and (by following workers before
displacement) to construct (left-censored) tenure measures for as long
as possible before displacement. Our reference years are 1983 for Belgium and 1988 for Denmark. Aside from timing, the only other major
difference between the two data sets is the fact that the Belgian data are
firm-based, while the Danish are plant-based. A second (minor) difference is that all point-in-time wage and employment variables for Belgium are defined for the end of the year, whereas they are defined for
mid November for Denmark.
Defining Displacement

We will label as “displaced” all the workers who separate from a
firm (or plant) where employment has been reduced by 30 percent or
more during the reference year and which had more than five employees before this reduction in employment. In the sample used below,
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multiple job holders are always excluded and workers having less than
three years tenure at the time of displacement are usually excluded.
We have also constructed two comparison groups. The first one is
made up of workers with at least three years’ tenure who continued to
be employed at the end of the displacing year in firms (plants, for Denmark) which displaced workers. The second comparison group is
made up of workers with at least three years’ tenure employed at other
plants or firms. The exception to the three-year-tenure rule occurs
when we compute displacement rates. Thus the analysis of the postdisplacement outcomes below includes only workers with three years or
more of tenure and excludes multiple-job holders. This study of outcomes will look at displaced workers’ histories up to three years after
their job loss.
Firm or Plant Identification and “False Death”

Sometimes, firms or plants disappear from the Belgian and Danish
data. According to the above definition, these firms will be treated as
displacing all their workers as they shrink to a size of zero (or “die”).
One potential problem with this is the possibility that firms may disappear from the data not because they close, but because they are
acquired by another firm or are involved in some other kind of reorganization that does not involve laying off the workforce. Given differences in the nature of the data available to us, we deal with this “false
deaths” problem in somewhat different ways in the two countries under
study.
In Belgium, firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that
can survive change in ownership. A firm ID number will change only
if the firm disappears as a corporation and all its debts have been paid
in full; the ID will not change if the corporation is taken over. Given
the nature of Belgian industrial organization (big holding companies
holding shares in many corporations), corporations rarely disappear.
Mergers do happen though, and they are probably more rare than in the
United States. Some firms also die and revive under different names.
To control for these possibilities we proceeded as follows: vanishing
firms where at least 70 percent of the workers were reemployed (at any
firm) in the next year, and where 70 percent of those rehired were
rehired in a single firm, were not considered to be displacing firms.4
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In Denmark, an establishment is considered (by Danmarks Statistiks) to be continuing from one year to the next if any one of the following four criteria is satisfied: there are the same owner and same
industry; there are the same owner and largely the same employees;
there are the same employees and the same industry; or there are the
same employees and the same address. More precisely, “same industry” means the same ISIC code at the 5-digit level. “Same employees,” in the second case, means that at least 30 percent of the first
plant’s employees remain at the plant or make up at least 30 percent of
the second-year employees. “Same employees,” in the third and fourth
cases, means that at least 30 percent of the first group of employees
remain at the plant and make up at least 30 percent of the second-year
employees.5
Even with such a classification scheme, it remains possible, of
course, to categorize workers as “displaced” even though we would not
consider them as being genuinely displaced. This can happen if some
of the workers at one plant are taken over by another plant. Our database contains variables to take this situation into account. In shrinking
but continuing plants, sometimes a group of two or more workers leave
the “main” plant and move to a second plant together. Danmarks
Statistiks calls such plants “spinoffs.” In such situations we classify
workers remaining in the main plant as not being displaced, but those
moving into the spinoffs as displaced. Among plants that disappear
completely from the data, a plant is considered to be “taken over” by a
new plant if at least two of its workers are employed in the new plant
and these workers constitute at least 30 percent of the workforce in the
closed plant. Workers involved in such “takeovers” are not treated as
displaced workers in our analysis (they are placed in the category
“other workers”).

RESULTS
Who Is Displaced?

To put our results into context, we first examine some aggregate
statistics for Belgium and Denmark for the two years before and after
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our reference years, which are 1983 for Belgium and 1988 for Denmark. These statistics are presented in Table 6.2. In the period before
the reference year, Belgium was suffering a recession and unemployment grew quite quickly (from 7.8 percent to 11.7 percent). In contrast, the prereference years in Denmark were relatively healthy,
although the economy declined in the reference year. The postreference-year experiences are much more similar, except that average
manufacturing wages declined in Belgium but not in Denmark. In both
countries unemployment increased a little in the postreference period
even though there was modest real growth. We take these statistics to
indicate that the postreference-year macro environment in the two
countries was similar and is unlikely to account for any large differences in outcomes that we observe below.
In Table 6.3 we present the incidence of displacement in Belgium
and Denmark (for all private sector workers). Although there are some
significant differences, the most striking feature of this table is that
long-tenure workers (those with three or more years with the firm or
plant) are just as likely to be displaced in Denmark as in Belgium (3.45
percent and 3.41 percent, respectively). This comes as something of a
surprise since, as we have seen, Belgium has very stringent layoff rules
and Denmark has very weak ones. The major difference between the
two countries is that short-tenure workers in Denmark are more likely
to be displaced and Danish workers (short-tenure and long-tenure) are
much more likely to be displaced from a shrinking firm than from a
dying one. There are two possible explanations for this last result. It
may reflect the fact that in Belgium it is more difficult for firms that
continue in business to lay off workers, or it may be that Danish plants
are less likely to go out of business, perhaps because they are larger.
With the data at hand we are unable to distinguish between these alternatives.
In Table 6.4 we present some of the characteristics of displaced
workers. Since our primary focus is on long-tenure workers, we
present results only for workers who had at least three years of tenure
at the plant or firm where they worked in the sample period. We also
break down the sample by whether the firm closed down or not.
Finally, we present the same statistics for workers who continued in
“shrinking” firms and for those who were not in firms that displaced
workers (“other workers”). Comparing the latter to the displaced sam-
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ple, we see that displaced workers in Belgium tend to have slightly
lower tenure (but remember that all the workers here have at least three
years’ tenure); to have lower wages; to be more likely to be blue-collar;
and to work for smaller firms than “other workers.” It is also clear that
women are more likely to be displaced. There are similar differentials
for firm size, tenure, and being blue-collar in Denmark, but the differences in wages and gender composition are much smaller there.
Finally we present an analysis of the characteristics of the displaced using a simple probit for being displaced (see Table 6.5); note
that here we include all workers, not just the long-tenure ones. The
first column provides a comparison with “all nondisplaced workers”
and the second is a comparison with those who remain in displacing
firms. In Belgium in the first comparison, the categories more likely to
be displaced are: male, blue-collar, lower wage, and low tenure. Controlling for tenure, workers in all age groups over 20 are more likely to
be displaced than teens, but there is no apparent age difference in displacement rates between the ages of 20 and 59. Workers over 60
appear to be at somewhat greater risk than workers with similar tenure
under 60. The results for the comparison with those in displacing firms
are somewhat different. In particular, the tenure effects are now stronger (with workers with less than one year of tenure being much more
likely to be displaced than other workers). Despite the differences in
sign, the age effects are similar (note that the comparisons are with the
“under twenty” group so that the change in sign tells us something only
about this group). In Denmark, the probabilities of being displaced are
quite similar to those for the “other” comparisons in Belgium. Thus
the first columns of Tables 6.4 and 6.5 give a similar picture in comparisons of who is displaced in the two countries except that for the
comparison with “nondisplaced” workers, the Danish results do not
show any significant differences in the tenure effects. All in all, there
are only relatively minor differences between the personal characteristics of workers who are displaced in Belgium and Denmark. The main
differences seen in Table 6.4—in the proportion who are white-collar
workers and the firm size—reflect differences found in the “other
worker” sample. As we shall see below, there are quite sharp differences in the postdisplacement experiences for workers in the two countries and the results presented in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 suggest that these

484

Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning

differences in outcomes are unlikely to be due to the sample composition of the displaced groups.
Postdisplacement Employment Outcomes

In Table 6.6 we present some statistics on the unemployment outcomes after displacement (once again, only for long-tenure workers).
Specifically, this gives details of how many months of unemployment
displaced workers experience in the three years after their displacement. It is most important to note that these statistics give information
on (registered) unemployment after displacement and not non-employment. Thus, someone who withdraws from the labor force after displacement or remains in the labor force but does not register as
unemployed would not be included in the “unemployed” here. These
results reveal some extraordinary differences between Belgium and
Denmark and are quite different from experiences in other countries.
First, almost two-thirds of displaced Danish workers experience no
interruption in employment (or unemployment in the subsequent three
years) as against one-third for Belgium. The latter figure is more in
line with the international experience, so one immediate worry is that
the Danish figure is incorrect. One possibility is that in the Danish
sample we are misclassifying workers and our displaced sample actually includes some workers who found employment in other plants
within the same firm. Although we cannot completely rule this out, as
we have documented in the data section above we have gone to great
lengths to ensure that we are not making such an error. We also note
that the proportion of all workers in Denmark who experience some
unemployment in our reference year is 23 percent. This is in line with
aggregate statistics that are compiled from different sources, leading us
to believe that our calculations are not seriously biased.
Turning to workers who do experience some unemployment, we
see that Danish workers are unemployed for an average of five months
but Belgian workers have average spells of 15 months (but note that
any spell is truncated above at 36 months). Now it is the Belgian
results that are out of line with the wider international experience. To
investigate these differences, we also present selected quantiles of spell
lengths in the lower portion of Table 6.6. From these we see that Danish workers either move out of unemployment relatively quickly (more
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than 50 percent of those exiting unemployment do so within about two
months) or tend to stay for long spells. In contrast, the majority of
workers who become unemployed in Belgium tend to have long
spells—less than one-half of them have left unemployment after one
year.
Combining the probability of having any unemployment and the
mean spell length, we see that a Belgian displaced worker has an
expected unemployment spell of about 10 months as against 6 weeks
for a Danish worker. What could account for such large differences?
Here we list some possibilities, informally. The first is that there is a
difference in definitions. The definitions of unemployment in our two
samples are not exactly the same, but they are so close that it is not
credible that the differences in outcomes are attributable to this. A second possibility is that there are differences in sample composition, that
is, that the composition of the displaced worker groups are very different in the two countries. As we saw in Table 6.4, however, the two
samples appear to have similar personal characteristics so that it is
unlikely that it is this that accounts for the differences in unemployment outcomes. A third possibility is that the differences are due to
differences in notice provisions. As discussed in the institutions section, workers in Belgium generally receive more advance notice of closures and mass layoffs than workers in Denmark. Conventional search
models would then suggest the converse of what we observe. Similar
remarks apply to a fourth possibility, namely, that the differences in
outcomes can be attributed to differences in UI systems. Both Denmark and Belgium are usually regarded as having very generous UI
systems (see, for example, Table 6.1 above) but, as discussed in the
institutions section, this is something of an illusion for Belgium. In
fact, an unemployed worker in Denmark is more likely to receive high
benefits than a comparable worker in Belgium. This is because Belgian benefits are means tested so that married workers with an
employed spouse do not receive much. Given this, we regard it as
extremely unlikely that the differences in unemployment outcomes in
Belgium and Denmark are due to differences in the UI system. Indeed,
we can go further and question whether the “generosity” of the UI system in Belgium “causes” the observed long unemployment spells,
given that the UI system in Denmark is at least as generous and unemployment spells are much shorter. This is clearly work for the future
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but we note here that this conclusion—that the long spells in Belgium
are unlikely to be solely the result of the UI system—highlights the virtue of making cross-country comparisons.
A fifth possibility is that the payment of severance pay to long-tenure workers in Belgium facilitates longer unemployment spells there.
Certain aspects of the results presented here are consistent with this—
for example, the longer duration for the longest-tenure workers (see
upcoming discussion of Table 6.8). Moreover, this effect is absent for
Denmark where severance pay is not usually given. This is certainly
an explanation that deserves closer inspection. Since the data at hand
do not report severance pay, we cannot follow this through here. A
sixth possible explanation for the differences between the two countries is the different cyclical effects in the two countries. As discussed
above, however, Belgium and Denmark experienced fairly similar
cyclical conditions after the reference year; it is difficult to believe that
such small differences could lead to such large differences in outcomes. Yet another alternative (number seven) is that because the UI
system in Denmark is administered by the unions they have more
incentive, or more ability, to find displaced workers new jobs. With
respect to this hypothesis it is sufficient to note that although the
unions administer UI payments they have no direct financial incentive
to move workers from unemployment to a new job. It thus seems
unlikely that unions’ incentives explain the difference between the
countries.
An eighth alternative is that labor-demand conditions differ significantly between the two countries. Although the cyclical conditions in
the countries are similar, it is still possible that there could be permanently lower arrival rates of job offers in Belgium. In a conventional
search model this would lead to longer unemployment durations. This
would also be consistent with the major difference in employers’ firing
flexibility between the two countries: high firing costs in Belgium lead
to employers being less willing to hire and, consequently, to longer
unemployment durations. If this explanation is to be consistent with
the roughly equal unemployment rates in the two countries (see Table
6.2), then it means that flows into unemployment must be much higher
in Denmark. Given that displacement rates in Denmark are not dramatically higher than in Belgium (see Table 6.3), the bulk of Danish
unemployment has to be the result of something other than displace-
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ment; for example a higher quit rate. We cannot check this with the
data at hand, but this is clearly a promising avenue of future research.
Finally, it could be that the differences arise because Danish wages
are less rigid downwards. The aggregate figures on wage growth given
in Table 6.2, however, suggest that, if anything, the converse is the
case. These show that the average wage in Belgium declined in the
year after the sample year but Danish wages did not. On the other
hand, these aggregate changes may be masking changes for displaced
workers in Denmark who take a job. Thus we need to look at what
happened to the earnings and wages of reemployed displaced workers.
We shall do this shortly. For now we anticipate those results and state
that we do not believe that the very large differences in unemployment
outcomes are attributable to a greater propensity for unemployed Danish workers to accept lower wages.
To complement the unemployment statistics of the previous table,
we present reemployment rates at annual intervals after the displacement in Table 6.7. These largely confirm the analysis above—Belgian
displaced workers have much lower subsequent reemployment rates
than Danish displaced workers, particularly in the year after the displacement. One additional interesting feature in Table 6.7 is that Belgian workers who were in a shrinking firm in the reference year but
were not displaced are significantly less likely to be employed in later
years than “other” workers. This is not the case for Denmark—the
employment rates for “other” workers and workers who stayed with
shrinking firms are almost identical. Once again, the likeliest explanation for this is the difference in firing costs: Danish firms adjust more
quickly to negative demand shocks and are less likely to experience
persistent downsizing.
We end the analysis of reemployment with a regression analysis of
the determinants of reemployment. Coefficients from comparable Cox
partial likelihood models of unemployment durations in both countries
are presented in Table 6.8. These coefficients give the (assumed proportional) impacts of different characteristics on the probability of
being reemployed. In Denmark we can draw no firm conclusions
regarding the determinants of reemployment, due to the small sample
size. In Belgium, reemployment is significantly more likely for men,
for white-collar workers, high-wage workers, young workers, and
(controlling for age) high-tenure workers. As was discussed in Chapter
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2 of this volume, this positive effect of tenure may reflect the greater
advance notice and other reemployment assistance provided to senior
workers under Belgium’s strict system of employment protection law.
Postdisplacement Wages and Earnings

We turn now to earnings and wages for those who find a job. We
present statistics on earnings in the years after displacement in Table
6.9; once again these are for long-tenure workers. The preparation of
these figures makes them somewhat different from those presented for
the United States by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993). In the
latter study the possibility of out-of-state migration (with consequent
attrition from the sample) meant that Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
had to condition on having some positive earnings in all of the comparison years after the displacement. In our analysis we condition only on
being in employment at the end of the relevant year (actually, in
November for Denmark—see the appendix for more details). In the
top panels of Table 6.9 we present average earnings in the year, conditional on our employment condition, so these are comparable to those
given by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan. These averages are not for
the same people in each year so that employment change, wage
changes, and selection are all confounded. In the lower panel we
present mean log differences in annual earnings as compared to the displacement year so that the comparison in any year is with the same
workers in the reference year (year 0). The most obvious feature of the
lower panels is the very large drop for displaced workers in Belgium in
the year after displacement. This reflects the fact that Belgian displaced workers are more likely than Danish displaced workers to have
only part-year employment in the year after, even if they are back in
work one year later. There is also a strong decline in year two for Belgian “nondisplaced workers at displacing firms.” This mirrors the persistence in displacement seen in Table 6.7. Comparing the results for
the two countries, we see that for Denmark even “other workers”
record a small loss in earnings (of 1.5 percent) over the three years
while displaced workers have a larger loss of 8.3 percent. Thus, Danish displaced workers seem to have a medium run earnings loss of
about 6.8 percent as compared to “other workers.” In Belgium, however, three-year earnings losses are actually smaller for displaced
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workers than for “other workers.” Indeed, Belgian workers who were
not displaced (“other workers”) experienced an earnings loss of 7.6
percent in the year after the reference year. This is consistent with the
macro evidence on wage and employment changes in year one given in
Table 6.2.
In Table 6.10, we present average wage levels and log wage
changes. Once again, we concentrate on the latter. For wages the perverse effect noted for earnings for Belgium disappears. Now both Danish and Belgian workers show a decline relative to “other” workers.
The order of the decline for Denmark is similar to that of earnings (a
relative loss of 6.4 percent as against a relative loss of 6.8 percent for
earnings). This suggests that all of the relative medium run negative
impacts on earnings for Danish workers are driven by wage losses and
not employment changes. In contrast, Belgian displaced workers suffered a relative wage loss of 3.7 percent as against a relative earnings
gain of 6 percent. It is important in interpreting these results to keep in
mind that we are always conditioning on being back in work at the end
of the relevant year. For the reasons discussed above, this probably
does not matter much for Denmark but in Belgium those who have
found a job after one year are the exception rather than the rule. The
finding that displaced Belgian workers who are reemployed are doing
relatively better than those who were not displaced seems very likely to
be a selection effect.
We finish our analysis in Table 6.11 with a regression of the wage
loss for those who are reemployed within two years of the displacement. For both countries the coefficient on the lagged wage is significantly less than 1 so that higher wage workers lose relatively more.
Moreover, this effect is more pronounced for Denmark, suggesting that
higher wage workers in Denmark do a good deal worse; this is consistent with the earlier analysis suggesting that Danish workers go back to
work much more quickly and suffer some wage loss as a consequence.
There is no significant effect of age for workers aged between 20 and
60 but workers aged over 60 who choose to go back to work suffer
very large falls: 14 percent for Belgium and 28 percent for Denmark.
Both countries also show much larger wage losses for women (15 percent for women relative to men for Belgium and 17 percent for Denmark). Given that the reemployment probabilities seem to be lower for
women than for men (see Table 6.8), this is clearly an important area
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for future research. One other notable feature is that postdisplacement
wage losses do not seem to be correlated with tenure (given the selection on having at least three years of tenure).

CONCLUSIONS

We have compared the displacement experience in two countries—Belgium and Denmark—that share some common features in
their labor market institutions but that also display significant differences. In particular, both have what are thought to be generous UI systems, but firing costs in Belgium are high relative to other countries
whereas firing costs in Denmark are very low by international standards. We found that displaced workers in Denmark are more likely to
be displaced from a firm that continues in existence than are displaced
Belgian workers. This is consistent with the fact that firing costs are
much higher for Belgian firms and that, consequently, they are less
likely to shed workers if they stay in business. Apart from this we did
not find significant differences in the predisplacement characteristics
of displaced workers in the two countries. When we compared postdisplacement outcomes we found very significant differences in employment outcomes but only relatively minor ones in wage losses for those
who are reemployed. Belgian workers have an expected unemployment spell of ten months while Danish workers have an expected spell
of only six weeks. We reviewed a number of possible explanations for
this difference. In particular, we rejected the proposition that the
longer Belgian spells are due to the UI system since the Danish UI system is even more likely to induce long unemployment spells. We concluded that of all of the explanations we examined, only one is likely to
be the cause of the longer spells, namely, that there are permanent differences in the demand side and Belgian workers face a much lower
arrival rate of job offers. This lower propensity to hire by Belgian
firms is consistent with the differences in firing costs.
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Notes
Van Audenrode carried out the analysis on the Belgian data and Albæk and Browning
the analysis on the Danish data. This work was supported in part by an EU grant. We
thank Martin Junge for his excellent research assistance and Peter Kuhn and conference participants for very helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. World Economic Forum rankings are based on a combination of objective information and employers’ subjective rankings of the difficulty of making employment adjustments. See World Economic Forum 1997.
2. The threshold between low and high wages is set by decree and indexed.
3. Using a survey of private sector employees, Scheuer (1997) found that only 52
percent of the respondents answered that they were covered by a collective agreement. This figure is low compared to other information, including a more recent
survey of about 2,000 firms with more than ten employees conducted by Statistics
Denmark. In this survey, 69 percent of firms indicated that a majority of their
employees were covered by collective agreements. When weighted by the number of employees in the firms, these responses suggest that 83 percent of the
workers in firms with more than ten employees are employed in firms where the
majority of workers are covered by collective agreements. However, the coverage among firms with less than ten employees is probably considerably below that
for larger firms (the coverage among firms with 10–19 employees was 63 percent). Given that about 20 percent of Danish workers work in plants with fewer
than ten employees and the 63 percent applies to firms with fewer than ten workers, then we get an average coverage of 79 percent. This figure is an upper bound.
If we assume 50 percent coverage for firms with fewer than ten employees then
we have an overall coverage of 76 percent. On the basis of these calculations, an
estimate of 75 percent coverage of collective agreements among private sector
employees seems reasonable.
4. A dying firm from which fewer than 70 percent of its workers failed to become
reemployed would automatically be considered a displacing firm according to our
30 percent employment-reduction criterion above.
5. Although our data contain only a small sample of workers, it is important to note
that the counts on which these definitions of continuity are based were generated
by Danmarks Statistiks from the full population of employees at all plants. Thus
we avoid the sampling and inference problem confronted by Bender et al. in their
analysis of the French data in this volume.

492

Albæk, Van Audenrode, and Browning

Table 6.1 Labor Market Characteristics (Ranking out of 53 countries)

Country

Flexible hiring
and firing

Low legislative
restrictions
on firing

Unemployment
Insurance
“meanness”

Belgium

39

46

52

Canada

10

11

24

Denmark

1

10

46

U.K.

8

5

10

U.S.A.

7

8

5

SOURCE: World Economic Forum (1997).

Table 6.2 Macroeconomic Environment in Belgium and Denmark
Time to displacement year
Characteristic

–2

–1

0

1

2

Belgium

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

Denmark

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

Belgium

–1.4

1.5

–0.1

1.3

2.1

Denmark

3.6

0.3

1.2

0.6

1.4

Belgium

–0.1

–2.0

–1.3

–1.1

0.0

Denmark

2.6

0.5

–0.6

–0.5

0.0

Belgium

7.8

10.0

11.7

12.9

12.9

Denmark

7.9

7.9

8.7

9.5

9.7

Belgium

7.6

8.7

7.7

6.3

5.2

Denmark

3.3

4.0

4.5

4.6

2.6

Belgium

1.4

–1.4

–1.7

–2.1

1.4

Denmark

1.5

0.4

2.0

0.3

1.8

Year

Real GDP growth rate

Employment growth rate

Unemployment rate

Inflation

Growth in real manufacturing
wages
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Table 6.3 Incidence of Displacement among Private Sector Workers in
Belgium and Denmark (%)
Group of workers

Total

Firms shrinking

Firms dying

All displaced

4.78

2.67

2.11

≥ 3 yr. tenure

3.41

1.80

1.61

All displaced

6.61

4.96

1.65

≥ 3 yr. tenure

3.45

2.84

0.61

Belgium

Denmark

SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.4 Characteristics of Displaced Workers with Tenure of at least
Three Years in Belgium and Denmark
Belgium
Group

Mean

Denmark

Std. error

Mean

Std. error

All displaced workers
Proportion men
Proportion white-collar
Age (yr.)

0.68

0.002

0.68

0.02

0.36

0.002

0.48

0.021

38.66

0.056

41.1

0.49

Tenure (yr.)

5.09

0.006

5.77

0.088

Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure

0.56

0.002

0.56

0.496

Proportion displaced because of closure

0.48

0.002

0.18

0.016

Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr)

1942

6.77

128.8

2.7

0.82

45.7

Average size of firm (no. of workers)
Number of observations

23.37
42,255

n.a.a

547

5.39
n.a.

Displaced workers in dying firms
Proportion men

0.656

0.003

0.667

0.049

Proportion white-collar

0.332

0.003

0.563

0.051

Age (yr.)

37.95

0.080

40.4

1.18

Tenure (yr.)

5.104

0.008

5.57

0.212

Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure

0.567

0.003

0.479

0.051

Proportion displaced because of closure

1.000

n.a.

1.00

n.a.

Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr)

1.865

8.87

125.3

6.14

27.3

Average size of firm (no. of workers)

20.330

1.242

Number of observations

20,294

n.a.

96

4.40
n.a.

Displaced workers in shrinking firms
Proportion men

0.707

0.003

0.683

0.022

Proportion white-collar

0.393

0.003

0.457

0.023

Age (yr.)

39.32

0.079

41.2

0.540

Tenure (yr.)

5.082

0.008

5.81

0.097

Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure

0.555

0.003

0.528

0.023

Proportion displaced because of closure
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr)

0

n.a.

0

n.a.

2,014

10.10

129.6

3.01

Average size of firm (no. of workers)

24.824

1.057

50.8

6.77

Number of observations

21,961

n.a.

451

n.a.
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Belgium
Group

Mean

Denmark

Std. error

Mean

Std. error

Nondisplaced workers in displacing firms
Proportion men

0.704

0.002

0.660

0.019

Proportion white-collar

0.369

0.002

0.544

0.020

39.746

0.057

40.7

.4400

5.772

0.008

5.68

0.084

Age (yr.)
Tenure (yr.)
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure

0.542

0.003

0.497

0.020

Proportion displaced because of closure

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr)

2,053

8.54

127.4

2.03

Average size of firm (no. of workers)

24.824

1.057

69.5

11.03

Number of observations

39,231

n.a.

608

n.a.

Other workers
Proportion men

0.732

0.000

0.668

0.004

Proportion white-collar

0.454

0.000

0.542

0.004

39.288

0.010

41.0

0.087

5.386

0.001

6.14

0.017

0.000

0.608

0.004

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Age (yr.)
Tenure (yr.)
Proportion with more than 6 yr. tenure
Proportion displaced because of closure
Average daily wage lost job (BF or DKr)
Average size of firm (no. of workers)
Number of observations
a

n.a. = Not applicable.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

0.703
n.a.
2,294

1.35

131.2

.499

49.120

1.548

66.7

2.03

14,705

n.a.

1,104,004

n.a.
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Table 6.5 Factors Affecting the Probability of being Displaced,
Compared with Nondisplaced Workers in Belgiuma and
Denmarkb
Belgium relative to

Worker group
Male

Workers in
displacing plants
All workers
or firms
0.043 (.004)

–0.008 (0.009)

Denmark relative to
Workers in
displacing plants
All workers
or firms
0.025 (0.023)

0.171 (0.048)

White-collar

–0.122 (0.003) –0.014 (0.008)

–0.176 (0.022) –0.213 (0.047)

log(wage)

–0.291 (0.004) –0.066 (0.009)

–0.117 (0.025) –0.206 (0.054)

c

Aged 20–29

0.153 (0.008)

–0.133 (0.024)

–0.112 (0.037) –0.104 (0.080)

Aged 30–39

0.161 (0.008)

–0.270 (0.024)

–0.137 (0.041) –0.188 (0.088)

Aged 40–49

0.161 (0.008)

–0.304 (0.025)

–0.119 (0.042) –0.236 (0.090)

Aged 50–59

0.172 (0.009)

–0.304 (0.025)

–0.135 (0.048) –0.344 (0.098)

Aged 60 or over

0.250 (0.013)

–0.245 (0.032)

0.044 (0.093)

Tenure of 1 yr.d

0.128 (0.005)

–5.95 (0.062)

–0.234 (0.029) –0.279 (0.061)

–0.160 (0.185)

Tenure of 2 yr.

0.017 (0.007)

–6.16 (0.063)

–0.333 (0.036) –0.414 (0.074)

Tenure of 3 yr.

–0.051 (0.007)

–6.13 (0.063)

–0.473 (0.046) –0.539 (0.092)

Tenure of 4 yr.

–0.020 (0.007)

–6.02 (0.064)

–0.445 (0.051) –0.463 (0.102)

Tenure of 5 yr.

–0.033 (0.008)

–6.09 (0.064)

–0.470 (0.063) –0.407 (0.126)

Tenure of 6 yr.+ –0.209 (0.005)

–6.16 (0.063)

–0.594 (0.033) –0.340 (0.069)

Pseudo R2
Sample size

0.026

0.106

0.045

0.044

1,861,806

142,275

37,319

3,494

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a
For Belgium, probit analysis of being displaced during 1983 (dependent variable = 1
if displaced).
b
For Denmark, probit analysis of being displaced during 1988 (dependent variable = 1
if displaced).
c
Omitted age is “less than 20.”
d
Omitted tenure is “less than one year.”
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Table 6.6 Unemployment for Long-Tenure Displaced Workers in the
Three Years after Displacement
Belgium

Denmark

Proportion of displaced workers with some
unemployment

0.65
(0.002)

0.31
(0.020)

Mean number of months unemployeda

15.22
(0.068)

5.31
(0.585)

5

0.69

0.15

10

1.38

0.24

25

4.16

0.89

50

13.86

2.09

75

25.40

5.33

90

32.10

16.73

95

33.49

25.48

Percentile

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Does not include non-employment spells
that are not registered as unemployment.
a
Maximum is set to 36 months.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.7 Reemploymenta after Displacement in Belgium and Denmark
(Share of workers employed)
Years after displacement
Group

0

1

2

3

Displaced workers

1

0.370
(0.002)

0.583
(0.002)

0.664
(0.002)

Nondisplaced workers at
displacing firms

1

1

0.712
(0.002)

0.785
(0.002)

Other workers

1

0.930
(0.000)

0.871
(0.000)

0.892
(0.000)

Displaced workers

1

0.718
(0.019)

0.750
(0.019)

0.746
(0.019)

Nondisplaced workers at
displacing firms

1

1

0.911
(0.012)

0.859
(0.014)

Other workers

1

0.957
(0.002)

0.918
(0.002)

0.879
(0.003)

Belgium

Denmark

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Proportion employed at the end of the year (Belgium) or in November of the year
(Denmark).
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

a
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Table 6.8 Duration Analysis of Reemployment for Long-Tenure
Workers in Belgium and Denmark
Group of workers

Belgium

Denmark

0.095 (0.014)

0.117 (0.202)

White-collar

0.142 (0.013)

–0.325 (0.193)

Log(wage)

0.192 (0.015)

0.221 (0.412)

Aged 20 to 29

–0.090 (0.057)

–0.315 (1.082)

Aged 30 to 39

–0.200 (0.057)

–0.234 (1.094)

Aged 40 to 49

–0.417 (0.058)

–0.366 (1.108)

Aged 50 to 59

–0.941 (0.059)

–0.577 (1.105)

Aged 60 or over

–1.686 (0.075)

–0.709 (1.226)

b

–0.019 (0.020)

–0.282 (0.298)

Male

a

Tenure of 4 yrs.
Tenure of 5 yrs.

0.106 (0.021)

0.615 (0.364)

Tenure of 6+ yrs.

0.137 (0.017)

0.163 (0.230)

42,223

135

Sample size

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. Cox non-parametric estimation of reemployment hazard, compared to all nondisplaced workers, workers with three or more
years of tenure only.
a
Omitted age is “less than 20.”
b
Omitted tenure is “three years.”
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Table 6.9 Average Annual Earnings and Earnings Growth for LongTenure Workers by Years after Displacement
Panel

–1 yr.

0

1 yr.

2 yr.

3 yr.

A. Average earning level
of workers
Belgium (1981 BF)a
Displaced

397,783
(1,114)b

327,101
(1,354)

366,496
(1,516)

370,934
(1,548)

n.d.c

Nondisplaced

402,002
(1,157)

394,304
(1,390)

323,612
(1,435)

350,049
(1,575)

n.d.

Other

498,963
(245)

489,596
(313)

491,471
(321)

484,745
(330)

n.d.

Displaced

185,375
(5,003)

169,031
(4,687)

174,887
(5,017)

170,386
(5,199)

n.d.

Nondisplaced

194,045
(4,350)

189,703
(4,388)

181,627
(4,333)

179,697
(4,118)

n.d.

Other

201,811
(840)

197,817
(865)

197,601
(899)

196,941
(931)

n.d.

Displaced

n.d.

n.d.

–0.393
(0.004)f

–0.094
(0.004)

–0.026
(0.004)

Nondisplaced

n.d.

n.d.

–0.044
(0.002)

–0.387
(0.004)

–0.091
(0.004)

Other

n.d.

n.d.

–0.076
(0.000)

–0.064
(0.000)

–0.086
(0.000)

Displaced

n.d.

n.d.

–0.060
(0.018)

–0.049
(0.025)

–0.083
(0.030)

Nondisplaced

n.d.

n.d.

–0.031
(0.010)

–0.044
(0.012)

–0.062
(0.015)

Other

n.d.

n.d.

–0.013
(0.002)

–0.015
(0.003)

–0.015
(0.003)

Denmark (1988
DKr)d

B. Earnings growth of
workerse
Belgium (1981 BF)a

Denmark (1988
DKr)c
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a

BF = Belgian francs. Sample selection = wage rate positive at end of relevant year.
Earnings growth for long-tenure workers is in parentheses.
c
n.d. = No data available.
d
DKr = Danish kroner. Sample selection = wage rate positive in November of relevant
year.
e
Growth is measured by log(Earningst) – log(Earnings0).
f
Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
b
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Table 6.10 Average Wages and Wage Growth for Long-Tenure
Workers
Years after displacement
Panel

–1

0

1

2

3

Displaced

1,870
(6.52)c

1,776
(7.75)

2,012
(5.36)

2,077
(5.49)

n.d.b

Nondisplaced

1,824
(7.61)

1,882
(4.414)

1,773
(5.83)

1,716
(6.60)

n.d.

Other

2,124
(0.92)

2,122
(1.24)

2,102
(1.16)

2,082
(1.63)

n.d.

Displaced

129
(2.70)

134
(3.97)

133
(3.82)

134
(3.46)

n.d.

Nondisplaced

127
(2.03)

129
(2.94)

132
(2.23)

133
(2.31)

n.d.

Other

131
(0.50)

133
(0.61)

139
(0.61)

142
(0.57)

n.d.

Displaced

–0.038
(0.002)f

–0.065
(0.002)

–0.088
(0.002)

Nondisplaced

0.008
(0.002)

–0.038
(0.002)

–0.076
(0.002)

Other

–0.018
(0.000)

–0.032
(0.000)

–0.051
(0.000)

Displaced

–0.032
(0.021)

–0.015
(0.020)

0.001
(0.021)

Nondisplaced

0.004
(0.008)

0.023
(0.010)

0.031
(0.11)

Other

0.008
(0.002)

0.049
(0.002)

0.065
(0.002)

A. Average wage level of
workers
Belgium (1981 BF)a

Denmark (1988 DKr)d

B. Wage growth of workerse
Belgium

Denmark
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a

Daily wage rates in 1981 Belgian francs. Sample selection: wage rate positive at end
of the relevant year.
b
n.d. = no data available.
c
Wage growth for long-tenure workers is in parentheses.
d
Hourly wage rates in 1988 Danish kroner. Sample selection: wage rate positive in
November of the relevant year.
e
Wage growth is measured as log(Waget) – log(Wage0).
f
Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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Table 6.11 Regression Analysis of Wages in Subsequent Job
Variable
Log wage on lost job

Belgium

Denmark

0.587 (0.005)

0.382 (0.054)

20 < Age ≤30

–0.022 (0.016)

0.595 (0.133)

30 < Age ≤ 40

–0.006 (0.016)

0.611 (0.134)

40 < Age ≤50

–0.020 (0.016)

0.614 (0.135)

50 < Age ≤60

–0.016 (0.016)

0.498 (0.137)

Age > 60

–0.159 (0.022)

0.332 (0.215)

Male

0.148 (0.004)

0.174 (0.043)

White-collar

0.167 (0.004)

0.073 (0.041)

Tenure = 4 yr.

0.003 (0.006)

–0.062 (0.059)

Tenure = 5 yr.

–0.010 (0.006)

–0.099 (0.068)

Tenure = 6 yr. or more

–0.003 (0.005)

–0.051 (0.049)

Lost job firm dead

0.033 (0.003)

0.027 (0.048)

Size of lost job firm

0.001 (0.001)

0.008 (0.014)

Adjusted R2

0.60

0.26

Sample size

27,567

408

NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. OLS for wage in a new job in Belgium in
1985 (two years after a displacement in 1983) and in Denmark in 1990 (two years
after displacement in 1988). Controls for region and occupation are included.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Appendix
Data Selection and Definitions
EMPLOYER SIDE
Plants or Firms

For the Belgian data set the unit is firms, but for the Danish data set it is
plants. However, the Danish data set contains a variable that indicates if a
worker transfers from one plant to another in the same firm. These workers are
not considered displaced workers in this study; they are placed in the control
groups (the group of stayers or nondisplaced workers in displacing plants).
Nevertheless, the difference between firm unit and plant unit is probably the
major problem in this study with respect to comparability between the two
countries.
The Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993) study (hereinafter called
“JLS”) appears to analyze firms. JLS (p. 706) stated that the basic statistics
are based on “Pennsylvania Unemployment Insurance (UI) tax reports and the
state ES202 data on firms’ employment.” The issue is perhaps not quite clear,
however, since they have no explicit discussion about plants or firms as units.
JLS (p. 687) mentioned “firm” but it also mentioned “geographical location.”
Both a plant and a single-plant firm have a “geographical location,” while this
term is not unambiguous for a multi-plant firm, either.
Size Reduction of Plants or Firms

In our study workers are considered displaced if they separate from a firm
(Belgium) or plant (Denmark) which experiences a 30 percent reduction in the
workforce from one year to the next. This 30 percent rule will produce more
displaced workers when applied to plants than when applied to firms. In general one would expect that it is more serious to separate from a downsizing firm
than from a downsizing plant, as firms can reallocate the separated workers to
another of their plants. These reallocated workers are not considered displaced
in our Danish data set, however, as mentioned.
The JLS study also applied a 30 percent downsizing threshold, but they did
not apply this rule to year-to-year changes in employment. Instead they applied
the following definitions: “. . . separators whose firms’ employment in the
year following their departure was 30 percent or more below their maximum
level during the late 1970s” (JLS, p. 688).
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Size of Plant or Firm (Cutoff Point)

In this study we eliminate firms (Belgium) and plants (Denmark) with five
or fewer employees. This cutoff point is applied to one particular year. The
main reason for the comparatively small cutoff point is that a higher one would
reduce the sample size of displaced workers for Denmark to too low a level.
The JLS study had a cutoff point of 50 employees in one particular year, 1979
(p. 688).
Identity of Establishments (False Death Problem)

In Belgium, firms are identified by a unique taxpayer number that can survive a change in ownership. A firm ID number will change only if the firm disappears as a corporation and all its debts have been paid in full. It will not
change if the corporation is taken over. Given the nature of Belgian industrial
organization (big holding companies holding shares in many corporations),
corporations rarely disappear. Mergers do happen, however, although they are
probably more rare than in the United States. Some firms also die and revive
under a different name. To control for that possibility we proceeded as follows:
dying firms from which at least 70 percent of the workers were rehired (so as
not to meet our criteria for being called a displacing firm) and 70 percent of
those rehired were rehired in a single firm were not considered to be displacing
firms.
For Denmark, the IDA database1 considers an establishment as continuing
if just one of the following four criteria is satisfied: 1) same owner and same
industry, 2) same owner and same employees, 3) same employees and same industry, or 4) same employees and same address. More precisely, “same industry” means the same ISIC code at the five digit level, and “same employees”
(in case 2) means that either at least 30 percent of the earlier employees remain
at the plant or these employees make up at least 30 percent of the second-year
employees, while “same employees” (in case 3 and 4) means that at least 30
percent of the earlier employees remain at the plant and they make up at least
30 percent of the second-year employees. Moreover, a reduction in the workforce in a plant could also take place when one would not consider the workers
as genuinely displaced. This could be the case if a share of the workers at a
plant were taken over by another plant. The IDA database contains variables
to take this situation into account. For continuing plants, these plants are considered “non-identical” if at least two workers find employment in another
plant. The creators of the IDA database called these workers “spin offs.” A
second such situation would concern closed plants which are considered “taken
over” by another plant if the other plant employs at least two of the earlier
workers and these workers constitute at least 30 percent of the workforce in the
closed plant. The creators of the IDA database called these workers “take
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overs.” For the present purpose, to ensure maximum comparability between
Belgium and Denmark, the following rules apply: The “spin offs” are considered displaced workers (although “spin offs” within a firm are not). The “take
overs” are not considered displaced workers (they are placed in the category
“other workers”).
For the U.S. case, JLS stated p. 707: “. . . [it is] important to account for
cases in which a firm’s employer identification number (EIN) changes from
one period to the next, . . .” and “In cases of mergers and divestitures that occurred during the sample period, we treated the separate parts as a single firm,
even in years when they were legally distinct.”
Public Sector Exclusion

The present study considers displacement only from the private sector.
The analysis of displacement from the public sector is problematic in both the
Belgian and Danish cases. The Belgian data set contains no observations for
some of their public sector employees. The present version of the Danish IDA
database contains considerable measurement errors with respect to plant size.
Therefore public sector employees are excluded from the initial state of analysis. If a worker displaced from the private sector gets a job in the public sector,
the observation is kept in the sample and the subsequent wage rate in the public
sector job enters into the calculations.
In the JLS study, there was no explicit discussion of this topic. Perhaps
U.S. economists are supposed to know if the public sector is included in
“ES202 data on firms’ employment.”
EMPLOYEE SIDE
Multiple Jobholders, Identification of Main Employer,
Timing during the Year

For the identification of a worker’s main employer in Denmark, the IDA
definition is used. This means that employed workers at one particular date in
the middle of November are assigned to the plant from which they received
their main earnings. For Belgium, the employer that comes closest to an employment relationship in November is used: in most cases this amounts to the
last employment relationship during the calendar year.
The JLS study allowed only one employer-employee relationship within a
year, that where there was the “greatest amount of earnings during the year”
(p. 707).
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Multiple Jobholders, More Than One Employment Relationship
by the End of the Year

For Belgium, those workers who have two jobs at the time of displacement
and fulfill the tenure condition of three or more years of employment in both
of them are deleted from the sample. For Denmark, IDA contains an indication
of “side employment” besides the main job (the one with the highest earnings)
in November. There is no tenure variable for these “side jobs.” Displaced
workers with “side jobs” are retained in the calculations.
Wages

For Belgium, wages are wage income per day. In calculating this figure
the numerator is the wage income during the year in the firm and the denominator is the number of days employed in the firm. For Denmark, wages are
wage income per hour. In calculating this figure the numerator is the wage income during the year in the plant and the denominator is the number of estimated hours employed in the plant. The assessment of the number of hours worked
is based on weekly contributions to a pension scheme, for which the size of the
contribution depends on the number of working hours. There are some measurement errors contained in the IDA data on the number of hours worked.
The JLS study did not consider wages.
Earnings, Annual

For both Belgium and Denmark we consider wage earnings during the calendar year, including the wage income from all plants or firms in which the
worker has been employed. Nominal earnings are deflated by the consumer
price index in the two countries (this index is also used for deflating wages).
We select workers with positive wage rates. In the Danish case we have wage
rates only for workers who are employed at the November date when workers
are assigned labor market status including plant affiliation. These workers are
the ones that are included in Table 6.10, the table describing the development
of wages after displacement (that is the only possibility for Denmark since we
do not have wage rates for workers who are not employed at the November
date). The figures used in such an earnings table are the early earnings (wage
income) from all employers (not only the employer at the November date).
Such an earnings table ensures comparability with the table over wage losses
since the drop in earnings can be decomposed into a wage loss and a drop in
hours. Precisely the same individuals figure in the wage table and the earnings
table. This means, however, that we exclude many workers who have positive
earnings during the year, but who are not employed at the November date.
Such workers might be unemployed most of the year and have just a small
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number of working hours placed somewhere during the year, but not at the November date.
We also include displaced workers who do not have a positive wage rate.
In the previous procedure we included only those workers who were fortunate
enough to have a positive wage rate after displacement. The conjecture must
be that those workers who do not have positive wage rates fare worse with respect to early earnings (or income). To the extent that there is a difference in
the transition rates into other states than employment between the displaced
workers and the control group, the above selection will underestimate the drop
in yearly earnings as a consequence of displacement. A minimal extension of
the sample in the previous procedure is to include workers who have positive
yearly earnings in each of the years after displacement. This would be a sample
selection where we come as close to the JLS selection scheme as we can with
the databases at hand. A further procedure would be to extend the sample to
workers who have positive earnings in just one of the years after displacement.
Tenure Condition

In some cases we consider only displaced workers with three or more years
of tenure at the year of separation. In the Danish data set we run into samplesize problems if the tenure condition is set higher. The Danish tenure variable
is plant tenure while the Belgian one is firm tenure.
In the JLS study the tenure condition was higher—“. . . workers who had
six or more years of tenure by the beginning of 1980” (p. 689).
Migration and Commuting from the Area of Interest

In the JLS study for Pennsylvania migration and commuting presented a
potentially severe problem. The solution applied by JLS is (p. 689): “. . . we
have eliminated from our sample the approximately 25 percent of high-tenured
separators who subsequently never have positive earnings in our data,” and
“Finally, to reduce biases due to sample attrition, we required that every worker
receive some wage or salary earnings during each calendar year.”
For Belgium and Denmark this is probably not a major problem, as the
amount of commuting and immigration to other countries is limited compared
to other states in the United States.
Reemployment

In the Danish data set a worker is considered reemployed if the worker has
a job the next November, when each Danish resident is assigned a particular
labor market status. For Belgium an employment and labor market status is
constructed for each worker by the end of the year. This construction should
come as close to the IDA definition as possible.
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In the JLS study (p. 689) workers were considered reemployed if the wage
income is positive each calendar year.
Comparison Groups (for Income and Wage Losses)

For Belgium and Denmark we select employees in one particular year, and
comparison groups are found among these workers. Workers who enter employment in subsequent years are excluded from the analysis. The main comparison groups to the displaced workers considered in this study are all other
workers and nondisplaced workers in displacing establishments.
The JLS study considered different variants of control groups. JLS (p.
690) considered “separators,” which must be all workers leaving a firm. The
separators were divided in “non-mass layoffs” and “mass layoffs” (the displaced workers according to the different selection criteria). The rest of the
workers were labeled “stayers.”
OTHER ISSUES
Years, Sample Period

For Belgium the sample period is 1978 to 1985. Dismissal is considered
from 1983 to 1984. This makes it possible to trace the effect of displacement
two years after its occurrence. The maximum length of tenure in the Belgian
data is six years. For Denmark the sample period is 1980 to 1991. Dismissal
is considered from 1988 to 1989. Calculations on the consequences two years
after displacement are possible. The maximum length of tenure in the Danish
data for the year 1988 is eight years.
In the JLS study, the sample period was 1974 through 1986. The observation unit was quarterly, and the data are quarterly observations, although some
of the conditioning was performed on a yearly basis.
Aggregate Economic Conditions

For Belgium and Denmark, the years of displacement were moderate to severe with respect to economic activity.
For the JLS study, the conditions were unusually severe in Pennsylvania.
Unemployment

For Belgium, there is information on the number of days unemployment
benefit has been paid out. There is also information on the number of days of
employment. For Denmark there is information on a quarterly basis on the
share of the normal working time when unemployment benefits have been paid
out. For both Belgium and Denmark we calculate the length of the unemployment spell after displacement before the entrance into a new job. The unit of
measurement is months.
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